kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
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kcov: code coverage for fuzzing
|
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|
===============================
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kcov exposes kernel code coverage information in a form suitable for coverage-
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|
guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage data of a running kernel is
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exported via the "kcov" debugfs file. Coverage collection is enabled on a task
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basis, and thus it can capture precise coverage of a single system call.
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Note that kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims
|
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|
to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
|
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|
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts
|
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|
and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic parts of kernel is
|
2017-03-10 00:16:31 +00:00
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|
disabled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
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2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
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kcov is also able to collect comparison operands from the instrumented code
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(this feature currently requires that the kernel is compiled with clang).
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Prerequisites
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|
-------------
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
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|
2016-08-07 21:13:00 +00:00
|
|
|
Configure the kernel with::
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
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CONFIG_KCOV=y
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2019-01-14 10:08:07 +00:00
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CONFIG_KCOV requires gcc 6.1.0 or later.
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
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If the comparison operands need to be collected, set::
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CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS=y
|
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2016-08-07 21:13:00 +00:00
|
|
|
Profiling data will only become accessible once debugfs has been mounted::
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
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|
|
|
|
mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
|
|
|
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|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
Coverage collection
|
|
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|
-------------------
|
kcov: remote coverage support
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 00:52:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
The following program demonstrates coverage collection from within a test
|
|
|
|
program using kcov:
|
2016-11-03 09:44:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. code-block:: c
|
2016-08-07 21:13:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <stddef.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <stdint.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mman.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <unistd.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
|
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|
|
#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE _IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_ENABLE _IO('c', 100)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
|
|
|
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#define COVER_SIZE (64<<10)
|
|
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|
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_TRACE_CMP 1
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|
|
|
|
2016-08-07 21:13:00 +00:00
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *cover, n, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A single fd descriptor allows coverage collection on a single
|
|
|
|
* thread.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1)
|
|
|
|
perror("open"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Setup trace mode and trace size. */
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Mmap buffer shared between kernel- and user-space. */
|
|
|
|
cover = (unsigned long*)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
|
|
|
|
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
|
|
|
|
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Enable coverage collection on the current thread. */
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, KCOV_TRACE_PC))
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Reset coverage from the tail of the ioctl() call. */
|
|
|
|
__atomic_store_n(&cover[0], 0, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
|
|
|
|
/* That's the target syscal call. */
|
|
|
|
read(-1, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Read number of PCs collected. */
|
|
|
|
n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
|
|
|
|
printf("0x%lx\n", cover[i + 1]);
|
|
|
|
/* Disable coverage collection for the current thread. After this call
|
|
|
|
* coverage can be enabled for a different thread.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Free resources. */
|
|
|
|
if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
|
|
|
|
perror("munmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (close(fd))
|
|
|
|
perror("close"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-08-07 21:13:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
After piping through addr2line output of the program looks as follows::
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SyS_read
|
|
|
|
fs/read_write.c:562
|
|
|
|
__fdget_pos
|
|
|
|
fs/file.c:774
|
|
|
|
__fget_light
|
|
|
|
fs/file.c:746
|
|
|
|
__fget_light
|
|
|
|
fs/file.c:750
|
|
|
|
__fget_light
|
|
|
|
fs/file.c:760
|
|
|
|
__fdget_pos
|
|
|
|
fs/file.c:784
|
|
|
|
SyS_read
|
|
|
|
fs/read_write.c:562
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a program needs to collect coverage from several threads (independently),
|
|
|
|
it needs to open /sys/kernel/debug/kcov in each thread separately.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The interface is fine-grained to allow efficient forking of test processes.
|
|
|
|
That is, a parent process opens /sys/kernel/debug/kcov, enables trace mode,
|
|
|
|
mmaps coverage buffer and then forks child processes in a loop. Child processes
|
|
|
|
only need to enable coverage (disable happens automatically on thread end).
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comparison operands collection
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
kcov: remote coverage support
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 00:52:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-17 23:30:53 +00:00
|
|
|
Comparison operands collection is similar to coverage collection:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. code-block:: c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Same includes and defines as above. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Number of 64-bit words per record. */
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The format for the types of collected comparisons.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Bit 0 shows whether one of the arguments is a compile-time constant.
|
|
|
|
* Bits 1 & 2 contain log2 of the argument size, up to 8 bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_CMP_CONST (1 << 0)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_CMP_SIZE(n) ((n) << 1)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_CMP_MASK KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t *cover, type, arg1, arg2, is_const, size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long n, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1)
|
|
|
|
perror("open"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note that the buffer pointer is of type uint64_t*, because all
|
|
|
|
* the comparison operands are promoted to uint64_t.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cover = (uint64_t *)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
|
|
|
|
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
|
|
|
|
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Note KCOV_TRACE_CMP instead of KCOV_TRACE_PC. */
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, KCOV_TRACE_CMP))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
__atomic_store_n(&cover[0], 0, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
|
|
|
|
read(-1, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Read number of comparisons collected. */
|
|
|
|
n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
|
|
type = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 1];
|
|
|
|
/* arg1 and arg2 - operands of the comparison. */
|
|
|
|
arg1 = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 2];
|
|
|
|
arg2 = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 3];
|
|
|
|
/* ip - caller address. */
|
|
|
|
ip = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 4];
|
|
|
|
/* size of the operands. */
|
|
|
|
size = 1 << ((type & KCOV_CMP_MASK) >> 1);
|
|
|
|
/* is_const - true if either operand is a compile-time constant.*/
|
|
|
|
is_const = type & KCOV_CMP_CONST;
|
|
|
|
printf("ip: 0x%lx type: 0x%lx, arg1: 0x%lx, arg2: 0x%lx, "
|
|
|
|
"size: %lu, %s\n",
|
|
|
|
ip, type, arg1, arg2, size,
|
|
|
|
is_const ? "const" : "non-const");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/* Free resources. */
|
|
|
|
if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
|
|
|
|
perror("munmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (close(fd))
|
|
|
|
perror("close"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that the kcov modes (coverage collection or comparison operands) are
|
|
|
|
mutually exclusive.
|
kcov: remote coverage support
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-05 00:52:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Remote coverage collection
|
|
|
|
--------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
|
|
|
|
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect
|
|
|
|
coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts
|
|
|
|
are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
|
|
|
|
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited
|
|
|
|
number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per
|
|
|
|
USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with
|
|
|
|
some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
|
|
|
|
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such
|
|
|
|
handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the
|
|
|
|
kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code
|
|
|
|
sections, that are referenced by those handles.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different
|
|
|
|
userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation.
|
|
|
|
Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the
|
|
|
|
common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets
|
|
|
|
saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be
|
|
|
|
passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads
|
|
|
|
should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle
|
|
|
|
is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and
|
|
|
|
the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within
|
|
|
|
that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common
|
|
|
|
handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are
|
|
|
|
currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes
|
|
|
|
used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a particular userspace proccess collects coverage by via a common
|
|
|
|
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated
|
|
|
|
to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current
|
|
|
|
task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage
|
|
|
|
selectively from different subsystems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. code-block:: c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct kcov_remote_arg {
|
|
|
|
unsigned trace_mode;
|
|
|
|
unsigned area_size;
|
|
|
|
unsigned num_handles;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t common_handle;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t handles[0];
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE _IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE _IOW('c', 102, struct kcov_remote_arg)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define COVER_SIZE (64 << 10)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON (0x00ull << 56)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB (0x01ull << 56)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK (0xffull << 56)
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK (0xffffffffull)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline __u64 kcov_remote_handle(__u64 subsys, __u64 inst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (subsys & ~KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK || inst & ~KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return subsys | inst;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_COMMON_ID 0x42
|
|
|
|
#define KCOV_USB_BUS_NUM 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *cover, n, i;
|
|
|
|
struct kcov_remote_arg *arg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
|
|
|
|
if (fd == -1)
|
|
|
|
perror("open"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
cover = (unsigned long*)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
|
|
|
|
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
|
|
|
|
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enable coverage collection via common handle and from USB bus #1. */
|
|
|
|
arg = calloc(1, sizeof(*arg) + sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
if (!arg)
|
|
|
|
perror("calloc"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
arg->trace_mode = KCOV_TRACE_PC;
|
|
|
|
arg->area_size = COVER_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
arg->num_handles = 1;
|
|
|
|
arg->common_handle = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON,
|
|
|
|
KCOV_COMMON_ID);
|
|
|
|
arg->handles[0] = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB,
|
|
|
|
KCOV_USB_BUS_NUM);
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE, arg))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), free(arg), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
free(arg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Here the user needs to trigger execution of a kernel code section
|
|
|
|
* that is either annotated with the common handle, or to trigger some
|
|
|
|
* activity on USB bus #1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sleep(2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
|
|
|
|
printf("0x%lx\n", cover[i + 1]);
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
|
|
|
|
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
|
|
|
|
perror("munmap"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (close(fd))
|
|
|
|
perror("close"), exit(1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|