linux/drivers/crypto/talitos.c

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/*
* talitos - Freescale Integrated Security Engine (SEC) device driver
*
* Copyright (c) 2008-2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
*
* Scatterlist Crypto API glue code copied from files with the following:
* Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
*
* Crypto algorithm registration code copied from hifn driver:
* 2007+ Copyright (c) Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
* All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
#include <linux/of_address.h>
#include <linux/of_irq.h>
#include <linux/of_platform.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/des.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/md5.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include "talitos.h"
static void to_talitos_ptr(struct talitos_ptr *talitos_ptr, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
{
talitos_ptr->ptr = cpu_to_be32(lower_32_bits(dma_addr));
talitos_ptr->eptr = upper_32_bits(dma_addr);
}
/*
* map virtual single (contiguous) pointer to h/w descriptor pointer
*/
static void map_single_talitos_ptr(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_ptr *talitos_ptr,
unsigned short len, void *data,
unsigned char extent,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
dma_addr_t dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, data, len, dir);
talitos_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(len);
to_talitos_ptr(talitos_ptr, dma_addr);
talitos_ptr->j_extent = extent;
}
/*
* unmap bus single (contiguous) h/w descriptor pointer
*/
static void unmap_single_talitos_ptr(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_ptr *talitos_ptr,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
dma_unmap_single(dev, be32_to_cpu(talitos_ptr->ptr),
be16_to_cpu(talitos_ptr->len), dir);
}
static int reset_channel(struct device *dev, int ch)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned int timeout = TALITOS_TIMEOUT;
setbits32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR, TALITOS_CCCR_RESET);
while ((in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR) & TALITOS_CCCR_RESET)
&& --timeout)
cpu_relax();
if (timeout == 0) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to reset channel %d\n", ch);
return -EIO;
}
/* set 36-bit addressing, done writeback enable and done IRQ enable */
setbits32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR_LO, TALITOS_CCCR_LO_EAE |
TALITOS_CCCR_LO_CDWE | TALITOS_CCCR_LO_CDIE);
/* and ICCR writeback, if available */
if (priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK)
setbits32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR_LO,
TALITOS_CCCR_LO_IWSE);
return 0;
}
static int reset_device(struct device *dev)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned int timeout = TALITOS_TIMEOUT;
u32 mcr = TALITOS_MCR_SWR;
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MCR, mcr);
while ((in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MCR) & TALITOS_MCR_SWR)
&& --timeout)
cpu_relax();
if (priv->irq[1]) {
mcr = TALITOS_MCR_RCA1 | TALITOS_MCR_RCA3;
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MCR, mcr);
}
if (timeout == 0) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to reset device\n");
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Reset and initialize the device
*/
static int init_device(struct device *dev)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int ch, err;
/*
* Master reset
* errata documentation: warning: certain SEC interrupts
* are not fully cleared by writing the MCR:SWR bit,
* set bit twice to completely reset
*/
err = reset_device(dev);
if (err)
return err;
err = reset_device(dev);
if (err)
return err;
/* reset channels */
for (ch = 0; ch < priv->num_channels; ch++) {
err = reset_channel(dev, ch);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* enable channel done and error interrupts */
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_IMR, TALITOS_IMR_INIT);
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_IMR_LO, TALITOS_IMR_LO_INIT);
/* disable integrity check error interrupts (use writeback instead) */
if (priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK)
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MDEUICR_LO,
TALITOS_MDEUICR_LO_ICE);
return 0;
}
/**
* talitos_submit - submits a descriptor to the device for processing
* @dev: the SEC device to be used
* @ch: the SEC device channel to be used
* @desc: the descriptor to be processed by the device
* @callback: whom to call when processing is complete
* @context: a handle for use by caller (optional)
*
* desc must contain valid dma-mapped (bus physical) address pointers.
* callback must check err and feedback in descriptor header
* for device processing status.
*/
int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc,
void (*callback)(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int error),
void *context)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct talitos_request *request;
unsigned long flags;
int head;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->chan[ch].head_lock, flags);
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&priv->chan[ch].submit_count)) {
/* h/w fifo is full */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->chan[ch].head_lock, flags);
return -EAGAIN;
}
head = priv->chan[ch].head;
request = &priv->chan[ch].fifo[head];
/* map descriptor and save caller data */
request->dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, desc, sizeof(*desc),
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
request->callback = callback;
request->context = context;
/* increment fifo head */
priv->chan[ch].head = (priv->chan[ch].head + 1) & (priv->fifo_len - 1);
smp_wmb();
request->desc = desc;
/* GO! */
wmb();
out_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_FF,
upper_32_bits(request->dma_desc));
out_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_FF_LO,
lower_32_bits(request->dma_desc));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->chan[ch].head_lock, flags);
return -EINPROGRESS;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(talitos_submit);
/*
* process what was done, notify callback of error if not
*/
static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct talitos_request *request, saved_req;
unsigned long flags;
int tail, status;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->chan[ch].tail_lock, flags);
tail = priv->chan[ch].tail;
while (priv->chan[ch].fifo[tail].desc) {
request = &priv->chan[ch].fifo[tail];
/* descriptors with their done bits set don't get the error */
rmb();
if ((request->desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_DONE) == DESC_HDR_DONE)
status = 0;
else
if (!error)
break;
else
status = error;
dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc,
sizeof(struct talitos_desc),
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
/* copy entries so we can call callback outside lock */
saved_req.desc = request->desc;
saved_req.callback = request->callback;
saved_req.context = request->context;
/* release request entry in fifo */
smp_wmb();
request->desc = NULL;
/* increment fifo tail */
priv->chan[ch].tail = (tail + 1) & (priv->fifo_len - 1);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->chan[ch].tail_lock, flags);
atomic_dec(&priv->chan[ch].submit_count);
saved_req.callback(dev, saved_req.desc, saved_req.context,
status);
/* channel may resume processing in single desc error case */
if (error && !reset_ch && status == error)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->chan[ch].tail_lock, flags);
tail = priv->chan[ch].tail;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->chan[ch].tail_lock, flags);
}
/*
* process completed requests for channels that have done status
*/
#define DEF_TALITOS_DONE(name, ch_done_mask) \
static void talitos_done_##name(unsigned long data) \
{ \
struct device *dev = (struct device *)data; \
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); \
unsigned long flags; \
\
if (ch_done_mask & 1) \
flush_channel(dev, 0, 0, 0); \
if (priv->num_channels == 1) \
goto out; \
if (ch_done_mask & (1 << 2)) \
flush_channel(dev, 1, 0, 0); \
if (ch_done_mask & (1 << 4)) \
flush_channel(dev, 2, 0, 0); \
if (ch_done_mask & (1 << 6)) \
flush_channel(dev, 3, 0, 0); \
\
out: \
/* At this point, all completed channels have been processed */ \
/* Unmask done interrupts for channels completed later on. */ \
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->reg_lock, flags); \
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_IMR, ch_done_mask); \
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_IMR_LO, TALITOS_IMR_LO_INIT); \
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->reg_lock, flags); \
}
DEF_TALITOS_DONE(4ch, TALITOS_ISR_4CHDONE)
DEF_TALITOS_DONE(ch0_2, TALITOS_ISR_CH_0_2_DONE)
DEF_TALITOS_DONE(ch1_3, TALITOS_ISR_CH_1_3_DONE)
/*
* locate current (offending) descriptor
*/
static u32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int tail, iter;
dma_addr_t cur_desc;
cur_desc = ((u64)in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CDPR)) << 32;
cur_desc |= in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CDPR_LO);
if (!cur_desc) {
dev_err(dev, "CDPR is NULL, giving up search for offending descriptor\n");
return 0;
}
tail = priv->chan[ch].tail;
iter = tail;
while (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].dma_desc != cur_desc) {
iter = (iter + 1) & (priv->fifo_len - 1);
if (iter == tail) {
dev_err(dev, "couldn't locate current descriptor\n");
return 0;
}
}
return priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->hdr;
}
/*
* user diagnostics; report root cause of error based on execution unit status
*/
static void report_eu_error(struct device *dev, int ch, u32 desc_hdr)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int i;
if (!desc_hdr)
desc_hdr = in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_DESCBUF);
switch (desc_hdr & DESC_HDR_SEL0_MASK) {
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_AFEU:
dev_err(dev, "AFEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_AFEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_AFEUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU:
dev_err(dev, "DEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_DEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_DEUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA:
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUB:
dev_err(dev, "MDEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MDEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MDEUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_RNG:
dev_err(dev, "RNGUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_PKEU:
dev_err(dev, "PKEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_PKEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_PKEUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU:
dev_err(dev, "AESUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_AESUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_AESUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_CRCU:
dev_err(dev, "CRCUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_CRCUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_CRCUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL0_KEU:
dev_err(dev, "KEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_KEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_KEUISR_LO));
break;
}
switch (desc_hdr & DESC_HDR_SEL1_MASK) {
case DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA:
case DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUB:
dev_err(dev, "MDEUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MDEUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_MDEUISR_LO));
break;
case DESC_HDR_SEL1_CRCU:
dev_err(dev, "CRCUISR 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_CRCUISR),
in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_CRCUISR_LO));
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
dev_err(dev, "DESCBUF 0x%08x_%08x\n",
in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_DESCBUF + 8*i),
in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_DESCBUF_LO + 8*i));
}
/*
* recover from error interrupts
*/
static void talitos_error(struct device *dev, u32 isr, u32 isr_lo)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned int timeout = TALITOS_TIMEOUT;
int ch, error, reset_dev = 0, reset_ch = 0;
u32 v, v_lo;
for (ch = 0; ch < priv->num_channels; ch++) {
/* skip channels without errors */
if (!(isr & (1 << (ch * 2 + 1))))
continue;
error = -EINVAL;
v = in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCPSR);
v_lo = in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCPSR_LO);
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_DOF) {
dev_err(dev, "double fetch fifo overflow error\n");
error = -EAGAIN;
reset_ch = 1;
}
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_SOF) {
/* h/w dropped descriptor */
dev_err(dev, "single fetch fifo overflow error\n");
error = -EAGAIN;
}
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_MDTE)
dev_err(dev, "master data transfer error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_SGDLZ)
dev_err(dev, "s/g data length zero error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_FPZ)
dev_err(dev, "fetch pointer zero error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_IDH)
dev_err(dev, "illegal descriptor header error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_IEU)
dev_err(dev, "invalid execution unit error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_EU)
report_eu_error(dev, ch, current_desc_hdr(dev, ch));
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_GB)
dev_err(dev, "gather boundary error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_GRL)
dev_err(dev, "gather return/length error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_SB)
dev_err(dev, "scatter boundary error\n");
if (v_lo & TALITOS_CCPSR_LO_SRL)
dev_err(dev, "scatter return/length error\n");
flush_channel(dev, ch, error, reset_ch);
if (reset_ch) {
reset_channel(dev, ch);
} else {
setbits32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR,
TALITOS_CCCR_CONT);
setbits32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR_LO, 0);
while ((in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CCCR) &
TALITOS_CCCR_CONT) && --timeout)
cpu_relax();
if (timeout == 0) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to restart channel %d\n",
ch);
reset_dev = 1;
}
}
}
if (reset_dev || isr & ~TALITOS_ISR_4CHERR || isr_lo) {
dev_err(dev, "done overflow, internal time out, or rngu error: "
"ISR 0x%08x_%08x\n", isr, isr_lo);
/* purge request queues */
for (ch = 0; ch < priv->num_channels; ch++)
flush_channel(dev, ch, -EIO, 1);
/* reset and reinitialize the device */
init_device(dev);
}
}
#define DEF_TALITOS_INTERRUPT(name, ch_done_mask, ch_err_mask, tlet) \
static irqreturn_t talitos_interrupt_##name(int irq, void *data) \
{ \
struct device *dev = data; \
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); \
u32 isr, isr_lo; \
unsigned long flags; \
\
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->reg_lock, flags); \
isr = in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_ISR); \
isr_lo = in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_ISR_LO); \
/* Acknowledge interrupt */ \
out_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_ICR, isr & (ch_done_mask | ch_err_mask)); \
out_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_ICR_LO, isr_lo); \
\
if (unlikely(isr & ch_err_mask || isr_lo)) { \
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->reg_lock, flags); \
talitos_error(dev, isr & ch_err_mask, isr_lo); \
} \
else { \
if (likely(isr & ch_done_mask)) { \
/* mask further done interrupts. */ \
clrbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_IMR, ch_done_mask); \
/* done_task will unmask done interrupts at exit */ \
tasklet_schedule(&priv->done_task[tlet]); \
} \
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->reg_lock, flags); \
} \
\
return (isr & (ch_done_mask | ch_err_mask) || isr_lo) ? IRQ_HANDLED : \
IRQ_NONE; \
}
DEF_TALITOS_INTERRUPT(4ch, TALITOS_ISR_4CHDONE, TALITOS_ISR_4CHERR, 0)
DEF_TALITOS_INTERRUPT(ch0_2, TALITOS_ISR_CH_0_2_DONE, TALITOS_ISR_CH_0_2_ERR, 0)
DEF_TALITOS_INTERRUPT(ch1_3, TALITOS_ISR_CH_1_3_DONE, TALITOS_ISR_CH_1_3_ERR, 1)
/*
* hwrng
*/
static int talitos_rng_data_present(struct hwrng *rng, int wait)
{
struct device *dev = (struct device *)rng->priv;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
u32 ofl;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
ofl = in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGUSR_LO) &
TALITOS_RNGUSR_LO_OFL;
if (ofl || !wait)
break;
udelay(10);
}
return !!ofl;
}
static int talitos_rng_data_read(struct hwrng *rng, u32 *data)
{
struct device *dev = (struct device *)rng->priv;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
/* rng fifo requires 64-bit accesses */
*data = in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGU_FIFO);
*data = in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGU_FIFO_LO);
return sizeof(u32);
}
static int talitos_rng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
{
struct device *dev = (struct device *)rng->priv;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned int timeout = TALITOS_TIMEOUT;
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGURCR_LO, TALITOS_RNGURCR_LO_SR);
while (!(in_be32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGUSR_LO) & TALITOS_RNGUSR_LO_RD)
&& --timeout)
cpu_relax();
if (timeout == 0) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to reset rng hw\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
/* start generating */
setbits32(priv->reg + TALITOS_RNGUDSR_LO, 0);
return 0;
}
static int talitos_register_rng(struct device *dev)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
priv->rng.name = dev_driver_string(dev),
priv->rng.init = talitos_rng_init,
priv->rng.data_present = talitos_rng_data_present,
priv->rng.data_read = talitos_rng_data_read,
priv->rng.priv = (unsigned long)dev;
return hwrng_register(&priv->rng);
}
static void talitos_unregister_rng(struct device *dev)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
hwrng_unregister(&priv->rng);
}
/*
* crypto alg
*/
#define TALITOS_CRA_PRIORITY 3000
#define TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE 96
#define TALITOS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 /* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE */
#define MD5_BLOCK_SIZE 64
struct talitos_ctx {
struct device *dev;
int ch;
__be32 desc_hdr_template;
u8 key[TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
u8 iv[TALITOS_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned int keylen;
unsigned int enckeylen;
unsigned int authkeylen;
unsigned int authsize;
};
#define HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE
#define TALITOS_MDEU_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx {
u32 hw_context[TALITOS_MDEU_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
unsigned int hw_context_size;
u8 buf[HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 bufnext[HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned int swinit;
unsigned int first;
unsigned int last;
unsigned int to_hash_later;
u64 nbuf;
struct scatterlist bufsl[2];
struct scatterlist *psrc;
};
static int aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
unsigned int authsize)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
ctx->authsize = authsize;
return 0;
}
static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0)
goto badkey;
if (keys.authkeylen + keys.enckeylen > TALITOS_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
goto badkey;
memcpy(ctx->key, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen);
memcpy(&ctx->key[keys.authkeylen], keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
ctx->keylen = keys.authkeylen + keys.enckeylen;
ctx->enckeylen = keys.enckeylen;
ctx->authkeylen = keys.authkeylen;
return 0;
badkey:
crypto_aead_set_flags(authenc, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* talitos_edesc - s/w-extended descriptor
* @assoc_nents: number of segments in associated data scatterlist
* @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist
* @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist
* @assoc_chained: whether assoc is chained or not
* @src_chained: whether src is chained or not
* @dst_chained: whether dst is chained or not
* @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table
* @dma_len: length of dma mapped link_tbl space
* @dma_link_tbl: bus physical address of link_tbl
* @desc: h/w descriptor
* @link_tbl: input and output h/w link tables (if {src,dst}_nents > 1)
*
* if decrypting (with authcheck), or either one of src_nents or dst_nents
* is greater than 1, an integrity check value is concatenated to the end
* of link_tbl data
*/
struct talitos_edesc {
int assoc_nents;
int src_nents;
int dst_nents;
bool assoc_chained;
bool src_chained;
bool dst_chained;
dma_addr_t iv_dma;
int dma_len;
dma_addr_t dma_link_tbl;
struct talitos_desc desc;
struct talitos_ptr link_tbl[0];
};
static int talitos_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
unsigned int nents, enum dma_data_direction dir,
bool chained)
{
if (unlikely(chained))
while (sg) {
dma_map_sg(dev, sg, 1, dir);
sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(sg);
}
else
dma_map_sg(dev, sg, nents, dir);
return nents;
}
static void talitos_unmap_sg_chain(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
while (sg) {
dma_unmap_sg(dev, sg, 1, dir);
sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(sg);
}
}
static void talitos_sg_unmap(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct scatterlist *src,
struct scatterlist *dst)
{
unsigned int src_nents = edesc->src_nents ? : 1;
unsigned int dst_nents = edesc->dst_nents ? : 1;
if (src != dst) {
if (edesc->src_chained)
talitos_unmap_sg_chain(dev, src, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else
dma_unmap_sg(dev, src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dst) {
if (edesc->dst_chained)
talitos_unmap_sg_chain(dev, dst,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
else
dma_unmap_sg(dev, dst, dst_nents,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
}
} else
if (edesc->src_chained)
talitos_unmap_sg_chain(dev, src, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
else
dma_unmap_sg(dev, src, src_nents, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
static void ipsec_esp_unmap(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct aead_request *areq)
{
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[6], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[3], DMA_TO_DEVICE);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[2], DMA_TO_DEVICE);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[0], DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (edesc->assoc_chained)
talitos_unmap_sg_chain(dev, areq->assoc, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else if (areq->assoclen)
/* assoc_nents counts also for IV in non-contiguous cases */
dma_unmap_sg(dev, areq->assoc,
edesc->assoc_nents ? edesc->assoc_nents - 1 : 1,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, areq->src, areq->dst);
if (edesc->dma_len)
dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
/*
* ipsec_esp descriptor callbacks
*/
static void ipsec_esp_encrypt_done(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc, void *context,
int err)
{
struct aead_request *areq = context;
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
struct scatterlist *sg;
void *icvdata;
edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
/* copy the generated ICV to dst */
if (edesc->dst_nents) {
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
edesc->dst_nents + 2 +
edesc->assoc_nents];
sg = sg_last(areq->dst, edesc->dst_nents);
memcpy((char *)sg_virt(sg) + sg->length - ctx->authsize,
icvdata, ctx->authsize);
}
kfree(edesc);
aead_request_complete(areq, err);
}
static void ipsec_esp_decrypt_swauth_done(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int err)
{
struct aead_request *req = context;
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
struct scatterlist *sg;
void *icvdata;
edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
if (!err) {
/* auth check */
if (edesc->dma_len)
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
edesc->dst_nents + 2 +
edesc->assoc_nents];
else
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[0];
sg = sg_last(req->dst, edesc->dst_nents ? : 1);
err = memcmp(icvdata, (char *)sg_virt(sg) + sg->length -
ctx->authsize, ctx->authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
}
kfree(edesc);
aead_request_complete(req, err);
}
static void ipsec_esp_decrypt_hwauth_done(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int err)
{
struct aead_request *req = context;
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
/* check ICV auth status */
if (!err && ((desc->hdr_lo & DESC_HDR_LO_ICCR1_MASK) !=
DESC_HDR_LO_ICCR1_PASS))
err = -EBADMSG;
kfree(edesc);
aead_request_complete(req, err);
}
/*
* convert scatterlist to SEC h/w link table format
* stop at cryptlen bytes
*/
static int sg_to_link_tbl(struct scatterlist *sg, int sg_count,
int cryptlen, struct talitos_ptr *link_tbl_ptr)
{
int n_sg = sg_count;
while (n_sg--) {
to_talitos_ptr(link_tbl_ptr, sg_dma_address(sg));
link_tbl_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(sg_dma_len(sg));
link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = 0;
link_tbl_ptr++;
cryptlen -= sg_dma_len(sg);
sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(sg);
}
/* adjust (decrease) last one (or two) entry's len to cryptlen */
link_tbl_ptr--;
while (be16_to_cpu(link_tbl_ptr->len) <= (-cryptlen)) {
/* Empty this entry, and move to previous one */
cryptlen += be16_to_cpu(link_tbl_ptr->len);
link_tbl_ptr->len = 0;
sg_count--;
link_tbl_ptr--;
}
be16_add_cpu(&link_tbl_ptr->len, cryptlen);
/* tag end of link table */
link_tbl_ptr->j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN;
return sg_count;
}
/*
* fill in and submit ipsec_esp descriptor
*/
static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
u64 seq, void (*callback) (struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int error))
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc;
unsigned int cryptlen = areq->cryptlen;
unsigned int authsize = ctx->authsize;
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int sg_count, ret;
int sg_link_tbl_len;
/* hmac key */
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[0], ctx->authkeylen, &ctx->key,
0, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
/* hmac data */
desc->ptr[1].len = cpu_to_be16(areq->assoclen + ivsize);
if (edesc->assoc_nents) {
int tbl_off = edesc->src_nents + edesc->dst_nents + 2;
struct talitos_ptr *tbl_ptr = &edesc->link_tbl[tbl_off];
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[1], edesc->dma_link_tbl + tbl_off *
sizeof(struct talitos_ptr));
desc->ptr[1].j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
/* assoc_nents - 1 entries for assoc, 1 for IV */
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->assoc, edesc->assoc_nents - 1,
areq->assoclen, tbl_ptr);
/* add IV to link table */
tbl_ptr += sg_count - 1;
tbl_ptr->j_extent = 0;
tbl_ptr++;
to_talitos_ptr(tbl_ptr, edesc->iv_dma);
tbl_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(ivsize);
tbl_ptr->j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN;
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
} else {
if (areq->assoclen)
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[1],
sg_dma_address(areq->assoc));
else
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[1], edesc->iv_dma);
desc->ptr[1].j_extent = 0;
}
/* cipher iv */
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[2], edesc->iv_dma);
desc->ptr[2].len = cpu_to_be16(ivsize);
desc->ptr[2].j_extent = 0;
/* Sync needed for the aead_givencrypt case */
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->iv_dma, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
/* cipher key */
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[3], ctx->enckeylen,
(char *)&ctx->key + ctx->authkeylen, 0,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
/*
* cipher in
* map and adjust cipher len to aead request cryptlen.
* extent is bytes of HMAC postpended to ciphertext,
* typically 12 for ipsec
*/
desc->ptr[4].len = cpu_to_be16(cryptlen);
desc->ptr[4].j_extent = authsize;
sg_count = talitos_map_sg(dev, areq->src, edesc->src_nents ? : 1,
(areq->src == areq->dst) ? DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL
: DMA_TO_DEVICE,
edesc->src_chained);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[4], sg_dma_address(areq->src));
} else {
sg_link_tbl_len = cryptlen;
if (edesc->desc.hdr & DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_CICV)
sg_link_tbl_len = cryptlen + authsize;
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->src, sg_count, sg_link_tbl_len,
&edesc->link_tbl[0]);
if (sg_count > 1) {
desc->ptr[4].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[4], edesc->dma_link_tbl);
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
} else {
/* Only one segment now, so no link tbl needed */
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[4],
sg_dma_address(areq->src));
}
}
/* cipher out */
desc->ptr[5].len = cpu_to_be16(cryptlen);
desc->ptr[5].j_extent = authsize;
if (areq->src != areq->dst)
sg_count = talitos_map_sg(dev, areq->dst,
edesc->dst_nents ? : 1,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, edesc->dst_chained);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[5], sg_dma_address(areq->dst));
} else {
int tbl_off = edesc->src_nents + 1;
struct talitos_ptr *tbl_ptr = &edesc->link_tbl[tbl_off];
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[5], edesc->dma_link_tbl +
tbl_off * sizeof(struct talitos_ptr));
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->dst, sg_count, cryptlen,
tbl_ptr);
/* Add an entry to the link table for ICV data */
tbl_ptr += sg_count - 1;
tbl_ptr->j_extent = 0;
tbl_ptr++;
tbl_ptr->j_extent = DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN;
tbl_ptr->len = cpu_to_be16(authsize);
/* icv data follows link tables */
to_talitos_ptr(tbl_ptr, edesc->dma_link_tbl +
(tbl_off + edesc->dst_nents + 1 +
edesc->assoc_nents) *
sizeof(struct talitos_ptr));
desc->ptr[5].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
dma_sync_single_for_device(ctx->dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
/* iv out */
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[6], ivsize, ctx->iv, 0,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq);
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
kfree(edesc);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* derive number of elements in scatterlist
*/
static int sg_count(struct scatterlist *sg_list, int nbytes, bool *chained)
{
struct scatterlist *sg = sg_list;
int sg_nents = 0;
*chained = false;
while (nbytes > 0) {
sg_nents++;
nbytes -= sg->length;
if (!sg_is_last(sg) && (sg + 1)->length == 0)
*chained = true;
sg = scatterwalk_sg_next(sg);
}
return sg_nents;
}
/*
* allocate and map the extended descriptor
*/
static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_edesc_alloc(struct device *dev,
struct scatterlist *assoc,
struct scatterlist *src,
struct scatterlist *dst,
u8 *iv,
unsigned int assoclen,
unsigned int cryptlen,
unsigned int authsize,
unsigned int ivsize,
int icv_stashing,
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
u32 cryptoflags,
bool encrypt)
{
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
int assoc_nents = 0, src_nents, dst_nents, alloc_len, dma_len;
bool assoc_chained = false, src_chained = false, dst_chained = false;
dma_addr_t iv_dma = 0;
gfp_t flags = cryptoflags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? GFP_KERNEL :
GFP_ATOMIC;
if (cryptlen + authsize > TALITOS_MAX_DATA_LEN) {
dev_err(dev, "length exceeds h/w max limit\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (ivsize)
iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (assoclen) {
/*
* Currently it is assumed that iv is provided whenever assoc
* is.
*/
BUG_ON(!iv);
assoc_nents = sg_count(assoc, assoclen, &assoc_chained);
talitos_map_sg(dev, assoc, assoc_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE,
assoc_chained);
assoc_nents = (assoc_nents == 1) ? 0 : assoc_nents;
if (assoc_nents || sg_dma_address(assoc) + assoclen != iv_dma)
assoc_nents = assoc_nents ? assoc_nents + 1 : 2;
}
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
if (!dst || dst == src) {
src_nents = sg_count(src, cryptlen + authsize, &src_chained);
src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
dst_nents = dst ? src_nents : 0;
} else { /* dst && dst != src*/
src_nents = sg_count(src, cryptlen + (encrypt ? 0 : authsize),
&src_chained);
src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
dst_nents = sg_count(dst, cryptlen + (encrypt ? authsize : 0),
&dst_chained);
dst_nents = (dst_nents == 1) ? 0 : dst_nents;
}
/*
* allocate space for base edesc plus the link tables,
* allowing for two separate entries for ICV and generated ICV (+ 2),
* and the ICV data itself
*/
alloc_len = sizeof(struct talitos_edesc);
if (assoc_nents || src_nents || dst_nents) {
dma_len = (src_nents + dst_nents + 2 + assoc_nents) *
sizeof(struct talitos_ptr) + authsize;
alloc_len += dma_len;
} else {
dma_len = 0;
alloc_len += icv_stashing ? authsize : 0;
}
edesc = kmalloc(alloc_len, GFP_DMA | flags);
if (!edesc) {
if (assoc_chained)
talitos_unmap_sg_chain(dev, assoc, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else if (assoclen)
dma_unmap_sg(dev, assoc,
assoc_nents ? assoc_nents - 1 : 1,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (iv_dma)
dma_unmap_single(dev, iv_dma, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
dev_err(dev, "could not allocate edescriptor\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
edesc->assoc_nents = assoc_nents;
edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents;
edesc->assoc_chained = assoc_chained;
edesc->src_chained = src_chained;
edesc->dst_chained = dst_chained;
edesc->iv_dma = iv_dma;
edesc->dma_len = dma_len;
if (dma_len)
edesc->dma_link_tbl = dma_map_single(dev, &edesc->link_tbl[0],
edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
return edesc;
}
static struct talitos_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *areq, u8 *iv,
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
int icv_stashing, bool encrypt)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc);
return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, areq->assoc, areq->src, areq->dst,
iv, areq->assoclen, areq->cryptlen,
ctx->authsize, ivsize, icv_stashing,
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
areq->base.flags, encrypt);
}
static int aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
/* allocate extended descriptor */
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
edesc = aead_edesc_alloc(req, req->iv, 0, true);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
/* set encrypt */
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_MODE0_ENCRYPT;
return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, 0, ipsec_esp_encrypt_done);
}
static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
unsigned int authsize = ctx->authsize;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
struct scatterlist *sg;
void *icvdata;
req->cryptlen -= authsize;
/* allocate extended descriptor */
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
edesc = aead_edesc_alloc(req, req->iv, 1, false);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
if ((priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK) &&
((!edesc->src_nents && !edesc->dst_nents) ||
priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT)) {
/* decrypt and check the ICV */
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template |
DESC_HDR_DIR_INBOUND |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_CICV;
/* reset integrity check result bits */
edesc->desc.hdr_lo = 0;
return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, 0, ipsec_esp_decrypt_hwauth_done);
}
/* Have to check the ICV with software */
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_DIR_INBOUND;
/* stash incoming ICV for later cmp with ICV generated by the h/w */
if (edesc->dma_len)
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents +
edesc->dst_nents + 2 +
edesc->assoc_nents];
else
icvdata = &edesc->link_tbl[0];
sg = sg_last(req->src, edesc->src_nents ? : 1);
memcpy(icvdata, (char *)sg_virt(sg) + sg->length - ctx->authsize,
ctx->authsize);
return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, 0, ipsec_esp_decrypt_swauth_done);
}
static int aead_givencrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
struct aead_request *areq = &req->areq;
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
/* allocate extended descriptor */
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
edesc = aead_edesc_alloc(areq, req->giv, 0, true);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
/* set encrypt */
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_MODE0_ENCRYPT;
memcpy(req->giv, ctx->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc));
/* avoid consecutive packets going out with same IV */
*(__be64 *)req->giv ^= cpu_to_be64(req->seq);
return ipsec_esp(edesc, areq, req->seq, ipsec_esp_encrypt_done);
}
static int ablkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
memcpy(&ctx->key, key, keylen);
ctx->keylen = keylen;
return 0;
}
static void common_nonsnoop_unmap(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct ablkcipher_request *areq)
{
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[2], DMA_TO_DEVICE);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[1], DMA_TO_DEVICE);
talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, areq->src, areq->dst);
if (edesc->dma_len)
dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
static void ablkcipher_done(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc, void *context,
int err)
{
struct ablkcipher_request *areq = context;
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
common_nonsnoop_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
kfree(edesc);
areq->base.complete(&areq->base, err);
}
static int common_nonsnoop(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct ablkcipher_request *areq,
void (*callback) (struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int error))
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc;
unsigned int cryptlen = areq->nbytes;
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(cipher);
int sg_count, ret;
/* first DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[0].len = 0;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[0], 0);
desc->ptr[0].j_extent = 0;
/* cipher iv */
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[1], edesc->iv_dma);
desc->ptr[1].len = cpu_to_be16(ivsize);
desc->ptr[1].j_extent = 0;
/* cipher key */
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[2], ctx->keylen,
(char *)&ctx->key, 0, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
/*
* cipher in
*/
desc->ptr[3].len = cpu_to_be16(cryptlen);
desc->ptr[3].j_extent = 0;
sg_count = talitos_map_sg(dev, areq->src, edesc->src_nents ? : 1,
(areq->src == areq->dst) ? DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL
: DMA_TO_DEVICE,
edesc->src_chained);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3], sg_dma_address(areq->src));
} else {
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->src, sg_count, cryptlen,
&edesc->link_tbl[0]);
if (sg_count > 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3], edesc->dma_link_tbl);
desc->ptr[3].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
} else {
/* Only one segment now, so no link tbl needed */
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3],
sg_dma_address(areq->src));
}
}
/* cipher out */
desc->ptr[4].len = cpu_to_be16(cryptlen);
desc->ptr[4].j_extent = 0;
if (areq->src != areq->dst)
sg_count = talitos_map_sg(dev, areq->dst,
edesc->dst_nents ? : 1,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE, edesc->dst_chained);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[4], sg_dma_address(areq->dst));
} else {
struct talitos_ptr *link_tbl_ptr =
&edesc->link_tbl[edesc->src_nents + 1];
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[4], edesc->dma_link_tbl +
(edesc->src_nents + 1) *
sizeof(struct talitos_ptr));
desc->ptr[4].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(areq->dst, sg_count, cryptlen,
link_tbl_ptr);
dma_sync_single_for_device(ctx->dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
/* iv out */
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5], ivsize, ctx->iv, 0,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
/* last DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[6].len = 0;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[6], 0);
desc->ptr[6].j_extent = 0;
ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq);
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
common_nonsnoop_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
kfree(edesc);
}
return ret;
}
static struct talitos_edesc *ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(struct ablkcipher_request *
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
areq, bool encrypt)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(cipher);
return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, NULL, areq->src, areq->dst,
areq->info, 0, areq->nbytes, 0, ivsize, 0,
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
areq->base.flags, encrypt);
}
static int ablkcipher_encrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *areq)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
/* allocate extended descriptor */
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, true);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
/* set encrypt */
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_MODE0_ENCRYPT;
return common_nonsnoop(edesc, areq, ablkcipher_done);
}
static int ablkcipher_decrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *areq)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
/* allocate extended descriptor */
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, false);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_DIR_INBOUND;
return common_nonsnoop(edesc, areq, ablkcipher_done);
}
static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
/* When using hashctx-in, must unmap it. */
if (edesc->desc.ptr[1].len)
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[1],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (edesc->desc.ptr[2].len)
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[2],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, req_ctx->psrc, NULL);
if (edesc->dma_len)
dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
static void ahash_done(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc, void *context,
int err)
{
struct ahash_request *areq = context;
struct talitos_edesc *edesc =
container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
if (!req_ctx->last && req_ctx->to_hash_later) {
/* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */
memcpy(req_ctx->buf, req_ctx->bufnext, req_ctx->to_hash_later);
req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later;
}
common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
kfree(edesc);
areq->base.complete(&areq->base, err);
}
static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int length,
void (*callback) (struct device *dev,
struct talitos_desc *desc,
void *context, int error))
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc;
int sg_count, ret;
/* first DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[0] = zero_entry;
/* hash context in */
if (!req_ctx->first || req_ctx->swinit) {
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[1],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
(char *)req_ctx->hw_context, 0,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
req_ctx->swinit = 0;
} else {
desc->ptr[1] = zero_entry;
/* Indicate next op is not the first. */
req_ctx->first = 0;
}
/* HMAC key */
if (ctx->keylen)
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[2], ctx->keylen,
(char *)&ctx->key, 0, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else
desc->ptr[2] = zero_entry;
/*
* data in
*/
desc->ptr[3].len = cpu_to_be16(length);
desc->ptr[3].j_extent = 0;
sg_count = talitos_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->psrc,
edesc->src_nents ? : 1,
DMA_TO_DEVICE, edesc->src_chained);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3], sg_dma_address(req_ctx->psrc));
} else {
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl(req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, length,
&edesc->link_tbl[0]);
if (sg_count > 1) {
desc->ptr[3].j_extent |= DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_JUMP;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3], edesc->dma_link_tbl);
dma_sync_single_for_device(ctx->dev,
edesc->dma_link_tbl,
edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
} else {
/* Only one segment now, so no link tbl needed */
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3],
sg_dma_address(req_ctx->psrc));
}
}
/* fifth DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[4] = zero_entry;
/* hash/HMAC out -or- hash context out */
if (req_ctx->last)
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm),
areq->result, 0, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
else
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
req_ctx->hw_context, 0, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
/* last DWORD empty */
desc->ptr[6] = zero_entry;
ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq);
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
kfree(edesc);
}
return ret;
}
static struct talitos_edesc *ahash_edesc_alloc(struct ahash_request *areq,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, NULL, req_ctx->psrc, NULL, NULL, 0,
crypto: talitos - fix aead sglen for case 'dst != src' For aead case when source and destination buffers are different, there is an incorrect assumption that the source length includes the ICV length. Fix this, since it leads to an oops when using sg_count() to find the number of nents in the scatterlist: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000004 Faulting instruction address: 0xf2265a28 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P2020 RDB Modules linked in: talitos(+) CPU: 1 PID: 2187 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #12 task: c4e72e20 ti: ef634000 task.ti: ef634000 NIP: f2265a28 LR: f2266ad8 CTR: c000c900 REGS: ef635bb0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.11.0) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 42042084 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 00000004, ESR: 00000000 GPR00: f2266e10 ef635c60 c4e72e20 00000001 00000014 ef635c69 00000001 c11f3082 GPR08: 00000010 00000000 00000002 2f635d58 22044084 00000000 00000000 c0755c80 GPR16: c4bf1000 ef784000 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000014 00000010 ef2f6100 GPR24: ef2f6200 00000024 ef143210 ef2f6000 00000000 ef635d58 00000000 2f635d58 NIP [f2265a28] sg_count+0x1c/0xb4 [talitos] LR [f2266ad8] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x12c/0x410 [talitos] Call Trace: [ef635c60] [c0552068] schedule_timeout+0x148/0x1ac (unreliable) [ef635cc0] [f2266e10] aead_edesc_alloc+0x54/0x64 [talitos] [ef635ce0] [f22680f0] aead_encrypt+0x24/0x70 [talitos] [ef635cf0] [c024b948] __test_aead+0x494/0xf68 [ef635e20] [c024d54c] test_aead+0x64/0xcc [ef635e40] [c024d604] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc4 [ef635e60] [c024c838] alg_test+0x10c/0x2e4 [ef635ee0] [c0249d1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x54 [ef635ef0] [c005d598] kthread+0xa8/0xac [ef635f40] [c000e3bc] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 81230024 552807fe 0f080000 5523003a 4bffff24 39000000 2c040000 99050000 408100a0 7c691b78 38c00001 38600000 <80e90004> 38630001 8109000c 70ea0002 ---[ end trace 4498123cd8478591 ]--- Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2013-11-28 13:11:17 +00:00
nbytes, 0, 0, 0, areq->base.flags, false);
}
static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
/* Initialize the context */
req_ctx->nbuf = 0;
req_ctx->first = 1; /* first indicates h/w must init its context */
req_ctx->swinit = 0; /* assume h/w init of context */
req_ctx->hw_context_size =
(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
return 0;
}
/*
* on h/w without explicit sha224 support, we initialize h/w context
* manually with sha224 constants, and tell it to run sha256.
*/
static int ahash_init_sha224_swinit(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
ahash_init(areq);
req_ctx->swinit = 1;/* prevent h/w initting context with sha256 values*/
req_ctx->hw_context[0] = SHA224_H0;
req_ctx->hw_context[1] = SHA224_H1;
req_ctx->hw_context[2] = SHA224_H2;
req_ctx->hw_context[3] = SHA224_H3;
req_ctx->hw_context[4] = SHA224_H4;
req_ctx->hw_context[5] = SHA224_H5;
req_ctx->hw_context[6] = SHA224_H6;
req_ctx->hw_context[7] = SHA224_H7;
/* init 64-bit count */
req_ctx->hw_context[8] = 0;
req_ctx->hw_context[9] = 0;
return 0;
}
static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
unsigned int blocksize =
crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
unsigned int nbytes_to_hash;
unsigned int to_hash_later;
unsigned int nsg;
bool chained;
if (!req_ctx->last && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) {
/* Buffer up to one whole block */
sg_copy_to_buffer(areq->src,
sg_count(areq->src, nbytes, &chained),
req_ctx->buf + req_ctx->nbuf, nbytes);
req_ctx->nbuf += nbytes;
return 0;
}
/* At least (blocksize + 1) bytes are available to hash */
nbytes_to_hash = nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf;
to_hash_later = nbytes_to_hash & (blocksize - 1);
if (req_ctx->last)
to_hash_later = 0;
else if (to_hash_later)
/* There is a partial block. Hash the full block(s) now */
nbytes_to_hash -= to_hash_later;
else {
/* Keep one block buffered */
nbytes_to_hash -= blocksize;
to_hash_later = blocksize;
}
/* Chain in any previously buffered data */
if (req_ctx->nbuf) {
nsg = (req_ctx->nbuf < nbytes_to_hash) ? 2 : 1;
sg_init_table(req_ctx->bufsl, nsg);
sg_set_buf(req_ctx->bufsl, req_ctx->buf, req_ctx->nbuf);
if (nsg > 1)
scatterwalk_sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, areq->src);
req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->bufsl;
} else
req_ctx->psrc = areq->src;
if (to_hash_later) {
int nents = sg_count(areq->src, nbytes, &chained);
sg_pcopy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents,
req_ctx->bufnext,
to_hash_later,
nbytes - to_hash_later);
}
req_ctx->to_hash_later = to_hash_later;
/* Allocate extended descriptor */
edesc = ahash_edesc_alloc(areq, nbytes_to_hash);
if (IS_ERR(edesc))
return PTR_ERR(edesc);
edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template;
/* On last one, request SEC to pad; otherwise continue */
if (req_ctx->last)
edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD;
else
edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT;
/* request SEC to INIT hash. */
if (req_ctx->first && !req_ctx->swinit)
edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT;
/* When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC.
* A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC.
*/
if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first || req_ctx->last))
edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC;
return common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, areq, nbytes_to_hash,
ahash_done);
}
static int ahash_update(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
req_ctx->last = 0;
return ahash_process_req(areq, areq->nbytes);
}
static int ahash_final(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
req_ctx->last = 1;
return ahash_process_req(areq, 0);
}
static int ahash_finup(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
req_ctx->last = 1;
return ahash_process_req(areq, areq->nbytes);
}
static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct crypto_ahash *ahash = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
ahash->init(areq);
req_ctx->last = 1;
return ahash_process_req(areq, areq->nbytes);
}
struct keyhash_result {
struct completion completion;
int err;
};
static void keyhash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct keyhash_result *res = req->data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
res->err = err;
complete(&res->completion);
}
static int keyhash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
u8 *hash)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct ahash_request *req;
struct keyhash_result hresult;
int ret;
init_completion(&hresult.completion);
req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Keep tfm keylen == 0 during hash of the long key */
ctx->keylen = 0;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
keyhash_complete, &hresult);
sg_init_one(&sg[0], key, keylen);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, hash, keylen);
ret = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
break;
case -EINPROGRESS:
case -EBUSY:
ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
&hresult.completion);
if (!ret)
ret = hresult.err;
break;
default:
break;
}
ahash_request_free(req);
return ret;
}
static int ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
unsigned int blocksize =
crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
unsigned int keysize = keylen;
u8 hash[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
int ret;
if (keylen <= blocksize)
memcpy(ctx->key, key, keysize);
else {
/* Must get the hash of the long key */
ret = keyhash(tfm, key, keylen, hash);
if (ret) {
crypto_ahash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
keysize = digestsize;
memcpy(ctx->key, hash, digestsize);
}
ctx->keylen = keysize;
return 0;
}
struct talitos_alg_template {
u32 type;
union {
struct crypto_alg crypto;
struct ahash_alg hash;
} alg;
__be32 desc_hdr_template;
};
static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
/* AEAD algorithms. These use a single-pass ipsec_esp descriptor */
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA1_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA1_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA224_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA224_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA256_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_SHA256_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha384-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEUB_SHA384_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha384-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEUB_SHA384_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha512-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEUB_SHA512_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha512-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEUB_SHA512_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_MD5_HMAC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))",
.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_aead = {
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES |
DESC_HDR_SEL1_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_INIT |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_PAD |
DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_MD5_HMAC,
},
/* ABLKCIPHER algorithms. */
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_ablkcipher = {
.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CBC,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER,
.alg.crypto = {
.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
.cra_driver_name = "cbc-3des-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
.cra_ablkcipher = {
.min_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
.max_keysize = DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_DEU |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_CBC |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_DEU_3DES,
},
/* AHASH algorithms. */
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "md5",
.cra_driver_name = "md5-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = MD5_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_MD5,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "sha1",
.cra_driver_name = "sha1-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA1,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "sha224",
.cra_driver_name = "sha224-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA224,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "sha256",
.cra_driver_name = "sha256-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA256,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "sha384",
.cra_driver_name = "sha384-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEUB_SHA384,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "sha512",
.cra_driver_name = "sha512-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEUB_SHA512,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(md5)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-md5-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = MD5_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_MD5,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(sha1)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-sha1-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA1,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(sha224)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-sha224-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA224,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(sha256)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-sha256-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA256,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(sha384)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-sha384-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEUB_SHA384,
},
{ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
.alg.hash = {
.halg.digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
.halg.base = {
.cra_name = "hmac(sha512)",
.cra_driver_name = "hmac-sha512-talitos",
.cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH |
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
}
},
.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUB |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEUB_SHA512,
}
};
struct talitos_crypto_alg {
struct list_head entry;
struct device *dev;
struct talitos_alg_template algt;
};
static int talitos_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg = tfm->__crt_alg;
struct talitos_crypto_alg *talitos_alg;
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct talitos_private *priv;
if ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH)
talitos_alg = container_of(__crypto_ahash_alg(alg),
struct talitos_crypto_alg,
algt.alg.hash);
else
talitos_alg = container_of(alg, struct talitos_crypto_alg,
algt.alg.crypto);
/* update context with ptr to dev */
ctx->dev = talitos_alg->dev;
/* assign SEC channel to tfm in round-robin fashion */
priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev);
ctx->ch = atomic_inc_return(&priv->last_chan) &
(priv->num_channels - 1);
/* copy descriptor header template value */
ctx->desc_hdr_template = talitos_alg->algt.desc_hdr_template;
/* select done notification */
ctx->desc_hdr_template |= DESC_HDR_DONE_NOTIFY;
return 0;
}
static int talitos_cra_init_aead(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
talitos_cra_init(tfm);
/* random first IV */
get_random_bytes(ctx->iv, TALITOS_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
static int talitos_cra_init_ahash(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
talitos_cra_init(tfm);
ctx->keylen = 0;
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
sizeof(struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx));
return 0;
}
/*
* given the alg's descriptor header template, determine whether descriptor
* type and primary/secondary execution units required match the hw
* capabilities description provided in the device tree node.
*/
static int hw_supports(struct device *dev, __be32 desc_hdr_template)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int ret;
ret = (1 << DESC_TYPE(desc_hdr_template) & priv->desc_types) &&
(1 << PRIMARY_EU(desc_hdr_template) & priv->exec_units);
if (SECONDARY_EU(desc_hdr_template))
ret = ret && (1 << SECONDARY_EU(desc_hdr_template)
& priv->exec_units);
return ret;
}
static int talitos_remove(struct platform_device *ofdev)
{
struct device *dev = &ofdev->dev;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct talitos_crypto_alg *t_alg, *n;
int i;
list_for_each_entry_safe(t_alg, n, &priv->alg_list, entry) {
switch (t_alg->algt.type) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER:
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
crypto_unregister_alg(&t_alg->algt.alg.crypto);
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH:
crypto_unregister_ahash(&t_alg->algt.alg.hash);
break;
}
list_del(&t_alg->entry);
kfree(t_alg);
}
if (hw_supports(dev, DESC_HDR_SEL0_RNG))
talitos_unregister_rng(dev);
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_channels; i++)
kfree(priv->chan[i].fifo);
kfree(priv->chan);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
if (priv->irq[i]) {
free_irq(priv->irq[i], dev);
irq_dispose_mapping(priv->irq[i]);
}
tasklet_kill(&priv->done_task[0]);
if (priv->irq[1])
tasklet_kill(&priv->done_task[1]);
iounmap(priv->reg);
kfree(priv);
return 0;
}
static struct talitos_crypto_alg *talitos_alg_alloc(struct device *dev,
struct talitos_alg_template
*template)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct talitos_crypto_alg *t_alg;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
t_alg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct talitos_crypto_alg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!t_alg)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
t_alg->algt = *template;
switch (t_alg->algt.type) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER:
alg = &t_alg->algt.alg.crypto;
alg->cra_init = talitos_cra_init;
alg->cra_type = &crypto_ablkcipher_type;
alg->cra_ablkcipher.setkey = ablkcipher_setkey;
alg->cra_ablkcipher.encrypt = ablkcipher_encrypt;
alg->cra_ablkcipher.decrypt = ablkcipher_decrypt;
alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv = "eseqiv";
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
alg = &t_alg->algt.alg.crypto;
alg->cra_init = talitos_cra_init_aead;
alg->cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
alg->cra_aead.setkey = aead_setkey;
alg->cra_aead.setauthsize = aead_setauthsize;
alg->cra_aead.encrypt = aead_encrypt;
alg->cra_aead.decrypt = aead_decrypt;
alg->cra_aead.givencrypt = aead_givencrypt;
alg->cra_aead.geniv = "<built-in>";
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH:
alg = &t_alg->algt.alg.hash.halg.base;
alg->cra_init = talitos_cra_init_ahash;
alg->cra_type = &crypto_ahash_type;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.init = ahash_init;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.update = ahash_update;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.final = ahash_final;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.finup = ahash_finup;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.digest = ahash_digest;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.setkey = ahash_setkey;
if (!(priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HMAC_OK) &&
!strncmp(alg->cra_name, "hmac", 4)) {
kfree(t_alg);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
if (!(priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_SHA224_HWINIT) &&
(!strcmp(alg->cra_name, "sha224") ||
!strcmp(alg->cra_name, "hmac(sha224)"))) {
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.init = ahash_init_sha224_swinit;
t_alg->algt.desc_hdr_template =
DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |
DESC_HDR_SEL0_MDEUA |
DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_SHA256;
}
break;
default:
dev_err(dev, "unknown algorithm type %d\n", t_alg->algt.type);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
alg->cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
alg->cra_priority = TALITOS_CRA_PRIORITY;
alg->cra_alignmask = 0;
alg->cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct talitos_ctx);
alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
t_alg->dev = dev;
return t_alg;
}
static int talitos_probe_irq(struct platform_device *ofdev)
{
struct device *dev = &ofdev->dev;
struct device_node *np = ofdev->dev.of_node;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int err;
priv->irq[0] = irq_of_parse_and_map(np, 0);
if (!priv->irq[0]) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to map irq\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
priv->irq[1] = irq_of_parse_and_map(np, 1);
/* get the primary irq line */
if (!priv->irq[1]) {
err = request_irq(priv->irq[0], talitos_interrupt_4ch, 0,
dev_driver_string(dev), dev);
goto primary_out;
}
err = request_irq(priv->irq[0], talitos_interrupt_ch0_2, 0,
dev_driver_string(dev), dev);
if (err)
goto primary_out;
/* get the secondary irq line */
err = request_irq(priv->irq[1], talitos_interrupt_ch1_3, 0,
dev_driver_string(dev), dev);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to request secondary irq\n");
irq_dispose_mapping(priv->irq[1]);
priv->irq[1] = 0;
}
return err;
primary_out:
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to request primary irq\n");
irq_dispose_mapping(priv->irq[0]);
priv->irq[0] = 0;
}
return err;
}
static int talitos_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
{
struct device *dev = &ofdev->dev;
struct device_node *np = ofdev->dev.of_node;
struct talitos_private *priv;
const unsigned int *prop;
int i, err;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct talitos_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
crypto: talitos: init the priv->alg_list more earlier in talitos_probe() In function talitos_probe(), it will jump to err_out when getting an error in talitos_probe_irq(). Then the uninitialized list head priv->alg_list will be used in function talitos_remove(). In this case we would get a call trace like the following. So move up the initialization of priv->alg_list. Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0459ff4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 P1020 RDB Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-08789-g54c0a4b46150 #33 task: cf050000 ti: cf04c000 task.ti: cf04c000 NIP: c0459ff4 LR: c0459fd4 CTR: c02f2438 REGS: cf04dcb0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (3.13.0-08789-g54c0a4b46150) MSR: 00029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 82000028 XER: 20000000 DEAR: 00000000 ESR: 00000000 GPR00: c045ac28 cf04dd60 cf050000 cf2579c0 00021000 00000000 c02f35b0 0000014e GPR08: c07e702c cf104300 c07e702c 0000014e 22000024 00000000 c0002a3c 00000000 GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 c082e4e0 000000df GPR24: 00000000 00100100 00200200 cf257a2c cf0efe10 cf2579c0 cf0efe10 00000000 NIP [c0459ff4] talitos_remove+0x3c/0x1c8 LR [c0459fd4] talitos_remove+0x1c/0x1c8 Call Trace: [cf04dd60] [c07485d8] __func__.13331+0x1241c8/0x1391c0 (unreliable) [cf04dd90] [c045ac28] talitos_probe+0x244/0x998 [cf04dde0] [c0306a74] platform_drv_probe+0x28/0x68 [cf04ddf0] [c0304d38] really_probe+0x78/0x250 [cf04de10] [c030505c] __driver_attach+0xc8/0xcc [cf04de30] [c0302e98] bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xb8 [cf04de60] [c03043cc] bus_add_driver+0x168/0x220 [cf04de80] [c0305798] driver_register+0x88/0x130 [cf04de90] [c0002458] do_one_initcall+0x14c/0x198 [cf04df00] [c079f904] kernel_init_freeable+0x138/0x1d4 [cf04df30] [c0002a50] kernel_init+0x14/0x124 [cf04df40] [c000ec40] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-01-28 12:17:23 +00:00
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->alg_list);
dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
priv->ofdev = ofdev;
spin_lock_init(&priv->reg_lock);
err = talitos_probe_irq(ofdev);
if (err)
goto err_out;
if (!priv->irq[1]) {
tasklet_init(&priv->done_task[0], talitos_done_4ch,
(unsigned long)dev);
} else {
tasklet_init(&priv->done_task[0], talitos_done_ch0_2,
(unsigned long)dev);
tasklet_init(&priv->done_task[1], talitos_done_ch1_3,
(unsigned long)dev);
}
priv->reg = of_iomap(np, 0);
if (!priv->reg) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to of_iomap\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
/* get SEC version capabilities from device tree */
prop = of_get_property(np, "fsl,num-channels", NULL);
if (prop)
priv->num_channels = *prop;
prop = of_get_property(np, "fsl,channel-fifo-len", NULL);
if (prop)
priv->chfifo_len = *prop;
prop = of_get_property(np, "fsl,exec-units-mask", NULL);
if (prop)
priv->exec_units = *prop;
prop = of_get_property(np, "fsl,descriptor-types-mask", NULL);
if (prop)
priv->desc_types = *prop;
if (!is_power_of_2(priv->num_channels) || !priv->chfifo_len ||
!priv->exec_units || !priv->desc_types) {
dev_err(dev, "invalid property data in device tree node\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_out;
}
if (of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,sec3.0"))
priv->features |= TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT;
if (of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,sec2.1"))
priv->features |= TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK |
TALITOS_FTR_SHA224_HWINIT |
TALITOS_FTR_HMAC_OK;
priv->chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct talitos_channel) *
priv->num_channels, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv->chan) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to allocate channel management space\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_channels; i++) {
priv->chan[i].reg = priv->reg + TALITOS_CH_STRIDE * (i + 1);
if (!priv->irq[1] || !(i & 1))
priv->chan[i].reg += TALITOS_CH_BASE_OFFSET;
}
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_channels; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&priv->chan[i].head_lock);
spin_lock_init(&priv->chan[i].tail_lock);
}
priv->fifo_len = roundup_pow_of_two(priv->chfifo_len);
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_channels; i++) {
priv->chan[i].fifo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct talitos_request) *
priv->fifo_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv->chan[i].fifo) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to allocate request fifo %d\n", i);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < priv->num_channels; i++)
atomic_set(&priv->chan[i].submit_count,
-(priv->chfifo_len - 1));
dma_set_mask(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(36));
/* reset and initialize the h/w */
err = init_device(dev);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to initialize device\n");
goto err_out;
}
/* register the RNG, if available */
if (hw_supports(dev, DESC_HDR_SEL0_RNG)) {
err = talitos_register_rng(dev);
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to register hwrng: %d\n", err);
goto err_out;
} else
dev_info(dev, "hwrng\n");
}
/* register crypto algorithms the device supports */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(driver_algs); i++) {
if (hw_supports(dev, driver_algs[i].desc_hdr_template)) {
struct talitos_crypto_alg *t_alg;
char *name = NULL;
t_alg = talitos_alg_alloc(dev, &driver_algs[i]);
if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) {
err = PTR_ERR(t_alg);
if (err == -ENOTSUPP)
continue;
goto err_out;
}
switch (t_alg->algt.type) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER:
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
err = crypto_register_alg(
&t_alg->algt.alg.crypto);
name = t_alg->algt.alg.crypto.cra_driver_name;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH:
err = crypto_register_ahash(
&t_alg->algt.alg.hash);
name =
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.halg.base.cra_driver_name;
break;
}
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "%s alg registration failed\n",
name);
kfree(t_alg);
} else
list_add_tail(&t_alg->entry, &priv->alg_list);
}
}
if (!list_empty(&priv->alg_list))
dev_info(dev, "%s algorithms registered in /proc/crypto\n",
(char *)of_get_property(np, "compatible", NULL));
return 0;
err_out:
talitos_remove(ofdev);
return err;
}
static const struct of_device_id talitos_match[] = {
{
.compatible = "fsl,sec2.0",
},
{},
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, talitos_match);
static struct platform_driver talitos_driver = {
.driver = {
.name = "talitos",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.of_match_table = talitos_match,
},
.probe = talitos_probe,
.remove = talitos_remove,
};
module_platform_driver(talitos_driver);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@freescale.com>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Freescale integrated security engine (SEC) driver");