linux/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c

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LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
/*
* security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2005-2011 NTT DATA CORPORATION
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
*/
#include <linux/security.h>
#include "common.h"
/**
* tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank - Target for security_cred_alloc_blank().
*
* @new: Pointer to "struct cred".
* @gfp: Memory allocation flags.
*
* Returns 0.
*/
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 08:14:21 +00:00
static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
{
new->security = NULL;
return 0;
}
/**
* tomoyo_cred_prepare - Target for security_prepare_creds().
*
* @new: Pointer to "struct cred".
* @old: Pointer to "struct cred".
* @gfp: Memory allocation flags.
*
* Returns 0.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = old->security;
new->security = domain;
if (domain)
atomic_inc(&domain->users);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
return 0;
}
/**
* tomoyo_cred_transfer - Target for security_transfer_creds().
*
* @new: Pointer to "struct cred".
* @old: Pointer to "struct cred".
*/
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 08:14:21 +00:00
static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
tomoyo_cred_prepare(new, old, 0);
}
/**
* tomoyo_cred_free - Target for security_cred_free().
*
* @cred: Pointer to "struct cred".
*/
static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
if (domain)
atomic_dec(&domain->users);
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 08:14:21 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_bprm_set_creds - Target for security_bprm_set_creds().
*
* @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int rc;
rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc)
return rc;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
/*
* Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
* operation.
*/
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
/*
* Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
* for the first time.
*/
if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename);
#endif
/*
* Release reference to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" stored inside
* "bprm->cred->security". New reference to "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
* stored inside "bprm->cred->security" will be acquired later inside
* tomoyo_find_next_domain().
*/
atomic_dec(&((struct tomoyo_domain_info *)
bprm->cred->security)->users);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
/*
* Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
* execve operation.
*/
bprm->cred->security = NULL;
return 0;
}
/**
* tomoyo_bprm_check_security - Target for security_bprm_check().
*
* @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
/*
* Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
* using current domain.
*/
if (!domain) {
const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
const int err = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
return err;
}
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
/*
* Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
*/
return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path,
O_RDONLY);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_inode_getattr - Target for security_inode_getattr().
*
* @mnt: Pointer to "struct vfsmount".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR, &path, NULL);
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_truncate - Target for security_path_truncate().
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path)
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
{
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path, NULL);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_unlink - Target for security_path_unlink().
*
* @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK, &path, NULL);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_mkdir - Target for security_path_mkdir().
*
* @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @mode: DAC permission mode.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
int mode)
{
struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path,
mode & S_IALLUGO);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_rmdir - Target for security_path_rmdir().
*
* @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR, &path, NULL);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_symlink - Target for security_path_symlink().
*
* @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @old_name: Symlink's content.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
{
struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK, &path, old_name);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_mknod - Target for security_path_mknod().
*
* @parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @mode: DAC permission mode.
* @dev: Device attributes.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
int mode, unsigned int dev)
{
struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE;
const unsigned int perm = mode & S_IALLUGO;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFCHR:
type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
break;
case S_IFBLK:
type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
break;
default:
goto no_dev;
}
return tomoyo_mkdev_perm(type, &path, perm, dev);
no_dev:
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
case S_IFIFO:
type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
break;
case S_IFSOCK:
type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK;
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
break;
}
return tomoyo_path_number_perm(type, &path, perm);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_link - Target for security_path_link().
*
* @old_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @new_dir: Pointer to "struct path".
* @new_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK, &path1, &path2);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_rename - Target for security_path_rename().
*
* @old_parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @old_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @new_parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @new_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct path *new_parent,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, &path1, &path2);
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_file_fcntl - Target for security_file_fcntl().
*
* @file: Pointer to "struct file".
* @cmd: Command for fcntl().
* @arg: Argument for @cmd.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
if (!(cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND)))
return 0;
return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &file->f_path,
O_WRONLY | (arg & O_APPEND));
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_dentry_open - Target for security_dentry_open().
*
* @f: Pointer to "struct file".
* @cred: Pointer to "struct cred".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
{
int flags = f->f_flags;
/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
if (current->in_execve)
return 0;
return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
}
/**
* tomoyo_file_ioctl - Target for security_file_ioctl().
*
* @file: Pointer to "struct file".
* @cmd: Command for ioctl().
* @arg: Argument for @cmd.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path, cmd);
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_chmod - Target for security_path_chmod().
*
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @mnt: Pointer to "struct vfsmount".
* @mode: DAC permission mode.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
mode_t mode)
{
struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path,
mode & S_IALLUGO);
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_chown - Target for security_path_chown().
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
* @uid: Owner ID.
* @gid: Group ID.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
int error = 0;
if (uid != (uid_t) -1)
error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, uid);
if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1)
error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, gid);
return error;
}
/**
* tomoyo_path_chroot - Target for security_path_chroot().
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path)
{
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path, NULL);
}
/**
* tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mount().
*
* @dev_name: Name of device file. Maybe NULL.
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
* @type: Name of filesystem type. Maybe NULL.
* @flags: Mount options.
* @data: Optional data. Maybe NULL.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
/**
* tomoyo_sb_umount - Target for security_sb_umount().
*
* @mnt: Pointer to "struct vfsmount".
* @flags: Unmount options.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT, &path, NULL);
}
/**
* tomoyo_sb_pivotroot - Target for security_sb_pivotroot().
*
* @old_path: Pointer to "struct path".
* @new_path: Pointer to "struct path".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT, new_path, old_path);
}
/**
* tomoyo_socket_listen - Check permission for listen().
*
* @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
* @backlog: Backlog parameter.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
return tomoyo_socket_listen_permission(sock);
}
/**
* tomoyo_socket_connect - Check permission for connect().
*
* @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
* @addr: Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
* @addr_len: Size of @addr.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
return tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(sock, addr, addr_len);
}
/**
* tomoyo_socket_bind - Check permission for bind().
*
* @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
* @addr: Pointer to "struct sockaddr".
* @addr_len: Size of @addr.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
return tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(sock, addr, addr_len);
}
/**
* tomoyo_socket_sendmsg - Check permission for sendmsg().
*
* @sock: Pointer to "struct socket".
* @msg: Pointer to "struct msghdr".
* @size: Size of message.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
return tomoyo_socket_sendmsg_permission(sock, msg, size);
}
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
.name = "tomoyo",
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 08:14:21 +00:00
.cred_alloc_blank = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
.cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 08:14:21 +00:00
.cred_transfer = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
.cred_free = tomoyo_cred_free,
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
.bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
.file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
.dentry_open = tomoyo_dentry_open,
.path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate,
.path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink,
.path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir,
.path_rmdir = tomoyo_path_rmdir,
.path_symlink = tomoyo_path_symlink,
.path_mknod = tomoyo_path_mknod,
.path_link = tomoyo_path_link,
.path_rename = tomoyo_path_rename,
.inode_getattr = tomoyo_inode_getattr,
.file_ioctl = tomoyo_file_ioctl,
.path_chmod = tomoyo_path_chmod,
.path_chown = tomoyo_path_chown,
.path_chroot = tomoyo_path_chroot,
.sb_mount = tomoyo_sb_mount,
.sb_umount = tomoyo_sb_umount,
.sb_pivotroot = tomoyo_sb_pivotroot,
.socket_bind = tomoyo_socket_bind,
.socket_connect = tomoyo_socket_connect,
.socket_listen = tomoyo_socket_listen,
.socket_sendmsg = tomoyo_socket_sendmsg,
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
};
/* Lock for GC. */
struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss;
/**
* tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module.
*
* Returns 0.
*/
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
return 0;
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops) ||
init_srcu_struct(&tomoyo_ss))
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
LSM adapter functions. DAC's permissions and TOMOYO's permissions are not one-to-one mapping. Regarding DAC, there are "read", "write", "execute" permissions. Regarding TOMOYO, there are "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_link", "allow_rename" permissions. +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | requested operation | required TOMOYO's permission | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDONLY) | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_WRONLY) | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_RDWR) | allow_read/write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from do_execve() | allow_execute | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | open_exec() from !do_execve() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_read() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_write() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mmap() | (none) | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_uselib() | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_CREAT) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open(O_TRUNC) | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_truncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_ftruncate() | allow_truncate | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_open() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | setfl() without O_APPEND | allow_rewrite | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for writing | allow_write | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_sysctl() for reading | allow_read | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_unlink() | allow_unlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFREG) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(0) | allow_create | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFIFO) | allow_mkfifo | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_bind(AF_UNIX) | allow_mksock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFBLK) | allow_mkblock | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mknod(S_IFCHR) | allow_mkchar | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_symlink() | allow_symlink | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_mkdir() | allow_mkdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rmdir() | allow_rmdir | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_link() | allow_link | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ | sys_rename() | allow_rename | +----------------------------------+----------------------------------+ TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of a pathname passed to do_execve() but does not require "allow_read" permission of that pathname. Let's consider 3 patterns (statically linked, dynamically linked, shell script). This description is to some degree simplified. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello\n"); return 0; } $ cat hello.sh #! /bin/sh echo "Hello" $ gcc -static -o hello-static hello.c $ gcc -o hello-dynamic hello.c $ chmod 755 hello.sh Case 1 -- Executing hello-static from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-static"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-static" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-static" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-static". (5) The child process transits to "bash hello-static" domain. (6) The "hello-static" starts and finishes. Case 2 -- Executing hello-dynamic from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello-dynamic"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello-dynamic" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello-dynamic" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read ld-linux.so" from "bash hello-dynamic" domain. I think permission to access ld-linux.so should be charged hello-dynamic program, for "hello-dynamic needs ld-linux.so" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "hello-dynamic". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello-dynamic" domain. (7) The "hello-dynamic" starts and finishes. Case 3 -- Executing hello.sh from bash. (1) The bash process calls fork() and the child process requests do_execve("hello.sh"). (2) The kernel checks "allow_execute hello.sh" from "bash" domain. (3) The kernel calculates "bash hello.sh" as the domain to transit to. (4) The kernel checks "allow_read /bin/sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. I think permission to access /bin/sh should be charged hello.sh program, for "hello.sh needs /bin/sh" is not a fault of bash program. (5) The kernel overwrites the child process by "/bin/sh". (6) The child process transits to "bash hello.sh" domain. (7) The "/bin/sh" requests open("hello.sh"). (8) The kernel checks "allow_read hello.sh" from "bash hello.sh" domain. (9) The "/bin/sh" starts and finishes. Whether a file is interpreted as a program or not depends on an application. The kernel cannot know whether the file is interpreted as a program or not. Thus, TOMOYO treats "hello-static" "hello-dynamic" "ld-linux.so" "hello.sh" "/bin/sh" equally as merely files; no distinction between executable and non-executable. Therefore, TOMOYO doesn't check DAC's execute permission. TOMOYO checks "allow_read" permission instead. Calling do_execve() is a bold gesture that an old program's instance (i.e. current process) is ready to be overwritten by a new program and is ready to transfer control to the new program. To split purview of programs, TOMOYO requires "allow_execute" permission of the new program against the old program's instance and performs domain transition. If do_execve() succeeds, the old program is no longer responsible against the consequence of the new program's behavior. Only the new program is responsible for all consequences. But TOMOYO doesn't require "allow_read" permission of the new program. If TOMOYO requires "allow_read" permission of the new program, TOMOYO will allow an attacker (who hijacked the old program's instance) to open the new program and steal data from the new program. Requiring "allow_read" permission will widen purview of the old program. Not requiring "allow_read" permission of the new program against the old program's instance is my design for reducing purview of the old program. To be able to know whether the current process is in do_execve() or not, I want to add in_execve flag to "task_struct". Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:16 +00:00
return 0;
}
security_initcall(tomoyo_init);