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46e27b9961
The kmemleak code sometimes complains about the following leak: unreferenced object 0xffff8000102e0000 (size 32768): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294937323 (age 71.240s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000db9a88a3>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x324/0x450 [<00000000ff8903a4>] __vmalloc_node+0x90/0xd0 [<000000001a06634f>] arm64_efi_rt_init+0x64/0xdc [<0000000007826a8d>] do_one_initcall+0x178/0xac0 [<0000000054a87017>] do_initcalls+0x190/0x1d0 [<00000000308092d0>] kernel_init_freeable+0x2c0/0x2f0 [<000000003e7b99e0>] kernel_init+0x28/0x14c [<000000002246af5b>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The memory object in this case is for efi_rt_stack_top and is allocated in an initcall. So this is certainly a false positive. Mark the object as not a leak to quash it. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
222 lines
6.0 KiB
C
222 lines
6.0 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Extensible Firmware Interface
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*
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* Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 2.4
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Linaro Ltd.
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*/
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
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#include <linux/screen_info.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
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static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
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return false;
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return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
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!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
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}
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/*
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* Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
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* executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
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* set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
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*/
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static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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u64 attr = md->attribute;
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u32 type = md->type;
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if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
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return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
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if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
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static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
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/*
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* Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
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* mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
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* with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
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* region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
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* misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
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* non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
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*/
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code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
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return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
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: pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
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}
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/* R-- */
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if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
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(EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
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/* R-X */
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if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
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/* RW- */
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if (((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_RP | EFI_MEMORY_WP | EFI_MEMORY_XP)) ==
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EFI_MEMORY_XP) ||
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type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
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/* RWX */
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return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
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}
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int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
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{
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pteval_t prot_val = create_mapping_protection(md);
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bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
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md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
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/*
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* If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
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* mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
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* frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
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* table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
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* adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
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* don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
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*/
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if (region_is_misaligned(md))
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page_mappings_only = true;
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create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
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md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
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__pgprot(prot_val | PTE_NG), page_mappings_only);
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return 0;
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}
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struct set_perm_data {
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const efi_memory_desc_t *md;
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bool has_bti;
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};
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static int __init set_permissions(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
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{
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struct set_perm_data *spd = data;
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const efi_memory_desc_t *md = spd->md;
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pte_t pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
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if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY));
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if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_PXN));
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else if (system_supports_bti_kernel() && spd->has_bti)
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pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_GP));
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__set_pte(ptep, pte);
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return 0;
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}
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int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
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efi_memory_desc_t *md,
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bool has_bti)
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{
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struct set_perm_data data = { md, has_bti };
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BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
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md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
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if (region_is_misaligned(md))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
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* guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called
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* for regions that have been mapped using efi_create_mapping() above
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* (and this is checked by the generic Memory Attributes table parsing
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* routines), there is no need to check that again here.
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*/
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return apply_to_page_range(mm, md->virt_addr,
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md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
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set_permissions, &data);
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}
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/*
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* UpdateCapsule() depends on the system being shutdown via
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* ResetSystem().
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*/
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bool efi_poweroff_required(void)
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{
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return efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES);
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}
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asmlinkage efi_status_t efi_handle_corrupted_x18(efi_status_t s, const char *f)
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{
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pr_err_ratelimited(FW_BUG "register x18 corrupted by EFI %s\n", f);
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return s;
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}
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static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(efi_rt_lock);
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void arch_efi_call_virt_setup(void)
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{
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efi_virtmap_load();
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__efi_fpsimd_begin();
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raw_spin_lock(&efi_rt_lock);
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}
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void arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(void)
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{
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raw_spin_unlock(&efi_rt_lock);
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__efi_fpsimd_end();
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efi_virtmap_unload();
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}
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asmlinkage u64 *efi_rt_stack_top __ro_after_init;
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asmlinkage efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_recover(void);
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bool efi_runtime_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
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{
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/* Check whether the exception occurred while running the firmware */
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if (!current_in_efi() || regs->pc >= TASK_SIZE_64)
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return false;
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pr_err(FW_BUG "Unable to handle %s in EFI runtime service\n", msg);
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add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
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clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
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regs->regs[0] = EFI_ABORTED;
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regs->regs[30] = efi_rt_stack_top[-1];
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regs->pc = (u64)__efi_rt_asm_recover;
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK))
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regs->regs[18] = efi_rt_stack_top[-2];
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return true;
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}
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/* EFI requires 8 KiB of stack space for runtime services */
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static_assert(THREAD_SIZE >= SZ_8K);
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static int __init arm64_efi_rt_init(void)
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{
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void *p;
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if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
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return 0;
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p = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL,
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NUMA_NO_NODE, &&l);
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l: if (!p) {
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pr_warn("Failed to allocate EFI runtime stack\n");
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clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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kmemleak_not_leak(p);
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efi_rt_stack_top = p + THREAD_SIZE;
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return 0;
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}
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core_initcall(arm64_efi_rt_init);
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