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malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember a lot of distinct verifier states. Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'. Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program. It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program. It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner instead of spending cpu time walking long link list. The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify the programs: before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1940 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3089 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1065 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 | 28162 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 | 35541 bpf_netdev.o 10864 10864 bpf_overlay.o 6643 6643 bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 38437 But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5 Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> |
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.. | ||
arraymap.c | ||
bpf_lru_list.c | ||
bpf_lru_list.h | ||
btf.c | ||
cgroup.c | ||
core.c | ||
cpumap.c | ||
devmap.c | ||
disasm.c | ||
disasm.h | ||
hashtab.c | ||
helpers.c | ||
inode.c | ||
local_storage.c | ||
lpm_trie.c | ||
Makefile | ||
map_in_map.c | ||
map_in_map.h | ||
offload.c | ||
percpu_freelist.c | ||
percpu_freelist.h | ||
queue_stack_maps.c | ||
reuseport_array.c | ||
stackmap.c | ||
syscall.c | ||
tnum.c | ||
verifier.c | ||
xskmap.c |