2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#ifndef _ASM_M32R_SOCKET_H
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#define _ASM_M32R_SOCKET_H
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#include <asm/sockios.h>
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/* For setsockoptions(2) */
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#define SOL_SOCKET 1
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#define SO_DEBUG 1
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#define SO_REUSEADDR 2
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#define SO_TYPE 3
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#define SO_ERROR 4
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#define SO_DONTROUTE 5
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#define SO_BROADCAST 6
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#define SO_SNDBUF 7
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#define SO_RCVBUF 8
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2005-08-10 02:30:51 +00:00
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#define SO_SNDBUFFORCE 32
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#define SO_RCVBUFFORCE 33
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#define SO_KEEPALIVE 9
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#define SO_OOBINLINE 10
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#define SO_NO_CHECK 11
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#define SO_PRIORITY 12
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#define SO_LINGER 13
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#define SO_BSDCOMPAT 14
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2013-01-22 09:49:50 +00:00
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#define SO_REUSEPORT 15
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#define SO_PASSCRED 16
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#define SO_PEERCRED 17
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#define SO_RCVLOWAT 18
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#define SO_SNDLOWAT 19
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#define SO_RCVTIMEO 20
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#define SO_SNDTIMEO 21
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/* Security levels - as per NRL IPv6 - don't actually do anything */
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#define SO_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION 22
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#define SO_SECURITY_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT 23
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#define SO_SECURITY_ENCRYPTION_NETWORK 24
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#define SO_BINDTODEVICE 25
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/* Socket filtering */
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#define SO_ATTACH_FILTER 26
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#define SO_DETACH_FILTER 27
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sk-filter: Add ability to get socket filter program (v2)
The SO_ATTACH_FILTER option is set only. I propose to add the get
ability by using SO_ATTACH_FILTER in getsockopt. To be less
irritating to eyes the SO_GET_FILTER alias to it is declared. This
ability is required by checkpoint-restore project to be able to
save full state of a socket.
There are two issues with getting filter back.
First, kernel modifies the sock_filter->code on filter load, thus in
order to return the filter element back to user we have to decode it
into user-visible constants. Fortunately the modification in question
is interconvertible.
Second, the BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K code modifies the command argument k to
speed up the run-time division by doing kernel_k = reciprocal(user_k).
Bad news is that different user_k may result in same kernel_k, so we
can't get the original user_k back. Good news is that we don't have
to do it. What we need to is calculate a user2_k so, that
reciprocal(user2_k) == reciprocal(user_k) == kernel_k
i.e. if it's re-loaded back the compiled again value will be exactly
the same as it was. That said, the user2_k can be calculated like this
user2_k = reciprocal(kernel_k)
with an exception, that if kernel_k == 0, then user2_k == 1.
The optlen argument is treated like this -- when zero, kernel returns
the amount of sock_fprog elements in filter, otherwise it should be
large enough for the sock_fprog array.
changes since v1:
* Declared SO_GET_FILTER in all arch headers
* Added decode of vlan-tag codes
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-11-01 02:01:48 +00:00
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#define SO_GET_FILTER SO_ATTACH_FILTER
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#define SO_PEERNAME 28
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#define SO_TIMESTAMP 29
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMP SO_TIMESTAMP
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#define SO_ACCEPTCONN 30
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#define SO_PEERSEC 31
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[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 19:27:47 +00:00
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#define SO_PASSSEC 34
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2007-03-26 05:14:49 +00:00
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#define SO_TIMESTAMPNS 35
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPNS SO_TIMESTAMPNS
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2008-01-31 03:08:16 +00:00
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#define SO_MARK 36
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2009-02-12 05:03:36 +00:00
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#define SO_TIMESTAMPING 37
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPING SO_TIMESTAMPING
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2009-08-04 07:28:28 +00:00
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#define SO_PROTOCOL 38
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2009-08-04 07:28:29 +00:00
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#define SO_DOMAIN 39
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2009-08-04 07:28:28 +00:00
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net: Generalize socket rx gap / receive queue overflow cmsg
Create a new socket level option to report number of queue overflows
Recently I augmented the AF_PACKET protocol to report the number of frames lost
on the socket receive queue between any two enqueued frames. This value was
exported via a SOL_PACKET level cmsg. AFter I completed that work it was
requested that this feature be generalized so that any datagram oriented socket
could make use of this option. As such I've created this patch, It creates a
new SOL_SOCKET level option called SO_RXQ_OVFL, which when enabled exports a
SOL_SOCKET level cmsg that reports the nubmer of times the sk_receive_queue
overflowed between any two given frames. It also augments the AF_PACKET
protocol to take advantage of this new feature (as it previously did not touch
sk->sk_drops, which this patch uses to record the overflow count). Tested
successfully by me.
Notes:
1) Unlike my previous patch, this patch simply records the sk_drops value, which
is not a number of drops between packets, but rather a total number of drops.
Deltas must be computed in user space.
2) While this patch currently works with datagram oriented protocols, it will
also be accepted by non-datagram oriented protocols. I'm not sure if thats
agreeable to everyone, but my argument in favor of doing so is that, for those
protocols which aren't applicable to this option, sk_drops will always be zero,
and reporting no drops on a receive queue that isn't used for those
non-participating protocols seems reasonable to me. This also saves us having
to code in a per-protocol opt in mechanism.
3) This applies cleanly to net-next assuming that commit
977750076d98c7ff6cbda51858bb5a5894a9d9ab (my af packet cmsg patch) is reverted
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-10-12 20:26:31 +00:00
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#define SO_RXQ_OVFL 40
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2011-11-09 09:15:42 +00:00
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#define SO_WIFI_STATUS 41
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#define SCM_WIFI_STATUS SO_WIFI_STATUS
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2012-02-21 07:31:34 +00:00
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#define SO_PEEK_OFF 42
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2011-11-09 09:15:42 +00:00
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2012-02-11 15:39:30 +00:00
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/* Instruct lower device to use last 4-bytes of skb data as FCS */
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#define SO_NOFCS 43
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2013-01-16 21:55:49 +00:00
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#define SO_LOCK_FILTER 44
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2013-03-28 11:19:25 +00:00
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#define SO_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE 45
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2013-07-10 14:13:36 +00:00
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#define SO_BUSY_POLL 46
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2013-06-14 13:33:57 +00:00
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2013-09-24 15:20:52 +00:00
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#define SO_MAX_PACING_RATE 47
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2014-01-17 16:09:45 +00:00
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#define SO_BPF_EXTENSIONS 48
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net: introduce SO_INCOMING_CPU
Alternative to RPS/RFS is to use hardware support for multiple
queues.
Then split a set of million of sockets into worker threads, each
one using epoll() to manage events on its own socket pool.
Ideally, we want one thread per RX/TX queue/cpu, but we have no way to
know after accept() or connect() on which queue/cpu a socket is managed.
We normally use one cpu per RX queue (IRQ smp_affinity being properly
set), so remembering on socket structure which cpu delivered last packet
is enough to solve the problem.
After accept(), connect(), or even file descriptor passing around
processes, applications can use :
int cpu;
socklen_t len = sizeof(cpu);
getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_INCOMING_CPU, &cpu, &len);
And use this information to put the socket into the right silo
for optimal performance, as all networking stack should run
on the appropriate cpu, without need to send IPI (RPS/RFS).
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-11-11 13:54:28 +00:00
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#define SO_INCOMING_CPU 49
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2014-12-01 23:06:35 +00:00
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#define SO_ATTACH_BPF 50
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#define SO_DETACH_BPF SO_DETACH_FILTER
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2016-01-04 22:41:47 +00:00
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#define SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_CBPF 51
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#define SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF 52
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2016-02-24 18:02:52 +00:00
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#define SO_CNX_ADVICE 53
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2016-11-28 07:07:18 +00:00
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS 54
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2017-03-20 19:22:03 +00:00
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#define SO_MEMINFO 55
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2017-03-24 17:08:36 +00:00
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#define SO_INCOMING_NAPI_ID 56
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2017-04-06 02:00:55 +00:00
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#define SO_COOKIE 57
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2017-05-22 03:13:37 +00:00
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPING_PKTINFO 58
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net: introduce SO_PEERGROUPS getsockopt
This adds the new getsockopt(2) option SO_PEERGROUPS on SOL_SOCKET to
retrieve the auxiliary groups of the remote peer. It is designed to
naturally extend SO_PEERCRED. That is, the underlying data is from the
same credentials. Regarding its syntax, it is based on SO_PEERSEC. That
is, if the provided buffer is too small, ERANGE is returned and @optlen
is updated. Otherwise, the information is copied, @optlen is set to the
actual size, and 0 is returned.
While SO_PEERCRED (and thus `struct ucred') already returns the primary
group, it lacks the auxiliary group vector. However, nearly all access
controls (including kernel side VFS and SYSVIPC, but also user-space
polkit, DBus, ...) consider the entire set of groups, rather than just
the primary group. But this is currently not possible with pure
SO_PEERCRED. Instead, user-space has to work around this and query the
system database for the auxiliary groups of a UID retrieved via
SO_PEERCRED.
Unfortunately, there is no race-free way to query the auxiliary groups
of the PID/UID retrieved via SO_PEERCRED. Hence, the current user-space
solution is to use getgrouplist(3p), which itself falls back to NSS and
whatever is configured in nsswitch.conf(3). This effectively checks
which groups we *would* assign to the user if it logged in *now*. On
normal systems it is as easy as reading /etc/group, but with NSS it can
resort to quering network databases (eg., LDAP), using IPC or network
communication.
Long story short: Whenever we want to use auxiliary groups for access
checks on IPC, we need further IPC to talk to the user/group databases,
rather than just relying on SO_PEERCRED and the incoming socket. This
is unfortunate, and might even result in dead-locks if the database
query uses the same IPC as the original request.
So far, those recursions / dead-locks have been avoided by using
primitive IPC for all crucial NSS modules. However, we want to avoid
re-inventing the wheel for each NSS module that might be involved in
user/group queries. Hence, we would preferably make DBus (and other IPC
that supports access-management based on groups) work without resorting
to the user/group database. This new SO_PEERGROUPS ioctl would allow us
to make dbus-daemon work without ever calling into NSS.
Cc: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-21 08:47:15 +00:00
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#define SO_PEERGROUPS 59
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2017-08-03 20:29:40 +00:00
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#define SO_ZEROCOPY 60
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#endif /* _ASM_M32R_SOCKET_H */
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