linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S

381 lines
8.4 KiB
ArmAsm
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
#define PROVIDE32(x) PROVIDE(__unused__##x)
#else
#define PROVIDE32(x) PROVIDE(x)
#endif
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#if defined(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX) && !defined(CONFIG_PPC32)
#define STRICT_ALIGN_SIZE (1 << 24)
#else
#define STRICT_ALIGN_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
#endif
ENTRY(_stext)
PHDRS {
kernel PT_LOAD FLAGS(7); /* RWX */
notes PT_NOTE FLAGS(0);
dummy PT_NOTE FLAGS(0);
/* binutils < 2.18 has a bug that makes it misbehave when taking an
ELF file with all segments at load address 0 as input. This
happens when running "strip" on vmlinux, because of the AT() magic
in this linker script. People using GCC >= 4.2 won't run into
this problem, because the "build-id" support will put some data
into the "notes" segment (at a non-zero load address).
To work around this, we force some data into both the "dummy"
segment and the kernel segment, so the dummy segment will get a
non-zero load address. It's not enough to always create the
"notes" segment, since if nothing gets assigned to it, its load
address will be zero. */
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
OUTPUT_ARCH(powerpc:common64)
jiffies = jiffies_64;
#else
OUTPUT_ARCH(powerpc:common)
jiffies = jiffies_64 + 4;
#endif
SECTIONS
{
. = KERNELBASE;
/*
* Text, read only data and other permanent read-only sections
*/
_text = .;
_stext = .;
/*
* Head text.
* This needs to be in its own output section to avoid ld placing
* branch trampoline stubs randomly throughout the fixed sections,
* which it will do (even if the branch comes from another section)
* in order to optimize stub generation.
*/
.head.text : AT(ADDR(.head.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
KEEP(*(.head.text.first_256B));
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E
#else
KEEP(*(.head.text.real_vectors));
*(.head.text.real_trampolines);
KEEP(*(.head.text.virt_vectors));
*(.head.text.virt_trampolines);
# if defined(CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)
KEEP(*(.head.data.fwnmi_page));
# endif
#endif
#else /* !CONFIG_PPC64 */
HEAD_TEXT
#endif
} :kernel
__head_end = .;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
/*
* BLOCK(0) overrides the default output section alignment because
* this needs to start right after .head.text in order for fixed
* section placement to work.
*/
.text BLOCK(0) : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
#ifdef CONFIG_LD_HEAD_STUB_CATCH
KEEP(*(.linker_stub_catch));
. = . ;
#endif
#else
.text : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
ALIGN_FUNCTION();
#endif
/* careful! __ftr_alt_* sections need to be close to .text */
*(.text.hot TEXT_MAIN .text.fixup .text.unlikely .fixup __ftr_alt_* .ref.text);
SCHED_TEXT
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT
KPROBES_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
/*
* -Os builds call FP save/restore functions. The powerpc64
* linker generates those on demand in the .sfpr section.
* .sfpr gets placed at the beginning of a group of input
* sections, which can break start-of-text offset if it is
* included with the main text sections, so put it by itself.
*/
*(.sfpr);
MEM_KEEP(init.text)
MEM_KEEP(exit.text)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
*(.got1)
__got2_start = .;
*(.got2)
__got2_end = .;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */
} :kernel
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
_etext = .;
PROVIDE32 (etext = .);
/* Read-only data */
RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 16:07:15 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
. = ALIGN(8);
__stf_entry_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_entry_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .;
*(__stf_entry_barrier_fixup)
__stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .;
}
. = ALIGN(8);
__stf_exit_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .;
*(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup)
__stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .;
}
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 16:07:15 +00:00
. = ALIGN(8);
__rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
*(__rfi_flush_fixup)
__stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
. = ALIGN(8);
__spec_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__spec_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___barrier_nospec_fixup = .;
*(__barrier_nospec_fixup)
__stop___barrier_nospec_fixup = .;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC */
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 16:07:15 +00:00
EXCEPTION_TABLE(0)
NOTES :kernel :notes
/* The dummy segment contents for the bug workaround mentioned above
near PHDRS. */
.dummy : AT(ADDR(.dummy) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
LONG(0)
LONG(0)
LONG(0)
} :kernel :dummy
/*
* Init sections discarded at runtime
*/
. = ALIGN(STRICT_ALIGN_SIZE);
__init_begin = .;
INIT_TEXT_SECTION(PAGE_SIZE) :kernel
/* .exit.text is discarded at runtime, not link time,
* to deal with references from __bug_table
*/
.exit.text : AT(ADDR(.exit.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
EXIT_TEXT
}
.init.data : AT(ADDR(.init.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
INIT_DATA
__vtop_table_begin = .;
KEEP(*(.vtop_fixup));
__vtop_table_end = .;
__ptov_table_begin = .;
KEEP(*(.ptov_fixup));
__ptov_table_end = .;
}
.init.setup : AT(ADDR(.init.setup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
INIT_SETUP(16)
}
.initcall.init : AT(ADDR(.initcall.init) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
INIT_CALLS
}
.con_initcall.init : AT(ADDR(.con_initcall.init) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
CON_INITCALL
}
SECURITY_INIT
. = ALIGN(8);
__ftr_fixup : AT(ADDR(__ftr_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___ftr_fixup = .;
KEEP(*(__ftr_fixup))
__stop___ftr_fixup = .;
}
. = ALIGN(8);
__mmu_ftr_fixup : AT(ADDR(__mmu_ftr_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___mmu_ftr_fixup = .;
KEEP(*(__mmu_ftr_fixup))
__stop___mmu_ftr_fixup = .;
}
. = ALIGN(8);
__lwsync_fixup : AT(ADDR(__lwsync_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___lwsync_fixup = .;
KEEP(*(__lwsync_fixup))
__stop___lwsync_fixup = .;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
. = ALIGN(8);
__fw_ftr_fixup : AT(ADDR(__fw_ftr_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__start___fw_ftr_fixup = .;
KEEP(*(__fw_ftr_fixup))
__stop___fw_ftr_fixup = .;
}
#endif
.init.ramfs : AT(ADDR(.init.ramfs) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
INIT_RAM_FS
}
PERCPU_SECTION(L1_CACHE_BYTES)
. = ALIGN(8);
.machine.desc : AT(ADDR(.machine.desc) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__machine_desc_start = . ;
KEEP(*(.machine.desc))
__machine_desc_end = . ;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
2008-08-30 01:43:47 +00:00
. = ALIGN(8);
.dynsym : AT(ADDR(.dynsym) - LOAD_OFFSET)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
__dynamic_symtab = .;
#endif
*(.dynsym)
}
2008-08-30 01:43:47 +00:00
.dynstr : AT(ADDR(.dynstr) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.dynstr) }
.dynamic : AT(ADDR(.dynamic) - LOAD_OFFSET)
{
__dynamic_start = .;
*(.dynamic)
}
.hash : AT(ADDR(.hash) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.hash) }
.interp : AT(ADDR(.interp) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.interp) }
.rela.dyn : AT(ADDR(.rela.dyn) - LOAD_OFFSET)
{
__rela_dyn_start = .;
*(.rela*)
}
#endif
/* .exit.data is discarded at runtime, not link time,
* to deal with references from .exit.text
*/
.exit.data : AT(ADDR(.exit.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
EXIT_DATA
}
/* freed after init ends here */
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
__init_end = .;
/*
* And now the various read/write data
*/
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
_sdata = .;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
.data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
DATA_DATA
*(.data.rel*)
*(SDATA_MAIN)
*(.sdata2)
*(.got.plt) *(.got)
*(.plt)
}
#else
.data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
DATA_DATA
*(.data.rel*)
*(.toc1)
*(.branch_lt)
}
.opd : AT(ADDR(.opd) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
powerpc64: Add .opd based function descriptor dereference We are moving towards separate kernel and module function descriptor dereference callbacks. This patch enables it for powerpc64. For pointers that belong to the kernel - Added __start_opd and __end_opd pointers, to track the kernel .opd section address range; - Added dereference_kernel_function_descriptor(). Now we will dereference only function pointers that are within [__start_opd, __end_opd); For pointers that belong to a module - Added dereference_module_function_descriptor() to handle module function descriptor dereference. Now we will dereference only pointers that are within [module->opd.start, module->opd.end). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171109234830.5067-4-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com To: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> To: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> To: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> To: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> To: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Tested-by: Santosh Sivaraj <santosh@fossix.org> #powerpc Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2017-11-09 23:48:27 +00:00
__start_opd = .;
KEEP(*(.opd))
powerpc64: Add .opd based function descriptor dereference We are moving towards separate kernel and module function descriptor dereference callbacks. This patch enables it for powerpc64. For pointers that belong to the kernel - Added __start_opd and __end_opd pointers, to track the kernel .opd section address range; - Added dereference_kernel_function_descriptor(). Now we will dereference only function pointers that are within [__start_opd, __end_opd); For pointers that belong to a module - Added dereference_module_function_descriptor() to handle module function descriptor dereference. Now we will dereference only pointers that are within [module->opd.start, module->opd.end). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171109234830.5067-4-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com To: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> To: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> To: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> To: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> To: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Tested-by: Santosh Sivaraj <santosh@fossix.org> #powerpc Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2017-11-09 23:48:27 +00:00
__end_opd = .;
}
. = ALIGN(256);
.got : AT(ADDR(.got) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__toc_start = .;
#ifndef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
__prom_init_toc_start = .;
arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.o*(.toc .got)
__prom_init_toc_end = .;
#endif
*(.got)
*(.toc)
}
#endif
/* The initial task and kernel stack */
INIT_TASK_DATA_SECTION(THREAD_SIZE)
.data..page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data..page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
}
.data..cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data..cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
CACHELINE_ALIGNED_DATA(L1_CACHE_BYTES)
}
.data..read_mostly : AT(ADDR(.data..read_mostly) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
READ_MOSTLY_DATA(L1_CACHE_BYTES)
}
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
.data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
NOSAVE_DATA
}
BUG_TABLE
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
_edata = .;
PROVIDE32 (edata = .);
/*
* And finally the bss
*/
BSS_SECTION(0, 0, 0)
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
_end = . ;
PROVIDE32 (end = .);
STABS_DEBUG
DWARF_DEBUG
DISCARDS
/DISCARD/ : {
*(*.EMB.apuinfo)
*(.glink .iplt .plt .rela* .comment)
*(.gnu.version*)
*(.gnu.attributes)
*(.eh_frame)
}
}