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a6c043a887
Hi, >From the RBAC specs: FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the set of authorized RBAC administrators with the capability to read the following audit information from the audit records: <snip> (e) The User Session Identifier or Terminal Type A patch adding the tty for all syscalls is included in this email. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
1329 lines
34 KiB
C
1329 lines
34 KiB
C
/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
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* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
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* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
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* Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
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* All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
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*
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* Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
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* especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
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*
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* The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
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* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
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* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
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*
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* The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
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* added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
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*
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* Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
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* filesystem information.
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*
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* Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
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* and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <asm/types.h>
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#include <asm/atomic.h>
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#include <asm/types.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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#include "audit.h"
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extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
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/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
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extern int audit_enabled;
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/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
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* for saving names from getname(). */
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#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
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/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
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* audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
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* path_lookup. */
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#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
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/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
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* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
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* pointers at syscall exit time).
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*
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* Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
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struct audit_names {
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const char *name;
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unsigned long ino;
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unsigned long pino;
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dev_t dev;
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umode_t mode;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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dev_t rdev;
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char *ctx;
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};
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struct audit_aux_data {
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struct audit_aux_data *next;
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int type;
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};
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#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
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struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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struct ipc_perm p;
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unsigned long qbytes;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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mode_t mode;
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char *ctx;
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};
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struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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int nargs;
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unsigned long args[0];
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};
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struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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int len;
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char a[0];
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};
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struct audit_aux_data_path {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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struct dentry *dentry;
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struct vfsmount *mnt;
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};
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/* The per-task audit context. */
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struct audit_context {
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int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
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enum audit_state state;
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unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
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struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
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uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
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int major; /* syscall number */
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unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
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int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
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long return_code;/* syscall return code */
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int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
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int name_count;
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struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
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struct dentry * pwd;
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struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
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struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
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struct audit_aux_data *aux;
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/* Save things to print about task_struct */
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pid_t pid;
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uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
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gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
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unsigned long personality;
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int arch;
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#if AUDIT_DEBUG
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int put_count;
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int ino_count;
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#endif
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};
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/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
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* otherwise. */
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static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
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struct audit_krule *rule,
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struct audit_context *ctx,
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enum audit_state *state)
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{
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int i, j;
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for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
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struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
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int result = 0;
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switch (f->type) {
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case AUDIT_PID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_UID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EUID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SUID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_FSUID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_GID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EGID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SGID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_FSGID:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_PERS:
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result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_ARCH:
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if (ctx)
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EXIT:
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if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
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if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
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if (f->val)
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
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else
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
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}
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break;
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case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
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if (ctx) {
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for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
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if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
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++result;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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break;
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case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
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if (ctx) {
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for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
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if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
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++result;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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break;
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case AUDIT_INODE:
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if (ctx) {
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for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
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if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
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audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
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++result;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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break;
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case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
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result = 0;
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if (ctx)
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_ARG0:
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case AUDIT_ARG1:
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case AUDIT_ARG2:
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case AUDIT_ARG3:
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if (ctx)
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
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break;
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}
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if (!result)
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return 0;
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}
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switch (rule->action) {
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case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
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case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
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case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
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* completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
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* structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
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*/
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static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct audit_entry *e;
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enum audit_state state;
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
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if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return state;
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
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}
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/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
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* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
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* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
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* record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
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*/
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static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
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struct audit_context *ctx,
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struct list_head *list)
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{
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struct audit_entry *e;
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enum audit_state state;
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if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
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return AUDIT_DISABLED;
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!list_empty(list)) {
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int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
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int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
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if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
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&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return state;
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}
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
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}
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/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
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static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
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int return_valid,
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int return_code)
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{
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struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
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if (likely(!context))
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return NULL;
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context->return_valid = return_valid;
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context->return_code = return_code;
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if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
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enum audit_state state;
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state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
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if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
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context->auditable = 1;
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}
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context->pid = tsk->pid;
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context->uid = tsk->uid;
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context->gid = tsk->gid;
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context->euid = tsk->euid;
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context->suid = tsk->suid;
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context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
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context->egid = tsk->egid;
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context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
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context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
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context->personality = tsk->personality;
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tsk->audit_context = NULL;
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return context;
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}
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static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
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{
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int i;
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#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
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if (context->auditable
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||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
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printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
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" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
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" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
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__FILE__, __LINE__,
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context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
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context->name_count, context->put_count,
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context->ino_count);
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for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
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printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
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context->names[i].name,
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context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
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}
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dump_stack();
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return;
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}
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#endif
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#if AUDIT_DEBUG
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context->put_count = 0;
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context->ino_count = 0;
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#endif
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for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
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char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
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context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
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kfree(p);
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if (context->names[i].name)
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__putname(context->names[i].name);
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}
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context->name_count = 0;
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if (context->pwd)
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dput(context->pwd);
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if (context->pwdmnt)
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mntput(context->pwdmnt);
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context->pwd = NULL;
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context->pwdmnt = NULL;
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}
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static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
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{
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struct audit_aux_data *aux;
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while ((aux = context->aux)) {
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if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
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struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
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dput(axi->dentry);
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mntput(axi->mnt);
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}
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if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
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struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
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if (axi->ctx)
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kfree(axi->ctx);
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}
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context->aux = aux->next;
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kfree(aux);
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}
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}
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static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
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enum audit_state state)
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{
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uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
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memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
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context->state = state;
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context->loginuid = loginuid;
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}
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static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
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{
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struct audit_context *context;
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if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
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return NULL;
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audit_zero_context(context, state);
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return context;
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}
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/**
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* audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
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* @tsk: task
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*
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* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
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* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
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* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
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* needed.
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*/
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int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct audit_context *context;
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enum audit_state state;
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if (likely(!audit_enabled))
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return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
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state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
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if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
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return 0;
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if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
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audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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/* Preserve login uid */
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context->loginuid = -1;
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if (current->audit_context)
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context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
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tsk->audit_context = context;
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set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
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return 0;
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}
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static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
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{
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struct audit_context *previous;
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int count = 0;
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do {
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previous = context->previous;
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if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
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++count;
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printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
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" freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
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context->serial, context->major,
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context->name_count, count);
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}
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audit_free_names(context);
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audit_free_aux(context);
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kfree(context);
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context = previous;
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} while (context);
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if (count >= 10)
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t len = 0;
|
|
|
|
len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
if (len != -EINVAL)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
|
|
if (len < 0 )
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
error_path:
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
kfree(ctx);
|
|
audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
|
|
get_task_comm(name, current);
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
|
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
|
|
|
|
if (!mm)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
|
|
* NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
|
|
*/
|
|
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
vma = mm->mmap;
|
|
while (vma) {
|
|
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
|
|
vma->vm_file) {
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
|
|
vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
|
|
vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
vma = vma->vm_next;
|
|
}
|
|
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
|
|
const char *tty;
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
|
|
context->arch, context->major);
|
|
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
|
|
if (context->return_valid)
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
|
|
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
|
|
context->return_code);
|
|
if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
|
|
tty = current->signal->tty->name;
|
|
else
|
|
tty = "(none)";
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
|
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
|
|
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
|
|
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
|
|
" egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
|
|
context->argv[0],
|
|
context->argv[1],
|
|
context->argv[2],
|
|
context->argv[3],
|
|
context->name_count,
|
|
context->pid,
|
|
context->loginuid,
|
|
context->uid,
|
|
context->gid,
|
|
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
|
|
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
|
|
audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
|
|
|
switch (aux->type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_IPC: {
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
|
" qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
|
|
axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
|
|
int i;
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
|
|
for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
|
|
audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
|
|
if (ab) {
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
|
|
unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
|
|
unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
|
|
if (context->names[i].name)
|
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
|
|
else
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
|
|
|
|
if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
|
|
if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
|
|
if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
|
|
" ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
|
|
MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
context->names[i].mode,
|
|
context->names[i].uid,
|
|
context->names[i].gid,
|
|
MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
|
|
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
|
|
if (context->names[i].ctx) {
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
|
|
context->names[i].ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_free - free a per-task audit context
|
|
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
task_lock(tsk);
|
|
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
|
|
task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
|
|
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
|
|
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
|
|
* in the context of the idle thread */
|
|
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
|
|
audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
|
audit_free_context(context);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
|
|
* @tsk: task being audited
|
|
* @arch: architecture type
|
|
* @major: major syscall type (function)
|
|
* @a1: additional syscall register 1
|
|
* @a2: additional syscall register 2
|
|
* @a3: additional syscall register 3
|
|
* @a4: additional syscall register 4
|
|
*
|
|
* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
|
|
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
|
|
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
|
|
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
|
|
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
|
|
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
|
|
* be written).
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
|
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
|
|
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!context);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
|
|
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
|
|
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
|
|
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
|
|
* got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
|
|
*
|
|
* i386 no
|
|
* x86_64 no
|
|
* ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
|
|
*
|
|
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
|
|
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (context->in_syscall) {
|
|
struct audit_context *newctx;
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR
|
|
"audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
|
|
" entering syscall=%d\n",
|
|
context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
|
|
#endif
|
|
newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
|
|
if (newctx) {
|
|
newctx->previous = context;
|
|
context = newctx;
|
|
tsk->audit_context = newctx;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
|
|
* can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
|
|
* will be lost). The only other alternative is
|
|
* to abandon auditing. */
|
|
audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
|
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
context->arch = arch;
|
|
context->major = major;
|
|
context->argv[0] = a1;
|
|
context->argv[1] = a2;
|
|
context->argv[2] = a3;
|
|
context->argv[3] = a4;
|
|
|
|
state = context->state;
|
|
if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
|
|
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
|
|
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
context->serial = 0;
|
|
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
|
|
context->in_syscall = 1;
|
|
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
|
|
* @tsk: task being audited
|
|
* @valid: success/failure flag
|
|
* @return_code: syscall return value
|
|
*
|
|
* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
|
|
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
|
|
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
|
|
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
|
|
* free the names stored from getname().
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
get_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
task_lock(tsk);
|
|
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
|
|
task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
|
|
* called __put_task_struct. */
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
|
|
audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
context->in_syscall = 0;
|
|
context->auditable = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (context->previous) {
|
|
struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
|
|
context->previous = NULL;
|
|
audit_free_context(context);
|
|
tsk->audit_context = new_context;
|
|
} else {
|
|
audit_free_names(context);
|
|
audit_free_aux(context);
|
|
tsk->audit_context = context;
|
|
}
|
|
out:
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_getname - add a name to the list
|
|
* @name: name to add
|
|
*
|
|
* Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
|
|
* Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_getname(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) {
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
#endif
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
|
|
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
|
|
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
++context->name_count;
|
|
if (!context->pwd) {
|
|
read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
|
|
context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
|
|
context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
|
|
read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
|
|
* @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
|
|
*
|
|
* If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
|
|
* then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
|
|
* Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_putname(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!context);
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) {
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
|
|
if (context->name_count) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
|
|
context->names[i].name,
|
|
context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
__putname(name);
|
|
}
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
else {
|
|
++context->put_count;
|
|
if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
|
|
" in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
|
|
" put_count=%d\n",
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__,
|
|
context->serial, context->major,
|
|
context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
|
|
context->put_count);
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
|
|
char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
int len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!suffix)
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
|
|
len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
|
|
context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
|
|
error_path:
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
kfree(ctx);
|
|
audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
|
|
ret:
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
|
|
* @name: name being audited
|
|
* @inode: inode being audited
|
|
* @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
|
|
*/
|
|
void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (context->name_count
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-1].name
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
|
|
idx = context->name_count - 1;
|
|
else if (context->name_count > 1
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-2].name
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
|
|
idx = context->name_count - 2;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
|
|
* associated name? */
|
|
if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
|
|
return;
|
|
idx = context->name_count++;
|
|
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
++context->ino_count;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
|
|
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
|
|
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
|
|
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
|
|
audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
|
|
if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
|
|
(strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
|
|
context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
} else {
|
|
context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
|
|
* @dname: inode's dentry name
|
|
* @inode: inode being audited
|
|
* @pino: inode number of dentry parent
|
|
*
|
|
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
|
|
* can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
|
|
* This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
|
|
* Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
|
|
* the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
|
|
* must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
|
|
* unsuccessful attempts.
|
|
*/
|
|
void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
|
|
unsigned long pino)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* determine matching parent */
|
|
if (dname)
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
|
|
if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
|
|
const char *n;
|
|
const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
|
|
int dlen = strlen(dname);
|
|
int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
|
|
|
|
if (nlen < dlen)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* disregard trailing slashes */
|
|
n = name + nlen - 1;
|
|
while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
|
|
n--;
|
|
|
|
/* find last path component */
|
|
n = n - dlen + 1;
|
|
if (n < name)
|
|
continue;
|
|
else if (n > name) {
|
|
if (*--n != '/')
|
|
continue;
|
|
else
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
|
|
goto update_context;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* catch-all in case match not found */
|
|
idx = context->name_count++;
|
|
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
|
|
context->names[idx].pino = pino;
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
context->ino_count++;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
update_context:
|
|
if (inode) {
|
|
context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
|
|
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
|
|
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
|
|
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
|
|
audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
|
|
* @ctx: audit_context for the task
|
|
* @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
|
|
* @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
|
|
*
|
|
* Also sets the context as auditable.
|
|
*/
|
|
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ctx->serial)
|
|
ctx->serial = audit_serial();
|
|
t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
|
|
t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
|
|
*serial = ctx->serial;
|
|
ctx->auditable = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
|
|
* @task: task whose audit context is being modified
|
|
* @loginuid: loginuid value
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (task->audit_context) {
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
|
|
if (ab) {
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
|
|
"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
|
|
task->pid, task->uid,
|
|
task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
}
|
|
task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
|
|
* @ctx: the audit_context
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
int len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto error_path;
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
|
|
error_path:
|
|
kfree(ctx);
|
|
audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
|
|
ret:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
|
|
* @qbytes: msgq bytes
|
|
* @uid: msgq user id
|
|
* @gid: msgq group id
|
|
* @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ax->qbytes = qbytes;
|
|
ax->uid = uid;
|
|
ax->gid = gid;
|
|
ax->mode = mode;
|
|
ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
|
|
* @nargs: number of args
|
|
* @args: args array
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ax->nargs = nargs;
|
|
memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
|
|
* @len: data length in user space
|
|
* @a: data address in kernel space
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ax->len = len;
|
|
memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
|
|
* @dentry: dentry to record
|
|
* @mnt: mnt to record
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
|
|
ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
|
|
* @sig: signal value
|
|
* @t: task being signaled
|
|
*
|
|
* If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
|
|
* and uid that is doing that.
|
|
*/
|
|
void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
|
|
{
|
|
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
|
|
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
|
|
if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
|
|
struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
|
|
audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
|
|
else
|
|
audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|