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a03a728e37
Commit1e562deace
("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend") enforced that rsassa-pkcs1 sign/verify operations specify a hash algorithm. That is necessary because per RFC 8017 sec 8.2, a hash algorithm identifier must be prepended to the hash before generating or verifying the signature ("Full Hash Prefix"). However the commit went too far in that it changed user space behavior: KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls now return -EINVAL unless they specify a hash algorithm. Intel Wireless Daemon (iwd) is one application issuing such system calls (for EAP-TLS). Closer analysis of the Embedded Linux Library (ell) used by iwd reveals that the problem runs even deeper: When iwd uses TLS 1.1 or earlier, it not only queries for keys, but performs sign/verify operations without specifying a hash algorithm. These legacy TLS versions concatenate an MD5 to a SHA-1 hash and omit the Full Hash Prefix: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/tree/ell/tls-suites.c#n97 TLS 1.1 was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, but removal of support was inadvertent in this case. It probably should be coordinated with iwd maintainers first. So reinstate support for such legacy protocols by defaulting to hash algorithm "none" which uses an empty Full Hash Prefix. If it is later on decided to remove TLS 1.1 support but still allow KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without a hash algorithm, that can be achieved by reverting the present commit and replacing it with the following patch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZxalYZwH5UiGX5uj@wunner.de/ It's worth noting that Python's cryptography library gained support for such legacy use cases very recently, so they do seem to still be a thing. The Python developers identified IKE version 1 as another protocol omitting the Full Hash Prefix: https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/10226 https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/5495 The author of those issues, Zoltan Kelemen, spent considerable effort searching for test vectors but only found one in a 2019 blog post by Kevin Jones. Add it to testmgr.h to verify correctness of this feature. Examination of wpa_supplicant as well as various IKE daemons (libreswan, strongswan, isakmpd, raccoon) has determined that none of them seems to use the kernel's Key Retention Service, so iwd is the only affected user space application known so far. Fixes:1e562deace
("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend") Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
455 lines
12 KiB
C
455 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix - PKCS #1 v1.5 (RFC 8017 sec 8.2)
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*
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* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017#section-8.2
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2015 - 2024 Intel Corporation
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/sig.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
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/*
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* Full Hash Prefix for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method (RFC 9580 table 24)
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*
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* RSA keys are usually much larger than the hash of the message to be signed.
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* The hash is therefore prepended by the Full Hash Prefix and a 0xff padding.
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* The Full Hash Prefix is an ASN.1 SEQUENCE containing the hash algorithm OID.
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*
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* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580#table-24
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*/
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static const u8 hash_prefix_none[] = { };
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static const u8 hash_prefix_md5[] = {
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0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, /* SEQUENCE (SEQUENCE (OID */
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0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* <algorithm>, */
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10 /* NULL), OCTET STRING <hash>) */
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha1[] = {
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0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
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0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_rmd160[] = {
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0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
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0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha224[] = {
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0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha256[] = {
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0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha384[] = {
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0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha512[] = {
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0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_256[] = {
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0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x08,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_384[] = {
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0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x09,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
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};
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static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_512[] = {
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0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x0a,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
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};
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static const struct hash_prefix {
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const char *name;
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const u8 *data;
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size_t size;
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} hash_prefixes[] = {
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#define _(X) { #X, hash_prefix_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_##X) }
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_(none),
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_(md5),
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_(sha1),
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_(rmd160),
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_(sha256),
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_(sha384),
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_(sha512),
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_(sha224),
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#undef _
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#define _(X) { "sha3-" #X, hash_prefix_sha3_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_sha3_##X) }
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_(256),
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_(384),
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_(512),
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#undef _
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{ NULL }
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};
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static const struct hash_prefix *rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(const char *name)
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{
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const struct hash_prefix *p;
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for (p = hash_prefixes; p->name; p++)
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if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0)
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return p;
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return NULL;
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}
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static bool rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(unsigned int len,
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const struct hash_prefix *p)
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{
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/*
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* Legacy protocols such as TLS 1.1 or earlier and IKE version 1
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* do not prepend a Full Hash Prefix to the hash. In that case,
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* the size of the Full Hash Prefix is zero.
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*/
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if (p->data == hash_prefix_none)
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return false;
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/*
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* The final byte of the Full Hash Prefix encodes the hash length.
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*
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* This needs to be revisited should hash algorithms with more than
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* 1016 bits (127 bytes * 8) ever be added. The length would then
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* be encoded into more than one byte by ASN.1.
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*/
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static_assert(HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE <= 127);
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return len != p->data[p->size - 1];
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}
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx {
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struct crypto_akcipher *child;
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unsigned int key_size;
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};
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx {
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struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn;
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const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix;
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};
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
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const void *src, unsigned int slen,
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void *dst, unsigned int dlen)
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{
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struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
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const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix = ictx->hash_prefix;
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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unsigned int child_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->child);
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struct akcipher_request *child_req __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
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struct scatterlist in_sg[3], out_sg;
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struct crypto_wait cwait;
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unsigned int pad_len;
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unsigned int ps_end;
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unsigned int len;
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u8 *in_buf;
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int err;
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if (!ctx->key_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (dlen < ctx->key_size)
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(slen, hash_prefix))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (slen + hash_prefix->size > ctx->key_size - 11)
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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pad_len = ctx->key_size - slen - hash_prefix->size - 1;
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child_req = kmalloc(sizeof(*child_req) + child_reqsize + pad_len,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!child_req)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.1 step 1 - EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding generation */
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in_buf = (u8 *)(child_req + 1) + child_reqsize;
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ps_end = pad_len - 1;
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in_buf[0] = 0x01;
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memset(in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
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in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.1 step 2 - RSA signature */
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crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
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sg_init_table(in_sg, 3);
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sg_set_buf(&in_sg[0], in_buf, pad_len);
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sg_set_buf(&in_sg[1], hash_prefix->data, hash_prefix->size);
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sg_set_buf(&in_sg[2], src, slen);
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sg_init_one(&out_sg, dst, dlen);
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akcipher_request_set_tfm(child_req, ctx->child);
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akcipher_request_set_crypt(child_req, in_sg, &out_sg,
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ctx->key_size - 1, dlen);
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akcipher_request_set_callback(child_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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crypto_req_done, &cwait);
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err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(child_req);
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err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
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if (err)
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return err;
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len = child_req->dst_len;
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pad_len = ctx->key_size - len;
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/* Four billion to one */
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if (unlikely(pad_len)) {
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memmove(dst + pad_len, dst, len);
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memset(dst, 0, pad_len);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
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const void *src, unsigned int slen,
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const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
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{
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struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
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const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix = ictx->hash_prefix;
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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unsigned int child_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->child);
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struct akcipher_request *child_req __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
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struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg;
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struct crypto_wait cwait;
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unsigned int dst_len;
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unsigned int pos;
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u8 *out_buf;
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int err;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 1 - length checking */
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if (!ctx->key_size ||
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slen != ctx->key_size ||
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rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(dlen, hash_prefix))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 2 - RSA verification */
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child_req = kmalloc(sizeof(*child_req) + child_reqsize + ctx->key_size,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!child_req)
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return -ENOMEM;
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out_buf = (u8 *)(child_req + 1) + child_reqsize;
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crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
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sg_init_one(&in_sg, src, slen);
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sg_init_one(&out_sg, out_buf, ctx->key_size);
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akcipher_request_set_tfm(child_req, ctx->child);
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akcipher_request_set_crypt(child_req, &in_sg, &out_sg,
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slen, ctx->key_size);
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akcipher_request_set_callback(child_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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crypto_req_done, &cwait);
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err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(child_req);
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err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
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if (err)
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return err;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 3 - EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding verification */
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dst_len = child_req->dst_len;
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if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
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if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
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/* Encrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
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return -EINVAL;
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dst_len--;
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out_buf++;
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}
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if (out_buf[0] != 0x01)
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return -EBADMSG;
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for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
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if (out_buf[pos] != 0xff)
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break;
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if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len || out_buf[pos] != 0x00)
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return -EBADMSG;
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pos++;
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if (hash_prefix->size > dst_len - pos)
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return -EBADMSG;
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if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, hash_prefix->data, hash_prefix->size))
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return -EBADMSG;
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pos += hash_prefix->size;
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/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 4 - comparison of digest with out_buf */
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if (dlen != dst_len - pos)
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return -EKEYREJECTED;
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if (memcmp(digest, out_buf + pos, dlen) != 0)
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return -EKEYREJECTED;
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return 0;
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}
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static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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return ctx->key_size;
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}
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_set_pub_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
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const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PUB, key, keylen);
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}
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_set_priv_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
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const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PRIV, key, keylen);
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}
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_init_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
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{
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struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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struct crypto_akcipher *child_tfm;
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child_tfm = crypto_spawn_akcipher(&ictx->spawn);
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if (IS_ERR(child_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(child_tfm);
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ctx->child = child_tfm;
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return 0;
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}
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static void rsassa_pkcs1_exit_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
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crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->child);
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}
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static void rsassa_pkcs1_free(struct sig_instance *inst)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ctx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
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struct crypto_akcipher_spawn *spawn = &ctx->spawn;
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crypto_drop_akcipher(spawn);
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kfree(inst);
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}
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static int rsassa_pkcs1_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
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{
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struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ctx;
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struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg;
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struct sig_instance *inst;
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const char *hash_name;
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u32 mask;
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int err;
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err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SIG, &mask);
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if (err)
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return err;
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inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!inst)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ctx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
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err = crypto_grab_akcipher(&ctx->spawn, sig_crypto_instance(inst),
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crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
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if (err)
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goto err_free_inst;
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rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
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if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto err_free_inst;
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}
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hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
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if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(hash_name);
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goto err_free_inst;
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}
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ctx->hash_prefix = rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(hash_name);
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if (!ctx->hash_prefix) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto err_free_inst;
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}
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err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
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if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
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"pkcs1(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_name,
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hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
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goto err_free_inst;
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if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
|
|
"pkcs1(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name,
|
|
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
|
|
goto err_free_inst;
|
|
|
|
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority;
|
|
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx);
|
|
|
|
inst->alg.init = rsassa_pkcs1_init_tfm;
|
|
inst->alg.exit = rsassa_pkcs1_exit_tfm;
|
|
|
|
inst->alg.sign = rsassa_pkcs1_sign;
|
|
inst->alg.verify = rsassa_pkcs1_verify;
|
|
inst->alg.key_size = rsassa_pkcs1_key_size;
|
|
inst->alg.set_pub_key = rsassa_pkcs1_set_pub_key;
|
|
inst->alg.set_priv_key = rsassa_pkcs1_set_priv_key;
|
|
|
|
inst->free = rsassa_pkcs1_free;
|
|
|
|
err = sig_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
err_free_inst:
|
|
rsassa_pkcs1_free(inst);
|
|
}
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_template rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl = {
|
|
.name = "pkcs1",
|
|
.create = rsassa_pkcs1_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("pkcs1");
|