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4e9b45a192
On 64 bit systems the test for negative message sizes is bogus as the
size, which may be positive when evaluated as a long, will get truncated
to an int when passed to load_msg(). So a long might very well contain a
positive value but when truncated to an int it would become negative.
That in combination with a small negative value of msg_ctlmax (which will
be promoted to an unsigned type for the comparison against msgsz, making
it a big positive value and therefore make it pass the check) will lead to
two problems: 1/ The kmalloc() call in alloc_msg() will allocate a too
small buffer as the addition of alen is effectively a subtraction. 2/ The
copy_from_user() call in load_msg() will first overflow the buffer with
userland data and then, when the userland access generates an access
violation, the fixup handler copy_user_handle_tail() will try to fill the
remainder with zeros -- roughly 4GB. That almost instantly results in a
system crash or reset.
,-[ Reproducer (needs to be run as root) ]--
| #include <sys/stat.h>
| #include <sys/msg.h>
| #include <unistd.h>
| #include <fcntl.h>
|
| int main(void) {
| long msg = 1;
| int fd;
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| fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/msgmax", O_WRONLY);
| write(fd, "-1", 2);
| close(fd);
|
| msgsnd(0, &msg, 0xfffffff0, IPC_NOWAIT);
|
| return 0;
| }
'---
Fix the issue by preventing msgsz from getting truncated by consistently
using size_t for the message length. This way the size checks in
do_msgsnd() could still be passed with a negative value for msg_ctlmax but
we would fail on the buffer allocation in that case and error out.
Also change the type of m_ts from int to size_t to avoid similar nastiness
in other code paths -- it is used in similar constructs, i.e. signed vs.
unsigned checks. It should never become negative under normal
circumstances, though.
Setting msg_ctlmax to a negative value is an odd configuration and should
be prevented. As that might break existing userland, it will be handled
in a separate commit so it could easily be reverted and reworked without
reintroducing the above described bug.
Hardening mechanisms for user copy operations would have catched that bug
early -- e.g. checking slab object sizes on user copy operations as the
usercopy feature of the PaX patch does. Or, for that matter, detect the
long vs. int sign change due to truncation, as the size overflow plugin
of the very same patch does.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [ v2.3.27+ -- yes, that old ;) ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
194 lines
5.8 KiB
C
194 lines
5.8 KiB
C
/*
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* linux/ipc/util.h
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* Copyright (C) 1999 Christoph Rohland
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*
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* ipc helper functions (c) 1999 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
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* namespaces support. 2006 OpenVZ, SWsoft Inc.
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* Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
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*/
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#ifndef _IPC_UTIL_H
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#define _IPC_UTIL_H
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#include <linux/unistd.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#define SEQ_MULTIPLIER (IPCMNI)
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void sem_init (void);
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void msg_init (void);
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void shm_init (void);
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struct ipc_namespace;
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#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE
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extern void mq_clear_sbinfo(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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extern void mq_put_mnt(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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#else
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static inline void mq_clear_sbinfo(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void mq_put_mnt(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
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void sem_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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void msg_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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void shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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void sem_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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void msg_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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void shm_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
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#else
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static inline void sem_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void msg_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void sem_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void msg_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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static inline void shm_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { }
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#endif
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struct ipc_rcu {
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struct rcu_head rcu;
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atomic_t refcount;
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} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
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#define ipc_rcu_to_struct(p) ((void *)(p+1))
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/*
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* Structure that holds the parameters needed by the ipc operations
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* (see after)
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*/
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struct ipc_params {
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key_t key;
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int flg;
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union {
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size_t size; /* for shared memories */
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int nsems; /* for semaphores */
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} u; /* holds the getnew() specific param */
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};
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/*
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* Structure that holds some ipc operations. This structure is used to unify
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* the calls to sys_msgget(), sys_semget(), sys_shmget()
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* . routine to call to create a new ipc object. Can be one of newque,
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* newary, newseg
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* . routine to call to check permissions for a new ipc object.
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* Can be one of security_msg_associate, security_sem_associate,
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* security_shm_associate
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* . routine to call for an extra check if needed
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*/
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struct ipc_ops {
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int (*getnew) (struct ipc_namespace *, struct ipc_params *);
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int (*associate) (struct kern_ipc_perm *, int);
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int (*more_checks) (struct kern_ipc_perm *, struct ipc_params *);
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};
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struct seq_file;
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struct ipc_ids;
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void ipc_init_ids(struct ipc_ids *);
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#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
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void __init ipc_init_proc_interface(const char *path, const char *header,
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int ids, int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *));
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#else
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#define ipc_init_proc_interface(path, header, ids, show) do {} while (0)
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#endif
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#define IPC_SEM_IDS 0
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#define IPC_MSG_IDS 1
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#define IPC_SHM_IDS 2
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#define ipcid_to_idx(id) ((id) % SEQ_MULTIPLIER)
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#define ipcid_to_seqx(id) ((id) / SEQ_MULTIPLIER)
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/* must be called with ids->rwsem acquired for writing */
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int ipc_addid(struct ipc_ids *, struct kern_ipc_perm *, int);
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/* must be called with ids->rwsem acquired for reading */
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int ipc_get_maxid(struct ipc_ids *);
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/* must be called with both locks acquired. */
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void ipc_rmid(struct ipc_ids *, struct kern_ipc_perm *);
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/* must be called with ipcp locked */
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int ipcperms(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flg);
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/* for rare, potentially huge allocations.
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* both function can sleep
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*/
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void* ipc_alloc(int size);
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void ipc_free(void* ptr, int size);
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/*
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* For allocation that need to be freed by RCU.
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* Objects are reference counted, they start with reference count 1.
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* getref increases the refcount, the putref call that reduces the recount
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* to 0 schedules the rcu destruction. Caller must guarantee locking.
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*/
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void* ipc_rcu_alloc(int size);
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int ipc_rcu_getref(void *ptr);
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void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr, void (*func)(struct rcu_head *head));
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void ipc_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *head);
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struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_lock(struct ipc_ids *, int);
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struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_obtain_object(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id);
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void kernel_to_ipc64_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *in, struct ipc64_perm *out);
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void ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(struct ipc64_perm *in, struct ipc_perm *out);
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int ipc_update_perm(struct ipc64_perm *in, struct kern_ipc_perm *out);
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struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcctl_pre_down_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
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struct ipc_ids *ids, int id, int cmd,
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struct ipc64_perm *perm, int extra_perm);
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#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
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/* On IA-64, we always use the "64-bit version" of the IPC structures. */
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# define ipc_parse_version(cmd) IPC_64
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#else
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int ipc_parse_version (int *cmd);
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#endif
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extern void free_msg(struct msg_msg *msg);
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extern struct msg_msg *load_msg(const void __user *src, size_t len);
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extern struct msg_msg *copy_msg(struct msg_msg *src, struct msg_msg *dst);
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extern int store_msg(void __user *dest, struct msg_msg *msg, size_t len);
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extern void recompute_msgmni(struct ipc_namespace *);
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static inline int ipc_buildid(int id, int seq)
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{
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return SEQ_MULTIPLIER * seq + id;
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}
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static inline int ipc_checkid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, int uid)
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{
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return uid / SEQ_MULTIPLIER != ipcp->seq;
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}
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static inline void ipc_lock_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
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{
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spin_lock(&perm->lock);
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}
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static inline void ipc_unlock_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
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{
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spin_unlock(&perm->lock);
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}
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static inline void ipc_assert_locked_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
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{
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assert_spin_locked(&perm->lock);
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}
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static inline void ipc_unlock(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
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{
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ipc_unlock_object(perm);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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}
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struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_obtain_object_check(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id);
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int ipcget(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids,
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struct ipc_ops *ops, struct ipc_params *params);
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void free_ipcs(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids,
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void (*free)(struct ipc_namespace *, struct kern_ipc_perm *));
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#endif
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