linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c
Linus Torvalds fa4bff1650 Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
  which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
  available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
  has the following CVEs assigned:

     CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
     CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
     CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory

  MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
  forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
  this data via cache side channels.

  Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
  vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
  address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
  as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
  successfully.

  The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
  user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
  instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
  exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
  requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
  default to avoid breaking unattended updates.

  The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
  deeper technical view"

* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
  Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
  x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
  x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
  x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
  x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
  x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
  Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
  Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
  x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
  x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
  x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
  x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
  x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
  x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
  ...
2019-05-14 07:57:29 -07:00

441 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
* common.c - C code for kernel entry and exit
* Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*
* Based on asm and ptrace code by many authors. The code here originated
* in ptrace.c and signal.c.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING
/* Called on entry from user mode with IRQs off. */
__visible inline void enter_from_user_mode(void)
{
CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_USER);
user_exit_irqoff();
}
#else
static inline void enter_from_user_mode(void) {}
#endif
static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) {
audit_syscall_entry(regs->orig_ax, regs->di,
regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10);
} else
#endif
{
audit_syscall_entry(regs->orig_ax, regs->bx,
regs->cx, regs->dx, regs->si);
}
}
/*
* Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax) or -1
* to skip the syscall.
*/
static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
unsigned long ret = 0;
bool emulated = false;
u32 work;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
BUG_ON(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
work = READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
emulated = true;
if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
return -1L;
if (emulated)
return -1L;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes.
*/
if (work & _TIF_SECCOMP) {
struct seccomp_data sd;
sd.arch = arch;
sd.nr = regs->orig_ax;
sd.instruction_pointer = regs->ip;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) {
sd.args[0] = regs->di;
sd.args[1] = regs->si;
sd.args[2] = regs->dx;
sd.args[3] = regs->r10;
sd.args[4] = regs->r8;
sd.args[5] = regs->r9;
} else
#endif
{
sd.args[0] = regs->bx;
sd.args[1] = regs->cx;
sd.args[2] = regs->dx;
sd.args[3] = regs->si;
sd.args[4] = regs->di;
sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
}
ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
if (ret == -1)
return ret;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax);
do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
}
#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS \
(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
{
/*
* In order to return to user mode, we need to have IRQs off with
* none of EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS set. Several of these flags
* can be set at any time on preemptible kernels if we have IRQs on,
* so we need to loop. Disabling preemption wouldn't help: doing the
* work to clear some of the flags can sleep.
*/
while (true) {
/* We have work to do. */
local_irq_enable();
if (cached_flags & _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
schedule();
if (cached_flags & _TIF_UPROBE)
uprobe_notify_resume(regs);
if (cached_flags & _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
klp_update_patch_state(current);
/* deal with pending signal delivery */
if (cached_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
do_signal(regs);
if (cached_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
rseq_handle_notify_resume(NULL, regs);
}
if (cached_flags & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
fire_user_return_notifiers();
/* Disable IRQs and retry */
local_irq_disable();
cached_flags = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
if (!(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS))
break;
}
}
/* Called with IRQs disabled. */
__visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
u32 cached_flags;
addr_limit_user_check();
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
lockdep_sys_exit();
cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
if (unlikely(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS))
exit_to_usermode_loop(regs, cached_flags);
/* Reload ti->flags; we may have rescheduled above. */
cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
if (unlikely(cached_flags & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
switch_fpu_return();
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before
* returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal
* handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat
* syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32
* selftest.
*
* We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer
* special case only applies after poking regs and before the
* very next return to user mode.
*/
ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
#endif
user_enter_irqoff();
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
#define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS \
(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
_TIF_SINGLESTEP | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
static void syscall_slow_exit_work(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
{
bool step;
audit_syscall_exit(regs);
if (cached_flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
trace_sys_exit(regs, regs->ax);
/*
* If TIF_SYSCALL_EMU is set, we only get here because of
* TIF_SINGLESTEP (i.e. this is PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP).
* We already reported this syscall instruction in
* syscall_trace_enter().
*/
step = unlikely(
(cached_flags & (_TIF_SINGLESTEP | _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
== _TIF_SINGLESTEP);
if (step || cached_flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, step);
}
/*
* Called with IRQs on and fully valid regs. Returns with IRQs off in a
* state such that we can immediately switch to user mode.
*/
__visible inline void syscall_return_slowpath(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
u32 cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) &&
WARN(irqs_disabled(), "syscall %ld left IRQs disabled", regs->orig_ax))
local_irq_enable();
rseq_syscall(regs);
/*
* First do one-time work. If these work items are enabled, we
* want to run them exactly once per syscall exit with IRQs on.
*/
if (unlikely(cached_flags & SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS))
syscall_slow_exit_work(regs, cached_flags);
local_irq_disable();
prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
__visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct thread_info *ti;
enter_from_user_mode();
local_irq_enable();
ti = current_thread_info();
if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY)
nr = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
/*
* NB: Native and x32 syscalls are dispatched from the same
* table. The only functional difference is the x32 bit in
* regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls.
*/
nr &= __SYSCALL_MASK;
if (likely(nr < NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr, NR_syscalls);
regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](regs);
}
syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
/*
* Does a 32-bit syscall. Called with IRQs on in CONTEXT_KERNEL. Does
* all entry and exit work and returns with IRQs off. This function is
* extremely hot in workloads that use it, and it's usually called from
* do_fast_syscall_32, so forcibly inline it to improve performance.
*/
static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
ti->status |= TS_COMPAT;
#endif
if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) {
/*
* Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than
* 2^32-1 into orig_ax, this truncates it. This may or
* may not be necessary, but it matches the old asm
* behavior.
*/
nr = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
}
if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
regs->ax = ia32_sys_call_table[nr](regs);
#else
/*
* It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
* takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
* the high bits are zero. Make sure we zero-extend all
* of the args.
*/
regs->ax = ia32_sys_call_table[nr](
(unsigned int)regs->bx, (unsigned int)regs->cx,
(unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->si,
(unsigned int)regs->di, (unsigned int)regs->bp);
#endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
}
syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
}
/* Handles int $0x80 */
__visible void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enter_from_user_mode();
local_irq_enable();
do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs);
}
/* Returns 0 to return using IRET or 1 to return using SYSEXIT/SYSRETL. */
__visible long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Called using the internal vDSO SYSENTER/SYSCALL32 calling
* convention. Adjust regs so it looks like we entered using int80.
*/
unsigned long landing_pad = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso +
vdso_image_32.sym_int80_landing_pad;
/*
* SYSENTER loses EIP, and even SYSCALL32 needs us to skip forward
* so that 'regs->ip -= 2' lands back on an int $0x80 instruction.
* Fix it up.
*/
regs->ip = landing_pad;
enter_from_user_mode();
local_irq_enable();
/* Fetch EBP from where the vDSO stashed it. */
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Micro-optimization: the pointer we're following is explicitly
* 32 bits, so it can't be out of range.
*/
__get_user(*(u32 *)&regs->bp,
(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp)
#else
get_user(*(u32 *)&regs->bp,
(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp)
#endif
) {
/* User code screwed up. */
local_irq_disable();
regs->ax = -EFAULT;
prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
return 0; /* Keep it simple: use IRET. */
}
/* Now this is just like a normal syscall. */
do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Opportunistic SYSRETL: if possible, try to return using SYSRETL.
* SYSRETL is available on all 64-bit CPUs, so we don't need to
* bother with SYSEXIT.
*
* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
* never the case.
*/
return regs->cs == __USER32_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
regs->ip == landing_pad &&
(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF)) == 0;
#else
/*
* Opportunistic SYSEXIT: if possible, try to return using SYSEXIT.
*
* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
* never the case.
*
* We don't allow syscalls at all from VM86 mode, but we still
* need to check VM, because we might be returning from sys_vm86.
*/
return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP) &&
regs->cs == __USER_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
regs->ip == landing_pad &&
(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_VM)) == 0;
#endif
}
#endif