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a3123341dc
If we fail to call crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey, we should free the
memory allocation for cipher, replace err_return with err_free_cipher
to free the memory of cipher.
Fixes: 4891f2d008
("gss_krb5: import functionality to derive keys into the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
547 lines
15 KiB
C
547 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
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* The Regents of the University of Michigan
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* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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*
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* Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
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* and redistribute this software and such derivative works
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* for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
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* Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
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* pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
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* without specific, written prior authorization. If the
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* above copyright notice or any other identification of the
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* University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
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* portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
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* also be included.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
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* FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
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* PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
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* MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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* WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
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* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
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* IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGES.
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
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*
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Export of this software from the United States of America may require
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* a specific license from the United States Government. It is the
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* responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
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* obtain such a license before exporting.
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*
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* WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
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* distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
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* without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
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* notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
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* this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
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* the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
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* to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
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* permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
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* this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
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* or implied warranty.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
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#include <linux/lcm.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <kunit/visibility.h>
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#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
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#endif
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/**
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* krb5_nfold - n-fold function
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* @inbits: number of bits in @in
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* @in: buffer containing input to fold
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* @outbits: number of bits in the output buffer
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* @out: buffer to hold the result
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*
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* This is the n-fold function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
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* Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
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*/
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VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
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void krb5_nfold(u32 inbits, const u8 *in, u32 outbits, u8 *out)
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{
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unsigned long ulcm;
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int byte, i, msbit;
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/* the code below is more readable if I make these bytes
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instead of bits */
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inbits >>= 3;
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outbits >>= 3;
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/* first compute lcm(n,k) */
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ulcm = lcm(inbits, outbits);
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/* now do the real work */
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memset(out, 0, outbits);
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byte = 0;
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/* this will end up cycling through k lcm(k,n)/k times, which
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is correct */
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for (i = ulcm-1; i >= 0; i--) {
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/* compute the msbit in k which gets added into this byte */
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msbit = (
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/* first, start with the msbit in the first,
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* unrotated byte */
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((inbits << 3) - 1)
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/* then, for each byte, shift to the right
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* for each repetition */
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+ (((inbits << 3) + 13) * (i/inbits))
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/* last, pick out the correct byte within
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* that shifted repetition */
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+ ((inbits - (i % inbits)) << 3)
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) % (inbits << 3);
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/* pull out the byte value itself */
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byte += (((in[((inbits - 1) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits] << 8)|
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(in[((inbits) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits]))
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>> ((msbit & 7) + 1)) & 0xff;
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/* do the addition */
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byte += out[i % outbits];
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out[i % outbits] = byte & 0xff;
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/* keep around the carry bit, if any */
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byte >>= 8;
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}
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/* if there's a carry bit left over, add it back in */
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if (byte) {
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for (i = outbits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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/* do the addition */
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byte += out[i];
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out[i] = byte & 0xff;
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/* keep around the carry bit, if any */
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byte >>= 8;
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}
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(krb5_nfold);
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/*
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* This is the DK (derive_key) function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
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* Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
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*/
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static int krb5_DK(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
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const struct xdr_netobj *inkey, u8 *rawkey,
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const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant, gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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size_t blocksize, keybytes, keylength, n;
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unsigned char *inblockdata, *outblockdata;
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struct xdr_netobj inblock, outblock;
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struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
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int ret = -EINVAL;
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keybytes = gk5e->keybytes;
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keylength = gk5e->keylength;
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if (inkey->len != keylength)
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goto err_return;
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cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(cipher))
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goto err_return;
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blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
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if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, inkey->data, inkey->len))
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goto err_free_cipher;
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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inblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
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if (inblockdata == NULL)
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goto err_free_cipher;
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outblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
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if (outblockdata == NULL)
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goto err_free_in;
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inblock.data = (char *) inblockdata;
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inblock.len = blocksize;
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outblock.data = (char *) outblockdata;
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outblock.len = blocksize;
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/* initialize the input block */
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if (in_constant->len == inblock.len) {
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memcpy(inblock.data, in_constant->data, inblock.len);
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} else {
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krb5_nfold(in_constant->len * 8, in_constant->data,
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inblock.len * 8, inblock.data);
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}
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/* loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated */
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n = 0;
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while (n < keybytes) {
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krb5_encrypt(cipher, NULL, inblock.data, outblock.data,
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inblock.len);
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if ((keybytes - n) <= outblock.len) {
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memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, (keybytes - n));
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break;
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}
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memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, outblock.len);
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memcpy(inblock.data, outblock.data, outblock.len);
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n += outblock.len;
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}
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ret = 0;
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kfree_sensitive(outblockdata);
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err_free_in:
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kfree_sensitive(inblockdata);
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err_free_cipher:
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crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
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err_return:
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* This is the identity function, with some sanity checking.
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*/
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static int krb5_random_to_key_v2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
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struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
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struct xdr_netobj *key)
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{
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int ret = -EINVAL;
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if (key->len != 16 && key->len != 32) {
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dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len);
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goto err_out;
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}
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if (randombits->len != 16 && randombits->len != 32) {
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dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n",
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__func__, randombits->len);
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goto err_out;
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}
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if (randombits->len != key->len) {
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dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d, key->len is %d\n",
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__func__, randombits->len, key->len);
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goto err_out;
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}
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memcpy(key->data, randombits->data, key->len);
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ret = 0;
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err_out:
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* krb5_derive_key_v2 - Derive a subkey for an RFC 3962 enctype
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* @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype profile
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* @inkey: base protocol key
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* @outkey: OUT: derived key
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* @label: subkey usage label
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* @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
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*
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* Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key.
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*
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* On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
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* is returned on failure.
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*/
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int krb5_derive_key_v2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
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const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
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struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
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const struct xdr_netobj *label,
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gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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struct xdr_netobj inblock;
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int ret;
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inblock.len = gk5e->keybytes;
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inblock.data = kmalloc(inblock.len, gfp_mask);
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if (!inblock.data)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = krb5_DK(gk5e, inkey, inblock.data, label, gfp_mask);
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if (!ret)
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ret = krb5_random_to_key_v2(gk5e, &inblock, outkey);
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kfree_sensitive(inblock.data);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* K(i) = CMAC(key, K(i-1) | i | constant | 0x00 | k)
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*
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* i: A block counter is used with a length of 4 bytes, represented
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* in big-endian order.
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*
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* constant: The label input to the KDF is the usage constant supplied
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* to the key derivation function
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*
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* k: The length of the output key in bits, represented as a 4-byte
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* string in big-endian order.
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*
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* Caller fills in K(i-1) in @step, and receives the result K(i)
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* in the same buffer.
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*/
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static int
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krb5_cmac_Ki(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const struct xdr_netobj *constant,
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u32 outlen, u32 count, struct xdr_netobj *step)
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{
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__be32 k = cpu_to_be32(outlen * 8);
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
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__be32 i = cpu_to_be32(count);
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u8 zero = 0;
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int ret;
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, step->data, step->len);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&i, sizeof(i));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, constant->data, constant->len);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &zero, sizeof(zero));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&k, sizeof(k));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, step->data);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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out_err:
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shash_desc_zero(desc);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac - Derive a subkey for a Camellia/CMAC-based enctype
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* @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype parameters
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* @inkey: base protocol key
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* @outkey: OUT: derived key
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* @constant: subkey usage label
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* @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
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*
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* RFC 6803 Section 3:
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*
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* "We use a key derivation function from the family specified in
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* [SP800-108], Section 5.2, 'KDF in Feedback Mode'."
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*
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* n = ceiling(k / 128)
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* K(0) = zeros
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* K(i) = CMAC(key, K(i-1) | i | constant | 0x00 | k)
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* DR(key, constant) = k-truncate(K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(n))
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* KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(key, constant) = random-to-key(DR(key, constant))
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*
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* Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key (k).
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*
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* On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
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* is returned on failure.
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*/
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int
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krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
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const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
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struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
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const struct xdr_netobj *constant,
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gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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struct xdr_netobj step = { .data = NULL };
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struct xdr_netobj DR = { .data = NULL };
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unsigned int blocksize, offset;
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struct crypto_shash *tfm;
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int n, count, ret;
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/*
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* This implementation assumes the CMAC used for an enctype's
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* key derivation is the same as the CMAC used for its
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* checksumming. This happens to be true for enctypes that
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* are currently supported by this implementation.
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*/
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, inkey->data, inkey->len);
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if (ret)
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goto out_free_tfm;
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blocksize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
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n = (outkey->len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
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/* K(0) is all zeroes */
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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step.len = blocksize;
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step.data = kzalloc(step.len, gfp_mask);
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if (!step.data)
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goto out_free_tfm;
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DR.len = blocksize * n;
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DR.data = kmalloc(DR.len, gfp_mask);
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if (!DR.data)
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goto out_free_tfm;
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/* XXX: Does not handle partial-block key sizes */
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for (offset = 0, count = 1; count <= n; count++) {
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ret = krb5_cmac_Ki(tfm, constant, outkey->len, count, &step);
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if (ret)
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goto out_free_tfm;
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memcpy(DR.data + offset, step.data, blocksize);
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offset += blocksize;
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}
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/* k-truncate and random-to-key */
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memcpy(outkey->data, DR.data, outkey->len);
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ret = 0;
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out_free_tfm:
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crypto_free_shash(tfm);
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out:
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kfree_sensitive(step.data);
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kfree_sensitive(DR.data);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* K1 = HMAC-SHA(key, 0x00000001 | label | 0x00 | k)
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*
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* key: The source of entropy from which subsequent keys are derived.
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*
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* label: An octet string describing the intended usage of the
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* derived key.
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*
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* k: Length in bits of the key to be outputted, expressed in
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* big-endian binary representation in 4 bytes.
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*/
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static int
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krb5_hmac_K1(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const struct xdr_netobj *label,
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u32 outlen, struct xdr_netobj *K1)
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{
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__be32 k = cpu_to_be32(outlen * 8);
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
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__be32 one = cpu_to_be32(1);
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u8 zero = 0;
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int ret;
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&one, sizeof(one));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, label->data, label->len);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &zero, sizeof(zero));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&k, sizeof(k));
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, K1->data);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err;
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out_err:
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shash_desc_zero(desc);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2 - Derive a subkey for an AES/SHA2-based enctype
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* @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype policy parameters
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* @inkey: base protocol key
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* @outkey: OUT: derived key
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* @label: subkey usage label
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* @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
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*
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* RFC 8009 Section 3:
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*
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* "We use a key derivation function from Section 5.1 of [SP800-108],
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|
* which uses the HMAC algorithm as the PRF."
|
|
*
|
|
* function KDF-HMAC-SHA2(key, label, [context,] k):
|
|
* k-truncate(K1)
|
|
*
|
|
* Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key.
|
|
*
|
|
* On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
|
|
* is returned on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
|
|
const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
|
|
const struct xdr_netobj *label,
|
|
gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj K1 = {
|
|
.data = NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This implementation assumes the HMAC used for an enctype's
|
|
* key derivation is the same as the HMAC used for its
|
|
* checksumming. This happens to be true for enctypes that
|
|
* are currently supported by this implementation.
|
|
*/
|
|
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, inkey->data, inkey->len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_free_tfm;
|
|
|
|
K1.len = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
|
|
K1.data = kmalloc(K1.len, gfp_mask);
|
|
if (!K1.data) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out_free_tfm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_hmac_K1(tfm, label, outkey->len, &K1);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_free_tfm;
|
|
|
|
/* k-truncate and random-to-key */
|
|
memcpy(outkey->data, K1.data, outkey->len);
|
|
|
|
out_free_tfm:
|
|
kfree_sensitive(K1.data);
|
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
|
|
out:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|