linux/include
Linus Torvalds eea2647e74 Entry code update:
Provide support for randomized stack offsets per syscall to make
  stack-based attacks harder which rely on the deterministic stack layout.
 
  The feature is based on the original idea of PaX's RANDSTACK feature, but
  uses a significantly different implementation.
 
  The offset does not affect the pt_regs location on the task stack as this
  was agreed on to be of dubious value. The offset is applied before the
  actual syscall is invoked.
 
  The offset is stored per cpu and the randomization happens at the end of
  the syscall which is less predictable than on syscall entry.
 
  The mechanism to apply the offset is via alloca(), i.e. abusing the
  dispised VLAs. This comes with the drawback that stack-clash-protection
  has to be disabled for the affected compilation units and there is also
  a negative interaction with stack-protector.
 
  Those downsides are traded with the advantage that this approach does not
  require any intrusive changes to the low level assembly entry code, does
  not affect the unwinder and the correct stack alignment is handled
  automatically by the compiler.
 
  The feature is guarded with a static branch which avoids the overhead when
  disabled.
 
  Currently this is supported for X86 and ARM64.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmCGjz8THHRnbHhAbGlu
 dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoWsvD/4tGnPAurd6lbzxWzRjW7jOOVyzkODM
 UXtIxxICaj7o6MNcloaGe1QtJ8+QOCw3yPQfLG/SoWHse5+oUKQRL9dmWVeJyRSt
 JZ1pirkKqWrB+OmPbJKUiO3/TsZ2Z/vO41JVgVTL5/HWhOECSDzZsJkuvF/H+qYD
 ReDzd7FUNd76pwVOsXq/cxXclRa81/wMNZRVwmyAwFYE2XoPtQyTERTLrfj6aQKF
 P0txr9fEjYlPPwYOk1kjBAoJfDltNm48BBL7CGZtRlsqpNpdsJ1MkeGffhodb6F0
 pJYQMlQJHXABZb5GF+v93+iASDpRFn0EvPmLkCxQUfZYLOkRsnuEF2S/fsYX/WPo
 uin/wQKwLVdeQq9d9BwlZUKEgsQuV7Q0GVN+JnEQerwD6cWTxv4a1RIUH+K/4Wo5
 nTeJVRKcs6m7UkGQRm8JbqnUP0vCV+PSiWWB8J9CmjYeCPbkGjt6mBIsmPaDZ9VL
 4i+UX5DJayoREF/rspOBcJftUmExize49p9860UI9N6fd7DsDt7Dq9Ai+ADtZa4C
 9BPbF4NWzJq8IWLqBi+PpKBAT3JMX9qQi7s9sbrRxpxtew9Keu5qggKZJYumX71V
 qgUMk+xB86HZOrtF6F3oY0zxYv3haPvDydsDgqojtqNGk4PdAdgDYJQwMlb8QSly
 SwIWPHIfvP4R9w==
 =GMlJ
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'x86-entry-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull entry code update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Provide support for randomized stack offsets per syscall to make
  stack-based attacks harder which rely on the deterministic stack
  layout.

  The feature is based on the original idea of PaX's RANDSTACK feature,
  but uses a significantly different implementation.

  The offset does not affect the pt_regs location on the task stack as
  this was agreed on to be of dubious value. The offset is applied
  before the actual syscall is invoked.

  The offset is stored per cpu and the randomization happens at the end
  of the syscall which is less predictable than on syscall entry.

  The mechanism to apply the offset is via alloca(), i.e. abusing the
  dispised VLAs. This comes with the drawback that
  stack-clash-protection has to be disabled for the affected compilation
  units and there is also a negative interaction with stack-protector.

  Those downsides are traded with the advantage that this approach does
  not require any intrusive changes to the low level assembly entry
  code, does not affect the unwinder and the correct stack alignment is
  handled automatically by the compiler.

  The feature is guarded with a static branch which avoids the overhead
  when disabled.

  Currently this is supported for X86 and ARM64"

* tag 'x86-entry-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
  lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
  x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
  stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
  init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
  jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
2021-04-26 10:02:09 -07:00
..
acpi ACPI: scan: Use unique number for instance_no 2021-03-22 17:45:53 +01:00
asm-generic RISC-V Patches for the 5.12 Merge Window 2021-02-26 10:28:35 -08:00
clocksource
crypto crypto: poly1305 - fix poly1305_core_setkey() declaration 2021-04-02 18:28:12 +11:00
drm drm/ttm: make ttm_bo_unpin more defensive 2021-03-15 16:02:30 +01:00
dt-bindings treewide: change my e-mail address, fix my name 2021-04-09 14:54:23 -07:00
keys Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 2021-04-26 08:51:23 -07:00
kunit
kvm KVM: arm64: Turn kvm_arm_support_pmu_v3() into a static key 2021-03-06 04:18:40 -05:00
linux Entry code update: 2021-04-26 10:02:09 -07:00
math-emu
media media: rc: compile rc-cec.c into rc-core 2021-03-11 11:40:28 +01:00
memory
misc
net ipv6: report errors for iftoken via netlink extack 2021-04-08 13:52:36 -07:00
pcmcia
ras
rdma
scsi scsi: iscsi: Fix race condition between login and sync thread 2021-03-29 21:17:45 -04:00
soc RISC-V Patches for the 5.12 Merge Window 2021-02-26 10:28:35 -08:00
sound ALSA/ASoC/SOF/SoundWire: fix Kconfig issues 2021-03-02 18:30:07 +01:00
target scsi: target: core: Add cmd length set before cmd complete 2021-02-22 22:21:29 -05:00
trace Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 2021-04-26 08:51:23 -07:00
uapi Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 2021-04-26 08:51:23 -07:00
vdso
video
xen Xen/gnttab: introduce common INVALID_GRANT_{HANDLE,REF} 2021-03-10 16:39:29 -06:00