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This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs, e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy could be established to only permit the execution of all files with verified built-in fsverity signatures. The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space, effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space stack interactions. The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE documentation in fsverity.rst. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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.. | ||
enable.c | ||
fsverity_private.h | ||
hash_algs.c | ||
init.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile | ||
measure.c | ||
open.c | ||
read_metadata.c | ||
signature.c | ||
verify.c |