doc/admin-guide: Note credentials consolidation under CAP_PERFMON
Add note that starting from Linux v5.9 CAP_PERFMON Linux capability is enough to conduct performance monitoring and observability using perf_events API. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2b1a92a1-84ce-5c70-837d-8ffe96849588@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
parent
4ef8451b33
commit
4cb3fb1cd9
@@ -84,11 +84,14 @@ capabilities then providing the process with CAP_PERFMON capability singly
|
||||
is recommended as the preferred secure approach to resolve double access
|
||||
denial logging related to usage of performance monitoring and observability.
|
||||
|
||||
Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call are also subject
|
||||
for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose
|
||||
outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged
|
||||
processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively
|
||||
permitted to pass the check.
|
||||
Prior Linux v5.9 unprivileged processes using perf_events system call
|
||||
are also subject for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check
|
||||
[7]_ , whose outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted.
|
||||
So unprivileged processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are
|
||||
effectively permitted to pass the check. Starting from Linux v5.9
|
||||
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability is not required and CAP_PERFMON is enough to
|
||||
be provided for processes to make performance monitoring and observability
|
||||
operations.
|
||||
|
||||
Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can
|
||||
effectively enable capturing of additional data required for later
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user