sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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				| @ -34,6 +34,7 @@ | ||||
|  * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. | ||||
|  */ | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| #include <crypto/algapi.h> | ||||
| #include <crypto/hash.h> | ||||
| #include <crypto/skcipher.h> | ||||
| #include <linux/err.h> | ||||
| @ -927,7 +928,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, | ||||
| 	if (ret) | ||||
| 		goto out_err; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) { | ||||
| 	if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) { | ||||
| 		ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; | ||||
| 		goto out_err; | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|  | ||||
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