linux/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (C) 2000-2001 Qualcomm Incorporated
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
/* Bluetooth HCI connection handling. */
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
void hci_acl_connect(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct inquiry_entry *ie;
struct hci_cp_create_conn cp;
BT_DBG("%p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = 1;
conn->link_mode = HCI_LM_MASTER;
conn->attempt++;
conn->link_policy = hdev->link_policy;
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.pscan_rep_mode = 0x02;
if ((ie = hci_inquiry_cache_lookup(hdev, &conn->dst))) {
if (inquiry_entry_age(ie) <= INQUIRY_ENTRY_AGE_MAX) {
cp.pscan_rep_mode = ie->data.pscan_rep_mode;
cp.pscan_mode = ie->data.pscan_mode;
cp.clock_offset = ie->data.clock_offset |
cpu_to_le16(0x8000);
}
memcpy(conn->dev_class, ie->data.dev_class, 3);
conn->ssp_mode = ie->data.ssp_mode;
}
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
if (lmp_rswitch_capable(hdev) && !(hdev->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
cp.role_switch = 0x01;
else
cp.role_switch = 0x00;
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
static void hci_acl_connect_cancel(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_cp_create_conn_cancel cp;
BT_DBG("%p", conn);
if (conn->hdev->hci_ver < 2)
return;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN_CANCEL, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
void hci_acl_disconn(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason)
{
struct hci_cp_disconnect cp;
BT_DBG("%p", conn);
conn->state = BT_DISCONN;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.reason = reason;
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_DISCONNECT, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
void hci_add_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_add_sco cp;
BT_DBG("%p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = 1;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(handle);
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_ADD_SCO, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
void hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_setup_sync_conn cp;
BT_DBG("%p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
conn->out = 1;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(handle);
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
cp.tx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.rx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0xffff);
cp.voice_setting = cpu_to_le16(hdev->voice_setting);
cp.retrans_effort = 0xff;
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SETUP_SYNC_CONN, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
static void hci_conn_timeout(unsigned long arg)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = (void *) arg;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("conn %p state %d", conn, conn->state);
if (atomic_read(&conn->refcnt))
return;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
switch (conn->state) {
case BT_CONNECT:
case BT_CONNECT2:
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK)
hci_acl_connect_cancel(conn);
else
hci_acl_disconn(conn, 0x13);
break;
case BT_CONFIG:
case BT_CONNECTED:
hci_acl_disconn(conn, 0x13);
break;
default:
conn->state = BT_CLOSED;
break;
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
static void hci_conn_idle(unsigned long arg)
{
struct hci_conn *conn = (void *) arg;
BT_DBG("conn %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
hci_conn_enter_sniff_mode(conn);
}
struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
BT_DBG("%s dst %s", hdev->name, batostr(dst));
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hci_conn), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!conn)
return NULL;
bacpy(&conn->dst, dst);
conn->hdev = hdev;
conn->type = type;
conn->mode = HCI_CM_ACTIVE;
conn->state = BT_OPEN;
conn->power_save = 1;
switch (type) {
case ACL_LINK:
conn->pkt_type = hdev->pkt_type & ACL_PTYPE_MASK;
break;
case SCO_LINK:
if (lmp_esco_capable(hdev))
conn->pkt_type = hdev->esco_type & SCO_ESCO_MASK;
else
conn->pkt_type = hdev->pkt_type & SCO_PTYPE_MASK;
break;
case ESCO_LINK:
conn->pkt_type = hdev->esco_type;
break;
}
skb_queue_head_init(&conn->data_q);
setup_timer(&conn->disc_timer, hci_conn_timeout, (unsigned long)conn);
setup_timer(&conn->idle_timer, hci_conn_idle, (unsigned long)conn);
atomic_set(&conn->refcnt, 0);
hci_dev_hold(hdev);
tasklet_disable(&hdev->tx_task);
hci_conn_hash_add(hdev, conn);
if (hdev->notify)
hdev->notify(hdev, HCI_NOTIFY_CONN_ADD);
tasklet_enable(&hdev->tx_task);
return conn;
}
int hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("%s conn %p handle %d", hdev->name, conn, conn->handle);
del_timer(&conn->idle_timer);
del_timer(&conn->disc_timer);
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
struct hci_conn *sco = conn->link;
if (sco)
sco->link = NULL;
/* Unacked frames */
hdev->acl_cnt += conn->sent;
} else {
struct hci_conn *acl = conn->link;
if (acl) {
acl->link = NULL;
hci_conn_put(acl);
}
}
tasklet_disable(&hdev->tx_task);
hci_conn_hash_del(hdev, conn);
if (hdev->notify)
hdev->notify(hdev, HCI_NOTIFY_CONN_DEL);
tasklet_enable(&hdev->tx_task);
skb_queue_purge(&conn->data_q);
return 0;
}
struct hci_dev *hci_get_route(bdaddr_t *dst, bdaddr_t *src)
{
int use_src = bacmp(src, BDADDR_ANY);
struct hci_dev *hdev = NULL;
struct list_head *p;
BT_DBG("%s -> %s", batostr(src), batostr(dst));
read_lock_bh(&hci_dev_list_lock);
list_for_each(p, &hci_dev_list) {
struct hci_dev *d = list_entry(p, struct hci_dev, list);
if (!test_bit(HCI_UP, &d->flags) || test_bit(HCI_RAW, &d->flags))
continue;
/* Simple routing:
* No source address - find interface with bdaddr != dst
* Source address - find interface with bdaddr == src
*/
if (use_src) {
if (!bacmp(&d->bdaddr, src)) {
hdev = d; break;
}
} else {
if (bacmp(&d->bdaddr, dst)) {
hdev = d; break;
}
}
}
if (hdev)
hdev = hci_dev_hold(hdev);
read_unlock_bh(&hci_dev_list_lock);
return hdev;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_get_route);
/* Create SCO or ACL connection.
* Device _must_ be locked */
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 05:19:20 +00:00
struct hci_conn *hci_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, __u8 auth_type)
{
struct hci_conn *acl;
struct hci_conn *sco;
BT_DBG("%s dst %s", hdev->name, batostr(dst));
if (!(acl = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst))) {
if (!(acl = hci_conn_add(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst)))
return NULL;
}
hci_conn_hold(acl);
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 05:19:20 +00:00
if (acl->state == BT_OPEN || acl->state == BT_CLOSED) {
acl->auth_type = auth_type;
hci_acl_connect(acl);
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 05:19:20 +00:00
}
if (type == ACL_LINK)
return acl;
if (!(sco = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, type, dst))) {
if (!(sco = hci_conn_add(hdev, type, dst))) {
hci_conn_put(acl);
return NULL;
}
}
acl->link = sco;
sco->link = acl;
hci_conn_hold(sco);
if (acl->state == BT_CONNECTED &&
(sco->state == BT_OPEN || sco->state == BT_CLOSED)) {
if (lmp_esco_capable(hdev))
hci_setup_sync(sco, acl->handle);
else
hci_add_sco(sco, acl->handle);
}
return sco;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_connect);
/* Check link security requirement */
int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (conn->ssp_mode > 0 && conn->hdev->ssp_mode > 0 &&
!(conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
return 1;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_check_link_mode);
/* Authenticate remote device */
int hci_conn_auth(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (conn->ssp_mode > 0 && conn->hdev->ssp_mode > 0) {
if (!(conn->auth_type & 0x01)) {
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2008-09-09 05:19:20 +00:00
conn->auth_type |= 0x01;
conn->link_mode &= ~HCI_LM_AUTH;
}
}
if (conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_AUTH)
return 1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->pend)) {
struct hci_cp_auth_requested cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_AUTH_REQUESTED,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_auth);
/* Enable encryption */
int hci_conn_encrypt(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_ENCRYPT)
return hci_conn_auth(conn);
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->pend))
return 0;
if (hci_conn_auth(conn)) {
struct hci_cp_set_conn_encrypt cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.encrypt = 1;
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_SET_CONN_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_encrypt);
/* Change link key */
int hci_conn_change_link_key(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->pend)) {
struct hci_cp_change_conn_link_key cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_CHANGE_CONN_LINK_KEY,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_change_link_key);
/* Switch role */
int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, uint8_t role)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (!role && conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
return 1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND, &conn->pend)) {
struct hci_cp_switch_role cp;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.role = role;
hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_SWITCH_ROLE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_conn_switch_role);
/* Enter active mode */
void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("conn %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
if (test_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags))
return;
if (conn->mode != HCI_CM_SNIFF || !conn->power_save)
goto timer;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &conn->pend)) {
struct hci_cp_exit_sniff_mode cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_EXIT_SNIFF_MODE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
timer:
if (hdev->idle_timeout > 0)
mod_timer(&conn->idle_timer,
jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(hdev->idle_timeout));
}
/* Enter sniff mode */
void hci_conn_enter_sniff_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("conn %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
if (test_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags))
return;
if (!lmp_sniff_capable(hdev) || !lmp_sniff_capable(conn))
return;
if (conn->mode != HCI_CM_ACTIVE || !(conn->link_policy & HCI_LP_SNIFF))
return;
if (lmp_sniffsubr_capable(hdev) && lmp_sniffsubr_capable(conn)) {
struct hci_cp_sniff_subrate cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0);
cp.min_remote_timeout = cpu_to_le16(0);
cp.min_local_timeout = cpu_to_le16(0);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SNIFF_SUBRATE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &conn->pend)) {
struct hci_cp_sniff_mode cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
cp.max_interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->sniff_max_interval);
cp.min_interval = cpu_to_le16(hdev->sniff_min_interval);
cp.attempt = cpu_to_le16(4);
cp.timeout = cpu_to_le16(1);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_SNIFF_MODE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
}
/* Drop all connection on the device */
void hci_conn_hash_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct list_head *p;
BT_DBG("hdev %s", hdev->name);
p = h->list.next;
while (p != &h->list) {
struct hci_conn *c;
c = list_entry(p, struct hci_conn, list);
p = p->next;
c->state = BT_CLOSED;
hci_conn_del_sysfs(c);
hci_proto_disconn_ind(c, 0x16);
hci_conn_del(c);
}
}
/* Check pending connect attempts */
void hci_conn_check_pending(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn *conn;
BT_DBG("hdev %s", hdev->name);
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, ACL_LINK, BT_CONNECT2);
if (conn)
hci_acl_connect(conn);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
}
int hci_get_conn_list(void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_conn_list_req req, *cl;
struct hci_conn_info *ci;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
struct list_head *p;
int n = 0, size, err;
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!req.conn_num || req.conn_num > (PAGE_SIZE * 2) / sizeof(*ci))
return -EINVAL;
size = sizeof(req) + req.conn_num * sizeof(*ci);
if (!(cl = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
if (!(hdev = hci_dev_get(req.dev_id))) {
kfree(cl);
return -ENODEV;
}
ci = cl->conn_info;
hci_dev_lock_bh(hdev);
list_for_each(p, &hdev->conn_hash.list) {
register struct hci_conn *c;
c = list_entry(p, struct hci_conn, list);
bacpy(&(ci + n)->bdaddr, &c->dst);
(ci + n)->handle = c->handle;
(ci + n)->type = c->type;
(ci + n)->out = c->out;
(ci + n)->state = c->state;
(ci + n)->link_mode = c->link_mode;
if (++n >= req.conn_num)
break;
}
hci_dev_unlock_bh(hdev);
cl->dev_id = hdev->id;
cl->conn_num = n;
size = sizeof(req) + n * sizeof(*ci);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
err = copy_to_user(arg, cl, size);
kfree(cl);
return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int hci_get_conn_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_conn_info_req req;
struct hci_conn_info ci;
struct hci_conn *conn;
char __user *ptr = arg + sizeof(req);
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock_bh(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, req.type, &req.bdaddr);
if (conn) {
bacpy(&ci.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
ci.handle = conn->handle;
ci.type = conn->type;
ci.out = conn->out;
ci.state = conn->state;
ci.link_mode = conn->link_mode;
}
hci_dev_unlock_bh(hdev);
if (!conn)
return -ENOENT;
return copy_to_user(ptr, &ci, sizeof(ci)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int hci_get_auth_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
struct hci_auth_info_req req;
struct hci_conn *conn;
if (copy_from_user(&req, arg, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock_bh(hdev);
conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &req.bdaddr);
if (conn)
req.type = conn->auth_type;
hci_dev_unlock_bh(hdev);
if (!conn)
return -ENOENT;
return copy_to_user(arg, &req, sizeof(req)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}