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The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de |
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.. | ||
amdtopology.c | ||
cpu_entry_area.c | ||
debug_pagetables.c | ||
dump_pagetables.c | ||
extable.c | ||
fault.c | ||
highmem_32.c | ||
hugetlbpage.c | ||
ident_map.c | ||
init_32.c | ||
init_64.c | ||
init.c | ||
iomap_32.c | ||
ioremap.c | ||
kasan_init_64.c | ||
kaslr.c | ||
kmmio.c | ||
Makefile | ||
mem_encrypt_boot.S | ||
mem_encrypt_identity.c | ||
mem_encrypt.c | ||
mm_internal.h | ||
mmap.c | ||
mmio-mod.c | ||
mpx.c | ||
numa_32.c | ||
numa_64.c | ||
numa_emulation.c | ||
numa_internal.h | ||
numa.c | ||
pageattr-test.c | ||
pageattr.c | ||
pat_internal.h | ||
pat_rbtree.c | ||
pat.c | ||
pf_in.c | ||
pf_in.h | ||
pgtable_32.c | ||
pgtable.c | ||
physaddr.c | ||
physaddr.h | ||
pkeys.c | ||
pti.c | ||
setup_nx.c | ||
srat.c | ||
testmmiotrace.c | ||
tlb.c |