linux/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
Linus Torvalds c013632192 2nd set of arm64 updates for 4.16:
Spectre v1 mitigation:
 - back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec()
 - masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the
   syscall table
 - masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines
 
 Spectre v2 mitigation update:
 - using the new firmware SMC calling convention specification update
 - removing the current PSCI GET_VERSION firmware call mitigation as
   vendors are deploying new SMCCC-capable firmware
 - additional branch predictor hardening for synchronous exceptions and
   interrupts while in user mode
 
 Meltdown v3 mitigation update for Cavium Thunder X: unaffected but
 hardware erratum gets in the way. The kernel now starts with the page
 tables mapped as global and switches to non-global if kpti needs to be
 enabled.
 
 Other:
 - Theoretical trylock bug fixed
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull more arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "As I mentioned in the last pull request, there's a second batch of
  security updates for arm64 with mitigations for Spectre/v1 and an
  improved one for Spectre/v2 (via a newly defined firmware interface
  API).

  Spectre v1 mitigation:

   - back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec()

   - masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the
     syscall table

   - masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines

  Spectre v2 mitigation update:

   - using the new firmware SMC calling convention specification update

   - removing the current PSCI GET_VERSION firmware call mitigation as
     vendors are deploying new SMCCC-capable firmware

   - additional branch predictor hardening for synchronous exceptions
     and interrupts while in user mode

  Meltdown v3 mitigation update:

    - Cavium Thunder X is unaffected but a hardware erratum gets in the
      way. The kernel now starts with the page tables mapped as global
      and switches to non-global if kpti needs to be enabled.

  Other:

   - Theoretical trylock bug fixed"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (38 commits)
  arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround
  arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support
  arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive
  arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity
  firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops
  firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit
  arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
  arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support
  arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline
  arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1
  arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support
  arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code
  arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper
  arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files
  arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap
  arm: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls
  arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls
  arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
  arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions
  arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference
  ...
2018-02-08 10:44:25 -08:00

240 lines
6.0 KiB
C

/*
* Based on arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1995-1999 Russell King
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef __ASM_PROCESSOR_H
#define __ASM_PROCESSOR_H
#define TASK_SIZE_64 (UL(1) << VA_BITS)
#define KERNEL_DS UL(-1)
#define USER_DS (TASK_SIZE_64 - 1)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
* Default implementation of macro that returns current
* instruction pointer ("program counter").
*/
#define current_text_addr() ({ __label__ _l; _l: &&_l;})
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
#include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <asm/lse.h>
#include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
/*
* TASK_SIZE - the maximum size of a user space task.
* TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - the lower boundary of the mmap VM area.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define TASK_SIZE_32 UL(0x100000000)
#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64)
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_32BIT) ? \
TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64)
#else
#define TASK_SIZE TASK_SIZE_64
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 4))
#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_64
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define AARCH32_VECTORS_BASE 0xffff0000
#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
AARCH32_VECTORS_BASE : STACK_TOP_MAX)
#else
#define STACK_TOP STACK_TOP_MAX
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
extern phys_addr_t arm64_dma_phys_limit;
#define ARCH_LOW_ADDRESS_LIMIT (arm64_dma_phys_limit - 1)
struct debug_info {
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
/* Have we suspended stepping by a debugger? */
int suspended_step;
/* Allow breakpoints and watchpoints to be disabled for this thread. */
int bps_disabled;
int wps_disabled;
/* Hardware breakpoints pinned to this task. */
struct perf_event *hbp_break[ARM_MAX_BRP];
struct perf_event *hbp_watch[ARM_MAX_WRP];
#endif
};
struct cpu_context {
unsigned long x19;
unsigned long x20;
unsigned long x21;
unsigned long x22;
unsigned long x23;
unsigned long x24;
unsigned long x25;
unsigned long x26;
unsigned long x27;
unsigned long x28;
unsigned long fp;
unsigned long sp;
unsigned long pc;
};
struct thread_struct {
struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */
unsigned long tp_value; /* TLS register */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
unsigned long tp2_value;
#endif
struct fpsimd_state fpsimd_state;
void *sve_state; /* SVE registers, if any */
unsigned int sve_vl; /* SVE vector length */
unsigned int sve_vl_onexec; /* SVE vl after next exec */
unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */
unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */
struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */
};
/*
* Everything usercopied to/from thread_struct is statically-sized, so
* no hardened usercopy whitelist is needed.
*/
static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset,
unsigned long *size)
{
*offset = *size = 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define task_user_tls(t) \
({ \
unsigned long *__tls; \
if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(t))) \
__tls = &(t)->thread.tp2_value; \
else \
__tls = &(t)->thread.tp_value; \
__tls; \
})
#else
#define task_user_tls(t) (&(t)->thread.tp_value)
#endif
/* Sync TPIDR_EL0 back to thread_struct for current */
void tls_preserve_current_state(void);
#define INIT_THREAD { }
static inline void start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc)
{
memset(regs, 0, sizeof(*regs));
forget_syscall(regs);
regs->pc = pc;
}
static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
unsigned long sp)
{
start_thread_common(regs, pc);
regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t;
regs->sp = sp;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
unsigned long sp)
{
start_thread_common(regs, pc);
regs->pstate = COMPAT_PSR_MODE_USR;
if (pc & 1)
regs->pstate |= COMPAT_PSR_T_BIT;
#ifdef __AARCH64EB__
regs->pstate |= COMPAT_PSR_E_BIT;
#endif
regs->compat_sp = sp;
}
#endif
/* Forward declaration, a strange C thing */
struct task_struct;
/* Free all resources held by a thread. */
extern void release_thread(struct task_struct *);
unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
static inline void cpu_relax(void)
{
asm volatile("yield" ::: "memory");
}
/* Thread switching */
extern struct task_struct *cpu_switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next);
#define task_pt_regs(p) \
((struct pt_regs *)(THREAD_SIZE + task_stack_page(p)) - 1)
#define KSTK_EIP(tsk) ((unsigned long)task_pt_regs(tsk)->pc)
#define KSTK_ESP(tsk) user_stack_pointer(task_pt_regs(tsk))
/*
* Prefetching support
*/
#define ARCH_HAS_PREFETCH
static inline void prefetch(const void *ptr)
{
asm volatile("prfm pldl1keep, %a0\n" : : "p" (ptr));
}
#define ARCH_HAS_PREFETCHW
static inline void prefetchw(const void *ptr)
{
asm volatile("prfm pstl1keep, %a0\n" : : "p" (ptr));
}
#define ARCH_HAS_SPINLOCK_PREFETCH
static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *ptr)
{
asm volatile(ARM64_LSE_ATOMIC_INSN(
"prfm pstl1strm, %a0",
"nop") : : "p" (ptr));
}
#define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
#endif
int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused);
int cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(void *__unused);
int cpu_clear_disr(void *__unused);
/* Userspace interface for PR_SVE_{SET,GET}_VL prctl()s: */
#define SVE_SET_VL(arg) sve_set_current_vl(arg)
#define SVE_GET_VL() sve_get_current_vl()
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */