drm/i915: Read Vprime thrice incase of mismatch
In case of V prime mismatch, DP HDCP spec mandates the re-read of Vprime atleast twice. This patch needed for DP HDCP1.4 CTS Test: 1B-05. v2: Moved the V' validation into a function for retry. [Sean Paul] v3: Removed Inline keyword and DRM_DEBUG_KMS are used [Sean Paul] Signed-off-by: Ramalingam C <ramalingam.c@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1522663834-24482-3-git-send-email-ramalingam.c@intel.com
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@ -142,53 +142,17 @@ bool intel_hdcp_is_ksv_valid(u8 *ksv)
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return true;
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}
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/* Implements Part 2 of the HDCP authorization procedure */
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static
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int intel_hdcp_auth_downstream(struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port,
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const struct intel_hdcp_shim *shim)
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int intel_hdcp_validate_v_prime(struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port,
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const struct intel_hdcp_shim *shim,
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u8 *ksv_fifo, u8 num_downstream, u8 *bstatus)
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{
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struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv;
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u32 vprime, sha_text, sha_leftovers, rep_ctl;
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u8 bstatus[2], num_downstream, *ksv_fifo;
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int ret, i, j, sha_idx;
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dev_priv = intel_dig_port->base.base.dev->dev_private;
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ret = intel_hdcp_poll_ksv_fifo(intel_dig_port, shim);
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if (ret) {
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DRM_ERROR("KSV list failed to become ready (%d)\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = shim->read_bstatus(intel_dig_port, bstatus);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (DRM_HDCP_MAX_DEVICE_EXCEEDED(bstatus[0]) ||
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DRM_HDCP_MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED(bstatus[1])) {
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DRM_ERROR("Max Topology Limit Exceeded\n");
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* When repeater reports 0 device count, HDCP1.4 spec allows disabling
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* the HDCP encryption. That implies that repeater can't have its own
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* display. As there is no consumption of encrypted content in the
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* repeater with 0 downstream devices, we are failing the
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* authentication.
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*/
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num_downstream = DRM_HDCP_NUM_DOWNSTREAM(bstatus[0]);
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if (num_downstream == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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ksv_fifo = kzalloc(num_downstream * DRM_HDCP_KSV_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ksv_fifo)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = shim->read_ksv_fifo(intel_dig_port, num_downstream, ksv_fifo);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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/* Process V' values from the receiver */
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for (i = 0; i < DRM_HDCP_V_PRIME_NUM_PARTS; i++) {
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ret = shim->read_v_prime_part(intel_dig_port, i, &vprime);
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@ -353,7 +317,8 @@ int intel_hdcp_auth_downstream(struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port,
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return ret;
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sha_idx += sizeof(sha_text);
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} else {
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DRM_ERROR("Invalid number of leftovers %d\n", sha_leftovers);
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DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Invalid number of leftovers %d\n",
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sha_leftovers);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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@ -381,14 +346,77 @@ int intel_hdcp_auth_downstream(struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port,
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if (intel_wait_for_register(dev_priv, HDCP_REP_CTL,
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HDCP_SHA1_COMPLETE,
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HDCP_SHA1_COMPLETE, 1)) {
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DRM_ERROR("Timed out waiting for SHA1 complete\n");
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DRM_DEBUG_KMS("Timed out waiting for SHA1 complete\n");
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return -ETIMEDOUT;
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}
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if (!(I915_READ(HDCP_REP_CTL) & HDCP_SHA1_V_MATCH)) {
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DRM_ERROR("SHA-1 mismatch, HDCP failed\n");
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DRM_DEBUG_KMS("SHA-1 mismatch, HDCP failed\n");
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Implements Part 2 of the HDCP authorization procedure */
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static
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int intel_hdcp_auth_downstream(struct intel_digital_port *intel_dig_port,
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const struct intel_hdcp_shim *shim)
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{
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u8 bstatus[2], num_downstream, *ksv_fifo;
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int ret, i, tries = 3;
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ret = intel_hdcp_poll_ksv_fifo(intel_dig_port, shim);
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if (ret) {
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DRM_ERROR("KSV list failed to become ready (%d)\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = shim->read_bstatus(intel_dig_port, bstatus);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (DRM_HDCP_MAX_DEVICE_EXCEEDED(bstatus[0]) ||
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DRM_HDCP_MAX_CASCADE_EXCEEDED(bstatus[1])) {
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DRM_ERROR("Max Topology Limit Exceeded\n");
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* When repeater reports 0 device count, HDCP1.4 spec allows disabling
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* the HDCP encryption. That implies that repeater can't have its own
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* display. As there is no consumption of encrypted content in the
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* repeater with 0 downstream devices, we are failing the
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* authentication.
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*/
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num_downstream = DRM_HDCP_NUM_DOWNSTREAM(bstatus[0]);
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if (num_downstream == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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ksv_fifo = kzalloc(num_downstream * DRM_HDCP_KSV_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ksv_fifo)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = shim->read_ksv_fifo(intel_dig_port, num_downstream, ksv_fifo);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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/*
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* When V prime mismatches, DP Spec mandates re-read of
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* V prime atleast twice.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < tries; i++) {
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ret = intel_hdcp_validate_v_prime(intel_dig_port, shim,
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ksv_fifo, num_downstream,
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bstatus);
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if (!ret)
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break;
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}
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if (i == tries) {
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DRM_ERROR("V Prime validation failed.(%d)\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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DRM_DEBUG_KMS("HDCP is enabled (%d downstream devices)\n",
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num_downstream);
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return 0;
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