linux/arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c

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2015-10-12 15:52:58 +00:00
/*
* This file contains kasan initialization code for ARM64.
*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
arm64: kasan: avoid TLB conflicts The page table modification performed during the KASAN init risks the allocation of conflicting TLB entries, as it swaps a set of valid global entries for another without suitable TLB maintenance. The presence of conflicting TLB entries can result in the delivery of synchronous TLB conflict aborts, or may result in the use of erroneous data being returned in response to a TLB lookup. This can affect explicit data accesses from software as well as translations performed asynchronously (e.g. as part of page table walks or speculative I-cache fetches), and can therefore result in a wide variety of problems. To avoid this, use cpu_replace_ttbr1 to swap the page tables. This ensures that when the new tables are installed there are no stale entries from the old tables which may conflict. As all updates are made to the tables while they are not active, the updates themselves are safe. At the same time, add the missing barrier to ensure that the tmp_pg_dir entries updated via memcpy are visible to the page table walkers at the point the tmp_pg_dir is installed. All other page table updates made as part of KASAN initialisation have the requisite barriers due to the use of the standard page table accessors. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-25 11:45:02 +00:00
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
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#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
static pgd_t tmp_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __initdata __aligned(PGD_SIZE);
static void __init kasan_early_pte_populate(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end)
{
pte_t *pte;
unsigned long next;
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, kasan_zero_pte);
pte = pte_offset_kimg(pmd, addr);
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do {
next = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(virt_to_pfn(kasan_zero_page),
PAGE_KERNEL));
} while (pte++, addr = next, addr != end && pte_none(*pte));
}
static void __init kasan_early_pmd_populate(pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
if (pud_none(*pud))
pud_populate(&init_mm, pud, kasan_zero_pmd);
pmd = pmd_offset_kimg(pud, addr);
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do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_early_pte_populate(pmd, addr, next);
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end && pmd_none(*pmd));
}
static void __init kasan_early_pud_populate(pgd_t *pgd,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end)
{
pud_t *pud;
unsigned long next;
if (pgd_none(*pgd))
pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd, kasan_zero_pud);
pud = pud_offset_kimg(pgd, addr);
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do {
next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_early_pmd_populate(pud, addr, next);
} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end && pud_none(*pud));
}
static void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(void)
{
unsigned long addr = KASAN_SHADOW_START;
unsigned long end = KASAN_SHADOW_END;
unsigned long next;
pgd_t *pgd;
pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
do {
next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_early_pud_populate(pgd, addr, next);
} while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
}
asmlinkage void __init kasan_early_init(void)
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{
BUILD_BUG_ON(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET != KASAN_SHADOW_END - (1UL << 61));
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(KASAN_SHADOW_START, PGDIR_SIZE));
BUILD_BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(KASAN_SHADOW_END, PGDIR_SIZE));
kasan_map_early_shadow();
}
arm64: mm: create new fine-grained mappings at boot At boot we may change the granularity of the tables mapping the kernel (by splitting or making sections). This may happen when we create the linear mapping (in __map_memblock), or at any point we try to apply fine-grained permissions to the kernel (e.g. fixup_executable, mark_rodata_ro, fixup_init). Changing the active page tables in this manner may result in multiple entries for the same address being allocated into TLBs, risking problems such as TLB conflict aborts or issues derived from the amalgamation of TLB entries. Generally, a break-before-make (BBM) approach is necessary to avoid conflicts, but we cannot do this for the kernel tables as it risks unmapping text or data being used to do so. Instead, we can create a new set of tables from scratch in the safety of the existing mappings, and subsequently migrate over to these using the new cpu_replace_ttbr1 helper, which avoids the two sets of tables being active simultaneously. To avoid issues when we later modify permissions of the page tables (e.g. in fixup_init), we must create the page tables at a granularity such that later modification does not result in splitting of tables. This patch applies this strategy, creating a new set of fine-grained page tables from scratch, and safely migrating to them. The existing fixmap and kasan shadow page tables are reused in the new fine-grained tables. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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/*
* Copy the current shadow region into a new pgdir.
*/
void __init kasan_copy_shadow(pgd_t *pgdir)
{
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_new, *pgd_end;
pgd = pgd_offset_k(KASAN_SHADOW_START);
pgd_end = pgd_offset_k(KASAN_SHADOW_END);
pgd_new = pgd_offset_raw(pgdir, KASAN_SHADOW_START);
do {
set_pgd(pgd_new, *pgd);
} while (pgd++, pgd_new++, pgd != pgd_end);
}
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static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
/*
* Remove references to kasan page tables from
* swapper_pg_dir. pgd_clear() can't be used
* here because it's nop on 2,3-level pagetable setups
*/
for (; start < end; start += PGDIR_SIZE)
set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(start), __pgd(0));
}
void __init kasan_init(void)
{
u64 kimg_shadow_start, kimg_shadow_end;
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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u64 mod_shadow_start, mod_shadow_end;
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struct memblock_region *reg;
int i;
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kimg_shadow_start = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_text);
kimg_shadow_end = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_end);
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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mod_shadow_start = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)MODULES_VADDR);
mod_shadow_end = (u64)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)MODULES_END);
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/*
* We are going to perform proper setup of shadow memory.
* At first we should unmap early shadow (clear_pgds() call bellow).
* However, instrumented code couldn't execute without shadow memory.
* tmp_pg_dir used to keep early shadow mapped until full shadow
* setup will be finished.
*/
memcpy(tmp_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(tmp_pg_dir));
arm64: kasan: avoid TLB conflicts The page table modification performed during the KASAN init risks the allocation of conflicting TLB entries, as it swaps a set of valid global entries for another without suitable TLB maintenance. The presence of conflicting TLB entries can result in the delivery of synchronous TLB conflict aborts, or may result in the use of erroneous data being returned in response to a TLB lookup. This can affect explicit data accesses from software as well as translations performed asynchronously (e.g. as part of page table walks or speculative I-cache fetches), and can therefore result in a wide variety of problems. To avoid this, use cpu_replace_ttbr1 to swap the page tables. This ensures that when the new tables are installed there are no stale entries from the old tables which may conflict. As all updates are made to the tables while they are not active, the updates themselves are safe. At the same time, add the missing barrier to ensure that the tmp_pg_dir entries updated via memcpy are visible to the page table walkers at the point the tmp_pg_dir is installed. All other page table updates made as part of KASAN initialisation have the requisite barriers due to the use of the standard page table accessors. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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dsb(ishst);
cpu_replace_ttbr1(tmp_pg_dir);
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clear_pgds(KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_END);
vmemmap_populate(kimg_shadow_start, kimg_shadow_end, NUMA_NO_NODE);
/*
* vmemmap_populate() has populated the shadow region that covers the
* kernel image with SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE mappings, so we have to round
* the start and end addresses to SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE as well, to prevent
* kasan_populate_zero_shadow() from replacing the PMD block mappings
* with PMD table mappings at the edges of the shadow region for the
* kernel image.
*/
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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if (ARM64_SWAPPER_USES_SECTION_MAPS) {
kimg_shadow_start = round_down(kimg_shadow_start,
SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE);
kimg_shadow_end = round_up(kimg_shadow_end, SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE);
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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}
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kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START,
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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(void *)mod_shadow_start);
kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)kimg_shadow_end,
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)PAGE_OFFSET));
if (kimg_shadow_start > mod_shadow_end)
kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)mod_shadow_end,
(void *)kimg_shadow_start);
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for_each_memblock(memory, reg) {
void *start = (void *)__phys_to_virt(reg->base);
void *end = (void *)__phys_to_virt(reg->base + reg->size);
if (start >= end)
break;
/*
* end + 1 here is intentional. We check several shadow bytes in
* advance to slightly speed up fastpath. In some rare cases
* we could cross boundary of mapped shadow, so we just map
* some more here.
*/
vmemmap_populate((unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(start),
(unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(end) + 1,
pfn_to_nid(virt_to_pfn(start)));
}
/*
* KAsan may reuse the contents of kasan_zero_pte directly, so we
* should make sure that it maps the zero page read-only.
*/
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++)
set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i],
pfn_pte(virt_to_pfn(kasan_zero_page), PAGE_KERNEL_RO));
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memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
arm64: kasan: avoid TLB conflicts The page table modification performed during the KASAN init risks the allocation of conflicting TLB entries, as it swaps a set of valid global entries for another without suitable TLB maintenance. The presence of conflicting TLB entries can result in the delivery of synchronous TLB conflict aborts, or may result in the use of erroneous data being returned in response to a TLB lookup. This can affect explicit data accesses from software as well as translations performed asynchronously (e.g. as part of page table walks or speculative I-cache fetches), and can therefore result in a wide variety of problems. To avoid this, use cpu_replace_ttbr1 to swap the page tables. This ensures that when the new tables are installed there are no stale entries from the old tables which may conflict. As all updates are made to the tables while they are not active, the updates themselves are safe. At the same time, add the missing barrier to ensure that the tmp_pg_dir entries updated via memcpy are visible to the page table walkers at the point the tmp_pg_dir is installed. All other page table updates made as part of KASAN initialisation have the requisite barriers due to the use of the standard page table accessors. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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cpu_replace_ttbr1(swapper_pg_dir);
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/* At this point kasan is fully initialized. Enable error messages */
init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
}