linux/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

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#ifndef _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H
#define _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
/* Forward declaration, a strange C thing */
struct task_struct;
struct mm_struct;
struct vm86;
#include <asm/math_emu.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <uapi/asm/sigcontext.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/desc_defs.h>
#include <asm/nops.h>
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/threads.h>
#include <linux/math64.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot() macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask. The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption mask from the page attribute. Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current __va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled for that physical location or not. Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active, this function: - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings with the encryption mask. - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask. - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask applied. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-17 21:10:07 +00:00
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
/*
* We handle most unaligned accesses in hardware. On the other hand
* unaligned DMA can be quite expensive on some Nehalem processors.
*
* Based on this we disable the IP header alignment in network drivers.
*/
#define NET_IP_ALIGN 0
#define HBP_NUM 4
/*
* Default implementation of macro that returns current
* instruction pointer ("program counter").
*/
static inline void *current_text_addr(void)
{
void *pc;
asm volatile("mov $1f, %0; 1:":"=r" (pc));
return pc;
}
x86/fpu: Fix FPU state save area alignment bug On most configs task-struct is cache line aligned, which makes the XSAVE area's 64-byte required alignment work out fine. But on some .config's task_struct is aligned only to 16 bytes (enforced by ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN), which makes things like fpu__copy() (that XSAVEOPT uses) not work so well. I broke this in: 7366ed771f6e ("x86/fpu: Simplify FPU handling by embedding the fpstate in task_struct (again)") which embedded the fpstate in the task_struct. The alignment requirements of the FPU code were originally present in ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN, which still has a value of 16, which was the alignment requirement of the FPU state area prior XSAVE. But this link was not documented (and not required) and the link got lost when the FPU state area was made dynamic years ago. With XSAVEOPT the minimum alignment requirment went up to 64 bytes, and the embedding of the FPU state area in task_struct exposed it again - and '16' was not increased to '64'. So fix this bug, but also try to address the underlying lost link of information that made it easier to happen: - document ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN a bit better - use alignof() to recover the current alignment requirements. This would work in the future as well, should the alignment requirements go up to 128 bytes with things like AVX512. ( We should probably also use the vSMP alignment rules for all of x86, but that's for another patch. ) Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-24 07:58:12 +00:00
/*
* These alignment constraints are for performance in the vSMP case,
* but in the task_struct case we must also meet hardware imposed
* alignment requirements of the FPU state:
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSMP
# define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN (1 << INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT)
# define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN (1 << INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT)
#else
x86/fpu: Fix FPU state save area alignment bug On most configs task-struct is cache line aligned, which makes the XSAVE area's 64-byte required alignment work out fine. But on some .config's task_struct is aligned only to 16 bytes (enforced by ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN), which makes things like fpu__copy() (that XSAVEOPT uses) not work so well. I broke this in: 7366ed771f6e ("x86/fpu: Simplify FPU handling by embedding the fpstate in task_struct (again)") which embedded the fpstate in the task_struct. The alignment requirements of the FPU code were originally present in ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN, which still has a value of 16, which was the alignment requirement of the FPU state area prior XSAVE. But this link was not documented (and not required) and the link got lost when the FPU state area was made dynamic years ago. With XSAVEOPT the minimum alignment requirment went up to 64 bytes, and the embedding of the FPU state area in task_struct exposed it again - and '16' was not increased to '64'. So fix this bug, but also try to address the underlying lost link of information that made it easier to happen: - document ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN a bit better - use alignof() to recover the current alignment requirements. This would work in the future as well, should the alignment requirements go up to 128 bytes with things like AVX512. ( We should probably also use the vSMP alignment rules for all of x86, but that's for another patch. ) Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-24 07:58:12 +00:00
# define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN __alignof__(union fpregs_state)
# define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN 0
#endif
enum tlb_infos {
ENTRIES,
NR_INFO
};
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m[NR_INFO];
extern u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g[NR_INFO];
/*
* CPU type and hardware bug flags. Kept separately for each CPU.
* Members of this structure are referenced in head_32.S, so think twice
* before touching them. [mj]
*/
struct cpuinfo_x86 {
__u8 x86; /* CPU family */
__u8 x86_vendor; /* CPU vendor */
__u8 x86_model;
__u8 x86_mask;
x86/cpu: Drop wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86 Remove the wp_works_ok member of struct cpuinfo_x86. It's an optimization back from Linux v0.99 times where we had no fixup support yet and did the CR0.WP test via special code in the page fault handler. The < 0 test was an optimization to not do the special casing for each NULL ptr access violation but just for the first one doing the WP test. Today it serves no real purpose as the test no longer needs special code in the page fault handler and the only call side -- mem_init() -- calls it just once, anyway. However, Xen pre-initializes it to 1, to skip the test. Doing the test again for Xen should be no issue at all, as even the commit introducing skipping the test (commit d560bc61575e ("x86, xen: Suppress WP test on Xen")) mentioned it being ban aid only. And, in fact, testing the patch on Xen showed nothing breaks. The pre-fixup times are long gone and with the removal of the fallback handling code in commit a5c2a893dbd4 ("x86, 386 removal: Remove CONFIG_X86_WP_WORKS_OK") the kernel requires a working CR0.WP anyway. So just get rid of the "optimization" and do the test unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Arnd Hannemann <hannemann@nets.rwth-aachen.de> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486933932-585-3-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-02-12 21:12:08 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Number of 4K pages in DTLB/ITLB combined(in pages): */
int x86_tlbsize;
#endif
__u8 x86_virt_bits;
__u8 x86_phys_bits;
/* CPUID returned core id bits: */
__u8 x86_coreid_bits;
__u8 cu_id;
/* Max extended CPUID function supported: */
__u32 extended_cpuid_level;
/* Maximum supported CPUID level, -1=no CPUID: */
int cpuid_level;
__u32 x86_capability[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS];
char x86_vendor_id[16];
char x86_model_id[64];
/* in KB - valid for CPUS which support this call: */
int x86_cache_size;
int x86_cache_alignment; /* In bytes */
x86: Add support for Intel Cache QoS Monitoring (CQM) detection This patch adds support for the new Cache QoS Monitoring (CQM) feature found in future Intel Xeon processors. It includes the new values to track CQM resources to the cpuinfo_x86 structure, plus the CPUID detection routines for CQM. CQM allows a process, or set of processes, to be tracked by the CPU to determine the cache usage of that task group. Using this data from the CPU, software can be written to extract this data and report cache usage and occupancy for a particular process, or group of processes. More information about Cache QoS Monitoring can be found in the Intel (R) x86 Architecture Software Developer Manual, section 17.14. Signed-off-by: Peter P Waskiewicz Jr <peter.p.waskiewicz.jr@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chris Webb <chris@arachsys.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Cc: Jacob Shin <jacob.w.shin@gmail.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kanaka Juvva <kanaka.d.juvva@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Steven Honeyman <stevenhoneyman@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> Cc: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422038748-21397-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-01-23 18:45:43 +00:00
/* Cache QoS architectural values: */
int x86_cache_max_rmid; /* max index */
int x86_cache_occ_scale; /* scale to bytes */
int x86_power;
unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
/* cpuid returned max cores value: */
u16 x86_max_cores;
u16 apicid;
u16 initial_apicid;
u16 x86_clflush_size;
/* number of cores as seen by the OS: */
u16 booted_cores;
/* Physical processor id: */
u16 phys_proc_id;
x86/topology: Create logical package id For per package oriented services we must be able to rely on the number of CPU packages to be within bounds. Create a tracking facility, which - calculates the number of possible packages depending on nr_cpu_ids after boot - makes sure that the package id is within the number of possible packages. If the apic id is outside we map it to a logical package id if there is enough space available. Provide interfaces for drivers to query the mapping and do translations from physcial to logical ids. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Harish Chegondi <harish.chegondi@intel.com> Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160222221011.541071755@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22 22:19:15 +00:00
/* Logical processor id: */
u16 logical_proc_id;
/* Core id: */
u16 cpu_core_id;
/* Index into per_cpu list: */
u16 cpu_index;
u32 microcode;
} __randomize_layout;
struct cpuid_regs {
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
};
enum cpuid_regs_idx {
CPUID_EAX = 0,
CPUID_EBX,
CPUID_ECX,
CPUID_EDX,
};
#define X86_VENDOR_INTEL 0
#define X86_VENDOR_CYRIX 1
#define X86_VENDOR_AMD 2
#define X86_VENDOR_UMC 3
#define X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR 5
#define X86_VENDOR_TRANSMETA 7
#define X86_VENDOR_NSC 8
#define X86_VENDOR_NUM 9
#define X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN 0xff
/*
* capabilities of CPUs
*/
extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
extern __u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS];
extern __u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS];
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info);
#define cpu_data(cpu) per_cpu(cpu_info, cpu)
#else
#define cpu_info boot_cpu_data
#define cpu_data(cpu) boot_cpu_data
#endif
extern const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op;
#define cache_line_size() (boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_alignment)
extern void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void early_cpu_init(void);
extern void identify_boot_cpu(void);
extern void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
extern void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
void print_cpu_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
extern void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern u32 get_scattered_cpuid_leaf(unsigned int level,
unsigned int sub_leaf,
enum cpuid_regs_idx reg);
extern unsigned int init_intel_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void init_amd_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
extern int have_cpuid_p(void);
#else
static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)
{
return 1;
}
#endif
static inline void native_cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
{
/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
asm volatile("cpuid"
: "=a" (*eax),
"=b" (*ebx),
"=c" (*ecx),
"=d" (*edx)
: "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
: "memory");
}
#define native_cpuid_reg(reg) \
static inline unsigned int native_cpuid_##reg(unsigned int op) \
{ \
unsigned int eax = op, ebx, ecx = 0, edx; \
\
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); \
\
return reg; \
}
/*
* Native CPUID functions returning a single datum.
*/
native_cpuid_reg(eax)
native_cpuid_reg(ebx)
native_cpuid_reg(ecx)
native_cpuid_reg(edx)
/*
* Friendlier CR3 helpers.
*/
static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
{
return __read_cr3() & CR3_ADDR_MASK;
}
x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates the PGD is encrypted. The encryption mask should not be used when creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function. During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(), so create native_read_cr3_pa(). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-17 21:10:08 +00:00
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
{
return __native_read_cr3() & CR3_ADDR_MASK;
}
static inline void load_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir)
{
x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot() macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask. The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption mask from the page attribute. Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current __va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled for that physical location or not. Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active, this function: - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings with the encryption mask. - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask. - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask applied. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-17 21:10:07 +00:00
write_cr3(__sme_pa(pgdir));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* This is the TSS defined by the hardware. */
struct x86_hw_tss {
unsigned short back_link, __blh;
unsigned long sp0;
unsigned short ss0, __ss0h;
unsigned long sp1;
/*
* We don't use ring 1, so ss1 is a convenient scratch space in
* the same cacheline as sp0. We use ss1 to cache the value in
* MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS. When we context switch
* MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, we first check if the new value being
* written matches ss1, and, if it's not, then we wrmsr the new
* value and update ss1.
*
* The only reason we context switch MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is
* that we set it to zero in vm86 tasks to avoid corrupting the
* stack if we were to go through the sysenter path from vm86
* mode.
*/
unsigned short ss1; /* MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS */
unsigned short __ss1h;
unsigned long sp2;
unsigned short ss2, __ss2h;
unsigned long __cr3;
unsigned long ip;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long ax;
unsigned long cx;
unsigned long dx;
unsigned long bx;
unsigned long sp;
unsigned long bp;
unsigned long si;
unsigned long di;
unsigned short es, __esh;
unsigned short cs, __csh;
unsigned short ss, __ssh;
unsigned short ds, __dsh;
unsigned short fs, __fsh;
unsigned short gs, __gsh;
unsigned short ldt, __ldth;
unsigned short trace;
unsigned short io_bitmap_base;
} __attribute__((packed));
#else
struct x86_hw_tss {
u32 reserved1;
u64 sp0;
u64 sp1;
u64 sp2;
u64 reserved2;
u64 ist[7];
u32 reserved3;
u32 reserved4;
u16 reserved5;
u16 io_bitmap_base;
} __attribute__((packed));
#endif
/*
* IO-bitmap sizes:
*/
#define IO_BITMAP_BITS 65536
#define IO_BITMAP_BYTES (IO_BITMAP_BITS/8)
#define IO_BITMAP_LONGS (IO_BITMAP_BYTES/sizeof(long))
#define IO_BITMAP_OFFSET offsetof(struct tss_struct, io_bitmap)
#define INVALID_IO_BITMAP_OFFSET 0x8000
struct tss_struct {
/*
* The hardware state:
*/
struct x86_hw_tss x86_tss;
/*
* The extra 1 is there because the CPU will access an
* additional byte beyond the end of the IO permission
* bitmap. The extra byte must be all 1 bits, and must
* be within the limit.
*/
unsigned long io_bitmap[IO_BITMAP_LONGS + 1];
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Space for the temporary SYSENTER stack.
*/
unsigned long SYSENTER_stack_canary;
unsigned long SYSENTER_stack[64];
#endif
} ____cacheline_aligned;
DECLARE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss);
/*
* sizeof(unsigned long) coming from an extra "long" at the end
* of the iobitmap.
*
* -1? seg base+limit should be pointing to the address of the
* last valid byte
*/
#define __KERNEL_TSS_LIMIT \
(IO_BITMAP_OFFSET + IO_BITMAP_BYTES + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack);
#endif
/*
* Save the original ist values for checking stack pointers during debugging
*/
struct orig_ist {
unsigned long ist[7];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct orig_ist, orig_ist);
union irq_stack_union {
char irq_stack[IRQ_STACK_SIZE];
/*
* GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40. Since the
* irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom
* 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary.
*/
struct {
char gs_base[40];
unsigned long stack_canary;
};
};
DECLARE_PER_CPU_FIRST(union irq_stack_union, irq_stack_union) __visible;
DECLARE_INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_union);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(char *, irq_stack_ptr);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, irq_count);
extern asmlinkage void ignore_sysret(void);
#else /* X86_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
/*
* Make sure stack canary segment base is cached-aligned:
* "For Intel Atom processors, avoid non zero segment base address
* that is not aligned to cache line boundary at all cost."
* (Optim Ref Manual Assembly/Compiler Coding Rule 15.)
*/
struct stack_canary {
char __pad[20]; /* canary at %gs:20 */
unsigned long canary;
};
DECLARE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct stack_canary, stack_canary);
#endif
/*
* per-CPU IRQ handling stacks
*/
struct irq_stack {
u32 stack[THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(u32)];
} __aligned(THREAD_SIZE);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, hardirq_stack);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softirq_stack);
#endif /* X86_64 */
extern unsigned int fpu_kernel_xstate_size;
extern unsigned int fpu_user_xstate_size;
hw-breakpoints: Rewrite the hw-breakpoints layer on top of perf events This patch rebase the implementation of the breakpoints API on top of perf events instances. Each breakpoints are now perf events that handle the register scheduling, thread/cpu attachment, etc.. The new layering is now made as follows: ptrace kgdb ftrace perf syscall \ | / / \ | / / / Core breakpoint API / / | / | / Breakpoints perf events | | Breakpoints PMU ---- Debug Register constraints handling (Part of core breakpoint API) | | Hardware debug registers Reasons of this rewrite: - Use the centralized/optimized pmu registers scheduling, implying an easier arch integration - More powerful register handling: perf attributes (pinned/flexible events, exclusive/non-exclusive, tunable period, etc...) Impact: - New perf ABI: the hardware breakpoints counters - Ptrace breakpoints setting remains tricky and still needs some per thread breakpoints references. Todo (in the order): - Support breakpoints perf counter events for perf tools (ie: implement perf_bpcounter_event()) - Support from perf tools Changes in v2: - Follow the perf "event " rename - The ptrace regression have been fixed (ptrace breakpoint perf events weren't released when a task ended) - Drop the struct hw_breakpoint and store generic fields in perf_event_attr. - Separate core and arch specific headers, drop asm-generic/hw_breakpoint.h and create linux/hw_breakpoint.h - Use new generic len/type for breakpoint - Handle off case: when breakpoints api is not supported by an arch Changes in v3: - Fix broken CONFIG_KVM, we need to propagate the breakpoint api changes to kvm when we exit the guest and restore the bp registers to the host. Changes in v4: - Drop the hw_breakpoint_restore() stub as it is only used by KVM - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL hw_breakpoint_restore() as KVM can be built as a module - Restore the breakpoints unconditionally on kvm guest exit: TIF_DEBUG_THREAD doesn't anymore cover every cases of running breakpoints and vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs might not always be set when the guest used debug registers. (Waiting for a reliable optimization) Changes in v5: - Split-up the asm-generic/hw-breakpoint.h moving to linux/hw_breakpoint.h into a separate patch - Optimize the breakpoints restoring while switching from kvm guest to host. We only want to restore the state if we have active breakpoints to the host, otherwise we don't care about messed-up address registers. - Add asm/hw_breakpoint.h to Kbuild - Fix bad breakpoint type in trace_selftest.c Changes in v6: - Fix wrong header inclusion in trace.h (triggered a build error with CONFIG_FTRACE_SELFTEST Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2009-09-09 17:22:48 +00:00
struct perf_event;
typedef struct {
unsigned long seg;
} mm_segment_t;
struct thread_struct {
/* Cached TLS descriptors: */
struct desc_struct tls_array[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
unsigned long sp0;
unsigned long sp;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
unsigned long sysenter_cs;
#else
unsigned short es;
unsigned short ds;
unsigned short fsindex;
unsigned short gsindex;
#endif
u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long fsbase;
unsigned long gsbase;
#else
/*
* XXX: this could presumably be unsigned short. Alternatively,
* 32-bit kernels could be taught to use fsindex instead.
*/
unsigned long fs;
unsigned long gs;
#endif
hw-breakpoints: Rewrite the hw-breakpoints layer on top of perf events This patch rebase the implementation of the breakpoints API on top of perf events instances. Each breakpoints are now perf events that handle the register scheduling, thread/cpu attachment, etc.. The new layering is now made as follows: ptrace kgdb ftrace perf syscall \ | / / \ | / / / Core breakpoint API / / | / | / Breakpoints perf events | | Breakpoints PMU ---- Debug Register constraints handling (Part of core breakpoint API) | | Hardware debug registers Reasons of this rewrite: - Use the centralized/optimized pmu registers scheduling, implying an easier arch integration - More powerful register handling: perf attributes (pinned/flexible events, exclusive/non-exclusive, tunable period, etc...) Impact: - New perf ABI: the hardware breakpoints counters - Ptrace breakpoints setting remains tricky and still needs some per thread breakpoints references. Todo (in the order): - Support breakpoints perf counter events for perf tools (ie: implement perf_bpcounter_event()) - Support from perf tools Changes in v2: - Follow the perf "event " rename - The ptrace regression have been fixed (ptrace breakpoint perf events weren't released when a task ended) - Drop the struct hw_breakpoint and store generic fields in perf_event_attr. - Separate core and arch specific headers, drop asm-generic/hw_breakpoint.h and create linux/hw_breakpoint.h - Use new generic len/type for breakpoint - Handle off case: when breakpoints api is not supported by an arch Changes in v3: - Fix broken CONFIG_KVM, we need to propagate the breakpoint api changes to kvm when we exit the guest and restore the bp registers to the host. Changes in v4: - Drop the hw_breakpoint_restore() stub as it is only used by KVM - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL hw_breakpoint_restore() as KVM can be built as a module - Restore the breakpoints unconditionally on kvm guest exit: TIF_DEBUG_THREAD doesn't anymore cover every cases of running breakpoints and vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs might not always be set when the guest used debug registers. (Waiting for a reliable optimization) Changes in v5: - Split-up the asm-generic/hw-breakpoint.h moving to linux/hw_breakpoint.h into a separate patch - Optimize the breakpoints restoring while switching from kvm guest to host. We only want to restore the state if we have active breakpoints to the host, otherwise we don't care about messed-up address registers. - Add asm/hw_breakpoint.h to Kbuild - Fix bad breakpoint type in trace_selftest.c Changes in v6: - Fix wrong header inclusion in trace.h (triggered a build error with CONFIG_FTRACE_SELFTEST Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2009-09-09 17:22:48 +00:00
/* Save middle states of ptrace breakpoints */
struct perf_event *ptrace_bps[HBP_NUM];
/* Debug status used for traps, single steps, etc... */
unsigned long debugreg6;
/* Keep track of the exact dr7 value set by the user */
unsigned long ptrace_dr7;
/* Fault info: */
unsigned long cr2;
unsigned long trap_nr;
unsigned long error_code;
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
/* Virtual 86 mode info */
struct vm86 *vm86;
#endif
/* IO permissions: */
unsigned long *io_bitmap_ptr;
unsigned long iopl;
/* Max allowed port in the bitmap, in bytes: */
unsigned io_bitmap_max;
mm_segment_t addr_limit;
unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
* WARNING: 'fpu' is dynamically-sized. It *MUST* be at
* the end.
*/
};
/*
* Thread-synchronous status.
*
* This is different from the flags in that nobody else
* ever touches our thread-synchronous status, so we don't
* have to worry about atomic accesses.
*/
#define TS_COMPAT 0x0002 /* 32bit syscall active (64BIT)*/
/*
* Set IOPL bits in EFLAGS from given mask
*/
static inline void native_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
unsigned int reg;
asm volatile ("pushfl;"
"popl %0;"
"andl %1, %0;"
"orl %2, %0;"
"pushl %0;"
"popfl"
: "=&r" (reg)
: "i" (~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL), "r" (mask));
#endif
}
static inline void
native_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread)
{
tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0;
}
static inline void native_swapgs(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
asm volatile("swapgs" ::: "memory");
#endif
}
static inline unsigned long current_top_of_stack(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
return this_cpu_read_stable(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0);
#else
/* sp0 on x86_32 is special in and around vm86 mode. */
return this_cpu_read_stable(cpu_current_top_of_stack);
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
#define __cpuid native_cpuid
static inline void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
struct thread_struct *thread)
{
native_load_sp0(tss, thread);
}
#define set_iopl_mask native_set_iopl_mask
#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
/* Free all resources held by a thread. */
extern void release_thread(struct task_struct *);
unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
/*
* Generic CPUID function
* clear %ecx since some cpus (Cyrix MII) do not set or clear %ecx
* resulting in stale register contents being returned.
*/
static inline void cpuid(unsigned int op,
unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
{
*eax = op;
*ecx = 0;
__cpuid(eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
}
/* Some CPUID calls want 'count' to be placed in ecx */
static inline void cpuid_count(unsigned int op, int count,
unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
{
*eax = op;
*ecx = count;
__cpuid(eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
}
/*
* CPUID functions returning a single datum
*/
static inline unsigned int cpuid_eax(unsigned int op)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
cpuid(op, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
return eax;
}
static inline unsigned int cpuid_ebx(unsigned int op)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
cpuid(op, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
return ebx;
}
static inline unsigned int cpuid_ecx(unsigned int op)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
cpuid(op, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
return ecx;
}
static inline unsigned int cpuid_edx(unsigned int op)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
cpuid(op, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
return edx;
}
/* REP NOP (PAUSE) is a good thing to insert into busy-wait loops. */
static __always_inline void rep_nop(void)
{
asm volatile("rep; nop" ::: "memory");
}
static __always_inline void cpu_relax(void)
{
rep_nop();
}
/*
* This function forces the icache and prefetched instruction stream to
* catch up with reality in two very specific cases:
*
* a) Text was modified using one virtual address and is about to be executed
* from the same physical page at a different virtual address.
*
* b) Text was modified on a different CPU, may subsequently be
* executed on this CPU, and you want to make sure the new version
* gets executed. This generally means you're calling this in a IPI.
*
* If you're calling this for a different reason, you're probably doing
* it wrong.
*/
static inline void sync_core(void)
{
/*
* There are quite a few ways to do this. IRET-to-self is nice
* because it works on every CPU, at any CPL (so it's compatible
* with paravirtualization), and it never exits to a hypervisor.
* The only down sides are that it's a bit slow (it seems to be
* a bit more than 2x slower than the fastest options) and that
* it unmasks NMIs. The "push %cs" is needed because, in
* paravirtual environments, __KERNEL_CS may not be a valid CS
* value when we do IRET directly.
*
* In case NMI unmasking or performance ever becomes a problem,
* the next best option appears to be MOV-to-CR2 and an
* unconditional jump. That sequence also works on all CPUs,
* but it will fault at CPL3 (i.e. Xen PV).
*
* CPUID is the conventional way, but it's nasty: it doesn't
* exist on some 486-like CPUs, and it usually exits to a
* hypervisor.
*
* Like all of Linux's memory ordering operations, this is a
* compiler barrier as well.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
asm volatile (
"pushfl\n\t"
"pushl %%cs\n\t"
"pushl $1f\n\t"
"iret\n\t"
"1:"
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame pointer is set up first: static inline void foo() { register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP); asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp)) } Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer. The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global variable. It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC version. With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as before: defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp before 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940 after 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940 With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed. It now changes its behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global. That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before inserting *any* inline asm. (Therefore, listing the variable as an output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.) It's a bit overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible. And in fact, there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled: defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp before 9796316 9468236 9076191 8790305 after 9796957 9464267 9076381 8785949 So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for older versions. Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-20 21:24:33 +00:00
: ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : : "memory");
#else
unsigned int tmp;
asm volatile (
UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
"mov %%ss, %0\n\t"
"pushq %q0\n\t"
"pushq %%rsp\n\t"
"addq $8, (%%rsp)\n\t"
"pushfq\n\t"
"mov %%cs, %0\n\t"
"pushq %q0\n\t"
"pushq $1f\n\t"
"iretq\n\t"
UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
"1:"
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame pointer is set up first: static inline void foo() { register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP); asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp)) } Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer. The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global variable. It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC version. With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as before: defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp before 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940 after 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940 With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed. It now changes its behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global. That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before inserting *any* inline asm. (Therefore, listing the variable as an output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.) It's a bit overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible. And in fact, there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled: defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp before 9796316 9468236 9076191 8790305 after 9796957 9464267 9076381 8785949 So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for older versions. Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-20 21:24:33 +00:00
: "=&r" (tmp), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : : "cc", "memory");
#endif
}
extern void select_idle_routine(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void amd_e400_c1e_apic_setup(void);
extern unsigned long boot_option_idle_override;
enum idle_boot_override {IDLE_NO_OVERRIDE=0, IDLE_HALT, IDLE_NOMWAIT,
IDLE_POLL};
extern void enable_sep_cpu(void);
extern int sysenter_setup(void);
extern void early_trap_init(void);
x86, 64bit: Use a #PF handler to materialize early mappings on demand Linear mode (CR0.PG = 0) is mutually exclusive with 64-bit mode; all 64-bit code has to use page tables. This makes it awkward before we have first set up properly all-covering page tables to access objects that are outside the static kernel range. So far we have dealt with that simply by mapping a fixed amount of low memory, but that fails in at least two upcoming use cases: 1. We will support load and run kernel, struct boot_params, ramdisk, command line, etc. above the 4 GiB mark. 2. need to access ramdisk early to get microcode to update that as early possible. We could use early_iomap to access them too, but it will make code to messy and hard to be unified with 32 bit. Hence, set up a #PF table and use a fixed number of buffers to set up page tables on demand. If the buffers fill up then we simply flush them and start over. These buffers are all in __initdata, so it does not increase RAM usage at runtime. Thus, with the help of the #PF handler, we can set the final kernel mapping from blank, and switch to init_level4_pgt later. During the switchover in head_64.S, before #PF handler is available, we use three pages to handle kernel crossing 1G, 512G boundaries with sharing page by playing games with page aliasing: the same page is mapped twice in the higher-level tables with appropriate wraparound. The kernel region itself will be properly mapped; other mappings may be spurious. early_make_pgtable is using kernel high mapping address to access pages to set page table. -v4: Add phys_base offset to make kexec happy, and add init_mapping_kernel() - Yinghai -v5: fix compiling with xen, and add back ident level3 and level2 for xen also move back init_level4_pgt from BSS to DATA again. because we have to clear it anyway. - Yinghai -v6: switch to init_level4_pgt in init_mem_mapping. - Yinghai -v7: remove not needed clear_page for init_level4_page it is with fill 512,8,0 already in head_64.S - Yinghai -v8: we need to keep that handler alive until init_mem_mapping and don't let early_trap_init to trash that early #PF handler. So split early_trap_pf_init out and move it down. - Yinghai -v9: switchover only cover kernel space instead of 1G so could avoid touch possible mem holes. - Yinghai -v11: change far jmp back to far return to initial_code, that is needed to fix failure that is reported by Konrad on AMD systems. - Yinghai Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359058816-7615-12-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2013-01-24 20:19:52 +00:00
void early_trap_pf_init(void);
/* Defined in head.S */
extern struct desc_ptr early_gdt_descr;
extern void cpu_set_gdt(int);
extern void switch_to_new_gdt(int);
x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit This patch makes the GDT remapped pages read-only, to prevent accidental (or intentional) corruption of this key data structure. This change is done only on 64-bit, because 32-bit needs it to be writable for TSS switches. The native_load_tr_desc function was adapted to correctly handle a read-only GDT. The LTR instruction always writes to the GDT TSS entry. This generates a page fault if the GDT is read-only. This change checks if the current GDT is a remap and swap GDTs as needed. This function was tested by booting multiple machines and checking hibernation works properly. KVM SVM and VMX were adapted to use the writeable GDT. On VMX, the per-cpu variable was removed for functions to fetch the original GDT. Instead of reloading the previous GDT, VMX will reload the fixmap GDT as expected. For testing, VMs were started and restored on multiple configurations. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-3-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-14 17:05:08 +00:00
extern void load_direct_gdt(int);
x86: Remap GDT tables in the fixmap section Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an attacker could target other per-cpu structures or deduce the base of the main memory section (PAGE_OFFSET). This patch relocates the GDT table for each processor inside the fixmap section. The space is reserved based on number of supported processors. For consistency, the remapping is done by default on 32 and 64-bit. Each processor switches to its remapped GDT at the end of initialization. For hibernation, the main processor returns with the original GDT and switches back to the remapping at completion. This patch was tested on both architectures. Hibernation and KVM were both tested specially for their usage of the GDT. Thanks to Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> for testing and recommending changes for Xen support. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-2-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-14 17:05:07 +00:00
extern void load_fixmap_gdt(int);
extern void load_percpu_segment(int);
extern void cpu_init(void);
static inline unsigned long get_debugctlmsr(void)
{
unsigned long debugctlmsr = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 6)
return 0;
#endif
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctlmsr);
return debugctlmsr;
}
static inline void update_debugctlmsr(unsigned long debugctlmsr)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 6)
return;
#endif
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctlmsr);
}
extern void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on);
/* Boot loader type from the setup header: */
extern int bootloader_type;
extern int bootloader_version;
extern char ignore_fpu_irq;
#define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT 1
#define ARCH_HAS_PREFETCHW
#define ARCH_HAS_SPINLOCK_PREFETCH
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
# define BASE_PREFETCH ""
# define ARCH_HAS_PREFETCH
#else
# define BASE_PREFETCH "prefetcht0 %P1"
#endif
/*
* Prefetch instructions for Pentium III (+) and AMD Athlon (+)
*
* It's not worth to care about 3dnow prefetches for the K6
* because they are microcoded there and very slow.
*/
static inline void prefetch(const void *x)
{
alternative_input(BASE_PREFETCH, "prefetchnta %P1",
X86_FEATURE_XMM,
"m" (*(const char *)x));
}
/*
* 3dnow prefetch to get an exclusive cache line.
* Useful for spinlocks to avoid one state transition in the
* cache coherency protocol:
*/
static inline void prefetchw(const void *x)
{
alternative_input(BASE_PREFETCH, "prefetchw %P1",
X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH,
"m" (*(const char *)x));
}
static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
{
prefetchw(x);
}
#define TOP_OF_INIT_STACK ((unsigned long)&init_stack + sizeof(init_stack) - \
TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* User space process size: 3GB (default).
*/
#define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET PAGE_OFFSET
#define TASK_SIZE PAGE_OFFSET
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
#define TASK_SIZE_LOW TASK_SIZE
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX TASK_SIZE
#define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW TASK_SIZE
#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
#define STACK_TOP_MAX STACK_TOP
#define INIT_THREAD { \
.sp0 = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK, \
.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS, \
.io_bitmap_ptr = NULL, \
.addr_limit = KERNEL_DS, \
}
/*
* TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING reserves 8 bytes on top of the ring0 stack.
* This is necessary to guarantee that the entire "struct pt_regs"
* is accessible even if the CPU haven't stored the SS/ESP registers
* on the stack (interrupt gate does not save these registers
* when switching to the same priv ring).
* Therefore beware: accessing the ss/esp fields of the
* "struct pt_regs" is possible, but they may contain the
* completely wrong values.
*/
#define task_pt_regs(task) \
({ \
unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(task); \
__ptr += THREAD_SIZE - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING; \
((struct pt_regs *)__ptr) - 1; \
})
#define KSTK_ESP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
#else
/*
* User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page. The guard
* page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
* the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
* syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
* address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. We avoid this
* particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
* at the maximum canonical address.
*/
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
#define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
/* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
* space during mmap's.
*/
#define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET ((current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_3GB) ? \
0xc0000000 : 0xFFFFe000)
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
#define TASK_SIZE_LOW (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32) ? \
IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32) ? \
IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(child) ((test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_ADDR32)) ? \
IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE_LOW
#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX
#define INIT_THREAD { \
.sp0 = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK, \
.addr_limit = KERNEL_DS, \
}
#define task_pt_regs(tsk) ((struct pt_regs *)(tsk)->thread.sp0 - 1)
extern unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
extern void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
unsigned long new_sp);
/*
* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
* space during mmap's.
*/
#define __TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(task_size) (PAGE_ALIGN(task_size / 3))
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE __TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(TASK_SIZE_LOW)
#define KSTK_EIP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->ip)
/* Get/set a process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
#define GET_TSC_CTL(adr) get_tsc_mode((adr))
#define SET_TSC_CTL(val) set_tsc_mode((val))
extern int get_tsc_mode(unsigned long adr);
extern int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val);
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:26 +00:00
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, msr_misc_features_shadow);
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
/* Register/unregister a process' MPX related resource */
#define MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT() mpx_enable_management()
#define MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT() mpx_disable_management()
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX
extern int mpx_enable_management(void);
extern int mpx_disable_management(void);
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
#else
static inline int mpx_enable_management(void)
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static inline int mpx_disable_management(void)
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
{
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX */
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
extern u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu);
extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
#else
static inline u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) { return 0; }
static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; }
#endif
static inline uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(const char *sig, uint32_t leaves)
{
uint32_t base, eax, signature[3];
for (base = 0x40000000; base < 0x40010000; base += 0x100) {
cpuid(base, &eax, &signature[0], &signature[1], &signature[2]);
if (!memcmp(sig, signature, 12) &&
(leaves == 0 || ((eax - base) >= leaves)))
return base;
}
return 0;
}
extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
extern void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end);
void default_idle(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
#else
#define xen_set_default_idle 0
#endif
void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */