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0b020f5af0
For SEV-ES to work with intra host migration the VMSAs, GHCB metadata, and other SEV-ES info needs to be preserved along with the guest's memory. Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Message-Id: <20211021174303.385706-4-pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2895 lines
71 KiB
C
2895 lines
71 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
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*
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* AMD SVM-SEV support
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*
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* Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
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*/
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#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
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#include <linux/processor.h>
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#include <linux/trace_events.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
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#include <asm/pkru.h>
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#include <asm/trapnr.h>
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#include "x86.h"
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#include "svm.h"
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#include "svm_ops.h"
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#include "cpuid.h"
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#include "trace.h"
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#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
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/*
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* When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
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* this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
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* module.
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*
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* We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
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* misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
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*
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* Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
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*/
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#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
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#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
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/* enable/disable SEV support */
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static bool sev_enabled = true;
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module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
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/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
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static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
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module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
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#else
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#define sev_enabled false
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#define sev_es_enabled false
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#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
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static u8 sev_enc_bit;
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
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unsigned int max_sev_asid;
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static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
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static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
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static unsigned int nr_asids;
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static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
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static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
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struct enc_region {
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struct list_head list;
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unsigned long npages;
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struct page **pages;
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unsigned long uaddr;
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unsigned long size;
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};
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/* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown */
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static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
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{
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int ret, asid, error = 0;
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/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
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asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid);
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if (asid > max_asid)
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return -EBUSY;
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/*
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* DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
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* so it must be guarded.
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*/
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down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
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ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
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up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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if (ret)
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pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
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return ret;
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}
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static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
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{
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return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
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}
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/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
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static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
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{
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if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
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return false;
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/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
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bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
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nr_asids);
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bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids);
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return true;
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}
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static int sev_misc_cg_try_charge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
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{
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enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
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return misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
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}
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static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
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{
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enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
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misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
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}
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static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
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{
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int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
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bool retry = true;
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WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
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sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
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ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev);
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if (ret) {
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put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
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sev->misc_cg = NULL;
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return ret;
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}
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mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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/*
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* SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
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* SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
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*/
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min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
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max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
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again:
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asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
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if (asid > max_asid) {
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if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
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retry = false;
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goto again;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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ret = -EBUSY;
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goto e_uncharge;
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}
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__set_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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return asid;
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e_uncharge:
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sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
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put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
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sev->misc_cg = NULL;
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return ret;
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}
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static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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return sev->asid;
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}
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static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
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{
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struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
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int cpu;
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mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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__set_bit(sev->asid, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
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for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
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sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
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sd->sev_vmcbs[sev->asid] = NULL;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
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sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
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put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
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sev->misc_cg = NULL;
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}
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static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
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{
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struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
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if (!handle)
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return;
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decommission.handle = handle;
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sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
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}
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static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
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{
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struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
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if (!handle)
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return;
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deactivate.handle = handle;
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/* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
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down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
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up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
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sev_decommission(handle);
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}
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static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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bool es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
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int asid, ret;
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if (kvm->created_vcpus)
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return -EINVAL;
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ret = -EBUSY;
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if (unlikely(sev->active))
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return ret;
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sev->es_active = es_active;
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asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
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if (asid < 0)
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goto e_no_asid;
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sev->asid = asid;
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ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
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if (ret)
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goto e_free;
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sev->active = true;
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sev->asid = asid;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
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return 0;
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e_free:
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sev_asid_free(sev);
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sev->asid = 0;
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e_no_asid:
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sev->es_active = false;
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return ret;
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}
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static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
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{
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struct sev_data_activate activate;
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int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
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int ret;
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/* activate ASID on the given handle */
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activate.handle = handle;
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activate.asid = asid;
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ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
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return ret;
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}
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static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
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{
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struct fd f;
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int ret;
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f = fdget(fd);
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if (!f.file)
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return -EBADF;
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ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
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fdput(f);
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return ret;
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}
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static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
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}
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static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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struct sev_data_launch_start start;
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struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
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void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
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int *error = &argp->error;
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int ret;
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if (!sev_guest(kvm))
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return -ENOTTY;
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if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
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return -EFAULT;
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memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
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dh_blob = NULL;
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if (params.dh_uaddr) {
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dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
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if (IS_ERR(dh_blob))
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return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
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start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
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start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
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}
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session_blob = NULL;
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if (params.session_uaddr) {
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session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
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if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
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goto e_free_dh;
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}
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start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
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start.session_len = params.session_len;
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}
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start.handle = params.handle;
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start.policy = params.policy;
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/* create memory encryption context */
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ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
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if (ret)
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goto e_free_session;
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/* Bind ASID to this guest */
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ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
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if (ret) {
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sev_decommission(start.handle);
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goto e_free_session;
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}
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/* return handle to userspace */
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params.handle = start.handle;
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if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
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sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
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ret = -EFAULT;
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goto e_free_session;
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}
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sev->handle = start.handle;
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sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
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e_free_session:
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kfree(session_blob);
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e_free_dh:
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kfree(dh_blob);
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return ret;
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}
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static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
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unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
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int write)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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unsigned long npages, size;
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int npinned;
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unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
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struct page **pages;
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unsigned long first, last;
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int ret;
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lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
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if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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/* Calculate number of pages. */
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first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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npages = (last - first + 1);
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locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
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lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
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pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
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size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
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if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
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pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
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else
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pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (!pages)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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/* Pin the user virtual address. */
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npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
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if (npinned != npages) {
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pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto err;
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}
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*n = npages;
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sev->pages_locked = locked;
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return pages;
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err:
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if (npinned > 0)
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unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
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kvfree(pages);
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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}
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static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
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unsigned long npages)
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{
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struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
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unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
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kvfree(pages);
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sev->pages_locked -= npages;
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}
|
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static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
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{
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uint8_t *page_virtual;
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unsigned long i;
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if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
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pages == NULL)
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return;
|
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for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
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page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
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clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
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kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
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}
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}
|
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|
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static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
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struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
|
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{
|
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unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
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unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
|
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|
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/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
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paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
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while (i < npages) {
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next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
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if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
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pages++;
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paddr = next_paddr;
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continue;
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}
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break;
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}
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return pages;
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}
|
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|
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static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
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{
|
|
unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
|
|
struct page **inpages;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
vaddr = params.uaddr;
|
|
size = params.len;
|
|
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the user memory. */
|
|
inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(inpages))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(inpages);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
|
|
* place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
|
|
|
|
data.reserved = 0;
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
|
|
int offset, len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
|
|
* within the page.
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
|
|
pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
|
|
|
|
len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
|
|
|
|
data.len = len;
|
|
data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_unpin;
|
|
|
|
size -= len;
|
|
next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e_unpin:
|
|
/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
|
|
set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
|
|
mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
/* unlock the user pages */
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
|
|
|
|
/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
|
|
if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (save->dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Sync registgers */
|
|
save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
|
|
save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
|
|
save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
|
|
save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
|
|
save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
|
|
save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
|
|
save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
|
|
save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
|
|
save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
|
|
save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
|
|
save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
|
|
save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
|
|
save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
|
|
save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
|
|
save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
|
|
#endif
|
|
save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
|
|
|
|
/* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
|
|
save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
|
|
save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
|
|
save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
|
|
save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
|
|
* the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
|
|
* traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
|
|
* for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(svm->sev_es.vmsa, save, sizeof(*save));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
int *error)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
|
|
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
|
|
ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
|
|
* the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
|
|
* with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
|
|
*/
|
|
clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
vmsa.reserved = 0;
|
|
vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
|
|
vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
|
|
vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
|
|
int i, ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
|
|
ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
|
|
void __user *p = NULL;
|
|
void *blob = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
|
|
/* User wants to query the blob length */
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto cmd;
|
|
|
|
p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
|
|
if (p) {
|
|
if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!blob)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
|
|
data.len = params.len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmd:
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free_blob;
|
|
|
|
if (blob) {
|
|
if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
params.len = data.len;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
e_free_blob:
|
|
kfree(blob);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
|
|
struct sev_data_guest_status data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
params.policy = data.policy;
|
|
params.state = data.state;
|
|
params.handle = data.handle;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
|
|
unsigned long dst, int size,
|
|
int *error, bool enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_dbg data;
|
|
|
|
data.reserved = 0;
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
data.dst_addr = dst;
|
|
data.src_addr = src;
|
|
data.len = size;
|
|
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
|
|
enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
|
|
&data, error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
|
|
{
|
|
int offset;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
|
|
* destination has enough space.
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = src_paddr & 15;
|
|
src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
|
|
sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
|
|
|
|
return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
|
|
void __user *dst_uaddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr,
|
|
int size, int *err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct page *tpage = NULL;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
|
|
!IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
|
|
tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!tpage)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
if (tpage) {
|
|
offset = paddr & 15;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
if (tpage)
|
|
__free_page(tpage);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
|
|
void __user *vaddr,
|
|
unsigned long dst_paddr,
|
|
void __user *dst_vaddr,
|
|
int size, int *error)
|
|
{
|
|
struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
|
|
struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
|
|
int ret, len = size;
|
|
|
|
/* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)vaddr, 16)) {
|
|
src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!src_tpage)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), vaddr, size)) {
|
|
__free_page(src_tpage);
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
|
|
* - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
|
|
* - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
|
|
* - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
|
|
int dst_offset;
|
|
|
|
dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!dst_tpage) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
|
|
* copy_from_user().
|
|
*/
|
|
dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
|
|
|
|
if (src_tpage)
|
|
memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
|
|
page_address(src_tpage), size);
|
|
else {
|
|
if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
|
|
vaddr, size)) {
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
|
|
dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
|
|
len = round_up(size, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
if (src_tpage)
|
|
__free_page(src_tpage);
|
|
if (dst_tpage)
|
|
__free_page(dst_tpage);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
|
|
unsigned long dst_vaddr;
|
|
struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
unsigned int size;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
|
|
size = debug.len;
|
|
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
|
|
dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
|
|
|
|
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
|
|
int len, s_off, d_off;
|
|
|
|
/* lock userspace source and destination page */
|
|
src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(src_p))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(src_p);
|
|
|
|
dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dst_p)) {
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
|
|
* the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
|
|
* see stale data.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
|
|
* offset within the page.
|
|
*/
|
|
s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
|
|
d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
|
|
len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
|
|
|
|
if (dec)
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
|
|
(void __user *)dst_vaddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
|
|
len, &argp->error);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
|
|
(void __user *)vaddr,
|
|
__sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
|
|
(void __user *)dst_vaddr,
|
|
len, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
|
|
dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
|
|
size -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
|
|
struct page **pages;
|
|
void *blob, *hdr;
|
|
unsigned long n, i;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pages))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(pages);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
|
|
* place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
|
|
* that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_unpin_memory;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
|
|
offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
|
|
data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
|
|
|
|
blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
|
|
goto e_unpin_memory;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
|
|
data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
|
|
|
|
hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
|
|
goto e_free_blob;
|
|
}
|
|
data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
|
|
data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
kfree(hdr);
|
|
|
|
e_free_blob:
|
|
kfree(blob);
|
|
e_unpin_memory:
|
|
/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
|
|
mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
|
|
void __user *p;
|
|
void *blob = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
|
|
/* User wants to query the blob length */
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto cmd;
|
|
|
|
p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
|
|
if (p) {
|
|
if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!blob)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
|
|
data.len = params.len;
|
|
memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
|
|
}
|
|
cmd:
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!params.len)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free_blob;
|
|
|
|
if (blob) {
|
|
if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
params.len = data.len;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(report, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
e_free_blob:
|
|
kfree(blob);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
|
|
static int
|
|
__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
|
|
struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_start data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
params->session_len = data.session_len;
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_start data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
|
|
void *amd_certs, *session_data;
|
|
void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
|
|
if (!params.session_len)
|
|
return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
|
|
¶ms);
|
|
|
|
/* some sanity checks */
|
|
if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
|
|
!params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
|
|
session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!session_data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
/* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
|
|
pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
|
|
params.pdh_cert_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
|
|
goto e_free_session;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
|
|
params.plat_certs_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
|
|
goto e_free_pdh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
|
|
params.amd_certs_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
|
|
goto e_free_plat_cert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
|
|
data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
|
|
data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
|
|
data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
|
|
data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
|
|
data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
|
|
data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
|
|
data.session_len = params.session_len;
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
|
|
session_data, params.session_len)) {
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
goto e_free_amd_cert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
params.policy = data.policy;
|
|
params.session_len = data.session_len;
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
e_free_amd_cert:
|
|
kfree(amd_certs);
|
|
e_free_plat_cert:
|
|
kfree(plat_certs);
|
|
e_free_pdh:
|
|
kfree(pdh_cert);
|
|
e_free_session:
|
|
kfree(session_data);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
|
|
static int
|
|
__sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
|
|
struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
|
|
params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
|
|
void *hdr, *trans_data;
|
|
struct page **guest_page;
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
|
|
if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
|
|
return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms);
|
|
|
|
if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
|
|
!params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
|
|
offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Pin guest memory */
|
|
guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
|
|
PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(guest_page))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(guest_page);
|
|
|
|
/* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!hdr)
|
|
goto e_unpin;
|
|
|
|
trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!trans_data)
|
|
goto e_free_hdr;
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
|
|
data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
|
|
data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
|
|
data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
|
|
|
|
/* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
|
|
data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
|
|
data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
|
|
data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free_trans_data;
|
|
|
|
/* copy transport buffer to user space */
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
|
|
trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
goto e_free_trans_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy packet header to userspace. */
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
|
|
params.hdr_len))
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
e_free_trans_data:
|
|
kfree(trans_data);
|
|
e_free_hdr:
|
|
kfree(hdr);
|
|
e_unpin:
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_finish data;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_receive_start start;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
|
|
int *error = &argp->error;
|
|
void *session_data;
|
|
void *pdh_data;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
/* Get parameter from the userspace */
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/* some sanity checks */
|
|
if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
|
|
!params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
|
|
|
|
session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
|
|
params.session_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
|
|
goto e_free_pdh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
|
|
start.handle = params.handle;
|
|
start.policy = params.policy;
|
|
start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
|
|
start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
|
|
start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
|
|
start.session_len = params.session_len;
|
|
|
|
/* create memory encryption context */
|
|
ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
|
|
error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto e_free_session;
|
|
|
|
/* Bind ASID to this guest */
|
|
ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
sev_decommission(start.handle);
|
|
goto e_free_session;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
params.handle = start.handle;
|
|
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
|
|
¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
|
|
goto e_free_session;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev->handle = start.handle;
|
|
sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
|
|
|
|
e_free_session:
|
|
kfree(session_data);
|
|
e_free_pdh:
|
|
kfree(pdh_data);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
|
|
struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
|
|
void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
|
|
struct page **guest_page;
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
int ret, offset;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
|
|
sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
|
|
!params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
|
|
!params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
|
|
offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
|
|
if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(hdr))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(hdr);
|
|
|
|
trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
|
|
goto e_free_hdr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
|
data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
|
|
data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
|
|
data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
|
|
data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Pin guest memory */
|
|
guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
|
|
PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page);
|
|
goto e_free_trans;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
|
|
data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
|
|
data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
|
|
data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
|
|
&argp->error);
|
|
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
|
|
|
|
e_free_trans:
|
|
kfree(trans);
|
|
e_free_hdr:
|
|
kfree(hdr);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
data.handle = sev->handle;
|
|
return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool cmd_allowed_from_miror(u32 cmd_id)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES
|
|
* active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ||
|
|
cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT ||
|
|
cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_lock_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Bail if this VM is already involved in a migration to avoid deadlock
|
|
* between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
|
|
return -EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_unlock_after_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
atomic_set_release(&sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
|
|
if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
|
|
if (i == j)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
|
|
}
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm_sev_info *dst,
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *src)
|
|
{
|
|
dst->active = true;
|
|
dst->asid = src->asid;
|
|
dst->handle = src->handle;
|
|
dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
|
|
|
|
src->asid = 0;
|
|
src->active = false;
|
|
src->handle = 0;
|
|
src->pages_locked = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (dst->misc_cg != src->misc_cg)
|
|
sev_misc_cg_uncharge(src);
|
|
|
|
put_misc_cg(src->misc_cg);
|
|
src->misc_cg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dst->regions_list);
|
|
list_replace_init(&src->regions_list, &dst->regions_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_es_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, *src_vcpu;
|
|
struct vcpu_svm *dst_svm, *src_svm;
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
|
|
if (!src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
|
|
src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
|
|
dst_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(dst, i);
|
|
dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination. Nullify and
|
|
* clear source fields as appropriate, the state now belongs to
|
|
* the destination.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(&dst_svm->sev_es, &src_svm->sev_es, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
|
|
dst_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
|
|
dst_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
|
|
dst_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
|
|
|
|
memset(&src_svm->sev_es, 0, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
|
|
src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
|
|
src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
|
|
src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = false;
|
|
}
|
|
to_kvm_svm(src)->sev_info.es_active = false;
|
|
to_kvm_svm(dst)->sev_info.es_active = true;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_vm_migrate_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev;
|
|
struct file *source_kvm_file;
|
|
struct kvm *source_kvm;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_lock_for_migration(kvm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
if (sev_guest(kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
|
|
if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
|
|
ret = -EBADF;
|
|
goto out_fput;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
|
|
ret = sev_lock_for_migration(source_kvm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_fput;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out_source;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
dst_sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
|
|
if (dst_sev->misc_cg != src_sev->misc_cg) {
|
|
ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(dst_sev);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_dst_put_cgroup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_dst_cgroup;
|
|
ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_dst_vcpu;
|
|
|
|
if (sev_es_guest(source_kvm)) {
|
|
ret = sev_es_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out_source_vcpu;
|
|
}
|
|
sev_migrate_from(dst_sev, src_sev);
|
|
kvm_vm_dead(source_kvm);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
out_source_vcpu:
|
|
sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
|
|
out_dst_vcpu:
|
|
sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
|
|
out_dst_cgroup:
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
sev_misc_cg_uncharge(dst_sev);
|
|
out_dst_put_cgroup:
|
|
put_misc_cg(dst_sev->misc_cg);
|
|
dst_sev->misc_cg = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
out_source:
|
|
sev_unlock_after_migration(source_kvm);
|
|
out_fput:
|
|
if (source_kvm_file)
|
|
fput(source_kvm_file);
|
|
out_unlock:
|
|
sev_unlock_after_migration(kvm);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_enabled)
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
if (!argp)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
/* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */
|
|
if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) &&
|
|
!cmd_allowed_from_miror(sev_cmd.id)) {
|
|
r = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (sev_cmd.id) {
|
|
case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
|
|
if (!sev_es_enabled) {
|
|
r = -ENOTTY;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_INIT:
|
|
r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
|
|
r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
|
|
r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
|
|
r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
|
|
r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
|
|
r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
|
|
r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
|
|
r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
|
|
r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
|
|
r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
|
|
r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
|
|
r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
|
|
r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
|
|
r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
|
|
r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
|
|
r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
|
|
r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
|
|
r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
r = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
|
|
r = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct enc_region *region;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return -ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
/* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
|
|
if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!region)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
region->uaddr = range->addr;
|
|
region->size = range->size;
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
|
|
* or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
|
|
* flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
|
|
* correct C-bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
kfree(region);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct enc_region *
|
|
find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
|
|
struct enc_region *i;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
|
|
if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
|
|
i->size == range->size)
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct enc_region *region)
|
|
{
|
|
sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
|
|
list_del(®ion->list);
|
|
kfree(region);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
|
|
struct kvm_enc_region *range)
|
|
{
|
|
struct enc_region *region;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
|
|
if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -ENOTTY;
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
|
|
if (!region) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
|
|
* releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
|
|
* not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
|
|
*/
|
|
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
|
|
|
|
__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
failed:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *source_kvm_file;
|
|
struct kvm *source_kvm;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info source_sev, *mirror_sev;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
|
|
if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
|
|
ret = -EBADF;
|
|
goto e_source_put;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
|
|
mutex_lock(&source_kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_source_unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly */
|
|
if (is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || source_kvm == kvm) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_source_unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&source_sev, &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info,
|
|
sizeof(source_sev));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
|
|
* disappear until we're done with it
|
|
*/
|
|
kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
|
|
|
|
fput(source_kvm_file);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (sev_guest(kvm)) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto e_mirror_unlock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
|
|
mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
|
|
mirror_sev->active = true;
|
|
mirror_sev->asid = source_sev.asid;
|
|
mirror_sev->fd = source_sev.fd;
|
|
mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev.es_active;
|
|
mirror_sev->handle = source_sev.handle;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same
|
|
* KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different
|
|
* memory-views.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
e_mirror_unlock:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
kvm_put_kvm(source_kvm);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
e_source_unlock:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&source_kvm->lock);
|
|
e_source_put:
|
|
if (source_kvm_file)
|
|
fput(source_kvm_file);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
|
|
struct list_head *pos, *q;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
|
|
if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
|
|
kvm_put_kvm(sev->enc_context_owner);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
|
|
* releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
|
|
* not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
|
|
*/
|
|
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
|
|
* then lets unpin all the registered memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!list_empty(head)) {
|
|
list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
|
|
__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
|
|
list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
|
|
|
|
sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
|
|
sev_asid_free(sev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sev_enabled)
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
|
|
if (!sev_es_enabled)
|
|
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
|
|
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
|
|
bool sev_es_supported = false;
|
|
bool sev_supported = false;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Does the CPU support SEV? */
|
|
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
|
|
cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
|
|
|
|
/* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
|
|
sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
|
|
max_sev_asid = ecx;
|
|
if (!max_sev_asid)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
|
|
min_sev_asid = edx;
|
|
sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps. Allocate space for ASID 0 in the bitmap,
|
|
* even though it's never used, so that the bitmap is indexed by the
|
|
* actual ASID.
|
|
*/
|
|
nr_asids = max_sev_asid + 1;
|
|
sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
|
|
bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
|
|
sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
|
|
if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pr_info("SEV supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_asid_count);
|
|
sev_supported = true;
|
|
|
|
/* SEV-ES support requested? */
|
|
if (!sev_es_enabled)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
|
|
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
|
|
if (min_sev_asid == 1)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
|
|
if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count);
|
|
sev_es_supported = true;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
sev_enabled = sev_supported;
|
|
sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sev_enabled)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */
|
|
sev_flush_asids(1, max_sev_asid);
|
|
|
|
bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
|
|
bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
|
|
|
|
misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
|
|
misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sev_enabled)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(nr_asids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
|
|
* returning them to the system.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void sev_flush_guest_memory(struct vcpu_svm *svm, void *va,
|
|
unsigned long len)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If hardware enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
|
|
* same physical page is supported, nothing to do.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the VM Page Flush MSR is supported, use it to flush the page
|
|
* (using the page virtual address and the guest ASID).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH)) {
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
|
|
unsigned long va_start;
|
|
u64 start, stop;
|
|
|
|
/* Align start and stop to page boundaries. */
|
|
va_start = (unsigned long)va;
|
|
start = (u64)va_start & PAGE_MASK;
|
|
stop = PAGE_ALIGN((u64)va_start + len);
|
|
|
|
if (start < stop) {
|
|
sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
|
|
while (start < stop) {
|
|
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH,
|
|
start | sev->asid);
|
|
|
|
start += PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WARN(1, "Address overflow, using WBINVD\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hardware should always have one of the above features,
|
|
* but if not, use WBINVD and issue a warning.
|
|
*/
|
|
WARN_ONCE(1, "Using WBINVD to flush guest memory\n");
|
|
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vcpu_svm *svm;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
svm = to_svm(vcpu);
|
|
|
|
if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
|
|
sev_flush_guest_memory(svm, svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
|
|
|
|
if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
|
|
kfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
unsigned int nbits;
|
|
|
|
/* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
|
|
if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
|
|
|
|
pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
|
|
pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
|
|
ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
|
|
pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
|
|
ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
|
|
pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
|
|
ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
|
|
pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
|
|
ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
|
|
pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
|
|
* to be returned:
|
|
* GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
|
|
*
|
|
* Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
|
|
* VM-Exit. It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
|
|
*/
|
|
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
|
|
ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
|
|
ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
|
|
ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
u64 exit_code;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
|
|
* to be supplied:
|
|
* GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
|
|
* XCR0
|
|
* CPL
|
|
*
|
|
* VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
|
|
* expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
|
|
*
|
|
* Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
|
|
*/
|
|
memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
|
|
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
|
|
svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
|
|
|
|
if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
|
|
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
|
|
kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
|
|
exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
|
|
control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
|
|
control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
|
|
control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
|
|
control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the valid entries fields */
|
|
memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb;
|
|
u64 exit_code = 0;
|
|
|
|
ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
|
|
/* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
|
|
if (ghcb->ghcb_usage)
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Retrieve the exit code now even though is may not be marked valid
|
|
* as it could help with debugging.
|
|
*/
|
|
exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
|
|
|
|
if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
|
|
switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
|
|
if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
|
|
if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
|
|
if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
|
|
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
|
|
!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
|
|
if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
goto vmgexit_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
vmgexit_err:
|
|
vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
|
|
|
|
if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
|
|
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
|
|
ghcb->ghcb_usage);
|
|
} else {
|
|
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit reason %#llx is not valid\n",
|
|
exit_code);
|
|
dump_ghcb(svm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
|
|
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
|
|
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
|
|
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
|
|
* buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
|
|
* need to be synced, then freed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
|
|
kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
|
|
ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->sev_es.ghcb),
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
|
|
|
|
sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
|
|
|
|
kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
|
|
{
|
|
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
|
|
int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
|
|
|
|
/* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
|
|
svm->asid = asid;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush guest TLB:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
|
|
* 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
|
|
svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
|
|
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
static bool setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
|
|
u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
|
|
void *scratch_va;
|
|
|
|
scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
|
|
if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
|
|
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
|
|
if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
|
|
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
|
|
len, scratch_gpa_beg);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
|
|
/* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
|
|
ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
|
|
offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
|
|
ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
|
|
offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
|
|
* completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
|
|
scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
|
|
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
|
|
scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
|
|
scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
|
|
* limit the size
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
|
|
pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
|
|
len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
scratch_va = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
|
if (!scratch_va)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
|
|
/* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
|
|
pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
|
|
|
|
kfree(scratch_va);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
|
|
* dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
|
|
* the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
|
|
* must be written back to the guest memory).
|
|
*/
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
|
|
unsigned int pos)
|
|
{
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
|
|
{
|
|
return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
|
|
{
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
|
|
u64 ghcb_info;
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
|
|
control->ghcb_gpa);
|
|
|
|
switch (ghcb_info) {
|
|
case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
|
|
set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
|
|
GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
|
|
sev_enc_bit));
|
|
break;
|
|
case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
|
|
u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
|
|
|
|
cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
|
|
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
|
|
if (cpuid_reg == 0)
|
|
cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
|
|
else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
|
|
cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
|
|
else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
|
|
cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
|
|
else
|
|
cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
|
|
|
|
set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
|
|
|
|
set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_INFO_POS);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
|
|
u64 reason_set, reason_code;
|
|
|
|
reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
|
|
reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
|
|
GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
|
|
pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
|
|
reason_set, reason_code);
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
|
|
control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
|
|
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
|
|
u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
|
|
struct ghcb *ghcb;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Validate the GHCB */
|
|
ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
|
|
if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
|
|
return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
|
|
|
|
if (!ghcb_gpa) {
|
|
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map)) {
|
|
/* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
|
|
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
|
|
ghcb_gpa);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
|
|
ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
|
|
|
|
exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
switch (exit_code) {
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
|
|
if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2))
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
|
|
control->exit_info_1,
|
|
control->exit_info_2,
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
|
|
if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2))
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
|
|
control->exit_info_1,
|
|
control->exit_info_2,
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
|
|
ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
|
|
ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
|
|
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
|
|
|
|
switch (control->exit_info_1) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
/* Set AP jump table address */
|
|
sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
/* Get AP jump table address */
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
|
|
control->exit_info_1);
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 1);
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb,
|
|
X86_TRAP_UD |
|
|
SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
|
|
SVM_EVTINJ_VALID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
|
|
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
|
|
"vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
|
|
control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
|
|
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len / size, in);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
|
|
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
|
|
* VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
|
|
* address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
|
|
*/
|
|
svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
|
|
|
|
/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
|
|
|
|
/* Track EFER/CR register changes */
|
|
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
|
|
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
|
|
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
|
|
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
/* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
|
|
clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
|
|
|
|
/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
|
|
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
|
|
|
|
/* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
|
|
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
|
|
* vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
|
|
GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
|
|
sev_enc_bit));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu)
|
|
{
|
|
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
|
|
struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
|
|
* of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. Since hardware does not
|
|
* perform a VMSAVE on VMRUN, the host savearea must be updated.
|
|
*/
|
|
vmsave(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
|
|
|
|
/* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
|
|
hostsa = (struct vmcb_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
|
|
hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
|
|
|
|
/* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
|
|
hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
|
|
|
|
/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
|
|
hostsa->xss = host_xss;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
|
|
|
|
/* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
|
|
if (!svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi) {
|
|
svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi = true;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
|
|
* the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
|
|
* non-zero value.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
|
|
}
|