linux/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
Ingo Molnar e9765680a3 EFI updates for v5.7:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
 usual. The main reasons are:
 - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
   increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
   making drastic changes,
 - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
   to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
   highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
   based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
   the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
   (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
   we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
 
 Summary of changes:
 - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
 - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
   memory allocation, etc.
 - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
   the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
   device tree.
 - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
   handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
   architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
   is a superset of another)
 - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
   doesn't need to be stored there.
 - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
   implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
   OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
   via a configuration table.
 - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
 - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
   on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
   beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
   a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
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Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core

Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:

This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:

 - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
   increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
   making drastic changes,

 - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
   to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
   highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
   based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
   the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
   (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
   we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.

Summary of changes:

 - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)

 - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64

 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
   memory allocation, etc.

 - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
   the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
   device tree.

 - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
   handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
   architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
   is a superset of another)

 - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
   doesn't need to be stored there.

 - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
   implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
   OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
   via a configuration table.

 - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)

 - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
   on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
   beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
   a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-26 15:21:22 +01:00

137 lines
3.5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
#include "keyring_handler.h"
/*
* Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
* it does.
*
* This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
* the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes. If it
* is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
* this.
*/
static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
{
efi_status_t status;
unsigned int db = 0;
unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
*/
static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
{
unsigned long lsize = 4;
unsigned long tmpdb[4];
void *db;
*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
return NULL;
if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
return NULL;
}
db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!db)
return NULL;
*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
kfree(db);
pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
return NULL;
}
*size = lsize;
return db;
}
/*
* Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted
* keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
* keyring.
*/
static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
{
efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
return false;
/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
* an error if we can't get them.
*/
if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
if (!db) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
else
pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
rc);
kfree(db);
}
}
mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
if (!mok) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
else
pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
kfree(mok);
}
dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
if (!dbx) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
else
pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
dbx, dbxsize,
get_handler_for_dbx);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
kfree(dbx);
}
return rc;
}
late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);