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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Six audit patches for v6.1, most are pretty trivial, but a quick list
of the highlights are below:
- Only free the audit proctitle information on task exit. This allows
us to cache the information and improve performance slightly.
- Use the time_after() macro to do time comparisons instead of doing
it directly and potentially causing ourselves problems when the
timer wraps.
- Convert an audit_context state comparison from a relative enum
comparison, e.g. (x < y), to a not-equal comparison to ensure that
we are not caught out at some unknown point in the future by an
enum shuffle.
- A handful of small cleanups such as tidying up comments and
removing unused declarations"
* tag 'audit-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove selinux_audit_rule_update() declaration
audit: use time_after to compare time
audit: free audit_proctitle only on task exit
audit: explicitly check audit_context->context enum value
audit: audit_context pid unused, context enum comment fix
audit: fix repeated words in comments
Since audit_proctitle is generated at syscall exit time, its value is
used immediately and cached for the next syscall. Since this is the
case, then only clear it at task exit time. Otherwise, there is no
point in caching the value OR bearing the overhead of regenerating it.
Fixes: 12c5e81d3f ("audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Be explicit in checking the struct audit_context "context" member enum
value rather than assuming the order of context enum values.
Fixes: 12c5e81d3f ("audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The pid member of struct audit_context is never used. Remove it.
The audit_reset_context() comment about unconditionally resetting
"ctx->state" should read "ctx->context".
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The success and return_code are needed by the filters. Move
audit_return_fixup() before the filters. This was causing syscall
auditing events to be missed.
Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/138
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12c5e81d3f ("audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: manual merge required]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Delete the redundant word 'doesn't'.
Signed-off-by: Jilin Yuan <yuanjilin@cdjrlc.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reset the type of the record last as the helper `audit_free_module()`
depends on it.
unreferenced object 0xffff888153b707f0 (size 16):
comm "modprobe", pid 1319, jiffies 4295110033 (age 1083.016s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
62 69 6e 66 6d 74 5f 6d 69 73 63 00 6b 6b 6b a5 binfmt_misc.kkk.
backtrace:
[<ffffffffa07dbf9b>] kstrdup+0x2b/0x50
[<ffffffffa04b0a9d>] __audit_log_kern_module+0x4d/0xf0
[<ffffffffa03b6664>] load_module+0x9d4/0x2e10
[<ffffffffa03b8f44>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x114/0x1b0
[<ffffffffa1f47124>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
[<ffffffffa200007e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12c5e81d3f ("audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Not calling the function for dummy contexts will cause the context to
not be reset. During the next syscall, this will cause an error in
__audit_syscall_entry:
WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
WARN_ON(context->name_count);
if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
return;
}
These problematic dummy contexts are created via the following call
chain:
exit_to_user_mode_prepare
-> arch_do_signal_or_restart
-> get_signal
-> task_work_run
-> tctx_task_work
-> io_req_task_submit
-> io_issue_sqe
-> audit_uring_entry
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5bd2182d58 ("audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring")
Signed-off-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit update from Paul Moore:
"Just one audit patch queued for v5.18:
- Change the AUDIT_TIME_* record generation so that they are
generated at syscall exit time and subject to all of the normal
syscall exit filtering.
This should help reduce noise and ensure those records which are
most relevant to the admin's audit configuration are recorded in
the audit log"
* tag 'audit-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: log AUDIT_TIME_* records only from rules
AUDIT_TIME_* events are generated when there are syscall rules present
that are not related to time keeping. This will produce noisy log
entries that could flood the logs and hide events we really care about.
Rather than immediately produce the AUDIT_TIME_* records, store the data
in the context and log it at syscall exit time respecting the filter
rules.
Note: This eats the audit_buffer, unlike any others in show_special().
Please see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1991919
Fixes: 7e8eda734d ("ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment")
Fixes: 2d87a0674b ("timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed style/whitespace issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As reported by Jeff, dereferencing the openat2 syscall argument in
audit_match_perm() to obtain the open_how::flags can result in an
oops/page-fault. This patch fixes this by using the open_how struct
that we store in the audit_context with audit_openat2_how().
Independent of this patch, Richard Guy Briggs posted a similar patch
to the audit mailing list roughly 40 minutes after this patch was
posted.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1c30e3af8a ("audit: add support for the openat2 syscall")
Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Add some additional audit logging to capture the openat2() syscall
open_how struct info.
Previous variations of the open()/openat() syscalls allowed audit
admins to inspect the syscall args to get the information contained in
the new open_how struct used in openat2()"
* tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: return early if the filter rule has a lower priority
audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info
audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macros
lsm_audit: avoid overloading the "key" audit field
audit: Convert to SPDX identifier
audit: rename struct node to struct audit_node to prevent future name collisions
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring.
As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we
were basically missing two things which we're adding here:
+ establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of
io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with
some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls)
+ additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of
the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides.
The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction
with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches
earlier in the year.
- Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials
are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code
comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand
the background and why this is the proper fix.
- Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing
improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make
use of securityfs, e.g. IMA.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
binder: use euid from cred instead of using task
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings
selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs
selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers
selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs
Smack: Brutalist io_uring support
selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure()
audit: add filtering for io_uring records
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
It is not necessary for audit_filter_rules() functions to check
audit fileds of the rule with a lower priority, and if we did,
there might be some unintended effects, such as the ctx->ppid
may be changed unexpectedly, so return early if the rule has
a lower priority.
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
[PM: slight tweak to the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules.
audit_filter_rules() error: we previously assumed 'ctx' could be null
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf361231c2 ("audit: add saddr_fam filter field")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate
its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's
four existing arguments.
Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its
third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve.
The new record in the context of an event would look like:
time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle=
73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D
7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2"
inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437
success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18
items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2"
exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2"
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace audit syscall class magic numbers with macros.
This required putting the macros into new header file
include/linux/audit_arch.h since the syscall macros were
included for both 64 bit and 32 bit in any compat code, causing
redefinition warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2300b1083a32aade7ae7efb95826e8f3f260b1df.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[PM: renamed header to audit_arch.h after consulting with Richard]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds basic audit io_uring filtering, using as much of the
existing audit filtering infrastructure as possible. In order to do
this we reuse the audit filter rule's syscall mask for the io_uring
operation and we create a new filter for io_uring operations as
AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT/audit_filter_list[7].
Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for his review, feedback, and work on
the corresponding audit userspace changes.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of
their context. This is accomplished by allocating audit_context
structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads
as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in
io_issue_sqe(). Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing
through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for
the operation; although great care must be taken so that security
relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact
the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions.
The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record,
an example is shown below:
type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1631800225.981:37289):
uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=15454 pid=15681
uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
key=(null)
Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch cleans up some of our audit_context handling by
abstracting out the reset and return code fixup handling to dedicated
functions. Not only does this help make things easier to read and
inspect, it allows for easier reuse by future patches. We also
convert the simple audit_context->in_syscall flag into an enum which
can be used to by future patches to indicate a calling context other
than the syscall context.
Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use SPDX-License-Identifier instead of a verbose license text.
Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <caihuoqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Run the following command to find and remove the trailing spaces and tabs:
sed -r -i 's/[ \t]+$//' <audit_files>
The files to be checked are as follows:
kernel/audit*
include/linux/audit.h
include/uapi/linux/audit.h
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
AUDIT_DISABLED defined in kernel/audit.h as element of enum audit_state
and redefined in kernel/audit.c. This produces a warning when kernel builds
with syscalls audit disabled and brokes kernel build if -Werror used.
enum audit_state used in syscall audit code only. This patch changes
enum audit_state constants prefix AUDIT to AUDIT_STATE to avoid
AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@yandex.ru>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix the following checkpatch warning in auditsc.c:
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
Signed-off-by: Roni Nevalainen <kitten@kittenz.dev>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another small pull request for audit, most of the patches are
documentation updates with only two real code changes: one to fix a
compiler warning for a dummy function/macro, and one to cleanup some
code since we removed the AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY ages ago (v4.17)"
* tag 'audit-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: drop /proc/PID/loginuid documentation Format field
audit: avoid -Wempty-body warning
audit: document /proc/PID/sessionid
audit: document /proc/PID/loginuid
MAINTAINERS: update audit files
audit: further cleanup of AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY deprecation
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Remove the list parameter from the function call since the exit filter
list is the only remaining list used by this function.
This cleans up commit 5260ecc2e0
("audit: deprecate the AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY filter")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
No invoker uses the return value of audit_filter_syscall().
So make it return void, and amend the comment of
audit_filter_syscall().
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: removed the changelog from the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A small set of audit patches for v5.11 with four patches in total and
only one of any real significance.
Richard's patch to trigger accompanying records causes the kernel to
emit additional related records when an audit event occurs; helping
provide some much needed context to events in the audit log. It is
also worth mentioning that this is a revised patch based on an earlier
attempt that had to be reverted in the v5.8 time frame.
Everything passes our test suite, and with no problems reported please
merge this for v5.11"
* tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: replace atomic_add_return()
audit: fix macros warnings
audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present
audit: fix a kernel-doc markup
Some unused macros could cause gcc warning:
kernel/audit.c:68:0: warning: macro "AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED" is not used
[-Wunused-macros]
kernel/auditsc.c:104:0: warning: macro "AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM" is not used
[-Wunused-macros]
kernel/auditsc.c:82:0: warning: macro "AUDITSC_INVALID" is not used
[-Wunused-macros]
AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED and AUDITSC_INVALID are still meaningful and should
be in incorporated.
Just remove AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM.
Thanks comments from Richard Guy Briggs and Paul Moore.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On architectures using the generic syscall entry code the architecture
independent syscall work is moved to flags in thread_info::syscall_work.
This removes architecture dependencies and frees up TIF bits.
Define SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_AUDIT, use it in the generic entry code and
convert the code which uses the TIF specific helper functions to use the
new *_syscall_work() helpers which either resolve to the new mode for users
of the generic entry code or to the TIF based functions for the other
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116174206.2639648-9-krisman@collabora.com
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).
This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed. Clear the dummy
bit if any record is generated, open coding this in audit_log_start().
The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.
The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it
isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was
allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid.
Check ctx->pwd in audit_log_name().
The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through
getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so
set the cwd in audit_alloc_name() if it has not already been done so due to
audit_names being valid and purge all other audit_getcwd() calls.
Revert the LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* cases from the
ghak96 patch since they are no longer necessary due to cwd coverage in
audit_alloc_name().
Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in
which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch.
Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
This is also related to upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Aside from some smaller bug fixes, here are the highlights:
- add a new backlog wait metric to the audit status message, this is
intended to help admins determine how long processes have been
waiting for the audit backlog queue to clear
- generate audit records for nftables configuration changes
- generate CWD audit records for for the relevant LSM audit records"
* tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply
audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
audit: use the proper gfp flags in the audit_log_nfcfg() calls
audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs
audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg
audit: log nftables configuration change events
audit: Use struct_size() helper in alloc_chunk
Unfortunately the commit listed in the subject line above failed
to ensure that the task's audit_context was properly initialized/set
before enabling the "accompanying records". Depending on the
situation, the resulting audit_context could have invalid values in
some of it's fields which could cause a kernel panic/oops when the
task/syscall exists and the audit records are generated.
We will revisit the original patch, with the necessary fixes, in a
future kernel but right now we just want to fix the kernel panic
with the least amount of added risk.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1320a4052e ("audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present")
Reported-by: j2468h@googlemail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records for PATH, FILE, IOCTL_OP, DENTRY and INODE
are incomplete without the task context of the AUDIT Current Working
Directory record. Add it.
This record addition can't use audit_dummy_context to determine whether
or not to store the record information since the LSM_AUDIT_DATA_*
records are initiated by various LSMs independent of any audit rules.
context->in_syscall is used to determine if it was called in user
context like audit_getname.
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Adapted from Vladis Dronov's v2 patch.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fixed an inconsistent use of GFP flags in nft_obj_notify() that used
GFP_KERNEL when a GFP flag was passed in to that function. Given this
allocated memory was then used in audit_log_nfcfg() it led to an audit
of all other GFP allocations in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c and a
modification of audit_log_nfcfg() to accept a GFP parameter.
Reported-by: Dan Carptenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
iptables, ip6tables, arptables and ebtables table registration,
replacement and unregistration configuration events are logged for the
native (legacy) iptables setsockopt api, but not for the
nftables netlink api which is used by the nft-variant of iptables in
addition to nftables itself.
Add calls to log the configuration actions in the nftables netlink api.
This uses the same NETFILTER_CFG record format but overloads the table
field.
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=?:0;?:0 family=unspecified entries=2 op=nft_register_gen pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
...
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=firewalld:1;?:0 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_table pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
...
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=8 op=nft_register_chain pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
...
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=101 op=nft_register_rule pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
...
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=87 op=nft_register_setelem pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
...
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_set pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
For further information please see issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/124
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to
garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace
actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to
cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record:
The uid, auid, tty, ses and exe fields have not been included since they
are in the SYSCALL record and contain nothing useful in the non-user
context.
Here are two sample orphaned records:
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-20 12:14:36.505:5) : table=filter family=ipv4 entries=0 op=register pid=1 subj=kernel comm=swapper/0
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-20 12:15:27.701:301) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=30 subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:1
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix sparse warnings:
kernel/auditsc.c:138:32: warning: symbol 'audit_nfcfgs' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Audit the action of unregistering ebtables and x_tables.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/44
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
NETFILTER_CFG record generation was inconsistent for x_tables and
ebtables configuration changes. The call was needlessly messy and there
were supporting records missing at times while they were produced when
not requested. Simplify the logging call into a new audit_log_nfcfg
call. Honour the audit_enabled setting while more consistently
recording information including supporting records by tidying up dummy
checks.
Add an op= field that indicates the operation being performed (register
or replace).
Here is the enhanced sample record:
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(1580905834.919:82970): table=filter family=2 entries=83 op=replace
Generate audit NETFILTER_CFG records on ebtables table registration.
Previously this was being done for x_tables registration and replacement
operations and ebtables table replacement only.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/25
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/35
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/43
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).
This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed.
Clear the dummy bit if any record is generated.
The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.
Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The field operator is ignored on several string fields. WATCH, DIR,
PERM and FILETYPE field operators are completely ignored and meaningless
since the op is not referenced in audit_filter_rules(). Range and
bitwise operators are already addressed in ghak73.
Honour the operator for WATCH, DIR, PERM, FILETYPE fields as is done in
the EXE field.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/114
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a method to filter out sockaddr and bind calls by network
address family.
Existing SOCKADDR records are listed for any network activity.
Implement the AUDIT_SADDR_FAM field selector to be able to classify or
limit records to specific network address families, such as AF_INET or
AF_INET6.
An example of a network record that is unlikely to be useful and flood
the logs:
type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : saddr={ fam=local
path=/var/run/nscd/socket }
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : arch=x86_64
syscall=connect success=no exit=ENOENT(No such file or directory) a0=0x3
a1=0x7fff229c4980 a2=0x6e a3=0x6 items=1 ppid=3301 pid=6145 auid=sgrubb
uid=sgrubb gid=sgrubb euid=sgrubb suid=sgrubb fsuid=sgrubb egid=sgrubb
sgid=sgrubb fsgid=sgrubb tty=pts3 ses=4 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
key=network-test
Please see the audit-testsuite PR at
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/87
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/64
Please see the github issue for the accompanying userspace support
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/93
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in auditfilter.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a process signals the audit daemon (shutdown, rotate, resume,
reconfig) but syscall auditing is not enabled, we still want to know the
identity of the process sending the signal to the audit daemon.
Move audit_signal_info() out of syscall auditing to general auditing but
create a new function audit_signal_info_syscall() to take care of the
syscall dependent parts for when syscall auditing is enabled.
Please see the github kernel audit issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/111
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
