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7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Frank Denis
cd8ebbf8fa
Merge 8303125879 into f845fa04a0 2024-11-20 16:58:46 -06:00
Alex Rønne Petersen
f845fa04a0 std.debug: Gracefully handle process_vm_readv() EPERM in MemoryAccessor.read().
Closes #21815.
2024-11-20 23:07:46 +01:00
Frank Denis
8303125879 rounds_log -> rounds 2024-11-20 00:48:09 +01:00
Frank Denis
941cbf1c25 Compatibility with 32-bit platforms 2024-11-19 23:42:51 +01:00
Frank Denis
002cadb27d Remove unneeded label 2024-11-19 21:30:05 +01:00
Frank Denis
68245c22be Nits 2024-11-19 21:28:58 +01:00
Frank Denis
7e661111ed std.crypto.bcrypt: implement the actual OpenSSH KDF
They way OpenSSH does key derivation to protect keys using a password
is not the standard PBKDF2, but something funky, picking key material
non-linearly.
2024-11-19 19:49:41 +01:00
2 changed files with 57 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -563,15 +563,57 @@ const pbkdf_prf = struct {
};
/// bcrypt-pbkdf is a key derivation function based on bcrypt.
/// This is the function used in OpenSSH to derive encryption keys from passphrases.
///
/// This implementation is compatible with the OpenBSD implementation (https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/master/lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c).
///
/// Unlike the password hashing function `bcrypt`, this function doesn't silently truncate passwords longer than 72 bytes.
pub fn pbkdf(pass: []const u8, salt: []const u8, key: []u8, rounds: u32) !void {
try crypto.pwhash.pbkdf2(key, pass, salt, rounds, pbkdf_prf);
}
/// The function used in OpenSSH to derive encryption keys from passphrases.
///
/// This implementation is compatible with the OpenBSD implementation (https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/master/lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c).
pub fn opensshKdf(pass: []const u8, salt: []const u8, key: []u8, rounds: u32) !void {
var tmp: [32]u8 = undefined;
var tmp2: [32]u8 = undefined;
if (rounds < 1 or pass.len == 0 or salt.len == 0 or key.len == 0 or key.len > tmp.len * tmp.len) {
return error.InvalidInput;
}
var sha2pass: [Sha512.digest_length]u8 = undefined;
Sha512.hash(pass, &sha2pass, .{});
const stride = (key.len + tmp.len - 1) / tmp.len;
var amt = (key.len + stride - 1) / stride;
if (math.shr(usize, key.len, 32) >= amt) {
return error.InvalidInput;
}
var key_remainder = key.len;
var count: u32 = 1;
while (key_remainder > 0) : (count += 1) {
var count_salt: [4]u8 = undefined;
std.mem.writeInt(u32, count_salt[0..], count, .big);
var sha2salt: [Sha512.digest_length]u8 = undefined;
var h = Sha512.init(.{});
h.update(salt);
h.update(&count_salt);
h.final(&sha2salt);
tmp2 = pbkdf_prf.hash(sha2pass, sha2salt);
tmp = tmp2;
for (1..rounds) |_| {
Sha512.hash(&tmp2, &sha2salt, .{});
tmp2 = pbkdf_prf.hash(sha2pass, sha2salt);
for (&tmp, tmp2) |*o, t| o.* ^= t;
}
amt = @min(amt, key_remainder);
key_remainder -= for (0..amt) |i| {
const dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
if (dest >= key.len) break i;
key[dest] = tmp[i];
} else amt;
}
crypto.secureZero(u8, &tmp);
crypto.secureZero(u8, &tmp2);
crypto.secureZero(u8, &sha2pass);
}
const crypt_format = struct {
/// String prefix for bcrypt
pub const prefix = "$2";
@ -847,3 +889,13 @@ test "bcrypt phc format" {
verify_options,
);
}
test "openssh kdf" {
var key: [100]u8 = undefined;
const pass = "password";
const salt = "salt";
const rounds = 5;
try opensshKdf(pass, salt, &key, rounds);
const expected = [_]u8{ 65, 207, 68, 58, 55, 252, 114, 141, 255, 65, 216, 175, 5, 92, 235, 68, 220, 92, 118, 161, 40, 13, 241, 190, 56, 152, 69, 136, 41, 214, 51, 205, 37, 221, 101, 59, 105, 73, 133, 36, 14, 59, 94, 212, 111, 107, 109, 237, 213, 235, 246, 119, 59, 76, 45, 130, 142, 81, 178, 231, 161, 158, 138, 108, 18, 162, 26, 50, 218, 251, 23, 66, 2, 232, 20, 202, 216, 46, 12, 250, 247, 246, 252, 23, 155, 74, 77, 195, 120, 113, 57, 88, 126, 81, 9, 249, 72, 18, 208, 160 };
try testing.expectEqualSlices(u8, &key, &expected);
}

View File

@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ fn read(ma: *MemoryAccessor, address: usize, buf: []u8) bool {
switch (linux.E.init(bytes_read)) {
.SUCCESS => return bytes_read == buf.len,
.FAULT => return false,
.INVAL, .PERM, .SRCH => unreachable, // own pid is always valid
.INVAL, .SRCH => unreachable, // own pid is always valid
.PERM => {}, // Known to happen in containers.
.NOMEM => {},
.NOSYS => {}, // QEMU is known not to implement this syscall.
else => unreachable, // unexpected