This reverts commit 2f36db7100.
It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
This prevents users from triggering a stack overflow through a recursive
invocation of pagefault handling that involves mapping procfs files into
virtual memory.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since we will be removing items off the list using list_del() we need
to use a safer version of the list_for_each_entry() macro aptly named
list_for_each_entry_safe(). We should use the safe macro if the loop
involves deletions of items.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
[tyhicks: Fixed compiler err - missing list_for_each_entry_safe() param]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails,
eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged
retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a
read/write open will still be unsuccessful.
The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to
be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being
O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the
open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second
failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to
determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged
kthread.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and
multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The
lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first
lookup through the lifetime of the inode.
This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds
reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not
currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such
as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is
opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the
term persistent file are changed to lower file.
Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file
and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs
the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it.
This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3
client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs
inode is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Some ecryptfs init functions are not prefixed by __init and thus not
freed after initialization. This patch saved about 1kB in ecryptfs
module.
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file
read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged
eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write. Instead, only try an
unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.
This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only
mount.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the
lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened
read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep
from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the
lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;
this patch implements this functionality.
This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs
file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with
the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to
both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up
calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
