mirror of
https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2024-12-22 10:56:40 +00:00
41dd9596d6
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
257 lines
5.5 KiB
C
257 lines
5.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
|
/*
|
|
* AppArmor security module
|
|
*
|
|
* This file contains AppArmor network mediation
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
|
|
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "include/apparmor.h"
|
|
#include "include/audit.h"
|
|
#include "include/cred.h"
|
|
#include "include/label.h"
|
|
#include "include/net.h"
|
|
#include "include/policy.h"
|
|
#include "include/secid.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "net_names.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
|
|
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
|
|
{ }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"send",
|
|
"receive",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
|
|
"create",
|
|
"shutdown",
|
|
"connect",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
|
|
"setattr",
|
|
"getattr",
|
|
"setcred",
|
|
"getcred",
|
|
|
|
"chmod",
|
|
"chown",
|
|
"chgrp",
|
|
"lock",
|
|
|
|
"mmap",
|
|
"mprot",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
|
|
"accept",
|
|
"bind",
|
|
"listen",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
|
|
"setopt",
|
|
"getopt",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
"unknown",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* audit callback for net specific fields */
|
|
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
|
|
{
|
|
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
|
|
|
|
if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
|
|
address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
|
|
else
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
|
|
sa->u.net->family);
|
|
if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
|
|
sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
|
|
else
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
|
|
aad(sa)->net.type);
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
|
|
|
|
if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
|
|
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
|
|
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
|
|
|
|
if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
|
|
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
|
|
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (aad(sa)->peer) {
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
|
|
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
|
|
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generic af perm */
|
|
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
|
|
u32 request, u16 family, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_perms perms = { };
|
|
unsigned int state;
|
|
__be16 buffer[2];
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
|
|
AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
|
|
|
|
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
|
|
if (!state)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
|
|
buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
|
|
state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
|
|
4);
|
|
aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
|
|
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
|
|
|
|
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
|
|
int type, int protocol)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile;
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
|
|
|
|
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
|
|
aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
|
|
type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
|
|
struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!label);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sk);
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(label)) {
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile;
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
|
|
|
|
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
|
|
aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
|
|
struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!label);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
|
|
return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
|
|
static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
|
|
if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
|
|
secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
|
|
secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
|
|
GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(label))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(label);
|
|
|
|
secmark->secid = label->secid;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
|
|
struct common_audit_data *sa)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, ret;
|
|
struct aa_perms perms = { };
|
|
|
|
if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
|
|
if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
|
|
ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
|
|
profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
|
|
if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
|
|
perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
|
|
else
|
|
perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
|
|
perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
|
|
|
|
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
|
|
u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile;
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
|
|
|
|
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
|
|
aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
|
|
&sa));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|