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xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
/*
* Machine specific setup for xen
*
* Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>, XenSource Inc, 2007
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/pm.h>
x86, memblock: Replace e820_/_early string with memblock_ 1.include linux/memblock.h directly. so later could reduce e820.h reference. 2 this patch is done by sed scripts mainly -v2: use MEMBLOCK_ERROR instead of -1ULL or -1UL Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2010-08-25 20:39:17 +00:00
#include <linux/memblock.h>
cpuidle: replace xen access to x86 pm_idle and default_idle When a Xen Dom0 kernel boots on a hypervisor, it gets access to the raw-hardware ACPI tables. While it parses the idle tables for the hypervisor's beneift, it uses HLT for its own idle. Rather than have xen scribble on pm_idle and access default_idle, have it simply disable_cpuidle() so acpi_idle will not load and architecture default HLT will be used. cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
2011-04-01 22:28:35 +00:00
#include <linux/cpuidle.h>
xen/cpufreq: Disable the cpu frequency scaling drivers from loading. By using the functionality provided by "[CPUFREQ]: provide disable_cpuidle() function to disable the API." Under the Xen hypervisor we do not want the initial domain to exercise the cpufreq scaling drivers. This is b/c the Xen hypervisor is in charge of doing this as well and we can end up with both the Linux kernel and the hypervisor trying to change the P-states leading to weird performance issues. Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v2: Fix compile error spotted by Benjamin Schweikert <b.schweikert@googlemail.com>]
2012-03-14 00:06:57 +00:00
#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#include <asm/elf.h>
x86 vDSO: i386 vdso32 This makes the i386 kernel use the new vDSO build in arch/x86/vdso/vdso32/ to replace the old one from arch/x86/kernel/. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 12:30:42 +00:00
#include <asm/vdso.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#include <asm/e820.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
xen: reserve ISA space in e820 map [ TODO: release the underlying memory back to Xen. ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:49 +00:00
#include <asm/acpi.h>
xen/boot: Disable NUMA for PV guests. The hypervisor is in charge of allocating the proper "NUMA" memory and dealing with the CPU scheduler to keep them bound to the proper NUMA node. The PV guests (and PVHVM) have no inkling of where they run and do not need to know that right now. In the future we will need to inject NUMA configuration data (if a guest spans two or more NUMA nodes) so that the kernel can make the right choices. But those patches are not yet present. In the meantime, disable the NUMA capability in the PV guest, which also fixes a bootup issue. Andre says: "we see Dom0 crashes due to the kernel detecting the NUMA topology not by ACPI, but directly from the northbridge (CONFIG_AMD_NUMA). This will detect the actual NUMA config of the physical machine, but will crash about the mismatch with Dom0's virtual memory. Variation of the theme: Dom0 sees what it's not supposed to see. This happens with the said config option enabled and on a machine where this scanning is still enabled (K8 and Fam10h, not Bulldozer class) We have this dump then: NUMA: Warning: node ids are out of bound, from=-1 to=-1 distance=10 Scanning NUMA topology in Northbridge 24 Number of physical nodes 4 Node 0 MemBase 0000000000000000 Limit 0000000040000000 Node 1 MemBase 0000000040000000 Limit 0000000138000000 Node 2 MemBase 0000000138000000 Limit 00000001f8000000 Node 3 MemBase 00000001f8000000 Limit 0000000238000000 Initmem setup node 0 0000000000000000-0000000040000000 NODE_DATA [000000003ffd9000 - 000000003fffffff] Initmem setup node 1 0000000040000000-0000000138000000 NODE_DATA [0000000137fd9000 - 0000000137ffffff] Initmem setup node 2 0000000138000000-00000001f8000000 NODE_DATA [00000001f095e000 - 00000001f0984fff] Initmem setup node 3 00000001f8000000-0000000238000000 Cannot find 159744 bytes in node 3 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.3.6 #1 AMD Dinar/Dinar RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81d220e6>] [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 .. snip.. [<ffffffff81d23024>] sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x64/0x178 [<ffffffff81d23348>] sparse_init+0xe4/0x25a [<ffffffff81d16840>] paging_init+0x13/0x22 [<ffffffff81d07fbb>] setup_arch+0x9c6/0xa9b [<ffffffff81683954>] ? printk+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff81d01a38>] start_kernel+0xe5/0x468 [<ffffffff81d012cf>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff81007153>] ? xen_setup_runstate_info+0x2c/0x36 [<ffffffff81d050ee>] xen_start_kernel+0x565/0x56c " so we just disable NUMA scanning by setting numa_off=1. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 14:22:37 +00:00
#include <asm/numa.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
xen: include xen/xen.h for definition of xen_initial_domain() CC arch/x86/xen/setup.o arch/x86/xen/setup.c: In function 'xen_memory_setup': arch/x86/xen/setup.c:161: error: implicit declaration of function 'xen_initial_domain' Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-10-25 23:32:29 +00:00
#include <xen/xen.h>
xen: add configurable max domain size Add a config option to set the max size of a Xen domain. This is used to scale the size of the physical-to-machine array; it ends up using around 1 page/GByte, so there's no reason to be very restrictive. For a 32-bit guest, the default value of 8GB is probably sufficient; there's not much point in giving a 32-bit machine much more memory than that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-05-26 22:31:19 +00:00
#include <xen/page.h>
xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor does 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-03-17 23:37:17 +00:00
#include <xen/interface/callback.h>
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#include <xen/interface/physdev.h>
#include <xen/features.h>
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
#include "mmu.h"
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#include "xen-ops.h"
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
#include "vdso.h"
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
/* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */
extern const char xen_hypervisor_callback[];
extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[];
xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME - pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN - pv_cpu_ops.iret). That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use the hypervisor iret. The other changes that would be neccessary for this would be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different events. Fortunately for us commit 1db01b4903639fcfaec213701a494fe3fb2c490b (xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right vector value for NMI. With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested x86_64). For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain) we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking of X86_FEATURE_APIC. Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround. Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch does not enable that. CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com> CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments] Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2013-07-19 15:51:31 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86, asmlinkage, xen: Fix type of NMI LTO requires consistent types of symbols over all files. So "nmi" cannot be declared as a char [] here, need to use the correct function type. Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1382458079-24450-8-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2013-10-22 16:07:59 +00:00
extern asmlinkage void nmi(void);
xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME - pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN - pv_cpu_ops.iret). That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use the hypervisor iret. The other changes that would be neccessary for this would be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different events. Fortunately for us commit 1db01b4903639fcfaec213701a494fe3fb2c490b (xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right vector value for NMI. With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested x86_64). For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain) we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking of X86_FEATURE_APIC. Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround. Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch does not enable that. CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com> CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments] Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2013-07-19 15:51:31 +00:00
#endif
xen: whitespace/checkpatch cleanup Impact: cleanup Signed-off-by: Tej <bewith.tej@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-16 19:56:06 +00:00
extern void xen_sysenter_target(void);
extern void xen_syscall_target(void);
extern void xen_syscall32_target(void);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
/* Amount of extra memory space we add to the e820 ranges */
xen: allow balloon driver to use more than one memory region Allow the xen balloon driver to populate its list of extra pages from more than one region of memory. This will allow platforms to provide (for example) a region of low memory and a region of high memory. The maximum possible number of extra regions is 128 (== E820MAX) which is quite large so xen_extra_mem is placed in __initdata. This is safe as both xen_memory_setup() and balloon_init() are in __init. The balloon regions themselves are not altered (i.e., there is still only the one region). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:34 +00:00
struct xen_memory_region xen_extra_mem[XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS] __initdata;
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
xen/balloon: account for pages released during memory setup In xen_memory_setup() pages that occur in gaps in the memory map are released back to Xen. This reduces the domain's current page count in the hypervisor. The Xen balloon driver does not correctly decrease its initial current_pages count to reflect this. If 'delta' pages are released and the target is adjusted the resulting reservation is always 'delta' less than the requested target. This affects dom0 if the initial allocation of pages overlaps the PCI memory region but won't affect most domU guests that have been setup with pseudo-physical memory maps that don't have gaps. Fix this by accouting for the released pages when starting the balloon driver. If the domain's targets are managed by xapi, the domain may eventually run out of memory and die because xapi currently gets its target calculations wrong and whenever it is restarted it always reduces the target by 'delta'. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:32 +00:00
/* Number of pages released from the initial allocation. */
unsigned long xen_released_pages;
xen: limit extra memory to a certain ratio of base If extra memory is very much larger than the base memory size then all of the base memory can be filled with structures reserved to describe the extra memory, leaving no space for anything else. Even at the maximum ratio there will be little space for anything else, but this change is intended to at least allow the system to boot rather than crash mysteriously. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-09-14 17:19:14 +00:00
/*
* The maximum amount of extra memory compared to the base size. The
* main scaling factor is the size of struct page. At extreme ratios
* of base:extra, all the base memory can be filled with page
* structures for the extra memory, leaving no space for anything
* else.
*
* 10x seems like a reasonable balance between scaling flexibility and
* leaving a practically usable system.
*/
#define EXTRA_MEM_RATIO (10)
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
static void __init xen_add_extra_mem(u64 start, u64 size)
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
{
xen: Mark all initial reserved pages for the balloon as INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. With this patch, we diligently set regions that will be used by the balloon driver to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY and under the ownership of the balloon driver. We are OK using the __set_phys_to_machine as we do not expect to be allocating any P2M middle or entries pages. The set_phys_to_machine has the side-effect of potentially allocating new pages and we do not want that at this stage. We can do this because xen_build_mfn_list_list will have already allocated all such pages up to xen_max_p2m_pfn. We also move the check for auto translated physmap down the stack so it is present in __set_phys_to_machine. [v2: Rebased with mmu->p2m code split] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-01-19 01:09:41 +00:00
unsigned long pfn;
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
int i;
xen: Mark all initial reserved pages for the balloon as INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. With this patch, we diligently set regions that will be used by the balloon driver to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY and under the ownership of the balloon driver. We are OK using the __set_phys_to_machine as we do not expect to be allocating any P2M middle or entries pages. The set_phys_to_machine has the side-effect of potentially allocating new pages and we do not want that at this stage. We can do this because xen_build_mfn_list_list will have already allocated all such pages up to xen_max_p2m_pfn. We also move the check for auto translated physmap down the stack so it is present in __set_phys_to_machine. [v2: Rebased with mmu->p2m code split] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-01-19 01:09:41 +00:00
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
/* Add new region. */
if (xen_extra_mem[i].size == 0) {
xen_extra_mem[i].start = start;
xen_extra_mem[i].size = size;
break;
}
/* Append to existing region. */
if (xen_extra_mem[i].start + xen_extra_mem[i].size == start) {
xen_extra_mem[i].size += size;
break;
}
}
if (i == XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS)
printk(KERN_WARNING "Warning: not enough extra memory regions\n");
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
Merge branch 'master' into x86/memblock Conflicts & resolutions: * arch/x86/xen/setup.c dc91c728fd "xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions" 24aa07882b "memblock, x86: Replace memblock_x86_reserve/free..." conflicted on xen_add_extra_mem() updates. The resolution is trivial as the latter just want to replace memblock_x86_reserve_range() with memblock_reserve(). * drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c 166e9278a3f "x86/ia64: intel-iommu: move to drivers/iommu/" 5dfe8660a3d "bootmem: Replace work_with_active_regions() with..." conflicted as the former moved the file under drivers/iommu/. Resolved by applying the chnages from the latter on the moved file. * mm/Kconfig 6661672053a "memblock: add NO_BOOTMEM config symbol" c378ddd53f9 "memblock, x86: Make ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK a config option" conflicted trivially. Both added config options. Just letting both add their own options resolves the conflict. * mm/memblock.c d1f0ece6cdc "mm/memblock.c: small function definition fixes" ed7b56a799c "memblock: Remove memblock_memory_can_coalesce()" confliected. The former updates function removed by the latter. Resolution is trivial. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2011-11-28 17:46:22 +00:00
memblock_reserve(start, size);
xen: make sure xen_max_p2m_pfn is up to date Keep xen_max_p2m_pfn up to date with the end of the extra memory we're adding. It is possible that it will be too high since memory may be truncated by a "mem=" option on the kernel command line, but that won't matter. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-09-15 20:32:49 +00:00
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
return;
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
xen_max_p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start + size);
xen/setup: Fix one-off error when adding for-balloon PFNs to the P2M. When we are finished with return PFNs to the hypervisor, then populate it back, and also mark the E820 MMIO and E820 gaps as IDENTITY_FRAMEs, we then call P2M to set areas that can be used for ballooning. We were off by one, and ended up over-writting a P2M entry that most likely was an IDENTITY_FRAME. For example: 1-1 mapping on 40000->40200 1-1 mapping on bc558->bc5ac 1-1 mapping on bc5b4->bc8c5 1-1 mapping on bc8c6->bcb7c 1-1 mapping on bcd00->100000 Released 614 pages of unused memory Set 277889 page(s) to 1-1 mapping Populating 40200-40466 pfn range: 614 pages added => here we set from 40466 up to bc559 P2M tree to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. We should have done it up to bc558. The end result is that if anybody is trying to construct a PTE for PFN bc558 they end up with ~PAGE_PRESENT. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 20:43:28 +00:00
for (pfn = PFN_DOWN(start); pfn < xen_max_p2m_pfn; pfn++) {
unsigned long mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
x86/xen: only warn once if bad MFNs are found during setup In xen_add_extra_mem(), if the WARN() checks for bad MFNs trigger it is likely that they will trigger at lot, spamming the log. Use WARN_ONCE() instead. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2014-01-07 11:36:53 +00:00
if (WARN_ONCE(mfn == pfn, "Trying to over-write 1-1 mapping (pfn: %lx)\n", pfn))
xen/setup: Fix one-off error when adding for-balloon PFNs to the P2M. When we are finished with return PFNs to the hypervisor, then populate it back, and also mark the E820 MMIO and E820 gaps as IDENTITY_FRAMEs, we then call P2M to set areas that can be used for ballooning. We were off by one, and ended up over-writting a P2M entry that most likely was an IDENTITY_FRAME. For example: 1-1 mapping on 40000->40200 1-1 mapping on bc558->bc5ac 1-1 mapping on bc5b4->bc8c5 1-1 mapping on bc8c6->bcb7c 1-1 mapping on bcd00->100000 Released 614 pages of unused memory Set 277889 page(s) to 1-1 mapping Populating 40200-40466 pfn range: 614 pages added => here we set from 40466 up to bc559 P2M tree to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. We should have done it up to bc558. The end result is that if anybody is trying to construct a PTE for PFN bc558 they end up with ~PAGE_PRESENT. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 20:43:28 +00:00
continue;
x86/xen: only warn once if bad MFNs are found during setup In xen_add_extra_mem(), if the WARN() checks for bad MFNs trigger it is likely that they will trigger at lot, spamming the log. Use WARN_ONCE() instead. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2014-01-07 11:36:53 +00:00
WARN_ONCE(mfn != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY, "Trying to remove %lx which has %lx mfn!\n",
pfn, mfn);
xen: Mark all initial reserved pages for the balloon as INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. With this patch, we diligently set regions that will be used by the balloon driver to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY and under the ownership of the balloon driver. We are OK using the __set_phys_to_machine as we do not expect to be allocating any P2M middle or entries pages. The set_phys_to_machine has the side-effect of potentially allocating new pages and we do not want that at this stage. We can do this because xen_build_mfn_list_list will have already allocated all such pages up to xen_max_p2m_pfn. We also move the check for auto translated physmap down the stack so it is present in __set_phys_to_machine. [v2: Rebased with mmu->p2m code split] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-01-19 01:09:41 +00:00
__set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
xen/setup: Fix one-off error when adding for-balloon PFNs to the P2M. When we are finished with return PFNs to the hypervisor, then populate it back, and also mark the E820 MMIO and E820 gaps as IDENTITY_FRAMEs, we then call P2M to set areas that can be used for ballooning. We were off by one, and ended up over-writting a P2M entry that most likely was an IDENTITY_FRAME. For example: 1-1 mapping on 40000->40200 1-1 mapping on bc558->bc5ac 1-1 mapping on bc5b4->bc8c5 1-1 mapping on bc8c6->bcb7c 1-1 mapping on bcd00->100000 Released 614 pages of unused memory Set 277889 page(s) to 1-1 mapping Populating 40200-40466 pfn range: 614 pages added => here we set from 40466 up to bc559 P2M tree to be INVALID_P2M_ENTRY. We should have done it up to bc558. The end result is that if anybody is trying to construct a PTE for PFN bc558 they end up with ~PAGE_PRESENT. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 20:43:28 +00:00
}
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
}
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
static unsigned long __init xen_do_chunk(unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, bool release)
xen: release unused free memory Scan an e820 table and release any memory which lies between e820 entries, as it won't be used and would just be wasted. At present this is just to release any memory beyond the end of the e820 map, but it will also deal with holes being punched in the map. Derived from patch by Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-09-16 07:56:17 +00:00
{
struct xen_memory_reservation reservation = {
.address_bits = 0,
.extent_order = 0,
.domid = DOMID_SELF
};
xen: make sure pages are really part of domain before freeing Scan the set of pages we're freeing and make sure they're actually owned by the domain before freeing. This generally won't happen on a domU (since Xen gives us contigious memory), but it could happen if there are some hardware mappings passed through. We only bother going up to the highest page Xen actually claimed to give us, since there's definitely nothing of ours above that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-09-16 19:38:33 +00:00
unsigned long len = 0;
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
int xlated_phys = xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap);
xen: release unused free memory Scan an e820 table and release any memory which lies between e820 entries, as it won't be used and would just be wasted. At present this is just to release any memory beyond the end of the e820 map, but it will also deal with holes being punched in the map. Derived from patch by Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-09-16 07:56:17 +00:00
unsigned long pfn;
int ret;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
for (pfn = start; pfn < end; pfn++) {
unsigned long frame;
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
unsigned long mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
if (release) {
/* Make sure pfn exists to start with */
if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY || mfn_to_pfn(mfn) != pfn)
continue;
frame = mfn;
} else {
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
if (!xlated_phys && mfn != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY)
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
continue;
frame = pfn;
}
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
set_xen_guest_handle(reservation.extent_start, &frame);
reservation.nr_extents = 1;
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
ret = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(release ? XENMEM_decrease_reservation : XENMEM_populate_physmap,
&reservation);
WARN(ret != 1, "Failed to %s pfn %lx err=%d\n",
release ? "release" : "populate", pfn, ret);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
if (ret == 1) {
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
if (!early_set_phys_to_machine(pfn, release ? INVALID_P2M_ENTRY : frame)) {
if (release)
break;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
set_xen_guest_handle(reservation.extent_start, &frame);
reservation.nr_extents = 1;
ret = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_decrease_reservation,
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
&reservation);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
break;
}
len++;
} else
break;
}
if (len)
xen/setup: Combine the two hypercall functions - since they are quite similar. They use the same set of arguments, so it is just the matter of using the proper hypercall. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 20:10:20 +00:00
printk(KERN_INFO "%s %lx-%lx pfn range: %lu pages %s\n",
release ? "Freeing" : "Populating",
start, end, len,
release ? "freed" : "added");
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
return len;
}
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
static unsigned long __init xen_release_chunk(unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
/*
* Xen already ballooned out the E820 non RAM regions for us
* and set them up properly in EPT.
*/
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
return end - start;
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
return xen_do_chunk(start, end, true);
}
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
static unsigned long __init xen_populate_chunk(
const struct e820entry *list, size_t map_size,
unsigned long max_pfn, unsigned long *last_pfn,
unsigned long credits_left)
{
const struct e820entry *entry;
unsigned int i;
unsigned long done = 0;
unsigned long dest_pfn;
for (i = 0, entry = list; i < map_size; i++, entry++) {
unsigned long s_pfn;
unsigned long e_pfn;
unsigned long pfns;
long capacity;
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
if (credits_left <= 0)
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
break;
if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
continue;
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
e_pfn = PFN_DOWN(entry->addr + entry->size);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
/* We only care about E820 after the xen_start_info->nr_pages */
if (e_pfn <= max_pfn)
continue;
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
s_pfn = PFN_UP(entry->addr);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
/* If the E820 falls within the nr_pages, we want to start
* at the nr_pages PFN.
* If that would mean going past the E820 entry, skip it
*/
if (s_pfn <= max_pfn) {
capacity = e_pfn - max_pfn;
dest_pfn = max_pfn;
} else {
capacity = e_pfn - s_pfn;
dest_pfn = s_pfn;
}
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
if (credits_left < capacity)
capacity = credits_left;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
pfns = xen_do_chunk(dest_pfn, dest_pfn + capacity, false);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
done += pfns;
*last_pfn = (dest_pfn + pfns);
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 05:06:39 +00:00
if (pfns < capacity)
break;
credits_left -= pfns;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
}
return done;
}
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
static void __init xen_set_identity_and_release_chunk(
unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned long *released, unsigned long *identity)
{
unsigned long pfn;
/*
x86/xen: during early setup, only 1:1 map the ISA region During early setup, when the reserved regions and MMIO holes are being setup as 1:1 in the p2m, clear any mappings instead of making them 1:1 (execept for the ISA region which is expected to be mapped). This fixes a regression introduced in 3.5 by 83d51ab473dd (xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup) which caused hosts with tboot to fail to boot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-07-22 14:29:00 +00:00
* If the PFNs are currently mapped, clear the mappings
* (except for the ISA region which must be 1:1 mapped) to
* release the refcounts (in Xen) on the original frames.
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
*/
xen/pvh: Update E820 to work with PVH (v2) In xen_add_extra_mem() we can skip updating P2M as it's managed by Xen. PVH maps the entire IO space, but only RAM pages need to be repopulated. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 18:02:58 +00:00
/*
* PVH E820 matches the hypervisor's P2M which means we need to
* account for the proper values of *release and *identity.
*/
for (pfn = start_pfn; !xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) &&
pfn <= max_pfn_mapped && pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
x86/xen: during early setup, only 1:1 map the ISA region During early setup, when the reserved regions and MMIO holes are being setup as 1:1 in the p2m, clear any mappings instead of making them 1:1 (execept for the ISA region which is expected to be mapped). This fixes a regression introduced in 3.5 by 83d51ab473dd (xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup) which caused hosts with tboot to fail to boot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-07-22 14:29:00 +00:00
pte_t pte = __pte_ma(0);
if (pfn < PFN_UP(ISA_END_ADDRESS))
pte = mfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_IO);
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
(void)HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping(
x86/xen: during early setup, only 1:1 map the ISA region During early setup, when the reserved regions and MMIO holes are being setup as 1:1 in the p2m, clear any mappings instead of making them 1:1 (execept for the ISA region which is expected to be mapped). This fixes a regression introduced in 3.5 by 83d51ab473dd (xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup) which caused hosts with tboot to fail to boot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-07-22 14:29:00 +00:00
(unsigned long)__va(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT), pte, 0);
}
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
if (start_pfn < nr_pages)
*released += xen_release_chunk(
start_pfn, min(end_pfn, nr_pages));
*identity += set_phys_range_identity(start_pfn, end_pfn);
}
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
static unsigned long __init xen_set_identity_and_release(
const struct e820entry *list, size_t map_size, unsigned long nr_pages)
xen: release unused free memory Scan an e820 table and release any memory which lies between e820 entries, as it won't be used and would just be wasted. At present this is just to release any memory beyond the end of the e820 map, but it will also deal with holes being punched in the map. Derived from patch by Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-09-16 07:56:17 +00:00
{
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
phys_addr_t start = 0;
xen: release unused free memory Scan an e820 table and release any memory which lies between e820 entries, as it won't be used and would just be wasted. At present this is just to release any memory beyond the end of the e820 map, but it will also deal with holes being punched in the map. Derived from patch by Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-09-16 07:56:17 +00:00
unsigned long released = 0;
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
unsigned long identity = 0;
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
const struct e820entry *entry;
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
int i;
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
/*
* Combine non-RAM regions and gaps until a RAM region (or the
* end of the map) is reached, then set the 1:1 map and
* release the pages (if available) in those non-RAM regions.
*
* The combined non-RAM regions are rounded to a whole number
* of pages so any partial pages are accessible via the 1:1
* mapping. This is needed for some BIOSes that put (for
* example) the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on
* a non-page boundary.
*/
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
for (i = 0, entry = list; i < map_size; i++, entry++) {
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
phys_addr_t end = entry->addr + entry->size;
if (entry->type == E820_RAM || i == map_size - 1) {
unsigned long start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start);
unsigned long end_pfn = PFN_UP(end);
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
if (entry->type == E820_RAM)
end_pfn = PFN_UP(entry->addr);
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
xen/setup: update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup In xen_memory_setup(), if a page that is being released has a VA mapping this must also be updated. Otherwise, the page will be not released completely -- it will still be referenced in Xen and won't be freed util the mapping is removed and this prevents it from being reallocated at a different PFN. This was already being done for the ISA memory region in xen_ident_map_ISA() but on many systems this was omitting a few pages as many systems marked a few pages below the ISA memory region as reserved in the e820 map. This fixes errors such as: (XEN) page_alloc.c:1148:d0 Over-allocation for domain 0: 2097153 > 2097152 (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (0 of 17) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-03 15:15:42 +00:00
if (start_pfn < end_pfn)
xen_set_identity_and_release_chunk(
start_pfn, end_pfn, nr_pages,
&released, &identity);
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
start = end;
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
}
}
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
xen/setup: Only print "Freeing XXX-YYY pfn range: Z pages freed" if Z > 0 Otherwise we can get these meaningless: Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 0 pages freed We also can do this for the summary ones - no point of printing "Set 0 page(s) to 1-1 mapping" Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Extended to the summary printks] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-03-30 19:37:07 +00:00
if (released)
printk(KERN_INFO "Released %lu pages of unused memory\n", released);
if (identity)
printk(KERN_INFO "Set %ld page(s) to 1-1 mapping\n", identity);
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
return released;
xen/setup: Set identity mapping for non-RAM E820 and E820 gaps. We walk the E820 region and start at 0 (for PV guests we start at ISA_END_ADDRESS) and skip any E820 RAM regions. For all other regions and as well the gaps we set them to be identity mappings. The reasons we do not want to set the identity mapping from 0-> ISA_END_ADDRESS when running as PV is b/c that the kernel would try to read DMI information and fail (no permissions to read that). There is a lot of gnarly code to deal with that weird region so we won't try to do a cleanup in this patch. This code ends up calling 'set_phys_to_identity' with the start and end PFN of the the E820 that are non-RAM or have gaps. On 99% of machines that means one big region right underneath the 4GB mark. Usually starts at 0xc0000 (or 0x80000) and goes to 0x100000. [v2: Fix for E820 crossing 1MB region and clamp the start] [v3: Squshed in code that does this over ranges] [v4: Moved the comment to the correct spot] [v5: Use the "raw" E820 from the hypervisor] [v6: Added Review-by tag] Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-02-01 22:15:30 +00:00
}
xen: use maximum reservation to limit amount of usable RAM Use the domain's maximum reservation to limit the amount of extra RAM for the memory balloon. This reduces the size of the pages tables and the amount of reserved low memory (which defaults to about 1/32 of the total RAM). On a system with 8 GiB of RAM with the domain limited to 1 GiB the kernel reports: Before: Memory: 627792k/4472000k available After: Memory: 549740k/11132224k available A increase of about 76 MiB (~1.5% of the unused 7 GiB). The reserved low memory is also reduced from 253 MiB to 32 MiB. The total additional usable RAM is 329 MiB. For dom0, this requires at patch to Xen ('x86: use 'dom0_mem' to limit the number of pages for dom0') (c/s 23790) CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-08-19 14:57:16 +00:00
static unsigned long __init xen_get_max_pages(void)
{
unsigned long max_pages = MAX_DOMAIN_PAGES;
domid_t domid = DOMID_SELF;
int ret;
xen: only limit memory map to maximum reservation for domain 0. d312ae878b6a "xen: use maximum reservation to limit amount of usable RAM" clamped the total amount of RAM to the current maximum reservation. This is correct for dom0 but is not correct for guest domains. In order to boot a guest "pre-ballooned" (e.g. with memory=1G but maxmem=2G) in order to allow for future memory expansion the guest must derive max_pfn from the e820 provided by the toolstack and not the current maximum reservation (which can reflect only the current maximum, not the guest lifetime max). The existing algorithm already behaves this correctly if we do not artificially limit the maximum number of pages for the guest case. For a guest booted with maxmem=512, memory=128 this results in: [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) -[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000008100000 (usable) -[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000008100000 - 0000000020800000 (unusable) +[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020800000 (usable) ... [ 0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active [ 0.000000] DMI not present or invalid. [ 0.000000] e820 update range: 0000000000000000 - 0000000000010000 (usable) ==> (reserved) [ 0.000000] e820 remove range: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (usable) -[ 0.000000] last_pfn = 0x8100 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000 +[ 0.000000] last_pfn = 0x20800 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000 [ 0.000000] initial memory mapped : 0 - 027ff000 [ 0.000000] Base memory trampoline at [c009f000] 9f000 size 4096 -[ 0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000008100000 -[ 0.000000] 0000000000 - 0008100000 page 4k -[ 0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 8100000 @ 27bb000-27ff000 +[ 0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000020800000 +[ 0.000000] 0000000000 - 0020800000 page 4k +[ 0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 20800000 @ 26f8000-27ff000 [ 0.000000] xen: setting RW the range 27e8000 - 27ff000 [ 0.000000] 0MB HIGHMEM available. -[ 0.000000] 129MB LOWMEM available. -[ 0.000000] mapped low ram: 0 - 08100000 -[ 0.000000] low ram: 0 - 08100000 +[ 0.000000] 520MB LOWMEM available. +[ 0.000000] mapped low ram: 0 - 20800000 +[ 0.000000] low ram: 0 - 20800000 With this change "xl mem-set <domain> 512M" will successfully increase the guest RAM (by reducing the balloon). There is no change for dom0. Reported-and-Tested-by: George Shuklin <george.shuklin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-12-14 12:16:08 +00:00
/*
* For the initial domain we use the maximum reservation as
* the maximum page.
*
* For guest domains the current maximum reservation reflects
* the current maximum rather than the static maximum. In this
* case the e820 map provided to us will cover the static
* maximum region.
*/
if (xen_initial_domain()) {
ret = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_maximum_reservation, &domid);
if (ret > 0)
max_pages = ret;
}
xen: use maximum reservation to limit amount of usable RAM Use the domain's maximum reservation to limit the amount of extra RAM for the memory balloon. This reduces the size of the pages tables and the amount of reserved low memory (which defaults to about 1/32 of the total RAM). On a system with 8 GiB of RAM with the domain limited to 1 GiB the kernel reports: Before: Memory: 627792k/4472000k available After: Memory: 549740k/11132224k available A increase of about 76 MiB (~1.5% of the unused 7 GiB). The reserved low memory is also reduced from 253 MiB to 32 MiB. The total additional usable RAM is 329 MiB. For dom0, this requires at patch to Xen ('x86: use 'dom0_mem' to limit the number of pages for dom0') (c/s 23790) CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-08-19 14:57:16 +00:00
return min(max_pages, MAX_DOMAIN_PAGES);
}
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
static void xen_align_and_add_e820_region(u64 start, u64 size, int type)
{
u64 end = start + size;
/* Align RAM regions to page boundaries. */
if (type == E820_RAM) {
start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
end &= ~((u64)PAGE_SIZE - 1);
}
e820_add_region(start, end - start, type);
}
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 14:42:55 +00:00
void xen_ignore_unusable(struct e820entry *list, size_t map_size)
{
struct e820entry *entry;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0, entry = list; i < map_size; i++, entry++) {
if (entry->type == E820_UNUSABLE)
entry->type = E820_RAM;
}
}
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
/**
* machine_specific_memory_setup - Hook for machine specific memory setup.
**/
char * __init xen_memory_setup(void)
{
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
static struct e820entry map[E820MAX] __initdata;
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
unsigned long max_pfn = xen_start_info->nr_pages;
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
unsigned long long mem_end;
int rc;
struct xen_memory_map memmap;
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
unsigned long max_pages;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
unsigned long last_pfn = 0;
xen: implement "extra" memory to reserve space for pages not present at boot When using the e820 map to get the initial pseudo-physical address space, look for either Xen-provided memory which doesn't lie within an E820 region, or an E820 RAM region which extends beyond the Xen-provided memory range. Count these pages, and add them to a new "extra memory" range. This range has an E820 RAM range to describe it - so the kernel will allocate page structures for it - but it is also marked reserved so that the kernel will not attempt to use it. The balloon driver can then add this range as a set of currently ballooned-out pages, which can be used to extend the domain beyond its original size. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-08-30 23:41:02 +00:00
unsigned long extra_pages = 0;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
unsigned long populated;
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
int i;
xen: use host E820 map for dom0 When running as initial domain, get the real physical memory map from xen using the XENMEM_machine_memory_map hypercall and use it to setup the e820 regions. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2010-09-02 15:16:00 +00:00
int op;
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
xen: add configurable max domain size Add a config option to set the max size of a Xen domain. This is used to scale the size of the physical-to-machine array; it ends up using around 1 page/GByte, so there's no reason to be very restrictive. For a 32-bit guest, the default value of 8GB is probably sufficient; there's not much point in giving a 32-bit machine much more memory than that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-05-26 22:31:19 +00:00
max_pfn = min(MAX_DOMAIN_PAGES, max_pfn);
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
mem_end = PFN_PHYS(max_pfn);
memmap.nr_entries = E820MAX;
set_xen_guest_handle(memmap.buffer, map);
xen: use host E820 map for dom0 When running as initial domain, get the real physical memory map from xen using the XENMEM_machine_memory_map hypercall and use it to setup the e820 regions. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2010-09-02 15:16:00 +00:00
op = xen_initial_domain() ?
XENMEM_machine_memory_map :
XENMEM_memory_map;
rc = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(op, &memmap);
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
if (rc == -ENOSYS) {
xen: do not release any memory under 1M in domain 0 We already deliberately setup a 1-1 P2M for the region up to 1M in order to allow code which assumes this region is already mapped to work without having to convert everything to ioremap. Domain 0 should not return any apparently unused memory regions (reserved or otherwise) in this region to Xen since the e820 may not accurately reflect what the BIOS has stashed in this region. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-10-28 18:32:29 +00:00
BUG_ON(xen_initial_domain());
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
memmap.nr_entries = 1;
map[0].addr = 0ULL;
map[0].size = mem_end;
/* 8MB slack (to balance backend allocations). */
map[0].size += 8ULL << 20;
map[0].type = E820_RAM;
rc = 0;
}
BUG_ON(rc);
xen: add configurable max domain size Add a config option to set the max size of a Xen domain. This is used to scale the size of the physical-to-machine array; it ends up using around 1 page/GByte, so there's no reason to be very restrictive. For a 32-bit guest, the default value of 8GB is probably sufficient; there's not much point in giving a 32-bit machine much more memory than that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-05-26 22:31:19 +00:00
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 14:42:55 +00:00
/*
* Xen won't allow a 1:1 mapping to be created to UNUSABLE
* regions, so if we're using the machine memory map leave the
* region as RAM as it is in the pseudo-physical map.
*
* UNUSABLE regions in domUs are not handled and will need
* a patch in the future.
*/
if (xen_initial_domain())
xen_ignore_unusable(map, memmap.nr_entries);
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
/* Make sure the Xen-supplied memory map is well-ordered. */
sanitize_e820_map(map, memmap.nr_entries, &memmap.nr_entries);
max_pages = xen_get_max_pages();
if (max_pages > max_pfn)
extra_pages += max_pages - max_pfn;
xen: release all pages within 1-1 p2m mappings In xen_memory_setup() all reserved regions and gaps are set to an identity (1-1) p2m mapping. If an available page has a PFN within one of these 1-1 mappings it will become inaccessible (as it MFN is lost) so release them before setting up the mapping. This can make an additional 256 MiB or more of RAM available (depending on the size of the reserved regions in the memory map) if the initial pages overlap with reserved regions. The 1:1 p2m mappings are also extended to cover partial pages. This fixes an issue with (for example) systems with a BIOS that puts the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on a non-page boundary. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-28 16:46:36 +00:00
/*
* Set P2M for all non-RAM pages and E820 gaps to be identity
* type PFNs. Any RAM pages that would be made inaccesible by
* this are first released.
*/
xen_released_pages = xen_set_identity_and_release(
map, memmap.nr_entries, max_pfn);
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
/*
* Populate back the non-RAM pages and E820 gaps that had been
* released. */
populated = xen_populate_chunk(map, memmap.nr_entries,
max_pfn, &last_pfn, xen_released_pages);
xen/balloon: Subtract from xen_released_pages the count that is populated. We did not take into account that xen_released_pages would be used outside the initial E820 parsing code. As such we would did not subtract from xen_released_pages the count of pages that we had populated back (instead we just did a simple extra_pages = released - populated). The balloon driver uses xen_released_pages to set the initial current_pages count. If this is wrong (too low) then when a new (higher) target is set, the balloon driver will request too many pages from Xen." This fixes errors such as: (XEN) memory.c:133:d0 Could not allocate order=0 extent: id=0 memflags=0 (51 of 512) during bootup and free_memory : 0 where the free_memory should be 128. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Per David's review made the git commit better] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-05-29 16:36:43 +00:00
xen_released_pages -= populated;
extra_pages += xen_released_pages;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 14:07:11 +00:00
if (last_pfn > max_pfn) {
max_pfn = min(MAX_DOMAIN_PAGES, last_pfn);
mem_end = PFN_PHYS(max_pfn);
}
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
/*
* Clamp the amount of extra memory to a EXTRA_MEM_RATIO
* factor the base size. On non-highmem systems, the base
* size is the full initial memory allocation; on highmem it
* is limited to the max size of lowmem, so that it doesn't
* get completely filled.
*
* In principle there could be a problem in lowmem systems if
* the initial memory is also very large with respect to
* lowmem, but we won't try to deal with that here.
*/
extra_pages = min(EXTRA_MEM_RATIO * min(max_pfn, PFN_DOWN(MAXMEM)),
extra_pages);
i = 0;
while (i < memmap.nr_entries) {
u64 addr = map[i].addr;
u64 size = map[i].size;
u32 type = map[i].type;
if (type == E820_RAM) {
if (addr < mem_end) {
size = min(size, mem_end - addr);
} else if (extra_pages) {
size = min(size, (u64)extra_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
extra_pages -= size / PAGE_SIZE;
xen_add_extra_mem(addr, size);
} else
type = E820_UNUSABLE;
xen: don't add extra_pages for RAM after mem_end If an E820 region is entirely beyond mem_end, don't attempt to truncate it and add the truncated pages to extra_pages, as they will be negative. Also, make sure the extra memory region starts after all BIOS provided E820 regions (and in the case of RAM regions, post-clipping). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-09-29 23:54:33 +00:00
}
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
xen_align_and_add_e820_region(addr, size, type);
xen: add extra pages for E820 RAM regions, even if beyond mem_end If an entire E820 RAM region is beyond mem_end, still add its pages to the extra area so that space can be used by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-09-03 00:10:12 +00:00
xen: allow extra memory to be in multiple regions Allow the extra memory (used by the balloon driver) to be in multiple regions (typically two regions, one for low memory and one for high memory). This allows the balloon driver to increase the number of available low pages (if the initial number if pages is small). As a side effect, the algorithm for building the e820 memory map is simpler and more obviously correct as the map supplied by the hypervisor is (almost) used as is (in particular, all reserved regions and gaps are preserved). Only RAM regions are altered and RAM regions above max_pfn + extra_pages are marked as unused (the region is split in two if necessary). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-09-29 11:26:19 +00:00
map[i].addr += size;
map[i].size -= size;
if (map[i].size == 0)
i++;
xen: Use host-provided E820 map Rather than simply using a flat memory map from Xen, use its provided E820 map. This allows the domain builder to tell the domain to reserve space for more pages than those initially provided at domain-build time. It also allows the host to specify holes in the address space (for PCI-passthrough, for example). Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-02-07 03:09:48 +00:00
}
xen: reserve ISA space in e820 map [ TODO: release the underlying memory back to Xen. ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:49 +00:00
x86/xen: set regions above the end of RAM as 1:1 PCI devices may have BARs located above the end of RAM so mark such frames as identity frames in the p2m (instead of the default of missing). PFNs outside the p2m (above MAX_P2M_PFN) are also considered to be identity frames for the same reason. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2014-01-03 15:46:10 +00:00
/*
* Set the rest as identity mapped, in case PCI BARs are
* located here.
*
* PFNs above MAX_P2M_PFN are considered identity mapped as
* well.
*/
set_phys_range_identity(map[i-1].addr / PAGE_SIZE, ~0ul);
xen: reserve ISA space in e820 map [ TODO: release the underlying memory back to Xen. ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:49 +00:00
/*
xen: do not release any memory under 1M in domain 0 We already deliberately setup a 1-1 P2M for the region up to 1M in order to allow code which assumes this region is already mapped to work without having to convert everything to ioremap. Domain 0 should not return any apparently unused memory regions (reserved or otherwise) in this region to Xen since the e820 may not accurately reflect what the BIOS has stashed in this region. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-10-28 18:32:29 +00:00
* In domU, the ISA region is normal, usable memory, but we
* reserve ISA memory anyway because too many things poke
xen: reserve ISA space in e820 map [ TODO: release the underlying memory back to Xen. ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:49 +00:00
* about in there.
*/
e820_add_region(ISA_START_ADDRESS, ISA_END_ADDRESS - ISA_START_ADDRESS,
E820_RESERVED);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
xen: reserve Xen-specific memory in e820 map Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:46 +00:00
/*
* Reserve Xen bits:
* - mfn_list
* - xen_start_info
* See comment above "struct start_info" in <xen/interface/xen.h>
Revert "xen/x86: Workaround 64-bit hypervisor and 32-bit initial domain." and "xen/x86: Use memblock_reserve for sensitive areas." This reverts commit 806c312e50f122c47913145cf884f53dd09d9199 and commit 59b294403e9814e7c1154043567f0d71bac7a511. And also documents setup.c and why we want to do it that way, which is that we tried to make the the memblock_reserve more selective so that it would be clear what region is reserved. Sadly we ran in the problem wherein on a 64-bit hypervisor with a 32-bit initial domain, the pt_base has the cr3 value which is not neccessarily where the pagetable starts! As Jan put it: " Actually, the adjustment turns out to be correct: The page tables for a 32-on-64 dom0 get allocated in the order "first L1", "first L2", "first L3", so the offset to the page table base is indeed 2. When reading xen/include/public/xen.h's comment very strictly, this is not a violation (since there nothing is said that the first thing in the page table space is pointed to by pt_base; I admit that this seems to be implied though, namely do I think that it is implied that the page table space is the range [pt_base, pt_base + nt_pt_frames), whereas that range here indeed is [pt_base - 2, pt_base - 2 + nt_pt_frames), which - without a priori knowledge - the kernel would have difficulty to figure out)." - so lets just fall back to the easy way and reserve the whole region. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-22 17:00:10 +00:00
* We tried to make the the memblock_reserve more selective so
* that it would be clear what region is reserved. Sadly we ran
* in the problem wherein on a 64-bit hypervisor with a 32-bit
* initial domain, the pt_base has the cr3 value which is not
* neccessarily where the pagetable starts! As Jan put it: "
* Actually, the adjustment turns out to be correct: The page
* tables for a 32-on-64 dom0 get allocated in the order "first L1",
* "first L2", "first L3", so the offset to the page table base is
* indeed 2. When reading xen/include/public/xen.h's comment
* very strictly, this is not a violation (since there nothing is said
* that the first thing in the page table space is pointed to by
* pt_base; I admit that this seems to be implied though, namely
* do I think that it is implied that the page table space is the
* range [pt_base, pt_base + nt_pt_frames), whereas that
* range here indeed is [pt_base - 2, pt_base - 2 + nt_pt_frames),
* which - without a priori knowledge - the kernel would have
* difficulty to figure out)." - so lets just fall back to the
* easy way and reserve the whole region.
xen: reserve Xen-specific memory in e820 map Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:46 +00:00
*/
memblock, x86: Replace memblock_x86_reserve/free_range() with generic ones Other than sanity check and debug message, the x86 specific version of memblock reserve/free functions are simple wrappers around the generic versions - memblock_reserve/free(). This patch adds debug messages with caller identification to the generic versions and replaces x86 specific ones and kills them. arch/x86/include/asm/memblock.h and arch/x86/mm/memblock.c are empty after this change and removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1310462166-31469-14-git-send-email-tj@kernel.org Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2011-07-12 09:16:06 +00:00
memblock_reserve(__pa(xen_start_info->mfn_list),
xen_start_info->pt_base - xen_start_info->mfn_list);
xen: reserve Xen-specific memory in e820 map Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-16 21:54:46 +00:00
sanitize_e820_map(e820.map, ARRAY_SIZE(e820.map), &e820.nr_map);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
return "Xen";
}
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
/*
* Set the bit indicating "nosegneg" library variants should be used.
x86_64: further cleanup of 32-bit compat syscall mechanisms AMD only supports "syscall" from 32-bit compat usermode. Intel and Centaur(?) only support "sysenter" from 32-bit compat usermode. Set the X86 feature bits accordingly, and set up the vdso in accordance with those bits. On the offchance we run on in a 64-bit environment which supports neither syscall nor sysenter from 32-bit mode, then fall back to the int $0x80 vdso. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-07-12 09:22:00 +00:00
* We only need to bother in pure 32-bit mode; compat 32-bit processes
* can have un-truncated segments, so wrapping around is allowed.
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
*/
xen: fix section usage in xen-head.S and setup.c additional section for .init.text appending a number. A side effect of this was a section mismatch warning because modpost did not recognize a .init.text section named .init.text.1: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text.head+0x247): Section mismatch: reference to .init.text.1:start_kernel (between 'is386' and 'check_x87') Fix this by hardcoding the "ax" in the pushsection. Thanks to Torlaf for reporting this. Alan Modra provided the hint that made me able to locate the root cause of this warning. And Mike Frysinger told me how to properly fix it using __INIT/__FINIT. Fix following Section mismatch warning in addition: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x14c8): Section mismatch: reference to .init.data:vsyscall_int80_start (between 'fiddle_vdso' and 'xen_setup_features') fiddle_vdso was only used from a __init function - so declare it __init. Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 12:33:25 +00:00
static void __init fiddle_vdso(void)
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
{
x86_64: further cleanup of 32-bit compat syscall mechanisms AMD only supports "syscall" from 32-bit compat usermode. Intel and Centaur(?) only support "sysenter" from 32-bit compat usermode. Set the X86 feature bits accordingly, and set up the vdso in accordance with those bits. On the offchance we run on in a 64-bit environment which supports neither syscall nor sysenter from 32-bit mode, then fall back to the int $0x80 vdso. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-07-12 09:22:00 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
u32 *mask;
mask = VDSO32_SYMBOL(&vdso32_int80_start, NOTE_MASK);
*mask |= 1 << VDSO_NOTE_NONEGSEG_BIT;
mask = VDSO32_SYMBOL(&vdso32_sysenter_start, NOTE_MASK);
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
*mask |= 1 << VDSO_NOTE_NONEGSEG_BIT;
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
#endif
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static int register_callback(unsigned type, const void *func)
xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor does 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-03-17 23:37:17 +00:00
{
xen64: register callbacks in arch-independent way Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:02 +00:00
struct callback_register callback = {
.type = type,
.address = XEN_CALLBACK(__KERNEL_CS, func),
xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor does 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-03-17 23:37:17 +00:00
.flags = CALLBACKF_mask_events,
};
xen64: register callbacks in arch-independent way Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:02 +00:00
return HYPERVISOR_callback_op(CALLBACKOP_register, &callback);
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
void xen_enable_sysenter(void)
xen64: register callbacks in arch-independent way Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:02 +00:00
{
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
int ret;
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
unsigned sysenter_feature;
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
sysenter_feature = X86_FEATURE_SEP;
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
#else
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
sysenter_feature = X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32;
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
#endif
xen64: register callbacks in arch-independent way Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:02 +00:00
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature))
return;
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target);
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
if(ret != 0)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature);
xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor does 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-03-17 23:37:17 +00:00
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
void xen_enable_syscall(void)
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int ret;
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target);
if (ret != 0) {
x86: xen: no need to disable vdso32 Now that the vdso32 code can cope with both syscall and sysenter missing for 32-bit compat processes, just disable the features without disabling vdso altogether. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-07-12 09:22:06 +00:00
printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret);
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
/* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other
mechanism for syscalls. */
}
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) {
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32,
xen_syscall32_target);
x86: xen: no need to disable vdso32 Now that the vdso32 code can cope with both syscall and sysenter missing for 32-bit compat processes, just disable the features without disabling vdso altogether. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2008-07-12 09:22:06 +00:00
if (ret != 0)
xen64: disable 32-bit syscall/sysenter if not supported. Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 23:24:08 +00:00
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
}
xen: delete new instances of added __cpuinit commit 6efa20e49b9cb1db1ab66870cc37323474a75a13 ("xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs") and commit cd9151e26d31048b2b5e00fd02e110e07d2200c9 ( "xen/balloon: set a mapping for ballooned out pages") added new instances of __cpuinit usage. We removed this a couple versions ago; we now want to remove the compat no-op stubs. Introducing new users is not what we want to see at this point in time, as it will break once the stubs are gone. Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-11-08 16:21:51 +00:00
void xen_enable_nmi(void)
xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME - pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN - pv_cpu_ops.iret). That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use the hypervisor iret. The other changes that would be neccessary for this would be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different events. Fortunately for us commit 1db01b4903639fcfaec213701a494fe3fb2c490b (xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right vector value for NMI. With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested x86_64). For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain) we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking of X86_FEATURE_APIC. Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround. Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch does not enable that. CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com> CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments] Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2013-07-19 15:51:31 +00:00
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86, asmlinkage, xen: Fix type of NMI LTO requires consistent types of symbols over all files. So "nmi" cannot be declared as a char [] here, need to use the correct function type. Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1382458079-24450-8-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2013-10-22 16:07:59 +00:00
if (register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_nmi, (char *)nmi))
xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME - pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN - pv_cpu_ops.iret). That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use the hypervisor iret. The other changes that would be neccessary for this would be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different events. Fortunately for us commit 1db01b4903639fcfaec213701a494fe3fb2c490b (xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right vector value for NMI. With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested x86_64). For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain) we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking of X86_FEATURE_APIC. Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround. Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch does not enable that. CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com> CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments] Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2013-07-19 15:51:31 +00:00
BUG();
#endif
}
xen/pvh: Early bootup changes in PV code (v4). We don't use the filtering that 'xen_cpuid' is doing because the hypervisor treats 'XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX' as an invalid instruction. This means that all of the filtering will have to be done in the hypervisor/toolstack. Without the filtering we expose to the guest the: - cpu topology (sockets, cores, etc); - the APERF (which the generic scheduler likes to use), see 5e626254206a709c6e937f3dda69bf26c7344f6f "xen/setup: filter APERFMPERF cpuid feature out" - and the inability to figure out whether MWAIT_LEAF should be exposed or not. See df88b2d96e36d9a9e325bfcd12eb45671cbbc937 "xen/enlighten: Disable MWAIT_LEAF so that acpi-pad won't be loaded." - x2apic, see 4ea9b9aca90cfc71e6872ed3522356755162932c "xen: mask x2APIC feature in PV" We also check for vector callback early on, as it is a required feature. PVH also runs at default kernel IOPL. Finally, pure PV settings are moved to a separate function that are only called for pure PV, ie, pv with pvmmu. They are also #ifdef with CONFIG_XEN_PVMMU. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 17:45:31 +00:00
void __init xen_pvmmu_arch_setup(void)
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
{
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable, VMASST_TYPE_4gb_segments);
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable, VMASST_TYPE_writable_pagetables);
xen/pvh: Early bootup changes in PV code (v4). We don't use the filtering that 'xen_cpuid' is doing because the hypervisor treats 'XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX' as an invalid instruction. This means that all of the filtering will have to be done in the hypervisor/toolstack. Without the filtering we expose to the guest the: - cpu topology (sockets, cores, etc); - the APERF (which the generic scheduler likes to use), see 5e626254206a709c6e937f3dda69bf26c7344f6f "xen/setup: filter APERFMPERF cpuid feature out" - and the inability to figure out whether MWAIT_LEAF should be exposed or not. See df88b2d96e36d9a9e325bfcd12eb45671cbbc937 "xen/enlighten: Disable MWAIT_LEAF so that acpi-pad won't be loaded." - x2apic, see 4ea9b9aca90cfc71e6872ed3522356755162932c "xen: mask x2APIC feature in PV" We also check for vector callback early on, as it is a required feature. PVH also runs at default kernel IOPL. Finally, pure PV settings are moved to a separate function that are only called for pure PV, ie, pv with pvmmu. They are also #ifdef with CONFIG_XEN_PVMMU. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 17:45:31 +00:00
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable,
VMASST_TYPE_pae_extended_cr3);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
xen64: register callbacks in arch-independent way Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:02 +00:00
if (register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_event, xen_hypervisor_callback) ||
register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_failsafe, xen_failsafe_callback))
BUG();
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
xen: support sysenter/sysexit if hypervisor does 64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-03-17 23:37:17 +00:00
xen_enable_sysenter();
xen64: set up syscall and sysenter entrypoints for 64-bit We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-08 22:07:14 +00:00
xen_enable_syscall();
xen: Support 64-bit PV guest receiving NMIs This is based on a patch that Zhenzhong Duan had sent - which was missing some of the remaining pieces. The kernel has the logic to handle Xen-type-exceptions using the paravirt interface in the assembler code (see PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME - pv_irq_ops.adjust_exception_frame and and INTERRUPT_RETURN - pv_cpu_ops.iret). That means the nmi handler (and other exception handlers) use the hypervisor iret. The other changes that would be neccessary for this would be to translate the NMI_VECTOR to one of the entries on the ipi_vector and make xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself use different events. Fortunately for us commit 1db01b4903639fcfaec213701a494fe3fb2c490b (xen: Clean up apic ipi interface) implemented this and we piggyback on the cleanup such that the apic IPI interface will pass the right vector value for NMI. With this patch we can trigger NMIs within a PV guest (only tested x86_64). For this to work with normal PV guests (not initial domain) we need the domain to be able to use the APIC ops - they are already implemented to use the Xen event channels. For that to be turned on in a PV domU we need to remove the masking of X86_FEATURE_APIC. Incidentally that means kgdb will also now work within a PV guest without using the 'nokgdbroundup' workaround. Note that the 32-bit version is different and this patch does not enable that. CC: Lisa Nguyen <lisa@xenapiadmin.com> CC: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> CC: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v1: Fixed up per David Vrabel comments] Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2013-07-19 15:51:31 +00:00
xen_enable_nmi();
xen/pvh: Early bootup changes in PV code (v4). We don't use the filtering that 'xen_cpuid' is doing because the hypervisor treats 'XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX' as an invalid instruction. This means that all of the filtering will have to be done in the hypervisor/toolstack. Without the filtering we expose to the guest the: - cpu topology (sockets, cores, etc); - the APERF (which the generic scheduler likes to use), see 5e626254206a709c6e937f3dda69bf26c7344f6f "xen/setup: filter APERFMPERF cpuid feature out" - and the inability to figure out whether MWAIT_LEAF should be exposed or not. See df88b2d96e36d9a9e325bfcd12eb45671cbbc937 "xen/enlighten: Disable MWAIT_LEAF so that acpi-pad won't be loaded." - x2apic, see 4ea9b9aca90cfc71e6872ed3522356755162932c "xen: mask x2APIC feature in PV" We also check for vector callback early on, as it is a required feature. PVH also runs at default kernel IOPL. Finally, pure PV settings are moved to a separate function that are only called for pure PV, ie, pv with pvmmu. They are also #ifdef with CONFIG_XEN_PVMMU. Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2013-12-13 17:45:31 +00:00
}
/* This function is not called for HVM domains */
void __init xen_arch_setup(void)
{
xen_panic_handler_init();
if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
xen_pvmmu_arch_setup();
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
if (!(xen_start_info->flags & SIF_INITDOMAIN)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ACPI in unprivileged domain disabled\n");
disable_acpi();
}
#endif
memcpy(boot_command_line, xen_start_info->cmd_line,
MAX_GUEST_CMDLINE > COMMAND_LINE_SIZE ?
COMMAND_LINE_SIZE : MAX_GUEST_CMDLINE);
xen: use default_idle We just need the idle loop to drop into safe_halt, which default_idle() is perfectly capable of doing. There's no need to duplicate it. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2010-11-23 01:17:50 +00:00
/* Set up idle, making sure it calls safe_halt() pvop */
cpuidle: replace xen access to x86 pm_idle and default_idle When a Xen Dom0 kernel boots on a hypervisor, it gets access to the raw-hardware ACPI tables. While it parses the idle tables for the hypervisor's beneift, it uses HLT for its own idle. Rather than have xen scribble on pm_idle and access default_idle, have it simply disable_cpuidle() so acpi_idle will not load and architecture default HLT will be used. cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
2011-04-01 22:28:35 +00:00
disable_cpuidle();
xen/cpufreq: Disable the cpu frequency scaling drivers from loading. By using the functionality provided by "[CPUFREQ]: provide disable_cpuidle() function to disable the API." Under the Xen hypervisor we do not want the initial domain to exercise the cpufreq scaling drivers. This is b/c the Xen hypervisor is in charge of doing this as well and we can end up with both the Linux kernel and the hypervisor trying to change the P-states leading to weird performance issues. Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [v2: Fix compile error spotted by Benjamin Schweikert <b.schweikert@googlemail.com>]
2012-03-14 00:06:57 +00:00
disable_cpufreq();
xen idle: make xen-specific macro xen-specific This macro is only invoked by Xen, so make its definition specific to Xen. > set_pm_idle_to_default() < xen_set_default_idle() Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
2013-02-10 04:08:07 +00:00
WARN_ON(xen_set_default_idle());
xen: disable vdso "nosegneg" on native boot One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 07:31:43 +00:00
fiddle_vdso();
xen/boot: Disable NUMA for PV guests. The hypervisor is in charge of allocating the proper "NUMA" memory and dealing with the CPU scheduler to keep them bound to the proper NUMA node. The PV guests (and PVHVM) have no inkling of where they run and do not need to know that right now. In the future we will need to inject NUMA configuration data (if a guest spans two or more NUMA nodes) so that the kernel can make the right choices. But those patches are not yet present. In the meantime, disable the NUMA capability in the PV guest, which also fixes a bootup issue. Andre says: "we see Dom0 crashes due to the kernel detecting the NUMA topology not by ACPI, but directly from the northbridge (CONFIG_AMD_NUMA). This will detect the actual NUMA config of the physical machine, but will crash about the mismatch with Dom0's virtual memory. Variation of the theme: Dom0 sees what it's not supposed to see. This happens with the said config option enabled and on a machine where this scanning is still enabled (K8 and Fam10h, not Bulldozer class) We have this dump then: NUMA: Warning: node ids are out of bound, from=-1 to=-1 distance=10 Scanning NUMA topology in Northbridge 24 Number of physical nodes 4 Node 0 MemBase 0000000000000000 Limit 0000000040000000 Node 1 MemBase 0000000040000000 Limit 0000000138000000 Node 2 MemBase 0000000138000000 Limit 00000001f8000000 Node 3 MemBase 00000001f8000000 Limit 0000000238000000 Initmem setup node 0 0000000000000000-0000000040000000 NODE_DATA [000000003ffd9000 - 000000003fffffff] Initmem setup node 1 0000000040000000-0000000138000000 NODE_DATA [0000000137fd9000 - 0000000137ffffff] Initmem setup node 2 0000000138000000-00000001f8000000 NODE_DATA [00000001f095e000 - 00000001f0984fff] Initmem setup node 3 00000001f8000000-0000000238000000 Cannot find 159744 bytes in node 3 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.3.6 #1 AMD Dinar/Dinar RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81d220e6>] [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 .. snip.. [<ffffffff81d23024>] sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x64/0x178 [<ffffffff81d23348>] sparse_init+0xe4/0x25a [<ffffffff81d16840>] paging_init+0x13/0x22 [<ffffffff81d07fbb>] setup_arch+0x9c6/0xa9b [<ffffffff81683954>] ? printk+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff81d01a38>] start_kernel+0xe5/0x468 [<ffffffff81d012cf>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff81007153>] ? xen_setup_runstate_info+0x2c/0x36 [<ffffffff81d050ee>] xen_start_kernel+0x565/0x56c " so we just disable NUMA scanning by setting numa_off=1. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 14:22:37 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
numa_off = 1;
#endif
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 01:37:04 +00:00
}
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