linux/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh
Ard Biesheuvel c07d2475f9 selftests/kexec: remove broken EFI_VARS secure boot fallback check
Commit b433a52aa2 ("selftests/kexec: update get_secureboot_mode")
refactored the code that discovers the EFI secure boot mode so it only
depends on either the efivars pseudo filesystem or the efivars sysfs
interface, but never both.

However, the latter version was not implemented correctly, given the
fact that the local 'efi_vars' variable never assumes a value. This
means the fallback has been dead code ever since it was introduced.

So let's drop the fallback altogether. The sysfs interface has been
deprecated for ~10 years now, and is only enabled on x86 to begin with,
so it is time to get rid of it entirely.

Reviewed-by:  Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2022-06-24 10:19:22 +02:00

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#!/bin/sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#
# Kselftest framework defines: ksft_pass=0, ksft_fail=1, ksft_skip=4
VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-1}"
IKCONFIG="/tmp/config-`uname -r`"
KERNEL_IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-`uname -r`"
SECURITYFS=$(grep "securityfs" /proc/mounts | awk '{print $2}')
log_info()
{
[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "[INFO] $1"
}
# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 0 for PASS.
log_pass()
{
[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1 [PASS]"
exit 0
}
# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 1 for FAIL.
log_fail()
{
[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1 [FAIL]"
exit 1
}
# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 4 for SKIP.
log_skip()
{
[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1"
exit 4
}
# Check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and SetupMode-$(the UUID).
# (Based on kdump-lib.sh)
get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode()
{
local efivarfs="/sys/firmware/efi/efivars"
local secure_boot_file=""
local setup_mode_file=""
local secureboot_mode=0
local setup_mode=0
# Make sure that efivar_fs is mounted in the normal location
if ! grep -q "^\S\+ $efivarfs efivarfs" /proc/mounts; then
log_info "efivars is not mounted on $efivarfs"
return 0;
fi
secure_boot_file=$(find "$efivarfs" -name SecureBoot-* 2>/dev/null)
setup_mode_file=$(find "$efivarfs" -name SetupMode-* 2>/dev/null)
if [ -f "$secure_boot_file" ] && [ -f "$setup_mode_file" ]; then
secureboot_mode=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "' \
"$secure_boot_file"|cut -d' ' -f 5)
setup_mode=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "' \
"$setup_mode_file"|cut -d' ' -f 5)
if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 1 ] && [ $setup_mode -eq 0 ]; then
log_info "secure boot mode enabled (CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS)"
return 1;
fi
fi
return 0;
}
# On powerpc platform, check device-tree property
# /proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing
# to detect secureboot state.
get_ppc64_secureboot_mode()
{
local secure_boot_file="/proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing"
# Check for secure boot file existence
if [ -f $secure_boot_file ]; then
log_info "Secureboot is enabled (Device tree)"
return 1;
fi
log_info "Secureboot is not enabled (Device tree)"
return 0;
}
# Return the architecture of the system
get_arch()
{
echo $(arch)
}
# Check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and SetupMode-$(the UUID).
# The secure boot mode can be accessed as the last integer of
# "od -An -t u1 /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-*". The efi
# SetupMode can be similarly accessed.
# Return 1 for SecureBoot mode enabled and SetupMode mode disabled.
get_secureboot_mode()
{
local secureboot_mode=0
local system_arch=$(get_arch)
if [ "$system_arch" == "ppc64le" ]; then
get_ppc64_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
else
get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
fi
if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 0 ]; then
log_info "secure boot mode not enabled"
fi
return $secureboot_mode;
}
require_root_privileges()
{
if [ $(id -ru) -ne 0 ]; then
log_skip "requires root privileges"
fi
}
# Look for config option in Kconfig file.
# Return 1 for found and 0 for not found.
kconfig_enabled()
{
local config="$1"
local msg="$2"
grep -E -q $config $IKCONFIG
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
log_info "$msg"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# Attempt to get the kernel config first by checking the modules directory
# then via proc, and finally by extracting it from the kernel image or the
# configs.ko using scripts/extract-ikconfig.
# Return 1 for found.
get_kconfig()
{
local proc_config="/proc/config.gz"
local module_dir="/lib/modules/`uname -r`"
local configs_module="$module_dir/kernel/kernel/configs.ko*"
if [ -f $module_dir/config ]; then
IKCONFIG=$module_dir/config
return 1
fi
if [ ! -f $proc_config ]; then
modprobe configs > /dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -f $proc_config ]; then
cat $proc_config | gunzip > $IKCONFIG 2>/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
return 1
fi
fi
local extract_ikconfig="$module_dir/source/scripts/extract-ikconfig"
if [ ! -f $extract_ikconfig ]; then
log_skip "extract-ikconfig not found"
fi
$extract_ikconfig $KERNEL_IMAGE > $IKCONFIG 2>/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
if [ ! -f $configs_module ]; then
log_skip "CONFIG_IKCONFIG not enabled"
fi
$extract_ikconfig $configs_module > $IKCONFIG
if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
log_skip "CONFIG_IKCONFIG not enabled"
fi
fi
return 1
}
# Make sure that securityfs is mounted
mount_securityfs()
{
if [ -z $SECURITYFS ]; then
SECURITYFS=/sys/kernel/security
mount -t securityfs security $SECURITYFS
fi
if [ ! -d "$SECURITYFS" ]; then
log_fail "$SECURITYFS :securityfs is not mounted"
fi
}
# The policy rule format is an "action" followed by key-value pairs. This
# function supports up to two key-value pairs, in any order.
# For example: action func=<keyword> [appraise_type=<type>]
# Return 1 for found and 0 for not found.
check_ima_policy()
{
local action="$1"
local keypair1="$2"
local keypair2="$3"
local ret=0
mount_securityfs
local ima_policy=$SECURITYFS/ima/policy
if [ ! -e $ima_policy ]; then
log_fail "$ima_policy not found"
fi
if [ -n $keypair2 ]; then
grep -e "^$action.*$keypair1" "$ima_policy" | \
grep -q -e "$keypair2"
else
grep -q -e "^$action.*$keypair1" "$ima_policy"
fi
# invert "grep -q" result, returning 1 for found.
[ $? -eq 0 ] && ret=1
return $ret
}