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22d94f493b
Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
379 lines
9.7 KiB
C
379 lines
9.7 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Key setup facility for FS encryption support.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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*
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* Originally written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar.
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* Heavily modified since then.
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*/
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
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static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
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[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
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.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
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.keysize = 64,
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.ivsize = 16,
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},
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[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
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.keysize = 32,
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.ivsize = 16,
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},
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[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
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.keysize = 16,
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.ivsize = 16,
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.needs_essiv = true,
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},
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[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
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.keysize = 16,
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.ivsize = 16,
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},
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[FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM] = {
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.friendly_name = "Adiantum",
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.cipher_str = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
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.keysize = 32,
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.ivsize = 32,
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},
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};
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static struct fscrypt_mode *
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select_encryption_mode(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct inode *inode)
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{
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if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode)) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode,
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"Unsupported encryption modes (contents mode %d, filenames mode %d)",
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ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode);
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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}
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if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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return &available_modes[ci->ci_data_mode];
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
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return &available_modes[ci->ci_filename_mode];
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WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
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inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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}
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/* Create a symmetric cipher object for the given encryption mode and key */
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struct crypto_skcipher *fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
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const u8 *raw_key,
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const struct inode *inode)
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{
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struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
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int err;
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tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode,
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"Missing crypto API support for %s (API name: \"%s\")",
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mode->friendly_name, mode->cipher_str);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG);
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}
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fscrypt_err(inode, "Error allocating '%s' transform: %ld",
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mode->cipher_str, PTR_ERR(tfm));
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return tfm;
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}
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if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) {
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/*
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* fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which
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* crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug
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* performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the
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* first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can
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* race here, but it doesn't really matter.
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*/
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mode->logged_impl_name = true;
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pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
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mode->friendly_name,
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crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
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}
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crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
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err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
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if (err)
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goto err_free_tfm;
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return tfm;
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err_free_tfm:
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crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
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{
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struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
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/* init hash transform on demand */
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if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
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struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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"Missing crypto API support for SHA-256");
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return -ENOPKG;
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}
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fscrypt_err(NULL,
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"Error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
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PTR_ERR(tfm));
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return PTR_ERR(tfm);
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}
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prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
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if (prev_tfm) {
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crypto_free_shash(tfm);
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tfm = prev_tfm;
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}
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}
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{
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
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}
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}
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static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
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int keysize)
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{
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int err;
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struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
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u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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if (WARN_ON(ci->ci_mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return -EINVAL;
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essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
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ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
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err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
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* used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
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* configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
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*/
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err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
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if (err)
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goto out;
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out:
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memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
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return err;
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}
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/* Given the per-file key, set up the file's crypto transform object(s) */
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int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *derived_key)
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{
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struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
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struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
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int err;
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ctfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(mode, derived_key, ci->ci_inode);
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if (IS_ERR(ctfm))
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return PTR_ERR(ctfm);
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ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
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if (mode->needs_essiv) {
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err = init_essiv_generator(ci, derived_key, mode->keysize);
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if (err) {
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fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode,
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"Error initializing ESSIV generator: %d",
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err);
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return err;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Find the master key, then set up the inode's actual encryption key.
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*/
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static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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struct key *key;
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = NULL;
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struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
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int err;
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mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR;
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memcpy(mk_spec.u.descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
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FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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key = fscrypt_find_master_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb, &mk_spec);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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if (key != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
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return PTR_ERR(key);
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return fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(ci);
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}
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mk = key->payload.data[0];
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if (mk->mk_secret.size < ci->ci_mode->keysize) {
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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"key with %s %*phN is too short (got %u bytes, need %u+ bytes)",
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master_key_spec_type(&mk_spec),
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master_key_spec_len(&mk_spec), (u8 *)&mk_spec.u,
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mk->mk_secret.size, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
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err = -ENOKEY;
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goto out_release_key;
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}
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err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, mk->mk_secret.raw);
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out_release_key:
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key_put(key);
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return err;
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}
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static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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if (!ci)
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return;
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if (ci->ci_direct_key) {
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fscrypt_put_direct_key(ci->ci_direct_key);
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} else {
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crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
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crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
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}
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kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
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}
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int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
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{
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struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
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struct fscrypt_context ctx;
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struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
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int res;
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if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))
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return 0;
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res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
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if (res)
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return res;
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res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
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if (res < 0) {
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if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
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IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode,
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"Error %d getting encryption context",
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res);
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return res;
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}
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/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
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memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
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ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
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ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
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ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
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memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42,
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FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode,
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"Unknown encryption context size (%d bytes)", res);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unknown encryption context version (%d)",
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ctx.format);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (ctx.flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) {
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fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unknown encryption context flags (0x%02x)",
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ctx.flags);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!crypt_info)
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return -ENOMEM;
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crypt_info->ci_inode = inode;
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crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
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crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
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crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
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memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
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FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
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mode = select_encryption_mode(crypt_info, inode);
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if (IS_ERR(mode)) {
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res = PTR_ERR(mode);
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goto out;
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}
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WARN_ON(mode->ivsize > FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE);
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crypt_info->ci_mode = mode;
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res = setup_file_encryption_key(crypt_info);
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if (res)
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goto out;
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if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
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crypt_info = NULL;
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out:
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if (res == -ENOKEY)
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res = 0;
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put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
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return res;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info);
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/**
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* fscrypt_put_encryption_info - free most of an inode's fscrypt data
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*
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* Free the inode's fscrypt_info. Filesystems must call this when the inode is
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* being evicted. An RCU grace period need not have elapsed yet.
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*/
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void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
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{
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put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info);
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inode->i_crypt_info = NULL;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);
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/**
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* fscrypt_free_inode - free an inode's fscrypt data requiring RCU delay
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*
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* Free the inode's cached decrypted symlink target, if any. Filesystems must
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* call this after an RCU grace period, just before they free the inode.
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*/
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void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
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{
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if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
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kfree(inode->i_link);
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inode->i_link = NULL;
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_inode);
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