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In Isolation VM, all shared memory with host needs to mark visible to host via hvcall. vmbus_establish_gpadl() has already done it for netvsc rx/tx ring buffer. The page buffer used by vmbus_sendpacket_ pagebuffer() stills need to be handled. Use DMA API to map/umap these memory during sending/receiving packet and Hyper-V swiotlb bounce buffer dma address will be returned. The swiotlb bounce buffer has been masked to be visible to host during boot up. rx/tx ring buffer is allocated via vzalloc() and they need to be mapped into unencrypted address space(above vTOM) before sharing with host and accessing. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap rx /tx ring buffer. Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211213071407.314309-6-ltykernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
318 lines
7.3 KiB
C
318 lines
7.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Hyper-V Isolation VM interface with paravisor and hypervisor
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*
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* Author:
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* Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/bitfield.h>
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#include <linux/hyperv.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <asm/svm.h>
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#include <asm/sev.h>
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
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#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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#define GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL 1
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union hv_ghcb {
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struct ghcb ghcb;
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struct {
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u64 hypercalldata[509];
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u64 outputgpa;
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union {
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union {
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struct {
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u32 callcode : 16;
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u32 isfast : 1;
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u32 reserved1 : 14;
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u32 isnested : 1;
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u32 countofelements : 12;
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u32 reserved2 : 4;
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u32 repstartindex : 12;
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u32 reserved3 : 4;
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};
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u64 asuint64;
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} hypercallinput;
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union {
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struct {
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u16 callstatus;
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u16 reserved1;
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u32 elementsprocessed : 12;
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u32 reserved2 : 20;
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};
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u64 asunit64;
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} hypercalloutput;
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};
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u64 reserved2;
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} hypercall;
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} __packed __aligned(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
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u64 hv_ghcb_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output, u32 input_size)
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{
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union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
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void **ghcb_base;
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unsigned long flags;
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u64 status;
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if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
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return -EFAULT;
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WARN_ON(in_nmi());
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local_irq_save(flags);
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ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
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hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
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if (!hv_ghcb) {
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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hv_ghcb->ghcb.protocol_version = GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX;
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hv_ghcb->ghcb.ghcb_usage = GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL;
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hv_ghcb->hypercall.outputgpa = (u64)output;
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hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercallinput.asuint64 = 0;
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hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercallinput.callcode = control;
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if (input_size)
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memcpy(hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercalldata, input, input_size);
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VMGEXIT();
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hv_ghcb->ghcb.ghcb_usage = 0xffffffff;
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memset(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.valid_bitmap, 0,
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sizeof(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.valid_bitmap));
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status = hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercalloutput.callstatus;
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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return status;
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}
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void hv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value)
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{
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union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
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void **ghcb_base;
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unsigned long flags;
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struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
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if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
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return;
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WARN_ON(in_nmi());
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local_irq_save(flags);
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ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
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hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
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if (!hv_ghcb) {
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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return;
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}
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ghcb_set_rcx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, msr);
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ghcb_set_rax(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, lower_32_bits(value));
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ghcb_set_rdx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, upper_32_bits(value));
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if (sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, false, &ctxt,
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SVM_EXIT_MSR, 1, 0))
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pr_warn("Fail to write msr via ghcb %llx.\n", msr);
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_ghcb_msr_write);
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void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)
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{
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union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
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void **ghcb_base;
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unsigned long flags;
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struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
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/* Check size of union hv_ghcb here. */
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union hv_ghcb) != HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
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if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
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return;
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WARN_ON(in_nmi());
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local_irq_save(flags);
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ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
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hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
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if (!hv_ghcb) {
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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return;
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}
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ghcb_set_rcx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, msr);
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if (sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, false, &ctxt,
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SVM_EXIT_MSR, 0, 0))
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pr_warn("Fail to read msr via ghcb %llx.\n", msr);
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else
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*value = (u64)lower_32_bits(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.rax)
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| ((u64)lower_32_bits(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.rdx) << 32);
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_ghcb_msr_read);
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#endif
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enum hv_isolation_type hv_get_isolation_type(void)
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{
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if (!(ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION))
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return HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE;
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return FIELD_GET(HV_ISOLATION_TYPE, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_get_isolation_type);
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/*
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* hv_is_isolation_supported - Check system runs in the Hyper-V
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* isolation VM.
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*/
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bool hv_is_isolation_supported(void)
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{
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
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return false;
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if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
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return false;
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return hv_get_isolation_type() != HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE;
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}
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DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(isolation_type_snp);
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/*
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* hv_isolation_type_snp - Check system runs in the AMD SEV-SNP based
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* isolation VM.
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*/
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bool hv_isolation_type_snp(void)
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{
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return static_branch_unlikely(&isolation_type_snp);
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}
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/*
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* hv_mark_gpa_visibility - Set pages visible to host via hvcall.
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*
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* In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
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* needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
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* with host.
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*/
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static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
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enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility)
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{
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struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **input_pcpu, *input;
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u16 pages_processed;
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u64 hv_status;
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unsigned long flags;
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/* no-op if partition isolation is not enabled */
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if (!hv_is_isolation_supported())
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return 0;
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if (count > HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT) {
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pr_err("Hyper-V: GPA count:%d exceeds supported:%lu\n", count,
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HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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local_irq_save(flags);
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input_pcpu = (struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **)
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this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
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input = *input_pcpu;
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if (unlikely(!input)) {
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
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input->host_visibility = visibility;
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input->reserved0 = 0;
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input->reserved1 = 0;
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memcpy((void *)input->gpa_page_list, pfn, count * sizeof(*pfn));
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hv_status = hv_do_rep_hypercall(
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HVCALL_MODIFY_SPARSE_GPA_PAGE_HOST_VISIBILITY, count,
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0, input, &pages_processed);
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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if (hv_result_success(hv_status))
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return 0;
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else
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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/*
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* hv_set_mem_host_visibility - Set specified memory visible to host.
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*
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* In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
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* needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
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* with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
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* with memory base and size.
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*/
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int hv_set_mem_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool visible)
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{
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enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = visible ?
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VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE : VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE;
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u64 *pfn_array;
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int ret = 0;
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int i, pfn;
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if (!hv_is_isolation_supported() || !hv_hypercall_pg)
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return 0;
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pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pfn_array)
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return -ENOMEM;
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for (i = 0, pfn = 0; i < pagecount; i++) {
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pfn_array[pfn] = virt_to_hvpfn((void *)kbuffer + i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
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pfn++;
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if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
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ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
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visibility);
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if (ret)
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goto err_free_pfn_array;
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pfn = 0;
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}
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}
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err_free_pfn_array:
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kfree(pfn_array);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* hv_map_memory - map memory to extra space in the AMD SEV-SNP Isolation VM.
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*/
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void *hv_map_memory(void *addr, unsigned long size)
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{
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unsigned long *pfns = kcalloc(size / PAGE_SIZE,
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sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
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void *vaddr;
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int i;
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if (!pfns)
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return NULL;
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for (i = 0; i < size / PAGE_SIZE; i++)
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pfns[i] = vmalloc_to_pfn(addr + i * PAGE_SIZE) +
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(ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary >> PAGE_SHIFT);
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vaddr = vmap_pfn(pfns, size / PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL_IO);
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kfree(pfns);
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return vaddr;
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}
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void hv_unmap_memory(void *addr)
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{
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vunmap(addr);
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}
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