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The current security_inode_setxattr() and security_inode_removexattr() hooks rely on individual LSMs to either call into the associated capability hooks (cap_inode_setxattr() or cap_inode_removexattr()), or return a magic value of 1 to indicate that the LSM layer itself should perform the capability checks. Unfortunately, with the default return value for these LSM hooks being 0, an individual LSM hook returning a 1 will cause the LSM hook processing to exit early, potentially skipping a LSM. Thankfully, with the exception of the BPF LSM, none of the LSMs which currently register inode xattr hooks should end up returning a value of 1, and in the BPF LSM case, with the BPF LSM hooks executing last there should be no real harm in stopping processing of the LSM hooks. However, the reliance on the individual LSMs to either call the capability hooks themselves, or signal the LSM with a return value of 1, is fragile and relies on a specific set of LSMs being enabled. This patch is an effort to resolve, or minimize, these issues. Before we discuss the solution, there are a few observations and considerations that we need to take into account: * BPF LSM registers an implementation for every LSM hook, and that implementation simply returns the hook's default return value, a 0 in this case. We want to ensure that the default BPF LSM behavior results in the capability checks being called. * SELinux and Smack do not expect the traditional capability checks to be applied to the xattrs that they "own". * SELinux and Smack are currently written in such a way that the xattr capability checks happen before any additional LSM specific access control checks. SELinux does apply SELinux specific access controls to all xattrs, even those not "owned" by SELinux. * IMA and EVM also register xattr hooks but assume that the LSM layer and specific LSMs have already authorized the basic xattr operation. In order to ensure we perform the capability based access controls before the individual LSM access controls, perform only one capability access control check for each operation, and clarify the logic around applying the capability controls, we need a mechanism to determine if any of the enabled LSMs "own" a particular xattr and want to take responsibility for controlling access to that xattr. The solution in this patch is to create a new LSM hook, 'inode_xattr_skipcap', that is not exported to the rest of the kernel via a security_XXX() function, but is used by the LSM layer to determine if a LSM wants to control access to a given xattr and avoid the traditional capability controls. Registering an inode_xattr_skipcap hook is optional, if a LSM declines to register an implementation, or uses an implementation that simply returns the default value (0), there is no effect as the LSM continues to enforce the capability based controls (unless another LSM takes ownership of the xattr). If none of the LSMs signal that the capability checks should be skipped, the capability check is performed and if access is granted the individual LSM xattr access control hooks are executed, keeping with the DAC-before-LSM convention. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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| README | ||
Linux kernel
============
There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read
Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.
In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``. The formatted documentation can also be read online at:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/
There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the reStructuredText markup notation.
Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.