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SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> |
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