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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like
security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the
cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system
are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible
LSM audit users.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop().
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing.
Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead
of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to
reflect the change.
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Patch series "remove PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM" v3.
This patch (of 2):
bch2_new_inode relies on PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM to try to allocate a new
inode to achieve GFP_NOWAIT semantic while holding locks. If this
allocation fails it will drop locks and use GFP_NOFS allocation context.
We would like to drop PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM because it is really
dangerous to use if the caller doesn't control the full call chain with
this flag set. E.g. if any of the function down the chain needed
GFP_NOFAIL request the PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM would override this and
cause unexpected failure.
While this is not the case in this particular case using the scoped gfp
semantic is not really needed bacause we can easily pus the allocation
context down the chain without too much clutter.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix kerneldoc warnings]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # For vfs changes
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...)
security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook
bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions
bpf: trivial conversions for fdget()
bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...)
bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list
bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
There is no reason why struct path pointer shouldn't be const-qualified
when being passed into bpf_token_create() LSM hook. Add that const.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM/SELinux)
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Highlight that the file_set_fowner hook is now called with a lock held.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Because these are equals to MAX_LSM_COUNT. Also, we can avoid dynamic
memory allocation for ordered_lsms because MAX_LSM_COUNT is a constant.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
is especially bad in kernel hot paths:
security_file_ioctl:
0xff...0320 <+0>: endbr64
0xff...0324 <+4>: push %rbp
0xff...0325 <+5>: push %r15
0xff...0327 <+7>: push %r14
0xff...0329 <+9>: push %rbx
0xff...032a <+10>: mov %rdx,%rbx
0xff...032d <+13>: mov %esi,%ebp
0xff...032f <+15>: mov %rdi,%r14
0xff...0332 <+18>: mov $0xff...7030,%r15
0xff...0339 <+25>: mov (%r15),%r15
0xff...033c <+28>: test %r15,%r15
0xff...033f <+31>: je 0xff...0358 <security_file_ioctl+56>
0xff...0341 <+33>: mov 0x18(%r15),%r11
0xff...0345 <+37>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0348 <+40>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...034a <+42>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...034d <+45>: call 0xff...2e0 <__x86_indirect_thunk_array+352>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Indirect calls that use retpolines leading to overhead, not just due
to extra instruction but also branch misses.
0xff...0352 <+50>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0354 <+52>: je 0xff...0339 <security_file_ioctl+25>
0xff...0356 <+54>: jmp 0xff...035a <security_file_ioctl+58>
0xff...0358 <+56>: xor %eax,%eax
0xff...035a <+58>: pop %rbx
0xff...035b <+59>: pop %r14
0xff...035d <+61>: pop %r15
0xff...035f <+63>: pop %rbp
0xff...0360 <+64>: jmp 0xff...47c4 <__x86_return_thunk>
The indirect calls are not really needed as one knows the addresses of
enabled LSM callbacks at boot time and only the order can possibly
change at boot time with the lsm= kernel command line parameter.
An array of static calls is defined per LSM hook and the static calls
are updated at boot time once the order has been determined.
With the hook now exposed as a static call, one can see that the
retpolines are no longer there and the LSM callbacks are invoked
directly:
security_file_ioctl:
0xff...0ca0 <+0>: endbr64
0xff...0ca4 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xff...0ca9 <+9>: push %rbp
0xff...0caa <+10>: push %r14
0xff...0cac <+12>: push %rbx
0xff...0cad <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx
0xff...0cb0 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp
0xff...0cb2 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14
0xff...0cb5 <+21>: jmp 0xff...0cc7 <security_file_ioctl+39>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for SELinux
0xffffffff818f0cb7 <+23>: jmp 0xff...0cde <security_file_ioctl+62>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for BPF LSM. This is something that is changed to
default to false to avoid the existing side effect issues of BPF LSM
[1] in a subsequent patch.
0xff...0cb9 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax
0xff...0cbb <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xff...0cbd <+29>: pop %rbx
0xff...0cbe <+30>: pop %r14
0xff...0cc0 <+32>: pop %rbp
0xff...0cc1 <+33>: cs jmp 0xff...0000 <__x86_return_thunk>
0xff...0cc7 <+39>: endbr64
0xff...0ccb <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0cce <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0cd0 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0cd3 <+51>: call 0xff...3230 <selinux_file_ioctl>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to SELinux.
0xff...0cd8 <+56>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0cda <+58>: jne 0xff...0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xff...0cdc <+60>: jmp 0xff...0cb7 <security_file_ioctl+23>
0xff...0cde <+62>: endbr64
0xff...0ce2 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0ce5 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0ce7 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0cea <+74>: call 0xff...e220 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to BPF LSM.
0xff...0cef <+79>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0cf1 <+81>: jne 0xff...0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xff...0cf3 <+83>: jmp 0xff...0cb9 <security_file_ioctl+25>
0xff...0cf5 <+85>: endbr64
0xff...0cf9 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0cfc <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0cfe <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0d01 <+97>: pop %rbx
0xff...0d02 <+98>: pop %r14
0xff...0d04 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xff...0d05 <+101>: ret
0xff...0d06 <+102>: int3
0xff...0d07 <+103>: int3
0xff...0d08 <+104>: int3
0xff...0d09 <+105>: int3
While this patch uses static_branch_unlikely indicating that an LSM hook
is likely to be not present. In most cases this is still a better choice
as even when an LSM with one hook is added, empty slots are created for
all LSM hooks (especially when many LSMs that do not initialize most
hooks are present on the system).
There are some hooks that don't use the call_int_hook or
call_void_hook. These hooks are updated to use a new macro called
lsm_for_each_hook where the lsm_callback is directly invoked as an
indirect call.
Below are results of the relevant Unixbench system benchmarks with BPF LSM
and SELinux enabled with default policies enabled with and without these
patches.
Benchmark Delta(%): (+ is better)
==========================================================================
Execl Throughput +1.9356
File Write 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks +6.5953
Pipe Throughput +9.5499
Pipe-based Context Switching +3.0209
Process Creation +2.3246
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) +1.4975
System Call Overhead +2.7815
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only): +3.4859
In the best case, some syscalls like eventfd_create benefitted to about
~10%.
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity
volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all
signed and validated dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature".
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed some line length issues in the comments]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.
Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.
The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The LSM framework has an existing inode_free_security() hook which
is used by LSMs that manage state associated with an inode, but
due to the use of RCU to protect the inode, special care must be
taken to ensure that the LSMs do not fully release the inode state
until it is safe from a RCU perspective.
This patch implements a new inode_free_security_rcu() implementation
hook which is called when it is safe to free the LSM's internal inode
state. Unfortunately, this new hook does not have access to the inode
itself as it may already be released, so the existing
inode_free_security() hook is retained for those LSMs which require
access to the inode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000076ba3b0617f65cc8@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Some cleanup and style corrections for lsm_hooks.h.
* Drop the lsm_inode_alloc() extern declaration, it is not needed.
* Relocate lsm_get_xattr_slot() and extern variables in the file to
improve grouping of related objects.
* Don't use tabs to needlessly align structure fields.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.
Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
other negative error code otherwise.
After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
any other negative error code otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code.
Before:
- Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1.
After:
- Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative
error code if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the perf_event->security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of
allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the
infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated
there. There are no longer any modules that require the perf_event_free()
hook. The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the infiniband security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure. The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the ib_free() hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the dev_tun security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure. The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the dev_tun_free hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Create a helper function lsm_blob_alloc() for general use in the hook
specific functions that allocate LSM blobs. Change the hook specific
functions to use this helper. This reduces the code size by a small
amount and will make adding new instances of infrastructure managed
security blobs easier.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the
blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how
much space is required, and the space is allocated there. There are
no existing modules that require a key_free hook, so the call to it and
the definition for it have been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240715' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Two LSM patches focused on cleaning up the inode xattr capability
handling"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240715' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
selinux,smack: remove the capability checks in the removexattr hooks
lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling
The current security_inode_setxattr() and security_inode_removexattr()
hooks rely on individual LSMs to either call into the associated
capability hooks (cap_inode_setxattr() or cap_inode_removexattr()), or
return a magic value of 1 to indicate that the LSM layer itself should
perform the capability checks. Unfortunately, with the default return
value for these LSM hooks being 0, an individual LSM hook returning a
1 will cause the LSM hook processing to exit early, potentially
skipping a LSM. Thankfully, with the exception of the BPF LSM, none
of the LSMs which currently register inode xattr hooks should end up
returning a value of 1, and in the BPF LSM case, with the BPF LSM hooks
executing last there should be no real harm in stopping processing of
the LSM hooks. However, the reliance on the individual LSMs to either
call the capability hooks themselves, or signal the LSM with a return
value of 1, is fragile and relies on a specific set of LSMs being
enabled. This patch is an effort to resolve, or minimize, these
issues.
Before we discuss the solution, there are a few observations and
considerations that we need to take into account:
* BPF LSM registers an implementation for every LSM hook, and that
implementation simply returns the hook's default return value, a
0 in this case. We want to ensure that the default BPF LSM behavior
results in the capability checks being called.
* SELinux and Smack do not expect the traditional capability checks
to be applied to the xattrs that they "own".
* SELinux and Smack are currently written in such a way that the
xattr capability checks happen before any additional LSM specific
access control checks. SELinux does apply SELinux specific access
controls to all xattrs, even those not "owned" by SELinux.
* IMA and EVM also register xattr hooks but assume that the LSM layer
and specific LSMs have already authorized the basic xattr operation.
In order to ensure we perform the capability based access controls
before the individual LSM access controls, perform only one capability
access control check for each operation, and clarify the logic around
applying the capability controls, we need a mechanism to determine if
any of the enabled LSMs "own" a particular xattr and want to take
responsibility for controlling access to that xattr. The solution in
this patch is to create a new LSM hook, 'inode_xattr_skipcap', that is
not exported to the rest of the kernel via a security_XXX() function,
but is used by the LSM layer to determine if a LSM wants to control
access to a given xattr and avoid the traditional capability controls.
Registering an inode_xattr_skipcap hook is optional, if a LSM declines
to register an implementation, or uses an implementation that simply
returns the default value (0), there is no effect as the LSM continues
to enforce the capability based controls (unless another LSM takes
ownership of the xattr). If none of the LSMs signal that the
capability checks should be skipped, the capability check is performed
and if access is granted the individual LSM xattr access control hooks
are executed, keeping with the DAC-before-LSM convention.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer
granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr
hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as
well.
Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM,SELinux)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 08abce60d6 ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call
to ima_post_path_mknod().
For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was
called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather
than only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call.
However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does
not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for
example, not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount).
If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when
security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to
the dentry is private.
Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was,
which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only
in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files.
Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: 08abce60d6 ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Passing a NULL buffer into the lsm_get_self_attr() syscall is a valid
way to quickly determine the minimum size of the buffer needed to for
the syscall to return all of the LSM attributes to the caller.
Unfortunately we/I broke that behavior in commit d7cf3412a9
("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()")
such that it returned an error to the caller; this patch restores the
original desired behavior of using the NULL buffer as a quick way to
correctly size the attribute buffer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d7cf3412a9 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a119808 ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec2 ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM
This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes
in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was
important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs,
complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the
only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM.
However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports
multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by
bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is
something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto
was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen.
- Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro
Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a
default return value, despite a default value being specified when
the LSM hook was defined.
This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value
which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number
of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently,
hence this work).
- Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create()
The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when
possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's
use it.
- Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks
Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in
the LSM hook comment blocks.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits)
cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create()
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers
integrity: Remove LSM
ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
security: Introduce file_release hook
security: Introduce file_post_open hook
security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
...
Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...)
as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro,
also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...).
After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar
logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing
call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still
a net simplification.
There should be no functional change resulting from this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c
where "Check is" should be "Check if".
Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since now IMA and EVM use their own integrity metadata, it is safe to
remove the 'integrity' LSM, with its management of integrity metadata.
Keep the iint.c file only for loading IMA and EVM keys at boot, and for
creating the integrity directory in securityfs (we need to keep it for
retrocompatibility reasons).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).
Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.
Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).
Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.
Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().
Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.
Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.
Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A few additional IMA hooks are needed to reset the cached appraisal
status, causing the file's integrity to be re-evaluated on next access.
Register these IMA-appraisal only functions separately from the rest of IMA
functions, as appraisal is a separate feature not necessarily enabled in
the kernel configuration.
Reuse the same approach as for other IMA functions, move hardcoded calls
from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure. Declare the
functions as static and register them as hook implementations in
init_ima_appraise_lsm(), called by init_ima_lsm().
Also move the inline function ima_inode_remove_acl() from the public ima.h
header to ima_appraise.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
'integrity').
Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
hardcoded.
Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook
path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always
executed to mark files as new, as before the move.
A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register
ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain
better what the problem is.
Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
LSM infrastructure).
Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
commit e2861fa716 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
unavailable").
EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the key_post_create_or_update hook.
Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update,
so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation
or update.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_remove_acl hook.
At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.
At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
xattr.
LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
canceled.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the path_post_mknod hook.
IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.
LSMs could also take some action after files are created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
