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69218e4799
Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an attacker could target other per-cpu structures or deduce the base of the main memory section (PAGE_OFFSET). This patch relocates the GDT table for each processor inside the fixmap section. The space is reserved based on number of supported processors. For consistency, the remapping is done by default on 32 and 64-bit. Each processor switches to its remapped GDT at the end of initialization. For hibernation, the main processor returns with the original GDT and switches back to the remapping at completion. This patch was tested on both architectures. Hibernation and KVM were both tested specially for their usage of the GDT. Thanks to Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> for testing and recommending changes for Xen support. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-2-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
124 lines
3.8 KiB
C
124 lines
3.8 KiB
C
/*
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* GCC stack protector support.
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*
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* Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of
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* the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when
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* returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary
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* and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs.
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* On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64
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* and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this
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* requirement differently.
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*
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* On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All
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* percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu
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* area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always
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* irq_stack_union which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland
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* %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using
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* swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there.
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*
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* On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is
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* used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much
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* slower at loading segment registers with different value when
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* entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu
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* area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when
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* necessary, usually during task switch.
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*
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* As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed
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* lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and
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* restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is
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* controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in
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* system.h to hide the details.
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*/
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#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
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#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
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#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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#include <asm/tsc.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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/*
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* 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker
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* can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in
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* head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others.
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*/
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#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \
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[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18),
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/*
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* Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
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*
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* NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
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* and it must always be inlined.
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*/
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static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
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{
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u64 canary;
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u64 tsc;
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40);
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#endif
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/*
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* We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
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* of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
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* there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
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* on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
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*/
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get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
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tsc = rdtsc();
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canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
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current->stack_canary = canary;
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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this_cpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary);
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#else
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this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary);
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#endif
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}
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static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu);
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struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
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struct desc_struct desc;
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desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY];
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set_desc_base(&desc, canary);
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write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S);
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#endif
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}
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static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory");
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#endif
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}
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#else /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
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#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT
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/* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */
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static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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{ }
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static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
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#endif
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}
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#endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
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#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
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