KVM: SVM: Don't apply SEV+SMAP workaround on code fetch or PT access
Resume the guest instead of synthesizing a triple fault shutdown if the instruction bytes buffer is empty due to the #NPF being on the code fetch itself or on a page table access. The SMAP errata applies if and only if the code fetch was successful and ucode's subsequent data read from the code page encountered a SMAP violation. In practice, the guest is likely hosed either way, but crashing the guest on a code fetch to emulated MMIO is technically wrong according to the behavior described in the APM. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-9-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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@ -4263,6 +4263,7 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
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{
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bool smep, smap, is_user;
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unsigned long cr4;
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u64 error_code;
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/* Emulation is always possible when KVM has access to all guest state. */
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if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
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@ -4328,22 +4329,31 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
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* loap uop with CPL=0 privileges. If the load hits a SMAP #PF, ucode
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* gives up and does not fill the instruction bytes buffer.
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*
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* Detection:
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* KVM reaches this point if the VM is an SEV guest, the CPU supports
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* DecodeAssist, a #NPF was raised, KVM's page fault handler triggered
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* emulation (e.g. for MMIO), and the CPU returned 0 in GuestIntrBytes
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* field of the VMCB.
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* As above, KVM reaches this point iff the VM is an SEV guest, the CPU
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* supports DecodeAssist, a #NPF was raised, KVM's page fault handler
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* triggered emulation (e.g. for MMIO), and the CPU returned 0 in the
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* GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB.
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*
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* This does _not_ mean that the erratum has been encountered, as the
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* DecodeAssist will also fail if the load for CS:RIP hits a legitimate
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* #PF, e.g. if the guest attempt to execute from emulated MMIO and
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* encountered a reserved/not-present #PF.
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*
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* To reduce the likelihood of false positives, take action if and only
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* if CR4.SMAP=1 (obviously required to hit the erratum) and CR4.SMEP=0
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* or CPL=3. If SMEP=1 and CPL!=3, the erratum cannot have been hit as
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* the guest would have encountered a SMEP violation #PF, not a #NPF.
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* To hit the erratum, the following conditions must be true:
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* 1. CR4.SMAP=1 (obviously).
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* 2. CR4.SMEP=0 || CPL=3. If SMEP=1 and CPL<3, the erratum cannot
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* have been hit as the guest would have encountered a SMEP
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* violation #PF, not a #NPF.
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* 3. The #NPF is not due to a code fetch, in which case failure to
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* retrieve the instruction bytes is legitimate (see abvoe).
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*
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* In addition, don't apply the erratum workaround if the #NPF occurred
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* while translating guest page tables (see below).
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*/
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error_code = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
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if (error_code & (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | PFERR_FETCH_MASK))
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goto resume_guest;
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cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
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smep = cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP;
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smap = cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP;
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@ -4353,6 +4363,21 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
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kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
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}
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resume_guest:
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/*
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* If the erratum was not hit, simply resume the guest and let it fault
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* again. While awful, e.g. the vCPU may get stuck in an infinite loop
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* if the fault is at CPL=0, it's the lesser of all evils. Exiting to
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* userspace will kill the guest, and letting the emulator read garbage
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* will yield random behavior and potentially corrupt the guest.
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*
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* Simply resuming the guest is technically not a violation of the SEV
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* architecture. AMD's APM states that all code fetches and page table
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* accesses for SEV guest are encrypted, regardless of the C-Bit. The
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* APM also states that encrypted accesses to MMIO are "ignored", but
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* doesn't explicitly define "ignored", i.e. doing nothing and letting
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* the guest spin is technically "ignoring" the access.
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*/
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return false;
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}
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