linux/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
Dimitri John Ledkov fdb4f66c95 crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures
Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash signature support in x509 certificates, pkcs7
signatures, and authenticode signatures. Supports hashes of size 256
and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical purposes.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-27 18:04:30 +08:00

828 lines
21 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* X.509 certificate parser
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509.asn1.h"
#include "x509_akid.asn1.h"
struct x509_parse_context {
struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
const void *key; /* Key data */
size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
const void *params; /* Key parameters */
size_t params_size; /* Size of key parameters */
enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
unsigned raw_akid_size;
const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
};
/*
* Free an X.509 certificate
*/
void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
if (cert) {
public_key_free(cert->pub);
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
kfree(cert->issuer);
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
kfree(cert);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
/*
* Parse an X.509 certificate
*/
struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
long ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert)
goto error_no_cert;
cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub)
goto error_no_ctx;
cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->sig)
goto error_no_ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
goto error_no_ctx;
ctx->cert = cert;
ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
/* Attempt to decode the certificate */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
/* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
if (ctx->raw_akid) {
pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
goto error_decode;
}
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub->key)
goto error_decode;
cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub->params)
goto error_decode;
cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->params_size;
cert->pub->algo = ctx->key_algo;
/* Grab the signature bits */
ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
cert->raw_serial_size,
cert->raw_issuer,
cert->raw_issuer_size);
if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
goto error_decode;
}
cert->id = kid;
/* Detect self-signed certificates */
ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
kfree(ctx);
return cert;
error_decode:
kfree(ctx);
error_no_ctx:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
error_no_cert:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
/*
* Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
* to interpret it.
*/
int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
char buffer[50];
sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
(unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it
* later.
*/
int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n",
hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen);
ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen;
ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Record the algorithm that was used to sign this certificate.
*/
int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
default:
return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_256:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_384:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_512:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_256:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_384:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_512:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";
goto ecdsa;
case OID_gost2012Signature256:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";
goto ecrdsa;
case OID_gost2012Signature512:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
goto ecrdsa;
case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
goto sm2;
}
rsa_pkcs1:
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
ecrdsa:
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
sm2:
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2";
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
ecdsa:
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";
ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note the whereabouts and type of the signature.
*/
int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("Signature: alg=%u, size=%zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen);
/*
* In X.509 certificates, the signature's algorithm is stored in two
* places: inside the TBSCertificate (the data that is signed), and
* alongside the signature. These *must* match.
*/
if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->sig_algo) {
pr_warn("signatureAlgorithm (%u) differs from tbsCertificate.signature (%u)\n",
ctx->last_oid, ctx->sig_algo);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 ||
strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||
strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 ||
strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) {
/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
value++;
vlen--;
}
ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note the certificate serial number
*/
int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
*/
int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_commonName:
ctx->cn_size = vlen;
ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
case OID_organizationName:
ctx->o_size = vlen;
ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
case OID_email_address:
ctx->email_size = vlen;
ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names
*/
static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
char **_name, size_t vlen)
{
const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data;
size_t namesize;
char *buffer;
if (*_name)
return -EINVAL;
/* Empty name string if no material */
if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) {
buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
buffer[0] = 0;
goto done;
}
if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) {
/* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is
* prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof.
*/
namesize = ctx->cn_size;
name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size &&
memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset,
ctx->o_size) == 0)
goto single_component;
if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 &&
ctx->o_size >= 7 &&
memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0)
goto single_component;
buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buffer,
data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size);
buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':';
buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' ';
memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2,
data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size);
buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0;
goto done;
} else if (ctx->cn_size) {
namesize = ctx->cn_size;
name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
} else if (ctx->o_size) {
namesize = ctx->o_size;
name = data + ctx->o_offset;
} else {
namesize = ctx->email_size;
name = data + ctx->email_offset;
}
single_component:
buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buffer, name, namesize);
buffer[namesize] = 0;
done:
*_name = buffer;
ctx->cn_size = 0;
ctx->o_size = 0;
ctx->email_size = 0;
return 0;
}
int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
if (!ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2]) {
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2] = kid;
}
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
}
int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
}
/*
* Extract the parameters for the public key
*/
int x509_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
/*
* AlgorithmIdentifier is used three times in the x509, we should skip
* first and ignore third, using second one which is after subject and
* before subjectPublicKey.
*/
if (!ctx->cert->raw_subject || ctx->key)
return 0;
ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
ctx->params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Extract the data for the public key algorithm
*/
int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
enum OID oid;
ctx->key_algo = ctx->last_oid;
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_rsaEncryption:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_gost2012PKey256:
case OID_gost2012PKey512:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
break;
case OID_sm2:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
break;
case OID_id_ecPublicKey:
if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
switch (oid) {
case OID_sm2:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
break;
case OID_id_prime192v1:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p192";
break;
case OID_id_prime256v1:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p256";
break;
case OID_id_ansip384r1:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p384";
break;
default:
return -ENOPKG;
}
break;
default:
return -ENOPKG;
}
/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
return 0;
}
/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
/*
* Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
*/
int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
return -EBADMSG;
v += 2;
vlen -= 2;
ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->skid = kid;
pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
/*
* Get hold of the keyUsage bit string
* v[1] is the encoding size
* (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes)
* v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string
* (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing when v[1] = 0x02)
* v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string
*
* From RFC 5280 4.2.1.3:
* 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string
* 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string
*/
if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen < 4)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[2] >= 8)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[3] & 0x80)
ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG;
if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04))
ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04))
ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
return 0;
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
ctx->raw_akid = v;
ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
/*
* Get hold of the basicConstraints
* v[1] is the encoding size
* (Expect 0x2 or greater, making it 1 or more bytes)
* v[2] is the encoding type
* (Expect an ASN1_BOOL for the CA)
* v[3] is the contents of the ASN1_BOOL
* (Expect 1 if the CA is TRUE)
* vlen should match the entire extension size
*/
if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen < 2)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_CA;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
* @_t: The time to fill in
* @hdrlen: The length of the object header
* @tag: The object tag
* @value: The object value
* @vlen: The size of the object value
*
* Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
* kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
*
* [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
* CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
* dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
* 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
* applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
* either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
*/
int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
{
static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,
31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
const unsigned char *p = value;
unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 13)
goto unsupported_time;
year = DD2bin(p);
if (year >= 50)
year += 1900;
else
year += 2000;
} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 15)
goto unsupported_time;
year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
goto invalid_time;
} else {
goto unsupported_time;
}
mon = DD2bin(p);
day = DD2bin(p);
hour = DD2bin(p);
min = DD2bin(p);
sec = DD2bin(p);
if (*p != 'Z')
goto unsupported_time;
if (year < 1970 ||
mon < 1 || mon > 12)
goto invalid_time;
mon_len = month_lengths[mon - 1];
if (mon == 2) {
if (year % 4 == 0) {
mon_len = 29;
if (year % 100 == 0) {
mon_len = 28;
if (year % 400 == 0)
mon_len = 29;
}
}
}
if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */
min > 59 ||
sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */
goto invalid_time;
*_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
return 0;
unsupported_time:
pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
invalid_time:
pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
/*
* Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
vlen,
ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
return 0;
}