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56af94aace
I started getting warnings for this one file, though I can't see what changed
since it was originally introduced in commit fec7b66905
("samples: add an
example of seccomp user trap").
samples/seccomp/user-trap.c: In function 'send_fd':
samples/seccomp/user-trap.c:50:11: warning: dereferencing type-punned pointer will break strict-aliasing rules [-Wstrict-aliasing]
50 | *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd;
| ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
samples/seccomp/user-trap.c: In function 'recv_fd':
samples/seccomp/user-trap.c:83:18: warning: dereferencing type-punned pointer will break strict-aliasing rules [-Wstrict-aliasing]
83 | return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
| ~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Using a temporary pointer variable avoids the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240212111737.917428-1-arnd@kernel.org
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
380 lines
8.0 KiB
C
380 lines
8.0 KiB
C
#include <signal.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/user.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/ptrace.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
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static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
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{
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errno = 0;
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return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
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}
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static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
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{
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struct msghdr msg = {};
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
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int *fd_ptr;
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char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
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struct iovec io = {
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.iov_base = &c,
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.iov_len = 1,
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};
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msg.msg_iov = &io;
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msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
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msg.msg_control = buf;
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msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
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cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
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cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
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cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
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cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
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fd_ptr = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
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*fd_ptr = fd;
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msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
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if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
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perror("sendmsg");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int recv_fd(int sock)
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{
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struct msghdr msg = {};
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
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int *fd_ptr;
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char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
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struct iovec io = {
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.iov_base = &c,
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.iov_len = 1,
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};
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msg.msg_iov = &io;
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msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
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msg.msg_control = buf;
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msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
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if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
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perror("recvmsg");
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return -1;
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}
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cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
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fd_ptr = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
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return *fd_ptr;
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}
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static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct sock_filter filter[] = {
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BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
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offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
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BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
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BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
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BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
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};
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struct sock_fprog prog = {
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.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
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.filter = filter,
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};
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return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
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}
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static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
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struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
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{
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char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
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int ret = -1, mem;
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resp->id = req->id;
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resp->error = -EPERM;
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resp->val = 0;
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if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
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fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mount? %d\n", req->data.nr);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Only allow bind mounts. */
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if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their
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* mount to go.
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*/
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snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
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mem = open(path, O_RDONLY);
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if (mem < 0) {
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perror("open mem");
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since
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* the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that
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* the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can
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* ask the listener fd this as follows.
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*
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* Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific
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* resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and
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* we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make
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* decisions.
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*/
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if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n");
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note
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* that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args
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* before we decide to allow the syscall.
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*/
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if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
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perror("seek");
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goto out;
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}
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ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source));
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if (ret < 0) {
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perror("read");
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goto out;
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}
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if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
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perror("seek");
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goto out;
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}
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ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target));
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if (ret < 0) {
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perror("read");
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very
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* interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user
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* namespaces already, but you get the idea.
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*/
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if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp/", 5) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp/", 5)) {
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if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) {
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ret = -1;
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perror("actual mount");
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goto out;
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}
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resp->error = 0;
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}
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/* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the
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* response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM.
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*/
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ret = 0;
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out:
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close(mem);
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return ret;
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}
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int main(void)
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{
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int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener;
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pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0;
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if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) {
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perror("socketpair");
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return 1;
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}
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worker = fork();
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if (worker < 0) {
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perror("fork");
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goto close_pair;
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}
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if (worker == 0) {
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listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount,
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SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
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if (listener < 0) {
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perror("seccomp");
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exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000.
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*/
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if (setuid(1000) < 0) {
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perror("setuid");
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exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Send the listener to the parent; also serves as
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* synchronization.
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*/
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if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0)
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exit(1);
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close(listener);
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if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) {
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perror("mkdir");
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exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Try a bad mount just for grins.
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*/
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if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) {
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fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (errno != EPERM) {
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perror("bad error from mount");
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exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Ok, we expect this one to succeed.
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*/
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if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
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perror("mount");
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exit(1);
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}
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exit(0);
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}
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/*
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* Get the listener from the child.
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*/
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listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]);
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if (listener < 0)
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goto out_kill;
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/*
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* Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary,
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* but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we
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* can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer.
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*/
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tracer = fork();
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if (tracer < 0) {
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perror("fork");
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goto out_kill;
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}
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if (tracer == 0) {
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struct seccomp_notif *req;
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struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp;
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struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
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if (seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) < 0) {
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perror("seccomp(GET_NOTIF_SIZES)");
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goto out_close;
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}
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req = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif);
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if (!req)
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goto out_close;
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resp = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
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if (!resp)
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goto out_req;
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memset(resp, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
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while (1) {
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memset(req, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif);
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if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req)) {
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perror("ioctl recv");
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goto out_resp;
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}
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if (handle_req(req, resp, listener) < 0)
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goto out_resp;
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/*
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* ENOENT here means that the task may have gotten a
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* signal and restarted the syscall. It's up to the
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* handler to decide what to do in this case, but for
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* the sample code, we just ignore it. Probably
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* something better should happen, like undoing the
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* mount, or keeping track of the args to make sure we
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* don't do it again.
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*/
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if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0 &&
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errno != ENOENT) {
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perror("ioctl send");
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goto out_resp;
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}
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}
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out_resp:
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free(resp);
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out_req:
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free(req);
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out_close:
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close(listener);
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exit(1);
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}
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close(listener);
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if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) {
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perror("waitpid");
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goto out_kill;
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}
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if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
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perror("umount2");
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goto out_kill;
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}
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if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
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perror("remove");
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exit(1);
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}
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if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n");
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goto out_kill;
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}
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ret = 0;
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out_kill:
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if (tracer > 0)
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kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
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if (worker > 0)
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kill(worker, SIGKILL);
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close_pair:
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close(sk_pair[0]);
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close(sk_pair[1]);
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return ret;
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}
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