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https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
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d01e7f10da
Pull exec-update-lock update from Eric Biederman: "The key point of this is to transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore so readers can be separated from writers. This makes it easier to understand what the holders of the lock are doing, and makes it harder to contend or deadlock on the lock. The real deadlock fix wound up in perf_event_open" * 'exec-update-lock-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
240 lines
5.4 KiB
C
240 lines
5.4 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/fdtable.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/cache.h>
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/kcmp.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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/*
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* We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
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* But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
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* obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
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*
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* The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
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* a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
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* Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
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* permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
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* is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
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* relative prime to 2^n).
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*
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* Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
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* it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
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*/
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static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
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static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
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{
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return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
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}
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/*
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* 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
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* 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
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* 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
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* 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
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*/
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static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
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{
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long t1, t2;
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t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
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t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
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return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
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}
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/* The caller must have pinned the task */
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static struct file *
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get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
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{
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struct file *file;
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rcu_read_lock();
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file = task_lookup_fd_rcu(task, idx);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return file;
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}
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static void kcmp_unlock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2)
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{
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if (likely(l2 != l1))
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up_read(l2);
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up_read(l1);
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}
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static int kcmp_lock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2)
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{
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int err;
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if (l2 > l1)
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swap(l1, l2);
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err = down_read_killable(l1);
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if (!err && likely(l1 != l2)) {
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err = down_read_killable_nested(l2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
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if (err)
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up_read(l1);
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}
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return err;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL
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static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
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struct task_struct *task2,
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unsigned long idx1,
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struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
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{
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struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt;
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struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot;
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if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot)))
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return -EFAULT;
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filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
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if (!filp)
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return -EBADF;
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filp_epoll = fget_task(task2, slot.efd);
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if (!filp_epoll)
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return -EBADF;
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filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff);
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fput(filp_epoll);
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if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt))
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return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt);
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return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE);
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}
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#else
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static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
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struct task_struct *task2,
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unsigned long idx1,
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struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
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{
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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#endif
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SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
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unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
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{
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struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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/*
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* Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
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*/
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task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
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task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
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if (!task1 || !task2)
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goto err_no_task;
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get_task_struct(task1);
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get_task_struct(task2);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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/*
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* One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
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*/
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ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock,
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&task2->signal->exec_update_lock);
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if (ret)
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goto err;
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if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
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!ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
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ret = -EPERM;
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goto err_unlock;
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}
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switch (type) {
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case KCMP_FILE: {
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struct file *filp1, *filp2;
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filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
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filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
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if (filp1 && filp2)
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ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
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else
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ret = -EBADF;
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break;
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}
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case KCMP_VM:
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
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break;
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case KCMP_FILES:
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
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break;
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case KCMP_FS:
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
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break;
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case KCMP_SIGHAND:
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
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break;
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case KCMP_IO:
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
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break;
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case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
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ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
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task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
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KCMP_SYSVSEM);
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#else
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ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
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#endif
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break;
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case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD:
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ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2);
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break;
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default:
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ret = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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err_unlock:
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kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock,
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&task2->signal->exec_update_lock);
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err:
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put_task_struct(task1);
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put_task_struct(task2);
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return ret;
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err_no_task:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return -ESRCH;
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}
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static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
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{
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int i;
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get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
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for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
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cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
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return 0;
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}
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arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);
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