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s/head/held Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> LKML-Reference: <4A7BD37E.9060806@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
224 lines
8.8 KiB
Plaintext
224 lines
8.8 KiB
Plaintext
Runtime locking correctness validator
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=====================================
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started by Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
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additions by Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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Lock-class
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----------
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The basic object the validator operates upon is a 'class' of locks.
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A class of locks is a group of locks that are logically the same with
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respect to locking rules, even if the locks may have multiple (possibly
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tens of thousands of) instantiations. For example a lock in the inode
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struct is one class, while each inode has its own instantiation of that
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lock class.
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The validator tracks the 'state' of lock-classes, and it tracks
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dependencies between different lock-classes. The validator maintains a
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rolling proof that the state and the dependencies are correct.
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Unlike an lock instantiation, the lock-class itself never goes away: when
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a lock-class is used for the first time after bootup it gets registered,
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and all subsequent uses of that lock-class will be attached to this
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lock-class.
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State
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-----
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The validator tracks lock-class usage history into 4n + 1 separate state bits:
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- 'ever held in STATE context'
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- 'ever held as readlock in STATE context'
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- 'ever held with STATE enabled'
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- 'ever held as readlock with STATE enabled'
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Where STATE can be either one of (kernel/lockdep_states.h)
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- hardirq
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- softirq
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- reclaim_fs
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- 'ever used' [ == !unused ]
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When locking rules are violated, these state bits are presented in the
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locking error messages, inside curlies. A contrived example:
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modprobe/2287 is trying to acquire lock:
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(&sio_locks[i].lock){-.-...}, at: [<c02867fd>] mutex_lock+0x21/0x24
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but task is already holding lock:
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(&sio_locks[i].lock){-.-...}, at: [<c02867fd>] mutex_lock+0x21/0x24
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The bit position indicates STATE, STATE-read, for each of the states listed
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above, and the character displayed in each indicates:
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'.' acquired while irqs disabled and not in irq context
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'-' acquired in irq context
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'+' acquired with irqs enabled
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'?' acquired in irq context with irqs enabled.
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Unused mutexes cannot be part of the cause of an error.
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Single-lock state rules:
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------------------------
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A softirq-unsafe lock-class is automatically hardirq-unsafe as well. The
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following states are exclusive, and only one of them is allowed to be
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set for any lock-class:
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<hardirq-safe> and <hardirq-unsafe>
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<softirq-safe> and <softirq-unsafe>
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The validator detects and reports lock usage that violate these
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single-lock state rules.
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Multi-lock dependency rules:
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----------------------------
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The same lock-class must not be acquired twice, because this could lead
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to lock recursion deadlocks.
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Furthermore, two locks may not be taken in different order:
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<L1> -> <L2>
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<L2> -> <L1>
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because this could lead to lock inversion deadlocks. (The validator
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finds such dependencies in arbitrary complexity, i.e. there can be any
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other locking sequence between the acquire-lock operations, the
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validator will still track all dependencies between locks.)
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Furthermore, the following usage based lock dependencies are not allowed
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between any two lock-classes:
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<hardirq-safe> -> <hardirq-unsafe>
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<softirq-safe> -> <softirq-unsafe>
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The first rule comes from the fact the a hardirq-safe lock could be
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taken by a hardirq context, interrupting a hardirq-unsafe lock - and
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thus could result in a lock inversion deadlock. Likewise, a softirq-safe
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lock could be taken by an softirq context, interrupting a softirq-unsafe
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lock.
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The above rules are enforced for any locking sequence that occurs in the
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kernel: when acquiring a new lock, the validator checks whether there is
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any rule violation between the new lock and any of the held locks.
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When a lock-class changes its state, the following aspects of the above
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dependency rules are enforced:
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- if a new hardirq-safe lock is discovered, we check whether it
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took any hardirq-unsafe lock in the past.
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- if a new softirq-safe lock is discovered, we check whether it took
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any softirq-unsafe lock in the past.
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- if a new hardirq-unsafe lock is discovered, we check whether any
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hardirq-safe lock took it in the past.
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- if a new softirq-unsafe lock is discovered, we check whether any
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softirq-safe lock took it in the past.
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(Again, we do these checks too on the basis that an interrupt context
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could interrupt _any_ of the irq-unsafe or hardirq-unsafe locks, which
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could lead to a lock inversion deadlock - even if that lock scenario did
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not trigger in practice yet.)
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Exception: Nested data dependencies leading to nested locking
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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There are a few cases where the Linux kernel acquires more than one
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instance of the same lock-class. Such cases typically happen when there
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is some sort of hierarchy within objects of the same type. In these
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cases there is an inherent "natural" ordering between the two objects
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(defined by the properties of the hierarchy), and the kernel grabs the
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locks in this fixed order on each of the objects.
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An example of such an object hierarchy that results in "nested locking"
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is that of a "whole disk" block-dev object and a "partition" block-dev
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object; the partition is "part of" the whole device and as long as one
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always takes the whole disk lock as a higher lock than the partition
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lock, the lock ordering is fully correct. The validator does not
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automatically detect this natural ordering, as the locking rule behind
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the ordering is not static.
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In order to teach the validator about this correct usage model, new
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versions of the various locking primitives were added that allow you to
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specify a "nesting level". An example call, for the block device mutex,
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looks like this:
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enum bdev_bd_mutex_lock_class
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{
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BD_MUTEX_NORMAL,
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BD_MUTEX_WHOLE,
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BD_MUTEX_PARTITION
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};
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mutex_lock_nested(&bdev->bd_contains->bd_mutex, BD_MUTEX_PARTITION);
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In this case the locking is done on a bdev object that is known to be a
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partition.
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The validator treats a lock that is taken in such a nested fashion as a
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separate (sub)class for the purposes of validation.
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Note: When changing code to use the _nested() primitives, be careful and
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check really thoroughly that the hierarchy is correctly mapped; otherwise
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you can get false positives or false negatives.
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Proof of 100% correctness:
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--------------------------
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The validator achieves perfect, mathematical 'closure' (proof of locking
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correctness) in the sense that for every simple, standalone single-task
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locking sequence that occurred at least once during the lifetime of the
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kernel, the validator proves it with a 100% certainty that no
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combination and timing of these locking sequences can cause any class of
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lock related deadlock. [*]
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I.e. complex multi-CPU and multi-task locking scenarios do not have to
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occur in practice to prove a deadlock: only the simple 'component'
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locking chains have to occur at least once (anytime, in any
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task/context) for the validator to be able to prove correctness. (For
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example, complex deadlocks that would normally need more than 3 CPUs and
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a very unlikely constellation of tasks, irq-contexts and timings to
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occur, can be detected on a plain, lightly loaded single-CPU system as
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well!)
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This radically decreases the complexity of locking related QA of the
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kernel: what has to be done during QA is to trigger as many "simple"
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single-task locking dependencies in the kernel as possible, at least
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once, to prove locking correctness - instead of having to trigger every
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possible combination of locking interaction between CPUs, combined with
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every possible hardirq and softirq nesting scenario (which is impossible
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to do in practice).
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[*] assuming that the validator itself is 100% correct, and no other
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part of the system corrupts the state of the validator in any way.
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We also assume that all NMI/SMM paths [which could interrupt
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even hardirq-disabled codepaths] are correct and do not interfere
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with the validator. We also assume that the 64-bit 'chain hash'
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value is unique for every lock-chain in the system. Also, lock
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recursion must not be higher than 20.
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Performance:
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------------
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The above rules require _massive_ amounts of runtime checking. If we did
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that for every lock taken and for every irqs-enable event, it would
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render the system practically unusably slow. The complexity of checking
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is O(N^2), so even with just a few hundred lock-classes we'd have to do
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tens of thousands of checks for every event.
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This problem is solved by checking any given 'locking scenario' (unique
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sequence of locks taken after each other) only once. A simple stack of
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held locks is maintained, and a lightweight 64-bit hash value is
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calculated, which hash is unique for every lock chain. The hash value,
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when the chain is validated for the first time, is then put into a hash
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table, which hash-table can be checked in a lockfree manner. If the
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locking chain occurs again later on, the hash table tells us that we
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dont have to validate the chain again.
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