forked from Minki/linux
tcp: fix early ETIMEDOUT after spurious non-SACK RTO
Fix a bug reported and analyzed by Nagaraj Arankal, where the handling
of a spurious non-SACK RTO could cause a connection to fail to clear
retrans_stamp, causing a later RTO to very prematurely time out the
connection with ETIMEDOUT.
Here is the buggy scenario, expanding upon Nagaraj Arankal's excellent
report:
(*1) Send one data packet on a non-SACK connection
(*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted
and we enter CA_Loss; but this retransmission is spurious.
(*3) The ACK for the original data is received. The transmitted packet
is acknowledged. The TCP timestamp is before the retrans_stamp,
so tcp_may_undo() returns true, and tcp_try_undo_loss() returns
true without changing state to Open (because tcp_is_sack() is
false), and tcp_process_loss() returns without calling
tcp_try_undo_recovery(). Normally after undoing a CA_Loss
episode, tcp_fastretrans_alert() would see that the connection
has returned to CA_Open and fall through and call
tcp_try_to_open(), which would set retrans_stamp to 0. However,
for non-SACK connections we hold the connection in CA_Loss, so do
not fall through to call tcp_try_to_open() and do not set
retrans_stamp to 0. So retrans_stamp is (erroneously) still
non-zero.
At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and
been recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely
new "event". However, retrans_stamp is erroneously still
set. (And we are still in CA_Loss, which is correct.)
(*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with tcp_retries2=15), a new data
packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and
(*4) and we disabled keep alives.
The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in
time, but instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16
minutes ago (step (*2)).
(*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.
(*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns
ETIMEDOUT, prematurely, because retrans_stamp is (erroneously)
too far in the past (set at the time of (*2)).
This commit fixes this bug by ensuring that we reuse in
tcp_try_undo_loss() the same careful logic for non-SACK connections
that we have in tcp_try_undo_recovery(). To avoid duplicating logic,
we factor out that logic into a new
tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen() helper and call that helper from
both undo functions.
Fixes: da34ac7626
("tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss")
Reported-by: Nagaraj Arankal <nagaraj.p.arankal@hpe.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ0PR84MB1847BE6C24D274C46A1B9B0EB27A9@SJ0PR84MB1847.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220903121023.866900-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
beb432528c
commit
686dc2db2a
@ -2513,6 +2513,21 @@ static inline bool tcp_may_undo(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
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return tp->undo_marker && (!tp->undo_retrans || tcp_packet_delayed(tp));
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}
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static bool tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(struct sock *sk)
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{
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struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
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if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
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/* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
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* is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
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* fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
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if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
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tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/* People celebrate: "We love our President!" */
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static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
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{
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@ -2535,14 +2550,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
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} else if (tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist) {
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tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist--;
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}
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if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
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/* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
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* is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
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* fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
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if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
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tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
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if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
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return true;
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}
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tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
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tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
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return false;
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@ -2578,6 +2587,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_loss(struct sock *sk, bool frto_undo)
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NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
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LINUX_MIB_TCPSPURIOUSRTOS);
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inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits = 0;
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if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
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return true;
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if (frto_undo || tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
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tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
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tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
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