diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6434f0df012e..6cd6daefaaed 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description: lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] - base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION] + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value uid:= decimal value @@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description: measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC - measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files - open for read by root in inode_permission. + open for read by root in do_filp_open. Examples of LSM specific definitions: @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description: dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t - measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ - measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ Smack: - measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c index 33baf27fac78..34ddda888e63 100644 --- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c +++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c @@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ befs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) brelse(bh); unacquire_priv_sbp: + kfree(befs_sb->mount_opts.iocharset); kfree(sb->s_fs_info); unacquire_none: diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 73d6a735b8f3..d11d0289f3d2 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev) if (!sb) goto out; if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) { - deactivate_locked_super(sb); + sb->s_frozen = SB_FREEZE_TRANS; + up_write(&sb->s_umount); mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex); return sb; } @@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb) BUG_ON(sb->s_bdev != bdev); down_write(&sb->s_umount); if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) - goto out_deactivate; + goto out_unfrozen; if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) { error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb); @@ -321,11 +322,11 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb) } } +out_unfrozen: sb->s_frozen = SB_UNFROZEN; smp_wmb(); wake_up(&sb->s_wait_unfrozen); -out_deactivate: if (sb) deactivate_locked_super(sb); out_unlock: diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 69652c5bd5f0..b98404b54383 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file) if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); security_file_free(file); + ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL)) cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); fops_put(file->f_op); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 94a5e60779f9..d62fdc875f22 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1736,8 +1736,7 @@ do_last: if (nd.root.mnt) path_put(&nd.root); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode & - (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); @@ -1797,8 +1796,7 @@ ok: } filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode & - (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index c194793b642b..97d79eff6b7f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, flags, current_cred()); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); + host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, access); out_nfserr: err = nfserrno(host_err); out: @@ -2127,7 +2128,6 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, */ path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt; path.dentry = dentry; - err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); nfsd_out: return err? nfserrno(err) : 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 99dc6d5cf7e5..975837e7d6c0 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm; extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); -extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask); +extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file); @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) return; } -static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) +static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index dac44a9356a5..4cb47a159f02 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -657,9 +657,9 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void) proc_caches_init(); buffer_init(); key_init(); + radix_tree_init(); security_init(); vfs_caches_init(totalram_pages); - radix_tree_init(); signals_init(); /* rootfs populating might need page-writeback */ page_writeback_init(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c41afe6639a0..47fb65d1fcbd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int info); /* Internal IMA function definitions */ -void ima_iintcache_init(void); int ima_init(void); void ima_cleanup(void); int ima_fs_init(void); @@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref); void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 3cd58b60afd2..2a5e0bcf3887 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out: * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) - * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) + * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c index fa592ff1ac1c..0d83edcfc402 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; int rc = 0; - if (!ima_initialized) - return 0; - iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); if (!iint) return -ENOMEM; @@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - if (!ima_initialized) - return; spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode); spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); @@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1); } -void __init ima_iintcache_init(void) +static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void) { iint_cache = kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); + return 0; } +security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a89f44d5e030..294b005d6520 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * * File: ima_main.c * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, - * and ima_path_check. + * and ima_file_check. */ #include #include @@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out: return found; } +/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. + * + * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, + * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. + * + * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results + * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * + * In either case invalidate the PCR. + */ +enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; +static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + switch (error) { + case TOMTOU: + if (iint->readcount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "ToMToU"); + break; + case OPEN_WRITERS: + if (iint->writecount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "open_writers"); + break; + } +} + /* * Update the counts given an fmode_t */ @@ -98,6 +128,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode) iint->writecount++; } +/* + * ima_counts_get - increment file counts + * + * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only + * invalidate the PCR for measured files: + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, + * could result in a file measurement error. + * + */ +void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + int rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { + ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); + goto out; + } + ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); +out: + ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); +} + /* * Decrement ima counts */ @@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); } -/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. - * - * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, - * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. - * - * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results - * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - * In either case invalidate the PCR. - */ -enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; -static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, - struct ima_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - switch (error) { - case TOMTOU: - if (iint->readcount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "ToMToU"); - break; - case OPEN_WRITERS: - if (iint->writecount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "open_writers"); - break; - } -} - -static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - int rc = 0; - - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - - rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); - if (!rc) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); - return rc; -} - -/** - * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. - * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured - * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE - * - * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the - * ima_must_measure() policy decision. - * - * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only - * invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, - * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. - * - * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. - * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) - */ -int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) -{ - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - struct file *file = NULL; - int rc; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return 0; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return 0; - - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); - if (rc < 0) - goto out; - - if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0)) - ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - - if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ) - goto out; - - ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { - struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry); - struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt); - - file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE, - current_cred()); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - int audit_info = 0; - - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, - dentry->d_name.name, - "add_measurement", - "dentry_open failed", - 1, audit_info); - file = NULL; - goto out; - } - rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name); - } -out: - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - if (file) - fput(file); - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check); - static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int mask, int function) { @@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out: return rc; } -/* - * ima_counts_get - increment file counts - * - * - for IPC shm and shmat file. - * - for nfsd exported files. - * - * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary - * imbalance messages. - */ -void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) -{ - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return; - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get); - /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) @@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } +/** + * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @file: pointer to the file to be measured + * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE + * + * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. + * + * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. + * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) + */ +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + int rc; + + rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), + FILE_CHECK); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; - ima_iintcache_init(); error = ima_init(); ima_initialized = 1; return error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e1278399b345..4759d0f99335 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; @@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_func: audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); - if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) - entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; + /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */ + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) entry->func = FILE_MMAP; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 24e060be9fa5..122b748d0f4c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) void security_file_free(struct file *file) { security_ops->file_free_security(file); - if (file->f_dentry) - ima_file_free(file); } int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)