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f66a211e8c
The function dh_is_pubkey_valid was added to for FIPS but it was only partially conditional to fips_enabled. In particular, the first test in the function relies on the last test to work properly, but the last test is only run in FIPS mode. Fix this inconsistency by making the whole function conditional on fips_enabled. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
928 lines
29 KiB
C
928 lines
29 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631]
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
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* Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/fips.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
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#include <crypto/kpp.h>
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#include <crypto/dh.h>
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#include <crypto/rng.h>
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#include <linux/mpi.h>
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struct dh_ctx {
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MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
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MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
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MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
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};
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static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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mpi_free(ctx->p);
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mpi_free(ctx->g);
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mpi_free(ctx->xa);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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/*
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* If base is g we compute the public key
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* ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
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* else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
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* ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
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*/
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static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
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{
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/* val = base^xa mod p */
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return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
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}
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static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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}
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static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
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{
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if (fips_enabled)
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return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
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return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
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}
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static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
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{
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if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
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return -EINVAL;
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ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
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if (!ctx->p)
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return -EINVAL;
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ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
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if (!ctx->g)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
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unsigned int len)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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struct dh params;
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/* Free the old MPI key if any */
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
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if (!ctx->xa)
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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return 0;
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err_clear_ctx:
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* SP800-56A public key verification:
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*
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* * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
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* trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
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* section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
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*
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* * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
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* according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
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*/
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static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
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{
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MPI val, q;
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int ret;
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if (!fips_enabled)
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return 0;
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if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
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*
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* The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
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* in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
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* p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
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* thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
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*/
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if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
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*
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* For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
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*/
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val = mpi_alloc(0);
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if (!val)
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return -ENOMEM;
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q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
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if (!q) {
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mpi_free(val);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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/*
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* ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
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* from it before shifting to the right.
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*/
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mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1);
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ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
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mpi_free(q);
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if (ret) {
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mpi_free(val);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
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mpi_free(val);
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if (ret != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
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int ret = 0;
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int sign;
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if (!val)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto err_free_val;
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}
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if (req->src) {
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base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
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if (!base) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto err_free_val;
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}
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ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
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if (ret)
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goto err_free_base;
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} else {
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base = ctx->g;
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}
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ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
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if (ret)
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goto err_free_base;
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if (fips_enabled) {
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/* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */
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if (req->src) {
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MPI pone;
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/* z <= 1 */
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if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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goto err_free_base;
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}
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/* z == p - 1 */
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pone = mpi_alloc(0);
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if (!pone) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto err_free_base;
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}
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ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
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if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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mpi_free(pone);
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if (ret)
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goto err_free_base;
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/* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
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} else {
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if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
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ret = -EAGAIN;
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goto err_free_val;
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}
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}
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}
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ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
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if (ret)
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goto err_free_base;
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if (sign < 0)
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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err_free_base:
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if (req->src)
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mpi_free(base);
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err_free_val:
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mpi_free(val);
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return ret;
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}
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static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
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}
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static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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}
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static struct kpp_alg dh = {
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.set_secret = dh_set_secret,
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.generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
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.compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
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.max_size = dh_max_size,
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.exit = dh_exit_tfm,
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.base = {
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.cra_name = "dh",
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.cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
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.cra_priority = 100,
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.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
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.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
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},
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};
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struct dh_safe_prime {
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unsigned int max_strength;
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unsigned int p_size;
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const char *p;
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};
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static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 };
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struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
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struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
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const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
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};
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struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
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struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
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};
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static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
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{
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struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
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crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
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kfree(inst);
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}
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static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
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struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
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}
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static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
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dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
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struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
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kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) +
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crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm));
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return 0;
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}
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static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
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}
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static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
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u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
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tmp += val;
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val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
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dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
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}
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return val;
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}
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static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
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unsigned int *key_size)
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{
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unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
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__be64 *key;
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int err;
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u64 h, o;
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/*
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* Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
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* sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
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*
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* 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
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* 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
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* with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
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* Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
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* avoid excessively large private keys while still
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* maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
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* most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
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* the following holds for such N:
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* - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
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* bits and
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* - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
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*/
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n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
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n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */
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/*
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* Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
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* required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
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*/
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oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
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key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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/*
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* 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
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* random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
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*/
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err = -EFAULT;
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if (crypto_get_default_rng())
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goto out_err;
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err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key,
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oversampling_size);
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crypto_put_default_rng();
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if (err)
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goto out_err;
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/*
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* 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
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* M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
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*
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* For step 6, calculate
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* key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
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*
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* In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
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* 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
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* 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
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* The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
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* may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
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* representing the 64 most significant bits and l
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* corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
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* from above,
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* h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
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* As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
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* this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
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* Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
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* h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
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* then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
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* be zero after a second reduction:
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* h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
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* At this point, it is still possible that
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* l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
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* is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
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* the final increment overflowing in this case.
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*/
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h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
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h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
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h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
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/* Increment to obtain the final result. */
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o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
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/*
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* The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
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* one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
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* order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
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* one, c.f. above.
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*/
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if (o)
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key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
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|
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/* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */
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*key_size = n << 3;
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/* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */
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memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
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return key;
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out_err:
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kfree_sensitive(key);
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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|
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static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
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unsigned int len)
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{
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struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
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dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
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struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct dh params = {};
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void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
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unsigned int buf_size;
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int err;
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|
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if (buffer) {
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err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms);
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if (err)
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return err;
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if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
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params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
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params.g = safe_prime_g;
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params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
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|
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if (!params.key_size) {
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key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
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¶ms.key_size);
|
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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return PTR_ERR(key);
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params.key = key;
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}
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buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms);
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buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buf) {
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err = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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|
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err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms);
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|
if (err)
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|
goto out;
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|
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err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
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|
out:
|
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kfree_sensitive(buf);
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kfree_sensitive(key);
|
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return err;
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}
|
|
|
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static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err)
|
|
{
|
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struct kpp_request *req = data;
|
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|
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kpp_request_complete(req, err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
|
|
kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
|
|
struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
|
|
|
|
kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
|
|
kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
|
|
dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
|
|
|
|
kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
|
|
kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
|
|
|
|
return dh_req;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
|
|
|
|
return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
|
|
|
|
return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
|
|
|
return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
|
|
struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
|
|
const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kpp_instance *inst;
|
|
struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
|
|
const char *dh_name;
|
|
struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
|
|
u32 mask;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
|
|
|
|
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!inst)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
|
|
dh_name, 0, mask);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto err_free_inst;
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
|
|
if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
|
|
goto err_free_inst;
|
|
|
|
ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
|
|
tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto err_free_inst;
|
|
|
|
inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
|
|
inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
|
|
inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
|
|
inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
|
|
inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
|
|
inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
|
|
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
|
|
inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
|
|
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
|
|
|
|
inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
|
|
|
|
err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto err_free_inst;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_free_inst:
|
|
dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
|
|
|
|
static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
|
|
.max_strength = 112,
|
|
.p_size = 256,
|
|
.p =
|
|
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
|
"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
|
"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
|
"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
|
"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
|
"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
|
"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
|
"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
|
"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
|
"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
|
"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
|
"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
|
"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
|
"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
|
"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
|
"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
|
|
.max_strength = 128,
|
|
.p_size = 384,
|
|
.p =
|
|
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
|
"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
|
"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
|
"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
|
"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
|
"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
|
"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
|
"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
|
"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
|
"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
|
"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
|
"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
|
"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
|
"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
|
"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
|
"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
|
"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
|
"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
|
"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
|
"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
|
"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
|
"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
|
"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
|
"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
|
|
.max_strength = 152,
|
|
.p_size = 512,
|
|
.p =
|
|
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
|
"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
|
"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
|
"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
|
"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
|
"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
|
"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
|
"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
|
"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
|
"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
|
"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
|
"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
|
"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
|
"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
|
"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
|
"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
|
"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
|
"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
|
"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
|
"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
|
"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
|
"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
|
"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
|
"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
|
"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
|
"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
|
"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
|
"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
|
"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
|
"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
|
"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
|
"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
|
|
.max_strength = 176,
|
|
.p_size = 768,
|
|
.p =
|
|
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
|
"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
|
"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
|
"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
|
"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
|
"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
|
"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
|
"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
|
"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
|
"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
|
"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
|
"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
|
"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
|
"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
|
"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
|
"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
|
"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
|
"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
|
"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
|
"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
|
"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
|
"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
|
"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
|
"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
|
"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
|
"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
|
"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
|
"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
|
"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
|
"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
|
"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
|
"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
|
|
"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
|
|
"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
|
|
"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
|
|
"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
|
|
"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
|
|
"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
|
|
"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
|
|
"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
|
|
"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
|
|
"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
|
|
"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
|
|
"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
|
|
"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
|
|
"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
|
|
"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
|
|
"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
|
|
.max_strength = 200,
|
|
.p_size = 1024,
|
|
.p =
|
|
"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
|
"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
|
"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
|
"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
|
"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
|
"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
|
"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
|
"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
|
"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
|
"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
|
"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
|
"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
|
"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
|
"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
|
"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
|
"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
|
"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
|
"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
|
"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
|
"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
|
"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
|
"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
|
"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
|
"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
|
"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
|
"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
|
"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
|
"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
|
"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
|
"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
|
"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
|
"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
|
|
"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
|
|
"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
|
|
"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
|
|
"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
|
|
"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
|
|
"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
|
|
"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
|
|
"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
|
|
"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
|
|
"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
|
|
"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
|
|
"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
|
|
"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
|
|
"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
|
|
"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
|
|
"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
|
|
"\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
|
|
"\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
|
|
"\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
|
|
"\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
|
|
"\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
|
|
"\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
|
|
"\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
|
|
"\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
|
|
"\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
|
|
"\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
|
|
"\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
|
|
"\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
|
|
"\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
|
|
"\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
|
|
"\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
|
|
"\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
{
|
|
return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
{
|
|
return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
{
|
|
return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
{
|
|
return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
|
struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
{
|
|
return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.name = "ffdhe2048",
|
|
.create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.name = "ffdhe3072",
|
|
.create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.name = "ffdhe4096",
|
|
.create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.name = "ffdhe6144",
|
|
.create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.name = "ffdhe8192",
|
|
.create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
|
|
|
|
static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init dh_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __exit dh_exit(void)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
|
|
crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subsys_initcall(dh_init);
|
|
module_exit(dh_exit);
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");
|