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9a95c5bfbf
A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID:1286325
Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commitc7423dbdbc
("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes:c7423dbdbc
("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
292 lines
5.8 KiB
C
292 lines
5.8 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor auditing functions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
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*/
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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#include "include/apparmor.h"
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/policy_ns.h"
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#include "include/secid.h"
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const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
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"normal",
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"quiet_denied",
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"quiet",
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"noquiet",
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"all"
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};
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static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
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"AUDIT",
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"ALLOWED",
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"DENIED",
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"HINT",
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"STATUS",
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"ERROR",
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"KILLED",
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"AUTO"
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};
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static const char *const aa_class_names[] = {
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"none",
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"unknown",
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"file",
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"cap",
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"net",
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"rlimits",
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"domain",
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"mount",
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"unknown",
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"ptrace",
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"signal",
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"xmatch",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"net",
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"unknown",
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"label",
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"posix_mqueue",
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"io_uring",
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"module",
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"lsm",
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"namespace",
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"io_uring",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"unknown",
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"X",
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"dbus",
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};
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/*
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* Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework.
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*
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* TODO:
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* netlink interface for complain mode
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* user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface
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* system control of whether user audit messages go to system log
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*/
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/**
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* audit_pre() - core AppArmor function.
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* @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
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* @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Record common AppArmor audit data from @va
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*/
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static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
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if (aa_g_audit_header) {
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audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"",
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aa_audit_type[ad->type]);
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}
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if (ad->op)
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audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op);
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if (ad->class)
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audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"",
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ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ?
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aa_class_names[ad->class] :
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"unknown");
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if (ad->info) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info);
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if (ad->error)
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audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error);
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}
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if (ad->subj_label) {
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struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label;
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if (label_isprofile(label)) {
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struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
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if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
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audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
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profile->ns->base.hname);
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}
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audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
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audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
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} else {
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audit_log_format(ab, " label=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, root_ns, label, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS,
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GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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}
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if (ad->name) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
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audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name);
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}
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}
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/**
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* aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem
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* @type: audit type for the message
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* @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
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* @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
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*/
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void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
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void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
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{
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ad->type = type;
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common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb);
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}
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/**
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* aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
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* @type: audit type for the message
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* @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
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* @ad: audit event (NOT NULL)
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* @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
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*
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* Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
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*
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* Returns: error on failure
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*/
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int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
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void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
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{
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
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if (likely(!ad->error)) {
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if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
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return 0;
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type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
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} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
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type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
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else
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type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
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}
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if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
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(type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
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AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED))
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return ad->error;
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if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
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type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
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ad->subj_label = &profile->label;
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aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);
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if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
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(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
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ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK &&
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ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current);
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if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
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return complain_error(ad->error);
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return ad->error;
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}
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struct aa_audit_rule {
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struct aa_label *label;
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};
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void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
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{
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struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
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if (rule) {
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if (!IS_ERR(rule->label))
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aa_put_label(rule->label);
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kfree(rule);
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}
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}
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int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
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switch (field) {
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
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return -EINVAL;
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp);
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if (!rule)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
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rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
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gfp, true, false);
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if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
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int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
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aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
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return err;
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}
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*vrule = rule;
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return 0;
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}
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int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
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struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
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switch (f->type) {
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
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{
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struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
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struct aa_label *label;
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int found = 0;
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label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
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if (!label)
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return -ENOENT;
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if (aa_label_is_subset(label, rule->label))
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found = 1;
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switch (field) {
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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switch (op) {
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case Audit_equal:
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return found;
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case Audit_not_equal:
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return !found;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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