2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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* linux/arch/x86_64/entry.S
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002 Andi Kleen SuSE Labs
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
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*/
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/*
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* entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines.
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*
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2011-06-05 17:50:18 +00:00
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* Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt
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*
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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* NOTE: This code handles signal-recognition, which happens every time
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* after an interrupt and after each system call.
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2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
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*
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* A note on terminology:
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* - top of stack: Architecture defined interrupt frame from SS to RIP
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* at the top of the kernel process stack.
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2011-03-17 19:24:16 +00:00
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* - partial stack frame: partially saved registers up to R11.
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2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
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* - full stack frame: Like partial stack frame, but all register saved.
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2006-09-26 08:52:29 +00:00
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*
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* Some macro usage:
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* - CFI macros are used to generate dwarf2 unwind information for better
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* backtraces. They don't change any code.
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* - ENTRY/END Define functions in the symbol table.
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* - FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK/RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK - Fix up the hardware stack
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* frame that is otherwise undefined after a SYSCALL
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* - TRACE_IRQ_* - Trace hard interrupt state for lock debugging.
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2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
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* - idtentry - Define exception entry points.
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*/
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/cache.h>
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#include <asm/errno.h>
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#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
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#include <asm/calling.h>
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2005-09-09 19:28:48 +00:00
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#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
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2009-02-13 19:14:01 +00:00
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#include <asm/page_types.h>
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2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
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#include <asm/irqflags.h>
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2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
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#include <asm/paravirt.h>
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2009-01-13 11:41:35 +00:00
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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2012-04-20 19:19:50 +00:00
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#include <asm/asm.h>
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2012-11-27 18:33:25 +00:00
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#include <asm/context_tracking.h>
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2012-09-21 19:43:12 +00:00
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#include <asm/smap.h>
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x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
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#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
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2012-01-03 19:23:06 +00:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2008-06-23 22:37:04 +00:00
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/* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying <linux/audit.h> just for this. */
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#include <linux/elf-em.h>
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.code64
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2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
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.section .entry.text, "ax"
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2008-05-12 19:20:42 +00:00
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2005-04-16 22:25:05 +00:00
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#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#define retint_kernel retint_restore_args
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2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
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#endif
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2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
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2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
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2008-06-25 04:19:28 +00:00
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ENTRY(native_usergs_sysret64)
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2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
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swapgs
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sysretq
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2009-02-23 19:57:00 +00:00
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ENDPROC(native_usergs_sysret64)
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2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
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2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
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2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
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.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
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2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
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2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
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bt $9,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
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2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
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jnc 1f
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TRACE_IRQS_ON
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1:
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#endif
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.endm
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2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
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/*
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* When dynamic function tracer is enabled it will add a breakpoint
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* to all locations that it is about to modify, sync CPUs, update
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* all the code, sync CPUs, then remove the breakpoints. In this time
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* if lockdep is enabled, it might jump back into the debug handler
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* outside the updating of the IST protection. (TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF).
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*
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* We need to change the IDT table before calling TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF to
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* make sure the stack pointer does not get reset back to the top
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* of the debug stack, and instead just reuses the current stack.
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*/
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#if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) && defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS)
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.macro TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
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call debug_stack_set_zero
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TRACE_IRQS_OFF
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call debug_stack_reset
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.endm
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.macro TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG
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call debug_stack_set_zero
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TRACE_IRQS_ON
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call debug_stack_reset
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.endm
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2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
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.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
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bt $9,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
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2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
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jnc 1f
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TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG
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1:
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.endm
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#else
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# define TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_OFF
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# define TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_ON
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# define TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
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#endif
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
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* C code is not supposed to know that the iret frame is not populated.
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* Every time a C function with an pt_regs argument is called from
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* the SYSCALL based fast path FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK is needed.
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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* RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK syncs the syscall state after any possible ptregs
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* manipulation.
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2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
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*/
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2008-11-21 15:41:55 +00:00
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.macro FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK tmp offset=0
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movq $__USER_DS,SS+\offset(%rsp)
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movq $__USER_CS,CS+\offset(%rsp)
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2015-01-17 00:19:27 +00:00
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movq RIP+\offset(%rsp),\tmp /* get rip */
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movq \tmp,RCX+\offset(%rsp) /* copy it to rcx as sysret would do */
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2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
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movq EFLAGS+\offset(%rsp),\tmp /* ditto for rflags->r11 */
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movq \tmp,R11+\offset(%rsp)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.endm
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2008-11-21 15:41:55 +00:00
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.macro RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK tmp offset=0
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2015-03-09 18:39:23 +00:00
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/* nothing to do */
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.endm
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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/*
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2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
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* empty frame
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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*/
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.macro EMPTY_FRAME start=1 offset=0
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2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
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.if \start
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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CFI_STARTPROC simple
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2006-09-26 08:52:41 +00:00
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CFI_SIGNAL_FRAME
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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CFI_DEF_CFA rsp,8+\offset
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2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
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.else
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET 8+\offset
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2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
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.endif
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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.endm
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x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
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/*
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
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* initial frame state for interrupts (and exceptions without error code)
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x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
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*/
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2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro INTR_FRAME start=1 offset=0
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
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|
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EMPTY_FRAME \start, 5*8+\offset
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/*CFI_REL_OFFSET ss, 4*8+\offset*/
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CFI_REL_OFFSET rsp, 3*8+\offset
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/*CFI_REL_OFFSET rflags, 2*8+\offset*/
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/*CFI_REL_OFFSET cs, 1*8+\offset*/
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CFI_REL_OFFSET rip, 0*8+\offset
|
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* initial frame state for exceptions with error code (and interrupts
|
|
|
|
* with vector already pushed)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro XCPT_FRAME start=1 offset=0
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME \start, 1*8+\offset
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* frame that enables passing a complete pt_regs to a C function.
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro DEFAULT_FRAME start=1 offset=0
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
XCPT_FRAME \start, ORIG_RAX+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdi, RDI+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rsi, RSI+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdx, RDX+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rcx, RCX+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rax, RAX+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r8, R8+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r9, R9+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r10, R10+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r11, R11+\offset
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbx, RBX+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbp, RBP+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r12, R12+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r13, R13+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r14, R14+\offset
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r15, R15+\offset
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* 64bit SYSCALL instruction entry. Up to 6 arguments in registers.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* 64bit SYSCALL saves rip to rcx, clears rflags.RF, then saves rflags to r11,
|
|
|
|
* then loads new ss, cs, and rip from previously programmed MSRs.
|
|
|
|
* rflags gets masked by a value from another MSR (so CLD and CLAC
|
|
|
|
* are not needed). SYSCALL does not save anything on the stack
|
|
|
|
* and does not change rsp.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Registers on entry:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* rax system call number
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* rcx return address
|
|
|
|
* r11 saved rflags (note: r11 is callee-clobbered register in C ABI)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* rdi arg0
|
|
|
|
* rsi arg1
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* rdx arg2
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* r10 arg3 (needs to be moved to rcx to conform to C ABI)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* r8 arg4
|
|
|
|
* r9 arg5
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* (note: r12-r15,rbp,rbx are callee-preserved in C ABI)
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Interrupts are off on entry.
|
|
|
|
* Only called from user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2006-04-07 17:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* When user can change the frames always force IRET. That is because
|
|
|
|
* it deals with uncanonical addresses better. SYSRET has trouble
|
|
|
|
* with them due to bugs in both AMD and Intel CPUs.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(system_call)
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC simple
|
2006-09-26 08:52:41 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_SIGNAL_FRAME
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA rsp,KERNEL_STACK_OFFSET
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REGISTER rip,rcx
|
|
|
|
/*CFI_REGISTER rflags,r11*/
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A hypervisor implementation might want to use a label
|
|
|
|
* after the swapgs, so that it can do the swapgs
|
|
|
|
* for the guest and jump here on syscall.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-11-29 11:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
GLOBAL(system_call_after_swapgs)
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp,PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp)
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* kernel_stack is set so that 5 slots (iret frame) are preallocated */
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(kernel_stack),%rsp
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK 8 /* +8: space for orig_ax */
|
2015-03-09 18:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rcx,RIP(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp),%rcx
|
|
|
|
movq %r11,EFLAGS(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
movq %rcx,RSP(%rsp)
|
2015-03-17 13:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No need to follow this irqs off/on section - it's straight
|
|
|
|
* and short:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2015-03-09 18:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
movq_cfi rax,ORIG_RAX
|
2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RAX_RCX_R11
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rip,RIP
|
|
|
|
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz tracesys
|
2008-06-23 22:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
system_call_fastpath:
|
2012-02-19 15:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
|
2012-02-19 15:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
andl $__SYSCALL_MASK,%eax
|
|
|
|
cmpl $__NR_syscall_max,%eax
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-09-05 22:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ja ret_from_sys_call /* and return regs->ax */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %r10,%rcx
|
|
|
|
call *sys_call_table(,%rax,8) # XXX: rip relative
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Syscall return path ending with SYSRET (fast path)
|
2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
|
|
|
* Has incompletely filled pt_regs, iret frame is also incomplete.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ret_from_sys_call:
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP)
|
2014-07-07 18:37:17 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz int_ret_from_sys_call_fixup /* Go the the slow path */
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-11 20:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2006-12-07 01:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sysretq will re-enable interrupts:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_ON
|
2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
|
|
|
|
movq RIP(%rsp),%rcx
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REGISTER rip,rcx
|
2015-03-09 18:39:21 +00:00
|
|
|
movq EFLAGS(%rsp),%r11
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*CFI_REGISTER rflags,r11*/
|
2015-03-09 18:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
movq RSP(%rsp),%rsp
|
2015-02-26 22:40:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* 64bit SYSRET restores rip from rcx,
|
|
|
|
* rflags from r11 (but RF and VM bits are forced to 0),
|
|
|
|
* cs and ss are loaded from MSRs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-06-25 04:19:28 +00:00
|
|
|
USERGS_SYSRET64
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-12-07 01:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-07 18:37:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int_ret_from_sys_call_fixup:
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
2014-07-07 18:37:17 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
2008-06-23 22:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Do syscall tracing */
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
tracesys:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
2014-09-05 22:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
movq $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, %rsi
|
|
|
|
call syscall_trace_enter_phase1
|
|
|
|
test %rax, %rax
|
|
|
|
jnz tracesys_phase2 /* if needed, run the slow path */
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RAX /* else restore clobbered regs */
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rax
|
2014-09-05 22:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp system_call_fastpath /* and return to the fast path */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tracesys_phase2:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
|
2014-09-05 22:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
|
|
movq $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, %rsi
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,%rdx
|
|
|
|
call syscall_trace_enter_phase2
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-09 09:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Reload registers from stack in case ptrace changed them.
|
2014-09-05 22:13:56 +00:00
|
|
|
* We don't reload %rax because syscall_trace_entry_phase2() returned
|
2008-07-09 09:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* the value it wants us to use in the table lookup.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RAX
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2012-02-19 15:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
|
2012-02-19 15:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
andl $__SYSCALL_MASK,%eax
|
|
|
|
cmpl $__NR_syscall_max,%eax
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-09-05 22:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ja int_ret_from_sys_call /* RAX(%rsp) is already set */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %r10,%rcx /* fixup for C */
|
|
|
|
call *sys_call_table(,%rax,8)
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
2006-04-07 17:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Use IRET because user could have changed frame */
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Syscall return path ending with IRET.
|
|
|
|
* Has correct top of stack, but partial stack frame.
|
2006-12-07 01:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-02-23 19:57:01 +00:00
|
|
|
GLOBAL(int_ret_from_sys_call)
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
movl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK,%edi
|
|
|
|
/* edi: mask to check */
|
2009-02-23 19:57:01 +00:00
|
|
|
GLOBAL(int_with_check)
|
2007-10-11 20:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
2008-06-24 14:19:35 +00:00
|
|
|
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
andl %edi,%edx
|
|
|
|
jnz int_careful
|
2008-06-24 14:19:35 +00:00
|
|
|
andl $~TS_COMPAT,TI_status(%rcx)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp retint_swapgs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Either reschedule or signal or syscall exit tracking needed. */
|
|
|
|
/* First do a reschedule test. */
|
|
|
|
/* edx: work, edi: workmask */
|
|
|
|
int_careful:
|
|
|
|
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%edx
|
|
|
|
jnc int_very_careful
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_ON
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdi
|
2012-07-11 18:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
SCHEDULE_USER
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rdi
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_with_check
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* handle signals and tracing -- both require a full stack frame */
|
|
|
|
int_very_careful:
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_ON
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check for syscall exit trace */
|
2008-07-09 09:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT,%edx
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jz int_signal
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdi
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
leaq 8(%rsp),%rdi # &ptregs -> arg1
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
call syscall_trace_leave
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rdi
|
2008-07-09 09:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
andl $~(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT|_TIF_SYSCALL_EMU),%edi
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_restore_rest
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int_signal:
|
2008-01-25 20:08:29 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $_TIF_DO_NOTIFY_MASK,%edx
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jz 1f
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi # &ptregs -> arg1
|
|
|
|
xorl %esi,%esi # oldset -> arg2
|
|
|
|
call do_notify_resume
|
x86_64: fix delayed signals
On three of the several paths in entry_64.S that call
do_notify_resume() on the way back to user mode, we fail to properly
check again for newly-arrived work that requires another call to
do_notify_resume() before going to user mode. These paths set the
mask to check only _TIF_NEED_RESCHED, but this is wrong. The other
paths that lead to do_notify_resume() do this correctly already, and
entry_32.S does it correctly in all cases.
All paths back to user mode have to check all the _TIF_WORK_MASK
flags at the last possible stage, with interrupts disabled.
Otherwise, we miss any flags (TIF_SIGPENDING for example) that were
set any time after we entered do_notify_resume(). More work flags
can be set (or left set) synchronously inside do_notify_resume(), as
TIF_SIGPENDING can be, or asynchronously by interrupts or other CPUs
(which then send an asynchronous interrupt).
There are many different scenarios that could hit this bug, most of
them races. The simplest one to demonstrate does not require any
race: when one signal has done handler setup at the check before
returning from a syscall, and there is another signal pending that
should be handled. The second signal's handler should interrupt the
first signal handler before it actually starts (so the interrupted PC
is still at the handler's entry point). Instead, it runs away until
the next kernel entry (next syscall, tick, etc).
This test behaves correctly on 32-bit kernels, and fails on 64-bit
(either 32-bit or 64-bit test binary). With this fix, it works.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ucontext.h>
#ifndef REG_RIP
#define REG_RIP REG_EIP
#endif
static sig_atomic_t hit1, hit2;
static void
handler (int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx)
{
ucontext_t *uc = ctx;
if ((void *) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] == &handler)
{
if (sig == SIGUSR1)
hit1 = 1;
else
hit2 = 1;
}
printf ("%s at %#lx\n", strsignal (sig),
uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP]);
}
int
main (void)
{
struct sigaction sa;
sigset_t set;
sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
sa.sa_sigaction = &handler;
if (sigaction (SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL)
|| sigaction (SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL))
return 2;
sigemptyset (&set);
sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR1);
sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR2);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL))
return 3;
printf ("main at %p, handler at %p\n", &main, &handler);
raise (SIGUSR1);
raise (SIGUSR2);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL))
return 4;
if (hit1 + hit2 == 1)
{
puts ("PASS");
return 0;
}
puts ("FAIL");
return 1;
}
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 21:50:39 +00:00
|
|
|
1: movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int_restore_rest:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_with_check
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2006-12-07 01:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
END(system_call)
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-23 02:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro FORK_LIKE func
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_\func)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0, 8 /* offset 8: return address */
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
|
2012-10-23 02:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8
|
|
|
|
call sys_\func
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ret
|
2012-10-23 02:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(stub_\func)
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FORK_LIKE clone
|
|
|
|
FORK_LIKE fork
|
|
|
|
FORK_LIKE vfork
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_execve)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
2010-09-02 12:52:45 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
call sys_execve
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2006-06-26 11:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
END(stub_execve)
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_execveat)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
call sys_execveat
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(stub_execveat)
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sigreturn is special because it needs to restore all registers on return.
|
|
|
|
* This cannot be done with SYSRET, so use the IRET return path instead.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_rt_sigreturn)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
call sys_rt_sigreturn
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp) # fixme, this could be done at the higher layer
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2006-06-26 11:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
END(stub_rt_sigreturn)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-19 17:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_x32_rt_sigreturn)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2012-02-19 17:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
call sys32_x32_rt_sigreturn
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp) # fixme, this could be done at the higher layer
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2012-02-19 17:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(stub_x32_rt_sigreturn)
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-19 18:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_x32_execve)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2012-02-19 18:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
2012-08-02 19:05:11 +00:00
|
|
|
call compat_sys_execve
|
2012-02-19 18:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2012-02-19 18:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(stub_x32_execve)
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(stub_x32_execveat)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
|
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
call compat_sys_execveat
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2014-12-13 00:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(stub_x32_execveat)
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-19 17:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A newly forked process directly context switches into this address.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* rdi: prev task we switched from
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
|
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LOCK ; btr $TIF_FORK,TI_flags(%r8)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $0x0002
|
|
|
|
popfq_cfi # reset kernel eflags
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
call schedule_tail # rdi: 'prev' task parameter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
testl $3,CS(%rsp) # from kernel_thread?
|
|
|
|
jz 1f
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* By the time we get here, we have no idea whether our pt_regs,
|
|
|
|
* ti flags, and ti status came from the 64-bit SYSCALL fast path,
|
|
|
|
* the slow path, or one of the ia32entry paths.
|
|
|
|
* Use int_ret_from_sys_call to return, since it can safely handle
|
|
|
|
* all of the above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
2015-02-26 22:40:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1:
|
|
|
|
movq %rbp, %rdi
|
|
|
|
call *%rbx
|
|
|
|
movl $0, RAX(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
|
|
|
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(ret_from_fork)
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Build the entry stubs and pointer table with some assembler magic.
|
|
|
|
* We pack 7 stubs into a single 32-byte chunk, which will fit in a
|
|
|
|
* single cache line on all modern x86 implementations.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
.section .init.rodata,"a"
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(interrupt)
|
2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
|
|
|
.section .entry.text
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
.p2align 5
|
|
|
|
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(irq_entries_start)
|
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME
|
|
|
|
vector=FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
|
2014-11-03 08:39:43 +00:00
|
|
|
.rept (FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR-FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR+6)/7
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
.balign 32
|
|
|
|
.rept 7
|
2014-11-03 08:39:43 +00:00
|
|
|
.if vector < FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR
|
2008-11-12 18:27:35 +00:00
|
|
|
.if vector <> FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -8
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
1: pushq_cfi $(~vector+0x80) /* Note: always in signed byte range */
|
2008-11-12 18:27:35 +00:00
|
|
|
.if ((vector-FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR)%7) <> 6
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp 2f
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
.previous
|
|
|
|
.quad 1b
|
2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
|
|
|
.section .entry.text
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
vector=vector+1
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
.endr
|
|
|
|
2: jmp common_interrupt
|
|
|
|
.endr
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(irq_entries_start)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.previous
|
|
|
|
END(interrupt)
|
|
|
|
.previous
|
|
|
|
|
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Interrupt entry/exit.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Interrupt entry points save only callee clobbered registers in fast path.
|
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros
Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for
the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line
for the zeroentry and errorentry macros.
The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy
to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch
code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the
calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80)
on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt:
<common_interrupt>:
(5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ>
<ret_from_intr>:
...
An apic interrupt stub now look like this:
<thermal_interrupt>:
(5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */
(4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args>
(5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt>
(5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr>
Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes
simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub
for an exception without errorcode looks like this:
<overflow>:
(6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */
(5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
And one for an exception with errorcode like this:
<segment_not_present>:
(6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38>
(4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */
(5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry>
(3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
(5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */
(9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */
(5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present>
(5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit>
Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space
savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration,
and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels
were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of
the exception handlers).
Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine
was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between
(almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much
time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured
delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent
outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were
started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added.
For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle
condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0.
Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs
for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there
are small differences.
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Entry runs with interrupts off.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 12:50:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/* 0(%rsp): ~(interrupt number) */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro interrupt func
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
cld
|
2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since nothing in interrupt handling code touches r12...r15 members
|
|
|
|
* of "struct pt_regs", and since interrupts can nest, we can save
|
|
|
|
* four stack slots and simultaneously provide
|
|
|
|
* an unwind-friendly stack layout by saving "truncated" pt_regs
|
|
|
|
* exactly up to rbp slot, without these members.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK -RBP
|
|
|
|
SAVE_C_REGS -RBP
|
|
|
|
/* this goes to 0(%rsp) for unwinder, not for saving the value: */
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS_RBP -RBP
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
leaq -RBP(%rsp),%rdi /* arg1 for \func (pointer to pt_regs) */
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $3, CS-RBP(%rsp)
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
je 1f
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
1:
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Save previous stack pointer, optionally switch to interrupt stack.
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack
|
|
|
|
* or not. While this is essentially redundant with preempt_count it is
|
|
|
|
* a little cheaper to use a separate counter in the PDA (short of
|
|
|
|
* moving irq_enter into assembly, which would be too much work)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rsi
|
|
|
|
incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
cmovzq PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsi
|
|
|
|
pushq %rsi
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For debugger:
|
|
|
|
* "CFA (Current Frame Address) is the value on stack + offset"
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ESCAPE 0x0f /* DW_CFA_def_cfa_expression */, 6, \
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
0x77 /* DW_OP_breg7 (rsp) */, 0, \
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
0x06 /* DW_OP_deref */, \
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
0x08 /* DW_OP_const1u */, SIZEOF_PTREGS-RBP, \
|
2015-01-08 16:25:15 +00:00
|
|
|
0x22 /* DW_OP_plus */
|
|
|
|
/* We entered an interrupt context - irqs are off: */
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
call \func
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 12:50:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The interrupt stubs push (~vector+0x80) onto the stack and
|
|
|
|
* then jump to common_interrupt.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-11 21:51:52 +00:00
|
|
|
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
|
|
|
|
common_interrupt:
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
XCPT_FRAME
|
2012-11-02 11:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ASM_CLAC
|
2008-11-13 12:50:20 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $-0x80,(%rsp) /* Adjust vector to [-256,-1] range */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
interrupt do_IRQ
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* 0(%rsp): old_rsp */
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
ret_from_intr:
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2011-01-06 14:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Restore saved previous stack */
|
|
|
|
popq %rsi
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA rsi,SIZEOF_PTREGS-RBP /* reg/off reset after def_cfa_expr */
|
2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* return code expects complete pt_regs - adjust rsp accordingly: */
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
leaq -RBP(%rsi),%rsp
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET RBP
|
2011-01-06 14:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
exit_intr:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $3,CS(%rsp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
je retint_kernel
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Interrupt came from user space */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Has a correct top of stack.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* %rcx: thread info. Interrupts off.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
retint_with_reschedule:
|
|
|
|
movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
retint_check:
|
2007-10-11 20:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
|
2008-06-24 14:19:35 +00:00
|
|
|
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
andl %edi,%edx
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz retint_careful
|
2007-10-11 20:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retint_swapgs: /* return to user-space */
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The iretq could re-enable interrupts:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try to use SYSRET instead of IRET if we're returning to
|
|
|
|
* a completely clean 64-bit userspace context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq RCX(%rsp),%rcx
|
|
|
|
cmpq %rcx,RIP(%rsp) /* RCX == RIP */
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* On Intel CPUs, sysret with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP
|
|
|
|
* in kernel space. This essentially lets the user take over
|
|
|
|
* the kernel, since userspace controls RSP. It's not worth
|
|
|
|
* testing for canonicalness exactly -- this check detects any
|
|
|
|
* of the 17 high bits set, which is true for non-canonical
|
|
|
|
* or kernel addresses. (This will pessimize vsyscall=native.
|
|
|
|
* Big deal.)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If virtual addresses ever become wider, this will need
|
|
|
|
* to be updated to remain correct on both old and new CPUs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
.ifne __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT - 47
|
|
|
|
.error "virtual address width changed -- sysret checks need update"
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx
|
|
|
|
jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq $__USER_CS,CS(%rsp) /* CS must match SYSRET */
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
movq R11(%rsp),%r11
|
|
|
|
cmpq %r11,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* R11 == RFLAGS */
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
testq $X86_EFLAGS_RF,%r11 /* sysret can't restore RF */
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* nothing to check for RSP */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq $__USER_DS,SS(%rsp) /* SS must match SYSRET */
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We win! This label is here just for ease of understanding
|
|
|
|
* perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
irq_return_via_sysret:
|
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
2015-02-26 22:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* r11 is already restored (see code above) */
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_R11
|
|
|
|
movq RSP(%rsp),%rsp
|
x86_64, entry: Use sysret to return to userspace when possible
The x86_64 entry code currently jumps through complex and
inconsistent hoops to try to minimize the impact of syscall exit
work. For a true fast-path syscall, almost nothing needs to be
done, so returning is just a check for exit work and sysret. For a
full slow-path return from a syscall, the C exit hook is invoked if
needed and we join the iret path.
Using iret to return to userspace is very slow, so the entry code
has accumulated various special cases to try to do certain forms of
exit work without invoking iret. This is error-prone, since it
duplicates assembly code paths, and it's dangerous, since sysret
can malfunction in interesting ways if used carelessly. It's
also inefficient, since a lot of useful cases aren't optimized
and therefore force an iret out of a combination of paranoia and
the fact that no one has bothered to write even more asm code
to avoid it.
I would argue that this approach is backwards. Rather than trying
to avoid the iret path, we should instead try to make the iret path
fast. Under a specific set of conditions, iret is unnecessary. In
particular, if RIP==RCX, RFLAGS==R11, RIP is canonical, RF is not
set, and both SS and CS are as expected, then
movq 32(%rsp),%rsp;sysret does the same thing as iret. This set of
conditions is nearly always satisfied on return from syscalls, and
it can even occasionally be satisfied on return from an irq.
Even with the careful checks for sysret applicability, this cuts
nearly 80ns off of the overhead from syscalls with unoptimized exit
work. This includes tracing and context tracking, and any return
that invokes KVM's user return notifier. For example, the cost of
getpid with CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE=y drops from ~360ns to
~280ns on my computer.
This may allow the removal and even eventual conversion to C
of a respectable amount of exit asm.
This may require further tweaking to give the full benefit on Xen.
It may be worthwhile to adjust signal delivery and exec to try hit
the sysret path.
This does not optimize returns to 32-bit userspace. Making the same
optimization for CS == __USER32_CS is conceptually straightforward,
but it will require some tedious code to handle the differences
between sysretl and sysexitl.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71428f63e681e1b4aa1a781e3ef7c27f027d1103.1421453410.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-22 19:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
USERGS_SYSRET64
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
opportunistic_sysret_failed:
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp restore_args
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-11 20:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
retint_restore_args: /* return to kernel space */
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The iretq could re-enable interrupts:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
|
|
|
|
restore_args:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS
|
|
|
|
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
|
2008-02-09 22:24:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-13 21:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
irq_return:
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
INTERRUPT_RETURN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(native_iret)
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Are we returning to a stack segment from the LDT? Note: in
|
|
|
|
* 64-bit mode SS:RSP on the exception stack is always valid.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-05-04 17:36:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
testb $4,(SS-RIP)(%rsp)
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz native_irq_return_ldt
|
2014-05-04 17:36:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-23 02:00:31 +00:00
|
|
|
.global native_irq_return_iret
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
native_irq_return_iret:
|
x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret
It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-23 02:00:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This may fault. Non-paranoid faults on return to userspace are
|
|
|
|
* handled by fixup_bad_iret. These include #SS, #GP, and #NP.
|
|
|
|
* Double-faults due to espfix64 are handled in do_double_fault.
|
|
|
|
* Other faults here are fatal.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
iretq
|
2008-02-09 22:24:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-04 17:36:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
native_irq_return_ldt:
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rax
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdi
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr),%rdi
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(0*8)(%rdi) /* RAX */
|
|
|
|
movq (2*8)(%rsp),%rax /* RIP */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(1*8)(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
movq (3*8)(%rsp),%rax /* CS */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(2*8)(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
movq (4*8)(%rsp),%rax /* RFLAGS */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(3*8)(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
movq (6*8)(%rsp),%rax /* SS */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(5*8)(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
movq (5*8)(%rsp),%rax /* RSP */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,(4*8)(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
andl $0xffff0000,%eax
|
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rdi
|
|
|
|
orq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_stack),%rax
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,%rsp
|
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rax
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp native_irq_return_iret
|
2014-05-04 17:36:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* edi: workmask, edx: work */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
retint_careful:
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%edx
|
|
|
|
jnc retint_signal
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_ON
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdi
|
2012-07-11 18:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
SCHEDULE_USER
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rdi
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp retint_check
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
retint_signal:
|
2008-01-25 20:08:29 +00:00
|
|
|
testl $_TIF_DO_NOTIFY_MASK,%edx
|
2005-05-17 04:53:19 +00:00
|
|
|
jz retint_swapgs
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_ON
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
|
2005-07-29 04:15:48 +00:00
|
|
|
xorl %esi,%esi # oldset
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi # &pt_regs
|
|
|
|
call do_notify_resume
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2005-05-01 15:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
x86_64: fix delayed signals
On three of the several paths in entry_64.S that call
do_notify_resume() on the way back to user mode, we fail to properly
check again for newly-arrived work that requires another call to
do_notify_resume() before going to user mode. These paths set the
mask to check only _TIF_NEED_RESCHED, but this is wrong. The other
paths that lead to do_notify_resume() do this correctly already, and
entry_32.S does it correctly in all cases.
All paths back to user mode have to check all the _TIF_WORK_MASK
flags at the last possible stage, with interrupts disabled.
Otherwise, we miss any flags (TIF_SIGPENDING for example) that were
set any time after we entered do_notify_resume(). More work flags
can be set (or left set) synchronously inside do_notify_resume(), as
TIF_SIGPENDING can be, or asynchronously by interrupts or other CPUs
(which then send an asynchronous interrupt).
There are many different scenarios that could hit this bug, most of
them races. The simplest one to demonstrate does not require any
race: when one signal has done handler setup at the check before
returning from a syscall, and there is another signal pending that
should be handled. The second signal's handler should interrupt the
first signal handler before it actually starts (so the interrupted PC
is still at the handler's entry point). Instead, it runs away until
the next kernel entry (next syscall, tick, etc).
This test behaves correctly on 32-bit kernels, and fails on 64-bit
(either 32-bit or 64-bit test binary). With this fix, it works.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ucontext.h>
#ifndef REG_RIP
#define REG_RIP REG_EIP
#endif
static sig_atomic_t hit1, hit2;
static void
handler (int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx)
{
ucontext_t *uc = ctx;
if ((void *) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] == &handler)
{
if (sig == SIGUSR1)
hit1 = 1;
else
hit2 = 1;
}
printf ("%s at %#lx\n", strsignal (sig),
uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP]);
}
int
main (void)
{
struct sigaction sa;
sigset_t set;
sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
sa.sa_sigaction = &handler;
if (sigaction (SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL)
|| sigaction (SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL))
return 2;
sigemptyset (&set);
sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR1);
sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR2);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL))
return 3;
printf ("main at %p, handler at %p\n", &main, &handler);
raise (SIGUSR1);
raise (SIGUSR2);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL))
return 4;
if (hit1 + hit2 == 1)
{
puts ("PASS");
return 0;
}
puts ("FAIL");
return 1;
}
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 21:50:39 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp retint_with_reschedule
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
/* Returning to kernel space. Check if we need preemption */
|
|
|
|
/* rcx: threadinfo. interrupts off. */
|
2006-09-26 08:52:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(retint_kernel)
|
2013-08-14 12:51:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpl $0,PER_CPU_VAR(__preempt_count)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz retint_restore_args
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
bt $9,EFLAGS(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jnc retint_restore_args
|
|
|
|
call preempt_schedule_irq
|
|
|
|
jmp exit_intr
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2006-06-26 11:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
END(common_interrupt)
|
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-29 23:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* APIC interrupts.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro apicinterrupt3 num sym do_sym
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(\sym)
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME
|
2012-11-02 11:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ASM_CLAC
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $~(\num)
|
2011-11-29 11:03:46 +00:00
|
|
|
.Lcommon_\sym:
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
interrupt \do_sym
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp ret_from_intr
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
END(\sym)
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
|
|
|
|
#define trace(sym) trace_##sym
|
|
|
|
#define smp_trace(sym) smp_trace_##sym
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.macro trace_apicinterrupt num sym
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 \num trace(\sym) smp_trace(\sym)
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
.macro trace_apicinterrupt num sym do_sym
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.macro apicinterrupt num sym do_sym
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 \num \sym \do_sym
|
|
|
|
trace_apicinterrupt \num \sym
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR \
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
irq_move_cleanup_interrupt smp_irq_move_cleanup_interrupt
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 REBOOT_VECTOR \
|
x86: fix panic with interrupts off (needed for MCE)
For some time each panic() called with interrupts disabled
triggered the !irqs_disabled() WARN_ON in smp_call_function(),
producing ugly backtraces and confusing users.
This is a common situation with machine checks for example which
tend to call panic with interrupts disabled, but will also hit
in other situations e.g. panic during early boot. In fact it
means that panic cannot be called in many circumstances, which
would be bad.
This all started with the new fancy queued smp_call_function,
which is then used by the shutdown path to shut down the other
CPUs.
On closer examination it turned out that the fancy RCU
smp_call_function() does lots of things not suitable in a panic
situation anyways, like allocating memory and relying on complex
system state.
I originally tried to patch this over by checking for panic
there, but it was quite complicated and the original patch
was also not very popular. This also didn't fix some of the
underlying complexity problems.
The new code in post 2.6.29 tries to patch around this by
checking for oops_in_progress, but that is not enough to make
this fully safe and I don't think that's a real solution
because panic has to be reliable.
So instead use an own vector to reboot. This makes the reboot
code extremly straight forward, which is definitely a big plus
in a panic situation where it is important to avoid relying on
too much kernel state. The new simple code is also safe to be
called from interupts off region because it is very very simple.
There can be situations where it is important that panic
is reliable. For example on a fatal machine check the panic
is needed to get the system up again and running as quickly
as possible. So it's important that panic is reliable and
all function it calls simple.
This is why I came up with this simple vector scheme.
It's very hard to beat in simplicity. Vectors are not
particularly precious anymore since all big systems are
using per CPU vectors.
Another possibility would have been to use an NMI similar
to kdump, but there is still the problem that NMIs don't
work reliably on some systems due to BIOS issues. NMIs
would have been able to stop CPUs running with interrupts
off too. In the sake of universal reliability I opted for
using a non NMI vector for now.
I put the reboot vector into the highest priority bucket of
the APIC vectors and moved the 64bit UV_BAU message down
instead into the next lower priority.
[ Impact: bug fix, fixes an old regression ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:52 +00:00
|
|
|
reboot_interrupt smp_reboot_interrupt
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 03:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 UV_BAU_MESSAGE \
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
uv_bau_message_intr1 uv_bau_message_interrupt
|
2009-01-20 03:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
apic_timer_interrupt smp_apic_timer_interrupt
|
2009-10-14 14:22:57 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
x86_platform_ipi smp_x86_platform_ipi
|
2005-11-05 16:25:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-11 11:25:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 POSTED_INTR_VECTOR \
|
2013-04-11 11:25:11 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm_posted_intr_ipi smp_kvm_posted_intr_ipi
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-22 11:33:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_THRESHOLD
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR \
|
2009-04-28 21:32:56 +00:00
|
|
|
threshold_interrupt smp_threshold_interrupt
|
2013-06-22 11:33:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_THERMAL_VECTOR
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt THERMAL_APIC_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
thermal_interrupt smp_thermal_interrupt
|
2013-06-22 11:33:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-06-02 13:56:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
call_function_single_interrupt smp_call_function_single_interrupt
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
call_function_interrupt smp_call_function_interrupt
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt RESCHEDULE_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
reschedule_interrupt smp_reschedule_interrupt
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt ERROR_APIC_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
error_interrupt smp_error_interrupt
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
spurious_interrupt smp_spurious_interrupt
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-10-14 06:01:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_WORK
|
|
|
|
apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR \
|
|
|
|
irq_work_interrupt smp_irq_work_interrupt
|
2008-12-03 09:39:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Exception entry points.
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-06 03:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
#define CPU_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8)
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.macro idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req paranoid=0 shift_ist=-1
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(\sym)
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Sanity check */
|
|
|
|
.if \shift_ist != -1 && \paranoid == 0
|
|
|
|
.error "using shift_ist requires paranoid=1"
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \has_error_code
|
|
|
|
XCPT_FRAME
|
|
|
|
.else
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-11-02 11:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ASM_CLAC
|
2008-11-21 15:44:28 +00:00
|
|
|
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.ifeq \has_error_code
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.if \paranoid
|
2014-11-11 20:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \paranoid == 1
|
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
|
|
|
testl $3, CS(%rsp) /* If coming from userspace, switch */
|
|
|
|
jnz 1f /* stacks. */
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
call paranoid_entry
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.else
|
|
|
|
call error_entry
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* returned flag: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: don't need it */
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:07 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.if \paranoid
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \shift_ist != -1
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG /* reload IDT in case of recursion */
|
|
|
|
.else
|
2008-11-21 15:44:28 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.if \has_error_code
|
|
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp),%rsi /* get error code */
|
|
|
|
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
|
|
|
|
.else
|
|
|
|
xorl %esi,%esi /* no error code */
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \shift_ist != -1
|
2015-03-06 03:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
subq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, CPU_TSS_IST(\shift_ist)
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
call \do_sym
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \shift_ist != -1
|
2015-03-06 03:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, CPU_TSS_IST(\shift_ist)
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* these procedures expect "no swapgs" flag in ebx */
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \paranoid
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp paranoid_exit
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.else
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp error_exit
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-11 20:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
.if \paranoid == 1
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Paranoid entry from userspace. Switch stacks and treat it
|
|
|
|
* as a normal entry. This means that paranoid handlers
|
|
|
|
* run in real process context if user_mode(regs).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
1:
|
|
|
|
call error_entry
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
|
|
|
|
call sync_regs
|
|
|
|
movq %rax,%rsp /* switch stack */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.if \has_error_code
|
|
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp),%rsi /* get error code */
|
|
|
|
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
|
|
|
|
.else
|
|
|
|
xorl %esi,%esi /* no error code */
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
call \do_sym
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
|
|
|
|
.endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-21 15:44:28 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
END(\sym)
|
2008-11-23 09:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
.endm
|
2008-11-21 15:44:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-30 20:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro trace_idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req
|
|
|
|
idtentry trace(\sym) trace(\do_sym) has_error_code=\has_error_code
|
|
|
|
idtentry \sym \do_sym has_error_code=\has_error_code
|
2013-10-30 20:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.macro trace_idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req
|
|
|
|
idtentry \sym \do_sym has_error_code=\has_error_code
|
2013-10-30 20:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry divide_error do_divide_error has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry overflow do_overflow has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry bounds do_bounds has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry invalid_op do_invalid_op has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry device_not_available do_device_not_available has_error_code=0
|
2014-11-11 20:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry double_fault do_double_fault has_error_code=1 paranoid=2
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry coprocessor_segment_overrun do_coprocessor_segment_overrun has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry invalid_TSS do_invalid_TSS has_error_code=1
|
|
|
|
idtentry segment_not_present do_segment_not_present has_error_code=1
|
|
|
|
idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug do_spurious_interrupt_bug has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry coprocessor_error do_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry alignment_check do_alignment_check has_error_code=1
|
|
|
|
idtentry simd_coprocessor_error do_simd_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
|
2011-06-05 17:50:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-03 07:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Reload gs selector with exception handling */
|
|
|
|
/* edi: new selector */
|
2008-06-25 04:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(native_load_gs_index)
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushfq_cfi
|
2009-01-28 22:35:03 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY & ~CLBR_RDI)
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
gs_change:
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
movl %edi,%gs
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
2: mfence /* workaround */
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
popfq_cfi
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ret
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2008-11-23 09:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
END(native_load_gs_index)
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 19:19:50 +00:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE(gs_change,bad_gs)
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
.section .fixup,"ax"
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* running with kernelgs */
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
bad_gs:
|
2008-01-30 12:32:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS /* switch back to user gs */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
xorl %eax,%eax
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
movl %eax,%gs
|
|
|
|
jmp 2b
|
|
|
|
.previous
|
2008-11-16 14:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-02 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Call softirq on interrupt stack. Interrupts are off. */
|
2013-09-05 13:49:45 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(do_softirq_own_stack)
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rbp
|
2006-08-02 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbp,0
|
|
|
|
mov %rsp,%rbp
|
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rbp
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
cmove PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
|
2006-08-02 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
push %rbp # backlink for old unwinder
|
2005-07-29 04:15:49 +00:00
|
|
|
call __do_softirq
|
2006-08-02 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
leaveq
|
2010-09-02 13:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE rbp
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
|
2006-08-02 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -8
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2005-07-29 04:15:49 +00:00
|
|
|
ret
|
2005-09-12 16:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2013-09-05 13:49:45 +00:00
|
|
|
END(do_softirq_own_stack)
|
2007-06-23 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry xen_hypervisor_callback xen_do_hypervisor_callback has_error_code=0
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* A note on the "critical region" in our callback handler.
|
|
|
|
* We want to avoid stacking callback handlers due to events occurring
|
|
|
|
* during handling of the last event. To do this, we keep events disabled
|
|
|
|
* until we've done all processing. HOWEVER, we must enable events before
|
|
|
|
* popping the stack frame (can't be done atomically) and so it would still
|
|
|
|
* be possible to get enough handler activations to overflow the stack.
|
|
|
|
* Although unlikely, bugs of that kind are hard to track down, so we'd
|
|
|
|
* like to avoid the possibility.
|
|
|
|
* So, on entry to the handler we detect whether we interrupted an
|
|
|
|
* existing activation in its critical region -- if so, we pop the current
|
|
|
|
* activation and restart the handler using the previous one.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
|
|
|
|
CFI_STARTPROC
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since we don't modify %rdi, evtchn_do_upall(struct *pt_regs) will
|
|
|
|
* see the correct pointer to the pt_regs
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rdi, %rsp # we don't return, adjust the stack frame
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
11: incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rbp
|
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rbp
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
cmovzq PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq %rbp # backlink for old unwinder
|
|
|
|
call xen_evtchn_do_upcall
|
|
|
|
popq %rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
|
2009-01-18 15:38:58 +00:00
|
|
|
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
|
2015-02-19 15:23:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp error_exit
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
x86, binutils, xen: Fix another wrong size directive
The latest binutils (2.21.0.20110302/Ubuntu) breaks the build
yet another time, under CONFIG_XEN=y due to a .size directive that
refers to a slightly differently named (hence, to the now very
strict and unforgiving assembler, non-existent) symbol.
[ mingo:
This unnecessary build breakage caused by new binutils
version 2.21 gets escallated back several kernel releases spanning
several years of Linux history, affecting over 130,000 upstream
kernel commits (!), on CONFIG_XEN=y 64-bit kernels (i.e. essentially
affecting all major Linux distro kernel configs).
Git annotate tells us that this slight debug symbol code mismatch
bug has been introduced in 2008 in commit 3d75e1b8:
3d75e1b8 (Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2008-07-08 15:06:49 -0700 1231) ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
The 'bug' is just a slight assymetry in ENTRY()/END()
debug-symbols sequences, with lots of assembly code between the
ENTRY() and the END():
ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
...
END(do_hypervisor_callback)
Human reviewers almost never catch such small mismatches, and binutils
never even warned about it either.
This new binutils version thus breaks the Xen build on all upstream kernels
since v2.6.27, out of the blue.
This makes a straightforward Git bisection of all 64-bit Xen-enabled kernels
impossible on such binutils, for a bisection window of over hundred
thousand historic commits. (!)
This is a major fail on the side of binutils and binutils needs to turn
this show-stopper build failure into a warning ASAP. ]
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
LKML-Reference: <1299877178-26063-1-git-send-email-heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-11 20:59:38 +00:00
|
|
|
END(xen_do_hypervisor_callback)
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* Hypervisor uses this for application faults while it executes.
|
|
|
|
* We get here for two reasons:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Fault while reloading DS, ES, FS or GS
|
|
|
|
* 2. Fault while executing IRET
|
|
|
|
* Category 1 we do not need to fix up as Xen has already reloaded all segment
|
|
|
|
* registers that could be reloaded and zeroed the others.
|
|
|
|
* Category 2 we fix up by killing the current process. We cannot use the
|
|
|
|
* normal Linux return path in this case because if we use the IRET hypercall
|
|
|
|
* to pop the stack frame we end up in an infinite loop of failsafe callbacks.
|
|
|
|
* We distinguish between categories by comparing each saved segment register
|
|
|
|
* with its current contents: any discrepancy means we in category 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
|
2008-11-20 13:40:11 +00:00
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME 1 (6*8)
|
|
|
|
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET gs,GS*/
|
|
|
|
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET fs,FS*/
|
|
|
|
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET es,ES*/
|
|
|
|
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET ds,DS*/
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET r11,8
|
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rcx,0
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
movw %ds,%cx
|
|
|
|
cmpw %cx,0x10(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
|
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
|
|
movw %es,%cx
|
|
|
|
cmpw %cx,0x18(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
|
|
movw %fs,%cx
|
|
|
|
cmpw %cx,0x20(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
|
|
movw %gs,%cx
|
|
|
|
cmpw %cx,0x28(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
|
|
/* All segments match their saved values => Category 2 (Bad IRET). */
|
|
|
|
movq (%rsp),%rcx
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE rcx
|
|
|
|
movq 8(%rsp),%r11
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE r11
|
|
|
|
addq $0x30,%rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -0x30
|
2008-11-21 14:20:47 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $0 /* RIP */
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %r11
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rcx
|
2008-07-08 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp general_protection
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
|
|
|
1: /* Segment mismatch => Category 1 (Bad segment). Retry the IRET. */
|
|
|
|
movq (%rsp),%rcx
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE rcx
|
|
|
|
movq 8(%rsp),%r11
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE r11
|
|
|
|
addq $0x30,%rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -0x30
|
2012-10-19 16:29:07 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
|
|
|
|
SAVE_C_REGS
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp error_exit
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(xen_failsafe_callback)
|
|
|
|
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR \
|
2010-05-14 11:40:51 +00:00
|
|
|
xen_hvm_callback_vector xen_evtchn_do_upcall
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-08 22:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN */
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-04 01:22:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
|
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints
[Purpose of this patch]
As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors
are useful.
http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html
<snip>
The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit
provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when
the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently
running processes.
There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space,
which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives
us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events.
The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to
know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other
processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when
the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state.
<snip>
On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and
getting a value of instruction pointer.
I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before.
But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap.
So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now.
[Patch Description]
Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events.
But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events.
In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events.
So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit.
so that we can enable them independently.
- local_timer_vector
- reschedule_vector
- call_function_vector
- call_function_single_vector
- irq_work_entry_vector
- error_apic_vector
- thermal_apic_vector
- threshold_apic_vector
- spurious_apic_vector
- x86_platform_ipi_vector
Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty
makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows.
- Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq().
- Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to
_set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table.
- Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing
macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers.
- Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt().
This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons.
- Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled.
- On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging
is disabled.
In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being
used for other purposes.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 15:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
apicinterrupt3 HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR \
|
2013-02-04 01:22:39 +00:00
|
|
|
hyperv_callback_vector hyperv_vector_handler
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:07:09 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry debug do_debug has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 shift_ist=DEBUG_STACK
|
|
|
|
idtentry int3 do_int3 has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 shift_ist=DEBUG_STACK
|
2014-11-23 02:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry stack_segment do_stack_segment has_error_code=1
|
2009-03-30 02:56:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry xen_debug do_debug has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry xen_int3 do_int3 has_error_code=0
|
|
|
|
idtentry xen_stack_segment do_stack_segment has_error_code=1
|
2009-03-30 02:56:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry general_protection do_general_protection has_error_code=1
|
|
|
|
trace_idtentry page_fault do_page_fault has_error_code=1
|
2010-10-14 09:22:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault has_error_code=1
|
2010-10-14 09:22:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
|
2014-05-21 22:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
idtentry machine_check has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 do_sym=*machine_check_vector(%rip)
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
|
|
|
|
* Use slow, but surefire "are we in kernel?" check.
|
|
|
|
* Return: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: otherwise
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
|
|
|
|
XCPT_FRAME 1 15*8
|
2015-02-26 22:40:33 +00:00
|
|
|
cld
|
|
|
|
SAVE_C_REGS 8
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
|
|
|
|
movl $1,%ebx
|
|
|
|
movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
|
|
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
|
|
testl %edx,%edx
|
|
|
|
js 1f /* negative -> in kernel */
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
xorl %ebx,%ebx
|
|
|
|
1: ret
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
END(paranoid_entry)
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* "Paranoid" exit path from exception stack. This is invoked
|
|
|
|
* only on return from non-NMI IST interrupts that came
|
|
|
|
* from kernel space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We may be returning to very strange contexts (e.g. very early
|
|
|
|
* in syscall entry), so checking for preemption here would
|
|
|
|
* be complicated. Fortunately, we there's no good reason
|
|
|
|
* to try to handle preemption here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* On entry, ebx is "no swapgs" flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) */
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
|
2010-09-02 12:54:32 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
testl %ebx,%ebx /* swapgs needed? */
|
2015-02-26 22:40:29 +00:00
|
|
|
jnz paranoid_exit_no_swapgs
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
|
2015-02-26 22:40:29 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp paranoid_exit_restore
|
|
|
|
paranoid_exit_no_swapgs:
|
2015-02-26 22:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
|
2015-02-26 22:40:29 +00:00
|
|
|
paranoid_exit_restore:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS
|
|
|
|
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
|
2014-11-11 20:49:41 +00:00
|
|
|
INTERRUPT_RETURN
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(paranoid_exit)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
|
|
|
|
* Return: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: otherwise
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(error_entry)
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
XCPT_FRAME 1 15*8
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
cld
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVE_C_REGS 8
|
|
|
|
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
xorl %ebx,%ebx
|
|
|
|
testl $3,CS+8(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
je error_kernelspace
|
|
|
|
error_swapgs:
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
error_sti:
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
|
|
|
|
* usergs. Handle them here. B stepping K8s sometimes report a
|
|
|
|
* truncated RIP for IRET exceptions returning to compat mode. Check
|
|
|
|
* for these here too.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
error_kernelspace:
|
2014-06-25 13:11:22 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rcx, RCX+8
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
incl %ebx
|
2014-07-23 15:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip),%rcx
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
|
x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret
It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-23 02:00:33 +00:00
|
|
|
je error_bad_iret
|
2009-10-12 14:18:23 +00:00
|
|
|
movl %ecx,%eax /* zero extend */
|
|
|
|
cmpq %rax,RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
|
|
je bstep_iret
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpq $gs_change,RIP+8(%rsp)
|
2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
je error_swapgs
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
jmp error_sti
|
2009-10-12 14:18:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bstep_iret:
|
|
|
|
/* Fix truncated RIP */
|
|
|
|
movq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
|
x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret
It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-23 02:00:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error_bad_iret:
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
mov %rsp,%rdi
|
|
|
|
call fixup_bad_iret
|
|
|
|
mov %rax,%rsp
|
|
|
|
decl %ebx /* Return to usergs */
|
|
|
|
jmp error_sti
|
2010-09-02 12:52:45 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
END(error_entry)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* On entry, ebx is "no swapgs" flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) */
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ENTRY(error_exit)
|
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME
|
|
|
|
movl %ebx,%eax
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
|
|
|
|
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
|
|
|
|
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
|
|
|
|
testl %eax,%eax
|
|
|
|
jne retint_kernel
|
|
|
|
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
|
|
|
|
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
|
|
|
|
movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
|
|
|
|
andl %edi,%edx
|
|
|
|
jnz retint_careful
|
|
|
|
jmp retint_swapgs
|
|
|
|
CFI_ENDPROC
|
|
|
|
END(error_exit)
|
|
|
|
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Test if a given stack is an NMI stack or not.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
.macro test_in_nmi reg stack nmi_ret normal_ret
|
|
|
|
cmpq %\reg, \stack
|
|
|
|
ja \normal_ret
|
|
|
|
subq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, %\reg
|
|
|
|
cmpq %\reg, \stack
|
|
|
|
jb \normal_ret
|
|
|
|
jmp \nmi_ret
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* runs on exception stack */
|
|
|
|
ENTRY(nmi)
|
|
|
|
INTR_FRAME
|
|
|
|
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We allow breakpoints in NMIs. If a breakpoint occurs, then
|
|
|
|
* the iretq it performs will take us out of NMI context.
|
|
|
|
* This means that we can have nested NMIs where the next
|
|
|
|
* NMI is using the top of the stack of the previous NMI. We
|
|
|
|
* can't let it execute because the nested NMI will corrupt the
|
|
|
|
* stack of the previous NMI. NMI handlers are not re-entrant
|
|
|
|
* anyway.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* To handle this case we do the following:
|
|
|
|
* Check the a special location on the stack that contains
|
|
|
|
* a variable that is set when NMIs are executing.
|
|
|
|
* The interrupted task's stack is also checked to see if it
|
|
|
|
* is an NMI stack.
|
|
|
|
* If the variable is not set and the stack is not the NMI
|
|
|
|
* stack then:
|
|
|
|
* o Set the special variable on the stack
|
|
|
|
* o Copy the interrupt frame into a "saved" location on the stack
|
|
|
|
* o Copy the interrupt frame into a "copy" location on the stack
|
|
|
|
* o Continue processing the NMI
|
|
|
|
* If the variable is set or the previous stack is the NMI stack:
|
|
|
|
* o Modify the "copy" location to jump to the repeate_nmi
|
|
|
|
* o return back to the first NMI
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Now on exit of the first NMI, we first clear the stack variable
|
|
|
|
* The NMI stack will tell any nested NMIs at that point that it is
|
|
|
|
* nested. Then we pop the stack normally with iret, and if there was
|
|
|
|
* a nested NMI that updated the copy interrupt stack frame, a
|
|
|
|
* jump will be made to the repeat_nmi code that will handle the second
|
|
|
|
* NMI.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use %rdx as out temp variable throughout */
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdx
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdx, 0
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-19 21:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If %cs was not the kernel segment, then the NMI triggered in user
|
|
|
|
* space, which means it is definitely not nested.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-02-20 20:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpl $__KERNEL_CS, 16(%rsp)
|
2012-02-19 21:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
jne first_nmi
|
|
|
|
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check the special variable on the stack to see if NMIs are
|
|
|
|
* executing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-02-20 20:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
cmpl $1, -8(%rsp)
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
je nested_nmi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now test if the previous stack was an NMI stack.
|
|
|
|
* We need the double check. We check the NMI stack to satisfy the
|
|
|
|
* race when the first NMI clears the variable before returning.
|
|
|
|
* We check the variable because the first NMI could be in a
|
|
|
|
* breakpoint routine using a breakpoint stack.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
lea 6*8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
|
|
test_in_nmi rdx, 4*8(%rsp), nested_nmi, first_nmi
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nested_nmi:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do nothing if we interrupted the fixup in repeat_nmi.
|
|
|
|
* It's about to repeat the NMI handler, so we are fine
|
|
|
|
* with ignoring this one.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
movq $repeat_nmi, %rdx
|
|
|
|
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
|
|
ja 1f
|
|
|
|
movq $end_repeat_nmi, %rdx
|
|
|
|
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
|
|
ja nested_nmi_out
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1:
|
|
|
|
/* Set up the interrupted NMIs stack to jump to repeat_nmi */
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
leaq -1*8(%rsp), %rdx
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
movq %rdx, %rsp
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 1*8
|
|
|
|
leaq -10*8(%rsp), %rdx
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_DS
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi %rdx
|
|
|
|
pushfq_cfi
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_CS
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $repeat_nmi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put stack back */
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $(6*8), %rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -6*8
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nested_nmi_out:
|
|
|
|
popq_cfi %rdx
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE rdx
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No need to check faults here */
|
|
|
|
INTERRUPT_RETURN
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
first_nmi:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Because nested NMIs will use the pushed location that we
|
|
|
|
* stored in rdx, we must keep that space available.
|
|
|
|
* Here's what our stack frame will look like:
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* | original SS |
|
|
|
|
* | original Return RSP |
|
|
|
|
* | original RFLAGS |
|
|
|
|
* | original CS |
|
|
|
|
* | original RIP |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* | temp storage for rdx |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* | NMI executing variable |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* | copied SS |
|
|
|
|
* | copied Return RSP |
|
|
|
|
* | copied RFLAGS |
|
|
|
|
* | copied CS |
|
|
|
|
* | copied RIP |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
* | Saved SS |
|
|
|
|
* | Saved Return RSP |
|
|
|
|
* | Saved RFLAGS |
|
|
|
|
* | Saved CS |
|
|
|
|
* | Saved RIP |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* | pt_regs |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------------------+
|
|
|
|
*
|
2012-02-24 20:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* The saved stack frame is used to fix up the copied stack frame
|
|
|
|
* that a nested NMI may change to make the interrupted NMI iret jump
|
|
|
|
* to the repeat_nmi. The original stack frame and the temp storage
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* is also used by nested NMIs and can not be trusted on exit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-02-24 20:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Do not pop rdx, nested NMIs will corrupt that part of the stack */
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
movq (%rsp), %rdx
|
|
|
|
CFI_RESTORE rdx
|
|
|
|
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Set the NMI executing variable on the stack. */
|
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $1
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Leave room for the "copied" frame
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
subq $(5*8), %rsp
|
2013-01-24 09:27:31 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 5*8
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Copy the stack frame to the Saved frame */
|
|
|
|
.rept 5
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi 11*8(%rsp)
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
.endr
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET 5*8
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-24 20:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Everything up to here is safe from nested NMIs */
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there was a nested NMI, the first NMI's iret will return
|
|
|
|
* here. But NMIs are still enabled and we can take another
|
|
|
|
* nested NMI. The nested NMI checks the interrupted RIP to see
|
|
|
|
* if it is between repeat_nmi and end_repeat_nmi, and if so
|
|
|
|
* it will just return, as we are about to repeat an NMI anyway.
|
|
|
|
* This makes it safe to copy to the stack frame that a nested
|
|
|
|
* NMI will update.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
repeat_nmi:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Update the stack variable to say we are still in NMI (the update
|
|
|
|
* is benign for the non-repeat case, where 1 was pushed just above
|
|
|
|
* to this very stack slot).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
movq $1, 10*8(%rsp)
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make another copy, this one may be modified by nested NMIs */
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
addq $(10*8), %rsp
|
|
|
|
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -10*8
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
.rept 5
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi -6*8(%rsp)
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
.endr
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
subq $(5*8), %rsp
|
2015-02-26 22:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET 5*8
|
2012-02-24 14:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
end_repeat_nmi:
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Everything below this point can be preempted by a nested
|
2012-02-24 20:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* NMI if the first NMI took an exception and reset our iret stack
|
|
|
|
* so that we repeat another NMI.
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-12-08 17:32:27 +00:00
|
|
|
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-08 17:32:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* Use paranoid_entry to handle SWAPGS, but no need to use paranoid_exit
|
2011-12-08 17:32:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* as we should not be calling schedule in NMI context.
|
|
|
|
* Even with normal interrupts enabled. An NMI should not be
|
|
|
|
* setting NEED_RESCHED or anything that normal interrupts and
|
|
|
|
* exceptions might do.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-02-26 22:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
call paranoid_entry
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
|
2012-06-07 14:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Save off the CR2 register. If we take a page fault in the NMI then
|
|
|
|
* it could corrupt the CR2 value. If the NMI preempts a page fault
|
|
|
|
* handler before it was able to read the CR2 register, and then the
|
|
|
|
* NMI itself takes a page fault, the page fault that was preempted
|
|
|
|
* will read the information from the NMI page fault and not the
|
|
|
|
* origin fault. Save it off and restore it if it changes.
|
|
|
|
* Use the r12 callee-saved register.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
movq %cr2, %r12
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi
|
|
|
|
movq $-1,%rsi
|
|
|
|
call do_nmi
|
2012-06-07 14:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Did the NMI take a page fault? Restore cr2 if it did */
|
|
|
|
movq %cr2, %rcx
|
|
|
|
cmpq %rcx, %r12
|
|
|
|
je 1f
|
|
|
|
movq %r12, %cr2
|
|
|
|
1:
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
|
|
|
testl %ebx,%ebx /* swapgs needed? */
|
|
|
|
jnz nmi_restore
|
|
|
|
nmi_swapgs:
|
|
|
|
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
|
|
|
|
nmi_restore:
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
|
|
|
|
RESTORE_C_REGS
|
2013-01-24 09:27:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Pop the extra iret frame at once */
|
x86/asm/entry/64: Always allocate a complete "struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack
The 64-bit entry code was using six stack slots less by not
saving/restoring registers which are callee-preserved according
to the C ABI, and was not allocating space for them.
Only when syscalls needed a complete "struct pt_regs" was
the complete area allocated and filled in.
As an additional twist, on interrupt entry a "slightly less
truncated pt_regs" trick is used, to make nested interrupt
stacks easier to unwind.
This proved to be a source of significant obfuscation and subtle
bugs. For example, 'stub_fork' had to pop the return address,
extend the struct, save registers, and push return address back.
Ugly. 'ia32_ptregs_common' pops return address and "returns" via
jmp insn, throwing a wrench into CPU return stack cache.
This patch changes the code to always allocate a complete
"struct pt_regs" on the kernel stack. The saving of registers
is still done lazily.
"Partial pt_regs" trick on interrupt stack is retained.
Macros which manipulate "struct pt_regs" on stack are reworked:
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK allocates the structure.
- SAVE_C_REGS saves to it those registers which are clobbered
by C code.
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS saves to it all other registers.
- Corresponding RESTORE_* and REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK macros
reverse it.
'ia32_ptregs_common', 'stub_fork' and friends lost their ugly dance
with the return pointer.
LOAD_ARGS32 in ia32entry.S now uses symbolic stack offsets
instead of magic numbers.
'error_entry' and 'save_paranoid' now use SAVE_C_REGS +
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS instead of having it open-coded yet again.
Patch was run-tested: 64-bit executables, 32-bit executables,
strace works.
Timing tests did not show measurable difference in 32-bit
and 64-bit syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1423778052-21038-2-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b89763d354aa23e670b9bdf3a40ae320320a7c2e.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-26 22:40:27 +00:00
|
|
|
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 6*8
|
2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes
In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
all over the previous NMI's stack.
Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
"In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
make the NMI code itself do something like
NMI entry:
- load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
- if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
- we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
"popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
"real" NMI iret happens.
- before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
return stack be invalid and cause a fault
- set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
Just do the iret.
Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
will stay masked.
And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
and everything is happy."
I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
code, a few gotchas showed up.
One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
Two, faulting on the iret.
I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
also simplified things.
Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
again.
The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
context will not get it back.
Here's what is done:
When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
One copy is used to return on iret
The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
This is what the stack will look like:
+-------------------------+
| original SS |
| original Return RSP |
| original RFLAGS |
| original CS |
| original RIP |
+-------------------------+
| temp storage for rdx |
+-------------------------+
| NMI executing variable |
+-------------------------+
| Saved SS |
| Saved Return RSP |
| Saved RFLAGS |
| Saved CS |
| Saved RIP |
+-------------------------+
| copied SS |
| copied Return RSP |
| copied RFLAGS |
| copied CS |
| copied RIP |
+-------------------------+
| pt_regs |
+-------------------------+
The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
the NMI.
We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
the rest of the NMI handler.
Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
to trigger another NMI.
When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
to latch now.
To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
Everything seems to be working fine.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
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/* Clear the NMI executing stack variable */
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2012-10-02 00:29:25 +00:00
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movq $0, 5*8(%rsp)
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2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
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jmp irq_return
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2008-11-27 18:10:08 +00:00
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CFI_ENDPROC
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2008-11-24 12:24:28 +00:00
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END(nmi)
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ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
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CFI_STARTPROC
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mov $-ENOSYS,%eax
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sysret
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CFI_ENDPROC
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END(ignore_sysret)
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