2019-06-04 08:11:33 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
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* which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
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* and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
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* on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
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* Security Inc.
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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2019-09-17 18:00:25 +00:00
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2017-02-02 16:54:15 +00:00
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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2017-02-08 17:51:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/sched/task.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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2017-02-16 18:29:15 +00:00
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#include <linux/thread_info.h>
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2018-07-03 19:43:08 +00:00
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/jump_label.h>
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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#include <asm/sections.h>
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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#include "slab.h"
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
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* stack frame (if possible).
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*
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* Returns:
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* NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
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* GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
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2022-02-16 20:05:28 +00:00
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* GOOD_STACK: within the current stack (when can't frame-check exactly)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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* BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
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*/
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static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
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{
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const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
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const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
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int ret;
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/* Object is not on the stack at all. */
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if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
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return NOT_STACK;
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/*
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* Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
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2020-08-12 01:33:23 +00:00
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* check above means at least one end is within the stack,
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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* so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
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*/
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if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
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return BAD_STACK;
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/* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */
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ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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2022-02-16 20:05:28 +00:00
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/* Finally, check stack depth if possible. */
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#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP)) {
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if ((void *)current_stack_pointer < obj + len)
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return BAD_STACK;
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} else {
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if (obj < (void *)current_stack_pointer)
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return BAD_STACK;
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}
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#endif
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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return GOOD_STACK;
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}
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2018-01-10 22:22:38 +00:00
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/*
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2018-01-10 23:17:01 +00:00
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* If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found
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* an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
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2018-01-10 22:22:38 +00:00
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* There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
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* __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
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* trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
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2018-01-10 23:17:01 +00:00
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* For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of
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* bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and
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* useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware
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* kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
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* carefully audit the whitelist range).
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2018-01-10 22:22:38 +00:00
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*/
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void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
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bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
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unsigned long len)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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{
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2018-01-10 22:22:38 +00:00
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pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
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to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
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to_user ? "from" : "to",
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name ? : "unknown?!",
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detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
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offset, len);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
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* but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
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* Oops code, so that is used here instead.
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*/
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BUG();
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}
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/* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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{
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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const unsigned long check_low = ptr;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
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/* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */
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2016-08-22 16:53:59 +00:00
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if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr,
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unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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{
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unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
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unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
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unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
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if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
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* mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
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* kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
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* when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
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* __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
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* and checked:
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*/
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2017-01-10 21:35:45 +00:00
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textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* No different mapping: we're done. */
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if (textlow_linear == textlow)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* Check the secondary mapping... */
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2017-01-10 21:35:45 +00:00
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texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user,
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ptr - textlow_linear, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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}
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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bool to_user)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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{
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/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
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2019-08-13 22:37:37 +00:00
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if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
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if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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}
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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/* Checks for allocs that are marked in some way as spanning multiple pages. */
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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static inline void check_page_span(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
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struct page *page, bool to_user)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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{
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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const void *end = ptr + n - 1;
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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struct page *endpage;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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bool is_reserved, is_cma;
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/*
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* Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see
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* check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover
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* rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly.
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*/
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/* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
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end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) {
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if (!to_user)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("rodata", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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}
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/* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start &&
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end <= (const void *)__bss_stop)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* Is the object wholly within one base page? */
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if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
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((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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/* Allow if fully inside the same compound (__GFP_COMP) page. */
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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endpage = virt_to_head_page(end);
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if (likely(endpage == page))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* Reject if range is entirely either Reserved (i.e. special or
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* device memory), or CMA. Otherwise, reject since the object spans
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* several independently allocated pages.
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*/
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is_reserved = PageReserved(page);
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is_cma = is_migrate_cma_page(page);
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if (!is_reserved && !is_cma)
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("spans multiple pages", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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for (ptr += PAGE_SIZE; ptr <= end; ptr += PAGE_SIZE) {
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page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
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if (is_reserved && !PageReserved(page))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("spans Reserved and non-Reserved pages",
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NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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if (is_cma && !is_migrate_cma_page(page))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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usercopy_abort("spans CMA and non-CMA pages", NULL,
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to_user, 0, n);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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}
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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#endif
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}
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
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bool to_user)
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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{
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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struct folio *folio;
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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return;
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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2019-09-17 18:00:25 +00:00
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/*
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* When CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, kmap_to_page() will give either the
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* highmem page or fallback to virt_to_page(). The following
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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* is effectively a highmem-aware virt_to_slab().
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2019-09-17 18:00:25 +00:00
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*/
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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folio = page_folio(kmap_to_page((void *)ptr));
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2016-09-07 16:54:34 +00:00
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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if (folio_test_slab(folio)) {
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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/* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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__check_heap_object(ptr, n, folio_slab(folio), to_user);
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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} else {
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/* Verify object does not incorrectly span multiple pages. */
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2021-10-04 13:45:56 +00:00
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check_page_span(ptr, n, folio_page(folio, 0), to_user);
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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}
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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}
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2018-07-03 19:43:08 +00:00
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static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/*
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* Validates that the given object is:
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* - not bogus address
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mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects
It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,
usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
For example,
print_worker_info
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
__copy_from_user_inatomic
check_object_size
check_heap_object
check_page_span
This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and
failed this check,
if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8
end = FFFF889007D7F00E
Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.
[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 23:23:04 +00:00
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* - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available)
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* - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available)
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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* - not in kernel text
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*/
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void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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{
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2018-07-03 19:43:08 +00:00
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if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
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return;
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2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
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/* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
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if (!n)
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return;
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/* Check for invalid addresses. */
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2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
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check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
|
2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for bad stack object. */
|
|
|
|
switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
|
|
|
|
case NOT_STACK:
|
|
|
|
/* Object is not touching the current process stack. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case GOOD_FRAME:
|
|
|
|
case GOOD_STACK:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Object is either in the correct frame (when it
|
|
|
|
* is possible to check) or just generally on the
|
|
|
|
* process stack (when frame checking not available).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2022-02-16 20:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user,
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
|
|
|
|
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP) ?
|
|
|
|
ptr - (void *)current_stack_pointer :
|
|
|
|
(void *)current_stack_pointer - ptr,
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n);
|
2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects
It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,
usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
For example,
print_worker_info
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
__copy_from_user_inatomic
check_object_size
check_heap_object
check_page_span
This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and
failed this check,
if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8
end = FFFF889007D7F00E
Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.
[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 23:23:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check for bad heap object. */
|
|
|
|
check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */
|
2018-01-10 22:48:22 +00:00
|
|
|
check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
|
2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
|
2018-07-03 19:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool enable_checks __initdata = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-22 21:47:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (strtobool(str, &enable_checks))
|
|
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid option string for hardened_usercopy: '%s'\n",
|
|
|
|
str);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2018-07-03 19:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (enable_checks == false)
|
|
|
|
static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy);
|