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integrity-v5.19

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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
  in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
  digest based signatures, both based on policy.

  In addition, are two bug fixes:

   - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
     Macs with T2 chips.

   - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
     command line ordering issue.

  The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"

* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
  evm: Clean up some variables
  evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
  efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
  fsverity: update the documentation
  ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
  ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
  ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
  fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
  ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
  ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
  ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
  ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2022-05-24 13:50:39 -07:00
commit 0350785b0a
24 changed files with 533 additions and 81 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

45
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
View File

@ -27,8 +27,9 @@ Description:
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
[appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
@ -47,10 +48,21 @@ Description:
fgroup:= decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
option:
appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
where 'imasig' is the original or the signature
format v2.
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. (Currently
limited to fsverity digest based signatures
stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
signature.
digest_type:= verity
Require fs-verity's file digest instead of the
regular IMA file hash.
keyrings:= list of keyrings
(eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid
when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK.
@ -149,3 +161,30 @@ Description:
security.ima xattr of a file:
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
Example of a 'measure' rule requiring fs-verity's digests
with indication of type of digest in the measurement list.
measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity \
template=ima-ngv2
Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity
signatures (format version 3) stored in security.ima xattr.
The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv3' template option,
which includes the indication of type of digest and the file
signature in the measurement list.
measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
template=ima-sigv3
The 'appraise' rule specifies the type and signature format
version (sigv3) required.
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
appraise_type=sigv3
All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
labels.

3
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -1914,7 +1914,8 @@
ima_template= [IMA]
Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-ngv2" | "ima-sig" |
"ima-sigv2" }
Default: "ima-ng"
ima_template_fmt=

35
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
View File

@ -70,12 +70,23 @@ must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some
users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes
in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
authenticating the files may be done by:
* Userspace-only
* Builtin signature verification + userspace policy
fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature verification
mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require that
all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring;
see `Built-in signature verification`_.
* Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
IMA supports including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the
IMA measurement list and verifying fs-verity based file signatures
stored as security.ima xattrs, based on policy.
User API
========
@ -653,12 +664,12 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.
IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
through IMA. As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
IMA supports the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an alternative
to full file hashes, for those who want the performance and
security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash. However, it
doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be through
IMA. fs-verity already meets many users' needs even as a
standalone filesystem feature, and it's testable like other
filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the

11
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
View File

@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
- 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to 255 bytes;
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
algorithm (field format: <hash algo>:digest);
- 'd-ngv2': same as d-ng, but prefixed with the "ima" or "verity" digest type
(field format: <digest type>:<hash algo>:digest);
- 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
signature is not found;
- 'sig': the file signature, based on either the file's/fsverity's digest[1],
or the EVM portable signature, if 'security.ima' contains a file hash.
- 'modsig' the appended file signature;
- 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations;
- 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature;
@ -88,7 +89,9 @@ Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
- "ima": its format is ``d|n``;
- "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``;
- "ima-ngv2": its format is ``d-ngv2|n-ng``;
- "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``;
- "ima-sigv2": its format is ``d-ngv2|n-ng|sig``;
- "ima-buf": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|buf``;
- "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``;
- "evm-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode``;

1
fs/verity/Kconfig
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
config FS_VERITY
bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
# SHA-256 is implied as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
# To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
# Note that CRYPTO_SHA256 denotes the generic C implementation, but

7
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
View File

@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/mempool.h>
@ -26,12 +25,6 @@ struct ahash_request;
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8
/*
* Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
* Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
struct fsverity_hash_alg {
struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */

43
fs/verity/measure.c
View File

@ -57,3 +57,46 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_measure);
/**
* fsverity_get_digest() - get a verity file's digest
* @inode: inode to get digest of
* @digest: (out) pointer to the digest
* @alg: (out) pointer to the hash algorithm enumeration
*
* Return the file hash algorithm and digest of an fsverity protected file.
* Assumption: before calling fsverity_get_digest(), the file must have been
* opened.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
enum hash_algo *alg)
{
const struct fsverity_info *vi;
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
int i;
vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
if (!vi)
return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
memset(digest, 0, FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* convert the verity hash algorithm name to a hash_algo_name enum */
i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, hash_alg->name);
if (i < 0)
return -EINVAL;
*alg = i;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hash_alg->digest_size != hash_digest_size[*alg]))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
pr_debug("file digest %s:%*phN\n", hash_algo_name[*alg],
hash_digest_size[*alg], digest);
return 0;
}

18
include/linux/fsverity.h
View File

@ -12,8 +12,16 @@
#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
/*
* Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
* Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
/* Verity operations for filesystems */
struct fsverity_operations {
@ -131,6 +139,9 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg);
/* measure.c */
int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
enum hash_algo *alg);
/* open.c */
@ -170,6 +181,13 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
enum hash_algo *alg)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* open.c */
static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)

3
security/integrity/digsig.c
View File

@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
digestlen);
case 2:
case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
digestlen);
}

3
security/integrity/evm/evm.h
View File

@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ extern int evm_initialized;
extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;

2
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);

2
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
View File

@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
return 0;
return INTEGRITY_PASS;
return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}

14
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
View File

@ -69,10 +69,9 @@ choice
hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname,
limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list
template permits both larger hash digests and longer
pathnames.
pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced
by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line.
config IMA_TEMPLATE
bool "ima"
config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
bool "ima-ng (default)"
config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
string
depends on IMA
default "ima" if IMA_TEMPLATE
default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
@ -102,19 +100,19 @@ choice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
bool "SHA256"
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
bool "SHA512"
depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
bool "WP512"
depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
bool "SM3"
depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y && !IMA_TEMPLATE
depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y
endchoice
config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH

47
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include "ima.h"
@ -200,6 +201,32 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
allowed_algos);
}
static int ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
{
enum hash_algo verity_alg;
int ret;
/*
* On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
* hash containing 0's.
*/
ret = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, &verity_alg);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Unlike in the case of actually calculating the file hash, in
* the fsverity case regardless of the hash algorithm, return
* the verity digest to be included in the measurement list. A
* mismatch between the verity algorithm and the xattr signature
* algorithm, if one exists, will be detected later.
*/
hash->hdr.algo = verity_alg;
hash->hdr.length = hash_digest_size[verity_alg];
return 0;
}
/*
* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
*
@ -242,16 +269,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*/
i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
if (buf)
if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash);
switch (result) {
case 0:
break;
case -ENODATA:
audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
break;
default:
audit_cause = "invalid-verity-digest";
break;
}
} else if (buf) {
result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
else
} else {
result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
}
if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
if (result == -ENOMEM)
goto out;
length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;

114
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
View File

@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
#include "ima.h"
@ -183,13 +185,18 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return ima_hash_algo;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
|| sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
ret = xattr_value->data[0];
@ -225,6 +232,40 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return ret;
}
/*
* calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
* @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
* @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
* @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
* @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
*
* IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
* indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
*
* Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for
* IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs.
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
*/
static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
struct ima_file_id file_id = {
.hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo};
unsigned int unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo];
if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, hash_digest_size[algo]);
hash->algo = algo;
hash->length = hash_digest_size[algo];
return ima_calc_buffer_hash(&file_id, sizeof(file_id) - unused, hash);
}
/*
* xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
*
@ -236,7 +277,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
{
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
int mask;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
@ -246,7 +290,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
*cause = "verity-signature-required";
else
*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
@ -274,6 +321,20 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
mask = IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
if ((iint->flags & mask) == mask) {
*cause = "verity-signature-required";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version >= 3) {
*cause = "invalid-signature-version";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len,
@ -296,6 +357,44 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
} else {
*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) {
*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
}
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 3) {
*cause = "invalid-signature-version";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
rc = calc_file_id_hash(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, iint->ima_hash->algo,
iint->ima_hash->digest, &hash.hdr);
if (rc) {
*cause = "sigv3-hashing-error";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len, hash.digest,
hash.hdr.length);
if (rc) {
*cause = "invalid-verity-signature";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
} else {
*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
default:
*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@ -396,8 +495,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ?
"IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash";
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
cause = "verity-signature-required";
else
cause = "IMA-signature-required";
} else {
cause = "missing-hash";
}
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;

4
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View File

@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
if (rc == -ENOMEM)
goto out_locked;
if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct file *file;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;

86
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -1023,6 +1023,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_fgroup_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_gid_lt, Opt_egid_lt,
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
Opt_digest_type,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
Opt_label, Opt_err
@ -1065,6 +1066,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_egid_lt, "egid<%s"},
{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
{Opt_fgroup_lt, "fgroup<%s"},
{Opt_digest_type, "digest_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_algos, "appraise_algos=%s"},
@ -1172,6 +1174,21 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
#undef MSG
}
/*
* Warn if the template does not contain the given field.
*/
static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
const char *field, const char *msg)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
return;
pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
}
static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
/* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
@ -1214,7 +1231,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED))
return false;
break;
@ -1292,6 +1310,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
!(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
return false;
/*
* Unlike for regular IMA 'appraise' policy rules where security.ima
* xattr may contain either a file hash or signature, the security.ima
* xattr for fsverity must contain a file signature (sigv3). Ensure
* that 'appraise' rules for fsverity require file signatures by
* checking the IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flag is set.
*/
if (entry->action == APPRAISE &&
(entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) &&
!(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
return false;
return true;
}
@ -1707,17 +1737,40 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
case Opt_digest_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "digest_type", args[0].from);
if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
result = -EINVAL;
else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "verity")) == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
else
result = -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
} else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
/* Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now */
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
else
result = -EINVAL;
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
} else {
result = -EINVAL;
}
break;
case Opt_appraise_flag:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
@ -1797,6 +1850,15 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
check_template_modsig(template_desc);
}
/* d-ngv2 template field recommended for unsigned fs-verity digests */
if (!result && entry->action == MEASURE &&
entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
ima_template_desc_current();
check_template_field(template_desc, "d-ngv2",
"verity rules should include d-ngv2");
}
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@ -2149,11 +2211,15 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->template)
seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=sigv3 ");
else if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
else
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)

4
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
View File

@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-ngv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sigv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
{.name = "evm-sig",
@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
{.field_id = "d-ngv2", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ngv2},
{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,

94
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
View File

@ -24,11 +24,24 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
enum data_formats {
DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
DATA_FMT_STRING,
DATA_FMT_HEX,
DATA_FMT_UINT
};
enum digest_type {
DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY,
DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
};
#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 7 /* including NUL */
static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
[DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima",
[DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY] = "verity"
};
static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
@ -72,8 +85,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
u32 buflen = field_data->len;
switch (datafmt) {
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
buf_ptr = strrchr(field_data->data, ':');
if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
@ -178,6 +192,14 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
field_data);
}
void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
ima_show_template_field_data(m, show,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
field_data);
}
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
@ -265,26 +287,35 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
}
static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
u8 hash_algo,
u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
/*
* digest formats:
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
* where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
* SHA1 or MD5
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
* <digest type> + ':' + <hash algo> + ':' + '\0' + digest,
*
* where 'DATA_FMT_DIGEST' is the original digest format ('d')
* with a hash size limitation of 20 bytes,
* where <digest type> is either "ima" or "verity",
* where <hash algo> is the hash_algo_name[] string.
*/
u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
u32 offset = 0;
if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%s:",
digest_type_name[digest_type],
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
} else if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s",
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
buffer[offset] = ':';
offset += 2;
offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:",
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
}
if (digest)
@ -359,7 +390,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data);
DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
field_data);
}
/*
@ -368,7 +400,7 @@ out:
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
@ -380,7 +412,34 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
hash_algo, field_data);
DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
field_data);
}
/*
* This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
* prefixed with both the digest type and hash algorithm.
*/
int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = ima_hash_algo;
u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
u8 digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_IMA;
if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
goto out;
cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
if (event_data->iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
digest_type, hash_algo,
field_data);
}
/*
@ -415,7 +474,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
}
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
hash_algo, field_data);
DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
field_data);
}
static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@ -475,7 +535,9 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
if (!xattr_value ||
(xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
xattr_value->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,

4
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
View File

@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,

27
security/integrity/integrity.h
View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_LAST
};
@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ struct evm_xattr {
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE
struct ima_digest_data {
u8 algo;
@ -121,7 +123,14 @@ struct ima_max_digest_data {
} __packed;
/*
* signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
* signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
*
* The signature_v2_hdr struct includes a signature format version
* to simplify defining new signature formats.
*
* signature format:
* version 2: regular file data hash based signature
* version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
*/
struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t type; /* xattr type */
@ -132,6 +141,20 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t sig[]; /* signature payload */
} __packed;
/*
* IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed, by
* indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data,
* containing either the fsverity_descriptor struct digest or, in the
* future, the regular IMA file hash.
*
* (The hash of the ima_file_id structure is only of the portion used.)
*/
struct ima_file_id {
__u8 hash_type; /* xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type] */
__u8 hash_algorithm; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
__u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
} __packed;
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */

6
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
View File

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
{
if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
return add_to_platform_keyring;
return 0;
return NULL;
}
/*
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
else
return add_to_platform_keyring;
}
return 0;
return NULL;
}
/*
@ -81,5 +81,5 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
return uefi_blacklist_binary;
if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
return uefi_revocation_list_x509;
return 0;
return NULL;
}

8
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
View File

@ -35,3 +35,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
#endif
#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT
#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \
.matches = { \
DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \
},
#endif

33
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@ -12,6 +13,31 @@
#include "../integrity.h"
#include "keyring_handler.h"
/*
* On T2 Macs reading the db and dbx efi variables to load UEFI Secure Boot
* certificates causes occurrence of a page fault in Apple's firmware and
* a crash disabling EFI runtime services. The following quirk skips reading
* these variables.
*/
static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") },
{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
{ }
};
/*
* Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
* it does.
@ -138,6 +164,13 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
if (dmi_id) {
pr_err("Reading UEFI Secure Boot Certs is not supported on T2 Macs.\n");
return false;
}
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
return false;