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EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
109 lines
2.4 KiB
C
109 lines
2.4 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: evm_secfs.c
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* - Used to signal when key is on keyring
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* - Get the key and enable EVM
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*/
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include "evm.h"
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static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;
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/**
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* evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
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*
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* @filp: file pointer, not actually used
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* @buf: where to put the result
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* @count: maximum to send along
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* @ppos: where to start
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*
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* Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
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*/
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static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char temp[80];
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ssize_t rc;
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if (*ppos != 0)
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return 0;
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sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized);
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rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* evm_write_key - write() for <securityfs>/evm
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* @file: file pointer, not actually used
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* @buf: where to get the data from
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* @count: bytes sent
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* @ppos: where to start
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*
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* Used to signal that key is on the kernel key ring.
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* - get the integrity hmac key from the kernel key ring
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* - create list of hmac protected extended attributes
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* Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
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*/
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static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char temp[80];
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int i, error;
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
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return -EPERM;
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if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
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return -EFAULT;
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temp[count] = '\0';
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if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1))
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return -EINVAL;
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error = evm_init_key();
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if (!error) {
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evm_initialized = 1;
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pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
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} else
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pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
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return count;
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}
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static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
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.read = evm_read_key,
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.write = evm_write_key,
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};
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int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
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{
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int error = 0;
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evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
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NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
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if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm))
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error = -EFAULT;
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return error;
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}
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void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void)
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{
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if (evm_init_tpm)
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securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
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}
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