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3c00cb5e68
This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value. The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.
copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.
This fixes the following information leaks:
x86: 8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
(si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86: 100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
64-bit process. (si_code = any)
parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process. These bugs are also fixed for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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| boot | ||
| configs | ||
| crypto | ||
| include | ||
| kernel | ||
| kvm | ||
| lib | ||
| math-emu | ||
| mm | ||
| net | ||
| oprofile | ||
| perf | ||
| platforms | ||
| sysdev | ||
| xmon | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Kconfig.debug | ||
| Makefile | ||
| relocs_check.sh | ||